流域污染防治的博弈分析
摘要
在企业生产排污的过程中,企业的管理者与地方政府、公众之间构成了一种或几种博弈关系,当企业生产者的效用函数与政府和公众的效用函数发生偏差时,企业利益最大化动机将导致企业管理者做出符合其自身利益的策略选择,从而导致流域生态环境遭到破坏——"公地悲剧"。通过运用内外两种监督博弈模式对流域"公地悲剧"问题进行深入探讨,并在此基础上得出建立健全流域企业奖惩机制和企业信誉监管制度、降低企业间合作成本是解决流域污染问题的关键。
During the process of production of sewage,managers of enterprises,local governments and the public constitute one or several game relations. When utility functions of producers,the government and public utility functions generate deviations,enterprise benefit maximization motives would lead corporate managers to make the strategic choice in line with their own interests,which would leads to destruction of the ecological. Through the use of both game theory models for watershed"tragedy of the Commons",we can have a deep discussion for the issue,establishing watershed corporate rewards and enterprise credit supervision system,reducing the cost of inter-firm cooperation is the key to solving the problems of pollution.
During the process of production of sewage,managers of enterprises,local governments and the public constitute one or several game relations. When utility functions of producers,the government and public utility functions generate deviations,enterprise benefit maximization motives would lead corporate managers to make the strategic choice in line with their own interests,which would leads to destruction of the ecological. Through the use of both game theory models for watershed"tragedy of the Commons",we can have a deep discussion for the issue,establishing watershed corporate rewards and enterprise credit supervision system,reducing the cost of inter-firm cooperation is the key to solving the problems of pollution.
引文
[1]Hardin Gaster J.The tragedy of commens[J].Science,1968,(162):1234-1248.
[2]Becker Nir,Easter KW.Water quantity/quality management and conflict resulution[M].Praeger,Westport,conn,1995:399-409.
[3]雷玉桃.流域水环境管理的博弈分析[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2006(1).
[4]湛志伟.“公地悲剧”及其治理的博弈分析[J].经济评论,2004(4).
[5]瑟尔·奥尔森.集体行动的逻辑[M].陈郁等译.上海三联书店,1995.
[6]陈振明等.公共服务导论[M].北京:北京大学出版社,2011.
[7]丁社教,柯小林.博弈论视角下河流污染问题的研究[J].发展研究,2011(11).
[8]尚宇红.治理环境污染问题的经济博弈分析[J].理论探索,2005(6).
[2]Becker Nir,Easter KW.Water quantity/quality management and conflict resulution[M].Praeger,Westport,conn,1995:399-409.
[3]雷玉桃.流域水环境管理的博弈分析[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2006(1).
[4]湛志伟.“公地悲剧”及其治理的博弈分析[J].经济评论,2004(4).
[5]瑟尔·奥尔森.集体行动的逻辑[M].陈郁等译.上海三联书店,1995.
[6]陈振明等.公共服务导论[M].北京:北京大学出版社,2011.
[7]丁社教,柯小林.博弈论视角下河流污染问题的研究[J].发展研究,2011(11).
[8]尚宇红.治理环境污染问题的经济博弈分析[J].理论探索,2005(6).