专利授权合同设计与生产外包——基于企业社会责任的视角
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摘要
良好的专利授权和确权质量是知识产权保护的基石,而专利授权协议又是知识产权转化为现实生产力的关键。本文针对由专利持有企业、品牌企业及OEM厂商组成的系统,考虑不同企业之间存在需求信息不对称及企业社会责任承担,构建了专利授权和生产外包等两阶段博弈模型,分析了最优专利授权合同设计和需求信息披露策略及企业社会责任的价值。研究结果表明,针对不同市场条件,专利持有企业会策略性地设计固定专利授权费的专利授权合同或者"单位产品销售提成+固定专利授权费"的专利授权合同;品牌企业承担的社会责任会促使其实施低价策略,有利于提升产品需求和消费者剩余;在一定条件下,品牌企业愿意披露其私有的市场需求信息,与专利持有企业共享整个系统利润。本研究结论可为专利提供商专利授权合同设计、品牌企业生产外包决策提供一定指导与借鉴。
Good quality of patent licensing and authorization agreements is the foundation for the protection of intellectual property rights, and patent authorization agreement is the key to transform intellectual property into realistic productivity. Considering a system consisting of a patent owner, a branded manufacturer and an original equipment manufacturer(OEM), we investigate a license contract and a production outsourcing strategy in a completely monopolized market in the presence of asymmetric information and corporate social responsibility. The patent owner wants to design a license contract to charge a branded manufacturer for the right to use the patented technology, but the branded manufacturer has private demand information, and the branded manufacturer purchases its goods from the OEM. We establish a two-stage game model considering demand information asymmetry existing among different enterprises, and corporate social responsibilities. In the first stage, the patent owner licenses its technology to the branded manufacturer. After that, the branded manufacturer outsources its production to the OEM in the second stage. A patent license agreement which meets participation constraints and incentive compatibility constraints is proposed in this paper to screen the market demand information from the view point of the patent owner. On this basis, we analyze the optimal design of the patent license agreement, the optimal demand information disclosure strategy, and the effects of the corporate social responsibility on equilibrium outcomes. The results show that, when market demand is relatively small, the optimal licensing contract is a fixed-fee licensing contract; otherwise, the optimal licensing contract is a two-part tariff licensing contract. Moreover, when focusing on the corporate social responsibility, the branded manufacturer reduces the price of products to meet consumer demand. In conclusion, the existence of corporate social responsibility leads to the change of the supply chain's enterprises' profit and the whole supply chain's profit, while the corporate social responsibility may not decrease the product demand and consumer surplus. Moreover, when the patent owner's bargaining power satisfies certain conditions, the branded manufacturer will reveal the private information voluntarily and share the supply chain's profit with patent owner. These results will provide valuable suggestions for patent owners and branded firms in terms of patent licensing contract design and production outsourcing strategies, respectively.
Good quality of patent licensing and authorization agreements is the foundation for the protection of intellectual property rights, and patent authorization agreement is the key to transform intellectual property into realistic productivity. Considering a system consisting of a patent owner, a branded manufacturer and an original equipment manufacturer(OEM), we investigate a license contract and a production outsourcing strategy in a completely monopolized market in the presence of asymmetric information and corporate social responsibility. The patent owner wants to design a license contract to charge a branded manufacturer for the right to use the patented technology, but the branded manufacturer has private demand information, and the branded manufacturer purchases its goods from the OEM. We establish a two-stage game model considering demand information asymmetry existing among different enterprises, and corporate social responsibilities. In the first stage, the patent owner licenses its technology to the branded manufacturer. After that, the branded manufacturer outsources its production to the OEM in the second stage. A patent license agreement which meets participation constraints and incentive compatibility constraints is proposed in this paper to screen the market demand information from the view point of the patent owner. On this basis, we analyze the optimal design of the patent license agreement, the optimal demand information disclosure strategy, and the effects of the corporate social responsibility on equilibrium outcomes. The results show that, when market demand is relatively small, the optimal licensing contract is a fixed-fee licensing contract; otherwise, the optimal licensing contract is a two-part tariff licensing contract. Moreover, when focusing on the corporate social responsibility, the branded manufacturer reduces the price of products to meet consumer demand. In conclusion, the existence of corporate social responsibility leads to the change of the supply chain's enterprises' profit and the whole supply chain's profit, while the corporate social responsibility may not decrease the product demand and consumer surplus. Moreover, when the patent owner's bargaining power satisfies certain conditions, the branded manufacturer will reveal the private information voluntarily and share the supply chain's profit with patent owner. These results will provide valuable suggestions for patent owners and branded firms in terms of patent licensing contract design and production outsourcing strategies, respectively.
引文
[1]易继明.势所必然:保护知识产权就是保护创新. http://theory.people.com.cn/n1/2018/0708/c40531-30133055.ht m l, 2018-7-8/2018-7-28.
[2]习近平.要加大知识产权保护执法力度,完善知识产权服务体系. http://www.ipraction.gov.cn/article/xxgk/ywdt/201805/20180500187486.shtml, 2018-5-30/2018-7-28.
[3] Chu, A. C., Cozzi, G., Galli, S.. Stage-dependent Intellectual Property Rights. Journal of Development Economics, 2014,106(1):239-249.
[4]国家知识产权局.公布2017年主要工作统计数据. http://www.sipo.gov.cn/zscqgz/1110168.htm, 2018-1-19/2018-7-28.
[5] Lee, H. L., Tang, C. S.. Socially and Environmentally Responsible Value Chain Innovations:New Operations Management Research Opportunities. Management Science, 2018, 64(3):983-1476.
[6] Hsueh, C. F.. Improving Corporate Social Responsibility in a Supply Chain through a New Revenue Sharing Contract. International Journal of Production Economics, 2014, 151(5):214-222.
[7] Tang, C. S.. Socially Responsible Supply Chains in Emerging Markets:Some Research Opportunities. Journal of Operations Management, 2018, 57(1):1-10.
[8]刘小鲁.知识产权保护、自主研发比重与后发国家的技术进步.管理世界, 2011,(10):10-19.
[9]李黎明,陈明媛.专利密集型产业、专利制度与经济增长.中国软科学, 2017,(4):152-168.
[10] Skowronski, K., Benton, J. W. C.. The Influence of Intellectual Property Rights on Poaching in Manufacturing Outsourcing.Production and Operations Management, 2018, 27(3):531-552.
[11] Qian, Y.. Do National Patent Laws Stimulate Domestic Innovation in a Global Patenting Environment. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 2007, 89(3):436-453.
[12]袁博,刘文兴,张鹏程.知识产权保护能力对重大科研项目技术创新影响的权变模型.系统工程理论与实践, 2014, 34(11):2965-2973.
[13]李平,宫旭红,齐丹丹.中国最优知识产权保护区间研究——基于自主研发及国际技术引进的视角.南开经济研究, 2013,(3):123-138.
[14] Naghavi, A., Strozzi, C.. Intellectual Property Rights, Diasporas,and Domestic Innovation. Journal of International Economics,2015, 96(1):150-161.
[15]王君美.非生产性企业技术授权的对象选择问题.科研管理,2012, 33(10):37-47.
[16] Yan, Q., Yang, L.. Optimal Licensing in a Differentiated Bertrand Market under Uncertain R&D Outcomes and Technology Spillover. Economic Modelling, 2018, 68(1):117-126.
[17]綦勇,侯泽敏.进口国关税、异质性与外国企业技术授权.科研管理, 2016, 37(5):132-140.
[18] Chen, J. Y., Dimitrov, S.. Eco-innovation with Opportunity of Licensing and Threat of Imitation. Journal of Cleaner Production, 2017, 147(3):306-318.
[19]叶光亮,何亚丽.环境污染治理中的最优专利授权:固定费用还是特许权收费?经济学(季刊), 2018, 17(2):633-650.
[20] Yang, F., Jiao, C., Ang, S.. The Optimal Technology Licensing Strategy under Supply Disruption. https://doi.org/10.1080/00207543.2018.1521535, 2018-9-20/2018-11-4.
[21] Zhang, Q., Zhang, J., Zaccour, G.. Strategic Technology Licensing in a Supply Chain. European Journal of Operational Research, 2018, 267(1):162-175.
[22] Wu, C. H.. Price Competition and Technology Licensing in a Dynamic Duopoly. European Journal of Operational Research,2018, 267(2):570-584.
[23]杨力.企业社会责任的制度化.法学研究, 2014, 36(5):131-158.
[24] Panda, S.. Coordination of a Socially Responsible Supply Chain Using Revenue Sharing Contract. Transportation Research Part E:Logistics and Transportation Review, 2014, 67(7):92-104.
[25]李祥进,杨东宁,徐敏亚等.中国劳动密集型制造业的生产力困境——企业社会责任的视角.南开管理评论, 2012, 15(3):122-130.
[26] Sodhi, M. M. S.. Conceptualizing Social Responsibility in Operations via Stakeholder Resource-based View. Production and Operations Management, 2015, 24(9):1375-1389.
[27]朱华伟,涂荣庭,靳菲.好事是否要做到底:企业停止承担社会责任后公众的态度变化.南开管理评论, 2014, 17(6):4-12.
[28] Arya, A., Mittendorf, B.. Supply Chain Consequences of Subsidies for Corporate Social Responsibility. Production and Operations Management, 2015, 24(8):1346-1357.
[29]权小锋,吴世农,尹洪英.企业社会责任与股价崩盘风险:“价值利器”或“自利工具”?经济研究, 2015, 50(11):49-64.
[30] Panda, S., Modak, N. M.. Exploring the Effects of Social Responsibility on Coordination and Profit Division in a Supply Chain. Journal of Cleaner Production, 2016, 139(12):25-40.
[31] Panda, S., Modak, N. M., Cárdenas-Barrón, L. E.. Coordinating a Socially Responsible Closed-loop Supply Chain with Product Recycling.International Journal of Production Economics, 2017, 188(6):11-21.
[32] Iyer, G., Soberman, D. A.. Social Responsibility and Product Innovation. Marketing Science, 2016, 35(5):727-742.
[33] Ma, P., Shang, J., Wang, H.. Enhancing Corporate Social Responsibility:Contract Design under Information Asymmetry.Omega, 2017, 67(3):19-30.
[34] Sodhi, M. M. S., Tang, C. S.. Corporate Social Sustainability in Supply Chains:A Thematic Analysis of the Literature. International Journal of Production Research, 2018, 56(2):882-901.
[35] Jabbour, A. B. L., Chiappetta, J. C. J., Sarkis, J., et al. Decarbonisation of Operations Management-looking Back, Moving Forward:A Review and Implications for the Production Research Community. International Journal of Production Research. https://doi.org/10.1080/00207543.2017.1421790.
[36] Chu, L. Y., Shamir, N., Shin, H.. Strategic Communication for Capacity Alignment with Pricing in a Supply Chain. Management Science, 2016, 63(12):4366-4388.
[37] Li, Z., Gilbert, S. M., Lai, G.. Supplier Encroachment as an Enhancement or a Hindrance to Nonlinear Pricing. Production and Operations Management, 2015, 24(1):89-109.
[38]刘凤军,孔伟,李辉.企业社会责任对消费者抵制内化机制研究——基于AEB理论与折扣原理的实证.南开管理评论,2015, 18(1):52-63.
[39] International Data Corporation(IDC). Smartphone Vendor.https://www.idc.com/promo/smartphone-market-share/vendor,2018-5-28/2018-7-28.
[40]孙燕飚.高通技术许可业务工程技术副总裁Sudeepto Roy:每年收入20%投入研发. http://www.sohu.com/a/167486358_142979,2017-8-26/2018-11-4.
(1)http://finance.sina.com.cn/hy/20061204/18073133429.shtml。
(2)http://intl.ce.cn/sjjj/qy/201310/31/t20131031_1689571.shtml。
[2]习近平.要加大知识产权保护执法力度,完善知识产权服务体系. http://www.ipraction.gov.cn/article/xxgk/ywdt/201805/20180500187486.shtml, 2018-5-30/2018-7-28.
[3] Chu, A. C., Cozzi, G., Galli, S.. Stage-dependent Intellectual Property Rights. Journal of Development Economics, 2014,106(1):239-249.
[4]国家知识产权局.公布2017年主要工作统计数据. http://www.sipo.gov.cn/zscqgz/1110168.htm, 2018-1-19/2018-7-28.
[5] Lee, H. L., Tang, C. S.. Socially and Environmentally Responsible Value Chain Innovations:New Operations Management Research Opportunities. Management Science, 2018, 64(3):983-1476.
[6] Hsueh, C. F.. Improving Corporate Social Responsibility in a Supply Chain through a New Revenue Sharing Contract. International Journal of Production Economics, 2014, 151(5):214-222.
[7] Tang, C. S.. Socially Responsible Supply Chains in Emerging Markets:Some Research Opportunities. Journal of Operations Management, 2018, 57(1):1-10.
[8]刘小鲁.知识产权保护、自主研发比重与后发国家的技术进步.管理世界, 2011,(10):10-19.
[9]李黎明,陈明媛.专利密集型产业、专利制度与经济增长.中国软科学, 2017,(4):152-168.
[10] Skowronski, K., Benton, J. W. C.. The Influence of Intellectual Property Rights on Poaching in Manufacturing Outsourcing.Production and Operations Management, 2018, 27(3):531-552.
[11] Qian, Y.. Do National Patent Laws Stimulate Domestic Innovation in a Global Patenting Environment. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 2007, 89(3):436-453.
[12]袁博,刘文兴,张鹏程.知识产权保护能力对重大科研项目技术创新影响的权变模型.系统工程理论与实践, 2014, 34(11):2965-2973.
[13]李平,宫旭红,齐丹丹.中国最优知识产权保护区间研究——基于自主研发及国际技术引进的视角.南开经济研究, 2013,(3):123-138.
[14] Naghavi, A., Strozzi, C.. Intellectual Property Rights, Diasporas,and Domestic Innovation. Journal of International Economics,2015, 96(1):150-161.
[15]王君美.非生产性企业技术授权的对象选择问题.科研管理,2012, 33(10):37-47.
[16] Yan, Q., Yang, L.. Optimal Licensing in a Differentiated Bertrand Market under Uncertain R&D Outcomes and Technology Spillover. Economic Modelling, 2018, 68(1):117-126.
[17]綦勇,侯泽敏.进口国关税、异质性与外国企业技术授权.科研管理, 2016, 37(5):132-140.
[18] Chen, J. Y., Dimitrov, S.. Eco-innovation with Opportunity of Licensing and Threat of Imitation. Journal of Cleaner Production, 2017, 147(3):306-318.
[19]叶光亮,何亚丽.环境污染治理中的最优专利授权:固定费用还是特许权收费?经济学(季刊), 2018, 17(2):633-650.
[20] Yang, F., Jiao, C., Ang, S.. The Optimal Technology Licensing Strategy under Supply Disruption. https://doi.org/10.1080/00207543.2018.1521535, 2018-9-20/2018-11-4.
[21] Zhang, Q., Zhang, J., Zaccour, G.. Strategic Technology Licensing in a Supply Chain. European Journal of Operational Research, 2018, 267(1):162-175.
[22] Wu, C. H.. Price Competition and Technology Licensing in a Dynamic Duopoly. European Journal of Operational Research,2018, 267(2):570-584.
[23]杨力.企业社会责任的制度化.法学研究, 2014, 36(5):131-158.
[24] Panda, S.. Coordination of a Socially Responsible Supply Chain Using Revenue Sharing Contract. Transportation Research Part E:Logistics and Transportation Review, 2014, 67(7):92-104.
[25]李祥进,杨东宁,徐敏亚等.中国劳动密集型制造业的生产力困境——企业社会责任的视角.南开管理评论, 2012, 15(3):122-130.
[26] Sodhi, M. M. S.. Conceptualizing Social Responsibility in Operations via Stakeholder Resource-based View. Production and Operations Management, 2015, 24(9):1375-1389.
[27]朱华伟,涂荣庭,靳菲.好事是否要做到底:企业停止承担社会责任后公众的态度变化.南开管理评论, 2014, 17(6):4-12.
[28] Arya, A., Mittendorf, B.. Supply Chain Consequences of Subsidies for Corporate Social Responsibility. Production and Operations Management, 2015, 24(8):1346-1357.
[29]权小锋,吴世农,尹洪英.企业社会责任与股价崩盘风险:“价值利器”或“自利工具”?经济研究, 2015, 50(11):49-64.
[30] Panda, S., Modak, N. M.. Exploring the Effects of Social Responsibility on Coordination and Profit Division in a Supply Chain. Journal of Cleaner Production, 2016, 139(12):25-40.
[31] Panda, S., Modak, N. M., Cárdenas-Barrón, L. E.. Coordinating a Socially Responsible Closed-loop Supply Chain with Product Recycling.International Journal of Production Economics, 2017, 188(6):11-21.
[32] Iyer, G., Soberman, D. A.. Social Responsibility and Product Innovation. Marketing Science, 2016, 35(5):727-742.
[33] Ma, P., Shang, J., Wang, H.. Enhancing Corporate Social Responsibility:Contract Design under Information Asymmetry.Omega, 2017, 67(3):19-30.
[34] Sodhi, M. M. S., Tang, C. S.. Corporate Social Sustainability in Supply Chains:A Thematic Analysis of the Literature. International Journal of Production Research, 2018, 56(2):882-901.
[35] Jabbour, A. B. L., Chiappetta, J. C. J., Sarkis, J., et al. Decarbonisation of Operations Management-looking Back, Moving Forward:A Review and Implications for the Production Research Community. International Journal of Production Research. https://doi.org/10.1080/00207543.2017.1421790.
[36] Chu, L. Y., Shamir, N., Shin, H.. Strategic Communication for Capacity Alignment with Pricing in a Supply Chain. Management Science, 2016, 63(12):4366-4388.
[37] Li, Z., Gilbert, S. M., Lai, G.. Supplier Encroachment as an Enhancement or a Hindrance to Nonlinear Pricing. Production and Operations Management, 2015, 24(1):89-109.
[38]刘凤军,孔伟,李辉.企业社会责任对消费者抵制内化机制研究——基于AEB理论与折扣原理的实证.南开管理评论,2015, 18(1):52-63.
[39] International Data Corporation(IDC). Smartphone Vendor.https://www.idc.com/promo/smartphone-market-share/vendor,2018-5-28/2018-7-28.
[40]孙燕飚.高通技术许可业务工程技术副总裁Sudeepto Roy:每年收入20%投入研发. http://www.sohu.com/a/167486358_142979,2017-8-26/2018-11-4.
(1)http://finance.sina.com.cn/hy/20061204/18073133429.shtml。
(2)http://intl.ce.cn/sjjj/qy/201310/31/t20131031_1689571.shtml。