银行信贷投放与信用风险积聚的非权衡理论——基于均值漂移投资技术模型
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摘要
2019年的中国政府工作报告指出,银行业应当持续提高对中小微企业的信贷投放。然而部分学者担忧:信贷规模的快速增长将在一定程度上导致信用风险的积聚。这看似是一个"此消彼长"的均衡问题,实则并不存在这样的权衡。利用均值漂移投资技术模型,创新论证以下三个命题:第一,区别于经济学常识,银行贷款利率的增加并不会导致企业的最优投资额下降,而是不断提升;第二,在信贷市场引入竞争会使贷款利率下调;第三,较低的贷款利率尽管会刺激普通项目信贷投放的增长,但将明显降低违约的可能性。综上得出推论:银行业大力服务实体经济、扩大对中小微企业信贷投放等行为,都不会是导致行业信用风险积聚的最终原因,根本原因是缺乏高效的投资技术和充分的信贷市场竞争,即银行信贷投放与信用风险积聚之间不存在权衡。
The government's work report of 2019 points out that the banking industry should continue to increase credit to small and medium-sized micro-enterprises. However, some scholars worry that the rapid growth of credit scale will lead to the accumulation of credit risk to a certain extent. This seems to be a balancing problem of"this falls, that rises", but there is no such trade-off. Using the mean shift investment technology model, we innovatively demonstrate the following three propositions: first, different from the common sense of economics, the increase in bank loan interest rate will not lead to a decline in the optimal investment amount of enterprises, but will continue to increase;second, the introduction of competition in the credit market will lower the loan interest rate;third, lower lending rates, while stimulating the growth of general project credit, will significantly reduce the likelihood of default. It is concluded that the banking industry's vigorous service to the real economy and expansion of credit to SMEs are not the ultimate causes of credit risk accumulation in the industry. The fundamental reason is the lack of efficient investment technology and sufficient credit market competition, that is, there is no trade-off between bank credit investment and credit risk accumulation.
The government's work report of 2019 points out that the banking industry should continue to increase credit to small and medium-sized micro-enterprises. However, some scholars worry that the rapid growth of credit scale will lead to the accumulation of credit risk to a certain extent. This seems to be a balancing problem of"this falls, that rises", but there is no such trade-off. Using the mean shift investment technology model, we innovatively demonstrate the following three propositions: first, different from the common sense of economics, the increase in bank loan interest rate will not lead to a decline in the optimal investment amount of enterprises, but will continue to increase;second, the introduction of competition in the credit market will lower the loan interest rate;third, lower lending rates, while stimulating the growth of general project credit, will significantly reduce the likelihood of default. It is concluded that the banking industry's vigorous service to the real economy and expansion of credit to SMEs are not the ultimate causes of credit risk accumulation in the industry. The fundamental reason is the lack of efficient investment technology and sufficient credit market competition, that is, there is no trade-off between bank credit investment and credit risk accumulation.
引文
[1]赵旭.从信贷市场结构看金融脆弱性与银行竞争的关系[J].经济科学,2002,(3):14-21.
[2]陆岷峰.商业银行公司治理如何钳进金融科技[J].金融经济,2019,(1):32-33.
[3]徐博欢等.普惠金融:发展现状、风险特征与管理研究[J].当代经济管理,2019,(3):31-40.
[4]徐阳洋等.大数据背景下政府宏观调控方式优化研究[J].西南金融,2019,(1):37-43.
[5] European Central Bank(ECB),1999.Possible effects of EMU on the EU banking systems in the medium to long term.
[6]周军煜等.基于数字化小微金融发展的战略研究[J].北华大学学报,2019,(2):26-32.
[7]杨亮等.我国经济金融化的形成逻辑、风险问题与治理路径[J].华侨大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2019,(2):74-83.
[8]徐阳洋等.关于构建商业银行与民营企业共同发展的基础研究[J].济南大学学报,2019,(2):137-145.
[9] Gehrig,T.,1996.Market structure,monitoring and capital adequacy regulation.Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics 132,685-702.
[10] Erkki Koskela&Rune Stenacka.2000.Is there a tradeoff between bank competition and financial fragility? Journal of Banking&Finance 24,1853-1873.
[11]陆岷峰.互联网金融生态前瞻[J].金融博览,2019,(1):74-75.
[12]陆岷峰.身边的互金风险了解吗?[J].金融博览,2019,(1):44-47.
[13] Broecker,T.,1990.Credit-worthiness tests and interbank competition.Econometrica 58,429-452.
[14] Nakamura,L.,1993.Loan screening within and outside of customer relationships. Working Paper 93-15,Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
[15] Riordan,M.,1993.Competition and bank performance:A theoretical perspective. In:Mayer,C.,Vives,X.(Eds.),Capital Markets and Financial Intermediation. Cambridge University Press,Cambridge,pp.328-343.
[16] Petersen.M.A.,Rajan,R.G.,1995.The effect of credit market competition on lending relationship. Quarterly Journal of Economics 110,407-443.
[17]季子钊等.新阶段下地方金融监管模式与金融发展关系研究[J].海南金融,2019,(3):45-52.
[18]徐博欢等.逆全球化影响下人民币国际化不确定因素与成长之路研究[J].云南师范大学学报,2019,(1):76-84.
[19]汪祖刚,吴建平等.关于金融通道叠加成本现象、原因及治理研究[J].财经理论与实践,2019,(3):21-34.
[20] Caminal,R.,Matutes,C.,1997.Can competition in the credit market be excessive? Working Paper 373,Institut d’Analisi Economica,Universidad Autonoma de Barcelona.
[21]周军煜等.金融科技嵌入商业银行生态系统的战略思考[J].农村金融研究,2019,(2):44-49.
[22]汪祖刚等.数字小微金融的优越性与发展策略研究[J].天津商务职业学院学报,2019,(1).
(1)数据来源:《中国上市银行分析报告(2018年)》
(1)伯特兰德模型是由法国经济学家约瑟夫·伯特兰德(Joseph Bertrand)于1883年建立的。其假设为:各寡头厂商通过选择价格进行竞争;各寡头厂商生产的产品是同质的;寡头厂商之间也没有正式或非正式的串谋行为。其主要结论:寡头市场的均衡价格为:P=MC;寡头的长期经济利润为0。
[2]陆岷峰.商业银行公司治理如何钳进金融科技[J].金融经济,2019,(1):32-33.
[3]徐博欢等.普惠金融:发展现状、风险特征与管理研究[J].当代经济管理,2019,(3):31-40.
[4]徐阳洋等.大数据背景下政府宏观调控方式优化研究[J].西南金融,2019,(1):37-43.
[5] European Central Bank(ECB),1999.Possible effects of EMU on the EU banking systems in the medium to long term.
[6]周军煜等.基于数字化小微金融发展的战略研究[J].北华大学学报,2019,(2):26-32.
[7]杨亮等.我国经济金融化的形成逻辑、风险问题与治理路径[J].华侨大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2019,(2):74-83.
[8]徐阳洋等.关于构建商业银行与民营企业共同发展的基础研究[J].济南大学学报,2019,(2):137-145.
[9] Gehrig,T.,1996.Market structure,monitoring and capital adequacy regulation.Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics 132,685-702.
[10] Erkki Koskela&Rune Stenacka.2000.Is there a tradeoff between bank competition and financial fragility? Journal of Banking&Finance 24,1853-1873.
[11]陆岷峰.互联网金融生态前瞻[J].金融博览,2019,(1):74-75.
[12]陆岷峰.身边的互金风险了解吗?[J].金融博览,2019,(1):44-47.
[13] Broecker,T.,1990.Credit-worthiness tests and interbank competition.Econometrica 58,429-452.
[14] Nakamura,L.,1993.Loan screening within and outside of customer relationships. Working Paper 93-15,Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
[15] Riordan,M.,1993.Competition and bank performance:A theoretical perspective. In:Mayer,C.,Vives,X.(Eds.),Capital Markets and Financial Intermediation. Cambridge University Press,Cambridge,pp.328-343.
[16] Petersen.M.A.,Rajan,R.G.,1995.The effect of credit market competition on lending relationship. Quarterly Journal of Economics 110,407-443.
[17]季子钊等.新阶段下地方金融监管模式与金融发展关系研究[J].海南金融,2019,(3):45-52.
[18]徐博欢等.逆全球化影响下人民币国际化不确定因素与成长之路研究[J].云南师范大学学报,2019,(1):76-84.
[19]汪祖刚,吴建平等.关于金融通道叠加成本现象、原因及治理研究[J].财经理论与实践,2019,(3):21-34.
[20] Caminal,R.,Matutes,C.,1997.Can competition in the credit market be excessive? Working Paper 373,Institut d’Analisi Economica,Universidad Autonoma de Barcelona.
[21]周军煜等.金融科技嵌入商业银行生态系统的战略思考[J].农村金融研究,2019,(2):44-49.
[22]汪祖刚等.数字小微金融的优越性与发展策略研究[J].天津商务职业学院学报,2019,(1).
(1)数据来源:《中国上市银行分析报告(2018年)》
(1)伯特兰德模型是由法国经济学家约瑟夫·伯特兰德(Joseph Bertrand)于1883年建立的。其假设为:各寡头厂商通过选择价格进行竞争;各寡头厂商生产的产品是同质的;寡头厂商之间也没有正式或非正式的串谋行为。其主要结论:寡头市场的均衡价格为:P=MC;寡头的长期经济利润为0。