有价与自主回收下废弃食品回收处理决策分析
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摘要
针对废弃食品回收处理不足导致食品安全问题日益严重的现状,在回收处理商有价回收和零售商自主回收这两种情况下分别构建了废弃食品回收处理问题中零售商、回收处理商与政府部门之间的博弈模型.对均衡解的分析表明,无论回收处理商与政府部门是相互独立还是合作的,当回收处理商有价回收废弃食品时,若政府部门提供的单位补贴较高,对应的零售商回收废弃食品安全意识也较高,相应的回收服务水平却较低,废弃食品回收价格较高,而废弃食品回收量却较少;当零售商自主回收废弃食品时,零售商的回收废弃食品安全意识、回收处理商的回收服务水平与回收量均为零,对应的利润值都为零.
The food safety problem becomes more and more serious due to the insufficient waste food recycling process.And in order to solve this problem,the optimal models among the retailer,the merchant of the recycling process and the government in the waste food recycling process with the price recycling and the self-recycling were built to analyze the decision variables,which include the recycling price,the recycling service level,the recycling subsidy per unit and the recycling food safety awareness.The main results show that,whether the recycling process is independent or cooperative with the government department,when the merchant of the recycling process recycles the waste food with the price,the higher subsidy per unit that the government department provides,the higher of the recycling food safety awareness of the retailer,the lower of the corresponding recycling service level,the higher of the price of the waste food recycling,but the less of the quantity of the waste food recovery;when the retailer recycles the waste food by himself,the recycling food safety awareness of the retailer,the recycling service level and the recycling quantity of the merchant are zero,and the corresponding profit is zero.
The food safety problem becomes more and more serious due to the insufficient waste food recycling process.And in order to solve this problem,the optimal models among the retailer,the merchant of the recycling process and the government in the waste food recycling process with the price recycling and the self-recycling were built to analyze the decision variables,which include the recycling price,the recycling service level,the recycling subsidy per unit and the recycling food safety awareness.The main results show that,whether the recycling process is independent or cooperative with the government department,when the merchant of the recycling process recycles the waste food with the price,the higher subsidy per unit that the government department provides,the higher of the recycling food safety awareness of the retailer,the lower of the corresponding recycling service level,the higher of the price of the waste food recycling,but the less of the quantity of the waste food recovery;when the retailer recycles the waste food by himself,the recycling food safety awareness of the retailer,the recycling service level and the recycling quantity of the merchant are zero,and the corresponding profit is zero.
引文
[1]费威.废弃食品回流再造问题的产品价格分析[J].经济数学,2015(2):76-86.
[2]王艳林,马杰.论回收废弃食品的认定及其法律规制[J].河南省政法管理干部学院学报,2009(4):115-117.
[3]KIM MS,NA JG,LEE MK,et al.More value from food waste:lactic acid and biogas recovery[J].Water Research,2016(96):208-216.
[4]沈一平.食品生产环节召回及过期食品处置的调查报告及政策建议[J].中国食品药品监管,2015(1):57-59.
[5]王永权,于浪摆.过期食品回收处置现状不容乐观[J].首都医药,2014(12):27-28.
[6]莫鸣,李亚婷.超市食品消费者赔偿投诉及其制度改进——基于208个超市食品安全事件的分析[J].湖南农业大学学报(社会科学版),2016,17(3):84-89.
[7]吴军,毕研林,李健,袁文燕.不对称信息下基于委托代理模型的地沟油监管政策研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,2016,36(10):2610-2617.
[8]余福茂,钟永光,沈祖志.考虑政府引导激励的电子废弃物回收处理决策模型研究[J].中国管理科学,2014(5):131-137.
[9]倪明,邵小伟,郭军华,杨善林.不确定需求及WTP差异条件下废弃电子产品再制造回收模式选择[J].系统工程,2015,33(10):44-53.
[10]何喜军,武玉英,杜同.基于微分对策的产品回收对供应链协同优化的影响[J].系统工程理论与实践,2016,36(8):1962-1974.
[11]宗刚,魏素豪.基于回收意识的废旧衣物回收模式对比分析[J].系统工程理论与实践,2016,36(10):2583-2589.
(1)对于消费者作为过期食品等废弃食品供给者的情况,因为这种情况下回收废弃食品数量相对较小,并且分析过程与此相似,所以未对此再做分析.
(2)图中实线表示正向的价值输出,虚线表示逆向的利益输入.全文以下同.
(1)为便于分析,社会利益和经济利润都是以货币为单位.并且政府部门的社会利益主要是在废弃食品回收处理问题的分析框架下,不考虑其它因素.全文以下同.
[2]王艳林,马杰.论回收废弃食品的认定及其法律规制[J].河南省政法管理干部学院学报,2009(4):115-117.
[3]KIM MS,NA JG,LEE MK,et al.More value from food waste:lactic acid and biogas recovery[J].Water Research,2016(96):208-216.
[4]沈一平.食品生产环节召回及过期食品处置的调查报告及政策建议[J].中国食品药品监管,2015(1):57-59.
[5]王永权,于浪摆.过期食品回收处置现状不容乐观[J].首都医药,2014(12):27-28.
[6]莫鸣,李亚婷.超市食品消费者赔偿投诉及其制度改进——基于208个超市食品安全事件的分析[J].湖南农业大学学报(社会科学版),2016,17(3):84-89.
[7]吴军,毕研林,李健,袁文燕.不对称信息下基于委托代理模型的地沟油监管政策研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,2016,36(10):2610-2617.
[8]余福茂,钟永光,沈祖志.考虑政府引导激励的电子废弃物回收处理决策模型研究[J].中国管理科学,2014(5):131-137.
[9]倪明,邵小伟,郭军华,杨善林.不确定需求及WTP差异条件下废弃电子产品再制造回收模式选择[J].系统工程,2015,33(10):44-53.
[10]何喜军,武玉英,杜同.基于微分对策的产品回收对供应链协同优化的影响[J].系统工程理论与实践,2016,36(8):1962-1974.
[11]宗刚,魏素豪.基于回收意识的废旧衣物回收模式对比分析[J].系统工程理论与实践,2016,36(10):2583-2589.
(1)对于消费者作为过期食品等废弃食品供给者的情况,因为这种情况下回收废弃食品数量相对较小,并且分析过程与此相似,所以未对此再做分析.
(2)图中实线表示正向的价值输出,虚线表示逆向的利益输入.全文以下同.
(1)为便于分析,社会利益和经济利润都是以货币为单位.并且政府部门的社会利益主要是在废弃食品回收处理问题的分析框架下,不考虑其它因素.全文以下同.