基于典型序贯博弈模型的供应链金融物流信用风险形成机理研究
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摘要
运用博弈论方法与工具构建供应链金融物流信用风险的典型序贯博弈模型,并采用逆推法求解得到序贯均衡解(串谋,不努力,不监管)。结果表明:在完全理性经济人假设条件下,供应链金融物流中的融资企业会选择串谋策略、物流企业会选择不努力策略、金融机构会选择不监管策略,从理论上解释了供应链金融物流信用风险的形成机制。最后,从金融机构、物流企业和融资企业三个层面提出有针对性且切合实际的对策建议,旨在降低供应链金融物流信用风险,促进多方共赢。
This paper uses the methods and tools of the game theory to construct a typical sequential game model of the credit risk of supply chain financial logistics, and uses the inverse induction method to solve it to obtain the sequential equilibrium solution(collusion, no effort and no supervision). The results show that under the assumption of the totally rational economic man, the financing enterprises in supply chain financial logistics will choose the collusion strategy, the logistics enterprises the no effort strategy, and the financial institutions the no supervision strategy, which theoretically explains the formation mechanism of the credit risk in supply chain financial logistics. Finally, from the three levels of financial institutions, logistics enterprises and financing enterprises, the paper puts forward targeted and practical countermeasures and suggestions to reduce the credit risk in supply chain financial logistics and promote multi-win among the three.
This paper uses the methods and tools of the game theory to construct a typical sequential game model of the credit risk of supply chain financial logistics, and uses the inverse induction method to solve it to obtain the sequential equilibrium solution(collusion, no effort and no supervision). The results show that under the assumption of the totally rational economic man, the financing enterprises in supply chain financial logistics will choose the collusion strategy, the logistics enterprises the no effort strategy, and the financial institutions the no supervision strategy, which theoretically explains the formation mechanism of the credit risk in supply chain financial logistics. Finally, from the three levels of financial institutions, logistics enterprises and financing enterprises, the paper puts forward targeted and practical countermeasures and suggestions to reduce the credit risk in supply chain financial logistics and promote multi-win among the three.
引文
[1]经济日报.供应链迎来创新与应用发展新时代[EB/OL].http://paper.ce.cn/jjrb/html/2017-10/21/content_346956.htm,2017-10-21.
[2]黄明田.新常态下湖州市供应链金融物流运作机理研究[J].湖州职业技术学院学报,2017,15(1):60-64.
[3]储雪俭,李聘飞.供应链金融信用风险扩散防控机制研究[J].金融发展研究,2017,(2):63-67.
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[6]Caldentey R,Haugh M B.Supply Contracts with Financial Hedging[J].Operations Research,2009,57(1):47-65.
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[8]Song Alex Yang, Birge J R. How Inventory Is(Should Be)Financed:Trade Credit in Supply Chains with Demand Uncertainty and Costs of Financial Distress[J].SSRN Electronic Journal,2011.
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[11]曹文彬,马翠香.基于供应链金融的应收账款融资博弈分析[J].商业研究,2013,55(3):168-173.
[12]杨欢欢,宋晓黎.基于博弈论视角的供应链金融信用风险研究[J].物流科技,2016,39(11):125-128.
[13]冯海侠,胡桂华,刘西坤.基于博弈论的物流供应链金融信用风险控制对策[J].经济管理:全文版,2016,(5):274-275.
[14]王宇,高杨,邹杰玲,等.基于供应链金融的预付款融资模式信用风险评价[J].西北工业大学学报(社会科学版),2016,36(2):52-57.
[15]郑余婷.基于核心企业选择的供应链金融风险评估及其博弈仿真[D].杭州:浙江财经大学, 2017.
[16]陈金龙,占永志,邹小红.核心企业主导型供应链金融的序贯互惠博弈模型[J].工业工程,2017,20(3):106-112.
[2]黄明田.新常态下湖州市供应链金融物流运作机理研究[J].湖州职业技术学院学报,2017,15(1):60-64.
[3]储雪俭,李聘飞.供应链金融信用风险扩散防控机制研究[J].金融发展研究,2017,(2):63-67.
[4]Buzacott J A,Zhang R Q.Inventory Management with AssetBased Financing[J].Management Science,2004,50(9):1 274-1 292.
[5]He X,Prasad A,Sethi S P,et al.A survey of stackelberg differential game models in supply and marketing channels[J].Journal of Systems Science and Systems Engineering,2007,16(4):385-413.
[6]Caldentey R,Haugh M B.Supply Contracts with Financial Hedging[J].Operations Research,2009,57(1):47-65.
[7]Caldentey R,Chen X.The Role of Financial Services in Procurement Contracts[A].The Handbook of Integrated Risk Management in Global Supply Chains[C].2011.
[8]Song Alex Yang, Birge J R. How Inventory Is(Should Be)Financed:Trade Credit in Supply Chains with Demand Uncertainty and Costs of Financial Distress[J].SSRN Electronic Journal,2011.
[9]李雯靓.基于多主体的供应链金融信用风险博弈仿真研究[D].广州:华南理工大学,2012.
[10]王妍.中小企业供应链金融信用风险博弈研究和案例分析[D].南京:南京工业大学,2012.
[11]曹文彬,马翠香.基于供应链金融的应收账款融资博弈分析[J].商业研究,2013,55(3):168-173.
[12]杨欢欢,宋晓黎.基于博弈论视角的供应链金融信用风险研究[J].物流科技,2016,39(11):125-128.
[13]冯海侠,胡桂华,刘西坤.基于博弈论的物流供应链金融信用风险控制对策[J].经济管理:全文版,2016,(5):274-275.
[14]王宇,高杨,邹杰玲,等.基于供应链金融的预付款融资模式信用风险评价[J].西北工业大学学报(社会科学版),2016,36(2):52-57.
[15]郑余婷.基于核心企业选择的供应链金融风险评估及其博弈仿真[D].杭州:浙江财经大学, 2017.
[16]陈金龙,占永志,邹小红.核心企业主导型供应链金融的序贯互惠博弈模型[J].工业工程,2017,20(3):106-112.