如何思考政治腐败:基于概念的理论反思
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摘要
腐败这一概念被引入社会科学,原本是用来形容政治权力的异化和政治制度的衰败,但在现代社会科学乃至政治科学中,腐败问题的研究越来越表现出"去政治化"的趋势。针对这一现象,可以把政治腐败重新定义为以政客为行为主体的政治权力的异化,在这个过程中,政治权力被制度化地扭曲为满足个人或者少数集团私利的工具,并且高度嵌入在既定的政治制度之中。在这个定义基础上,政治腐败不再是简单的滥用公共权力的个人行为,而是表现为集中特定的政治形态,主要包括盗贼政权、庇护主义和回报性腐败。
The concept of corruption was originally used to describe the dissimilation of political power and the decline of the political system. However, in modern social sciences and even political science, the study of corruption has increasingly shown a trend of "depoliticization". In response to this phenomenon, this paper tries to rediscover the political meaning of corruption: political corruption is a game played by high-level political(and economic) elites. In this game, political power is institutionally distorted as a tool to satisfy the private interests of individuals or minority groups. And it is highly embedded in the established political system. Based on this definition, the political corruption manifested as kleptocracy, political clientelism, and quid pro quo corruption.
The concept of corruption was originally used to describe the dissimilation of political power and the decline of the political system. However, in modern social sciences and even political science, the study of corruption has increasingly shown a trend of "depoliticization". In response to this phenomenon, this paper tries to rediscover the political meaning of corruption: political corruption is a game played by high-level political(and economic) elites. In this game, political power is institutionally distorted as a tool to satisfy the private interests of individuals or minority groups. And it is highly embedded in the established political system. Based on this definition, the political corruption manifested as kleptocracy, political clientelism, and quid pro quo corruption.
引文
(1)(3)“Introduction to Part I”,Political Corruption:Concepts&Contexts,edited by Arnold J.Heidenheimer and Micheal Johnston,Transaction Publishers,2007,pp.3-15,83.
(2)J.S.Nye,“Corruption and Political Development:A CostBenefit Analysis”,American Political Science Review,vol.61,no.2(1967),pp.417-427.
(4)Carl J.Friedrich,The Pathology of Politics:Violence,Betrayal Corruption,Secrecy and Propaganda,New York:Harper&Row,1972,pp.127-141.
(5)James C.Scott,Comparative Political Corruption,Englewood Cliffs:Prentice-Hall,1972.
(6)John Gardiner,“Defining Corruption”,Political Corruption:Concepts&Contexts,edited by Arnold J.Heidenheimer and Micheal Johnston,Transaction Publishers,2007,p.29.
(7)Daniel Treisman,“The Causes of Corruption:A CrossNational Study”,Journal of Public Economics,vol.76(2000),pp.99-457.
(8)西蒙·马丁·利普赛特、加布里埃尔·萨曼·伦兹:《腐败,文化及市场》,塞缪尔·亨廷顿、劳伦斯·哈里森主编:《文化的重要作用:价值观如果影响人类进步》,北京:新华出版社,2010年,第158-171页。
(9)Akhil Gputa,“Blurred Boundaries:The Discourse of Corruption,the Culture of Politics,and the Imagined State”,American Ethnologist,vol.22,no.2(1995),pp.375-402.
(10)R.Klitgaard,Controlling Corruption,Berkeley:University of California Press,1988.
(11)詹姆斯·马奇、约翰·奥尔森:《重新发现制度:政治的组织基础》,张伟译,北京:生活·读书·新知三联书店,2011年。所谓结果性逻辑指的是个体总是根据行为的预期后果做出选择,成本-收益分析就是典型的结果性逻辑。而恰适性逻辑指的是个体根据是否符合组织的惯例做出行为选择,如果一个行为在组织中被认为是恰当的,符合惯例、习俗、规范的要求,那么个体不论结果如何都会自然做出这种选择。
(12)李辉:《贿赂中的自我道德化与嵌入性腐败:基于H市纪检监察机关档案的一项文本研究》,《社会》2009年第6期。
(13)Jennifer Hasty,“The Pleasures of Corruption:Desire and Discipline in Ghanaian Political Culture”,Cultural Anthropology,vol.20,no.2(2008),pp.271-301.
(14)Thomas D.Lancaster,“Electoral Structures and Pork Barrel Politics”,International Political Science Review,vol.7,no.1(1986),pp.67-81.
(15)M.McMullan,“A Theory of Corruption:Based on a Consideration of Corruption in the Public Services and Governments of British Colonies in Ex-Colonies in West Africa”,Sociological Review,vol.9,no.2(1961),pp.181-201.
(16)Nathaniel H.Leff,“Economic Development Through Bureaucratic Corruption”,American Behavioral Scientist,vol.8,no.3(1964),pp.8-14.
(17)David H.Bayley,“The Effects of Corruption in a Developing Nation”,The Western Political Quarterly,vol.l19(1966),pp.719-732.
(18)Masaya Kobayashi,“Political clientelism and corruption:Neo-structuralism and republicanism”,Junichi Kawata ed.,Comparing Political Corruption and Clentelism,Ashgate,2006.
(19)(21)迈克尔·约翰斯顿:《腐败征候群:财富、权力和民主》,袁建华译,上海:上海人民出版社,2009年,第186页,第3页。
(20)雷蒙德·菲斯曼、爱德华·米格尔:《经济黑帮:腐败、暴力的黑帮经济学》,冯斌译,北京:中信出版社,2010年,第42页。
(22)David A.Strauss,“Corruption,Equality,and Campaign Finance Reform”,Columbia Law Review,vol.94(1994),pp.1369-1389.
(23)Thomas F.Burke,“The Concept of Corruption in Campaign Finance Law”,Constitutional Commentary,vol.14(1997),pp.127-149.
(24)Robert Harris,“Preface”,Political Corruption:In and Beyond the Nation State,London:Routledge,2003.
(2)J.S.Nye,“Corruption and Political Development:A CostBenefit Analysis”,American Political Science Review,vol.61,no.2(1967),pp.417-427.
(4)Carl J.Friedrich,The Pathology of Politics:Violence,Betrayal Corruption,Secrecy and Propaganda,New York:Harper&Row,1972,pp.127-141.
(5)James C.Scott,Comparative Political Corruption,Englewood Cliffs:Prentice-Hall,1972.
(6)John Gardiner,“Defining Corruption”,Political Corruption:Concepts&Contexts,edited by Arnold J.Heidenheimer and Micheal Johnston,Transaction Publishers,2007,p.29.
(7)Daniel Treisman,“The Causes of Corruption:A CrossNational Study”,Journal of Public Economics,vol.76(2000),pp.99-457.
(8)西蒙·马丁·利普赛特、加布里埃尔·萨曼·伦兹:《腐败,文化及市场》,塞缪尔·亨廷顿、劳伦斯·哈里森主编:《文化的重要作用:价值观如果影响人类进步》,北京:新华出版社,2010年,第158-171页。
(9)Akhil Gputa,“Blurred Boundaries:The Discourse of Corruption,the Culture of Politics,and the Imagined State”,American Ethnologist,vol.22,no.2(1995),pp.375-402.
(10)R.Klitgaard,Controlling Corruption,Berkeley:University of California Press,1988.
(11)詹姆斯·马奇、约翰·奥尔森:《重新发现制度:政治的组织基础》,张伟译,北京:生活·读书·新知三联书店,2011年。所谓结果性逻辑指的是个体总是根据行为的预期后果做出选择,成本-收益分析就是典型的结果性逻辑。而恰适性逻辑指的是个体根据是否符合组织的惯例做出行为选择,如果一个行为在组织中被认为是恰当的,符合惯例、习俗、规范的要求,那么个体不论结果如何都会自然做出这种选择。
(12)李辉:《贿赂中的自我道德化与嵌入性腐败:基于H市纪检监察机关档案的一项文本研究》,《社会》2009年第6期。
(13)Jennifer Hasty,“The Pleasures of Corruption:Desire and Discipline in Ghanaian Political Culture”,Cultural Anthropology,vol.20,no.2(2008),pp.271-301.
(14)Thomas D.Lancaster,“Electoral Structures and Pork Barrel Politics”,International Political Science Review,vol.7,no.1(1986),pp.67-81.
(15)M.McMullan,“A Theory of Corruption:Based on a Consideration of Corruption in the Public Services and Governments of British Colonies in Ex-Colonies in West Africa”,Sociological Review,vol.9,no.2(1961),pp.181-201.
(16)Nathaniel H.Leff,“Economic Development Through Bureaucratic Corruption”,American Behavioral Scientist,vol.8,no.3(1964),pp.8-14.
(17)David H.Bayley,“The Effects of Corruption in a Developing Nation”,The Western Political Quarterly,vol.l19(1966),pp.719-732.
(18)Masaya Kobayashi,“Political clientelism and corruption:Neo-structuralism and republicanism”,Junichi Kawata ed.,Comparing Political Corruption and Clentelism,Ashgate,2006.
(19)(21)迈克尔·约翰斯顿:《腐败征候群:财富、权力和民主》,袁建华译,上海:上海人民出版社,2009年,第186页,第3页。
(20)雷蒙德·菲斯曼、爱德华·米格尔:《经济黑帮:腐败、暴力的黑帮经济学》,冯斌译,北京:中信出版社,2010年,第42页。
(22)David A.Strauss,“Corruption,Equality,and Campaign Finance Reform”,Columbia Law Review,vol.94(1994),pp.1369-1389.
(23)Thomas F.Burke,“The Concept of Corruption in Campaign Finance Law”,Constitutional Commentary,vol.14(1997),pp.127-149.
(24)Robert Harris,“Preface”,Political Corruption:In and Beyond the Nation State,London:Routledge,2003.