投贷联动业务创新模式选择的激励机制研究
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摘要
投贷联动业务是解决科创型企业融资难问题的有效尝试,然而,商业银行参与度不高是影响投贷联动业务发展的主要问题。运用委托代理理论对投贷联动不同模式构建了委托代理动态博弈模型,分析了商业银行参与方式对各方收益的影响及对商业银行、风险投资公司和创业企业准入限制的影响机制。研究发现商业银行、风投公司共同运作时可以充分发挥银行和风投公司各自的优势。最后根据我国市场发展特点,提出具有可行性的投贷联动业务两种模式选择:借道创投孵化器的股权投资基金模式和第三方投资机构合作的紧密型模式。
Investment and loan linkage business is an effective attempt to solve the financing difficulties of science and technology-based enterprises.However,the low participation of commercial bank is a key factor affecting the development of investment and loan linkage.In this paper,principal-agent theory is used to build a dynamic model of principal-agent dynamic game for different modes of investment and loan linkage.The paper analyzes the influence of banks' participation on the income of all parties and the influence mechanism of the three parties' access restrictions.The study found that when commercial banks and venture capital companies work together,they can give full play to the advantages of both banks and venture capital firms.According to the characteristics of China's market development,it proposes two modes of investment and loan linkage:the mode of equity investment fund through the venture capital incubator and the close cooperation model of third-party investment institutions.
Investment and loan linkage business is an effective attempt to solve the financing difficulties of science and technology-based enterprises.However,the low participation of commercial bank is a key factor affecting the development of investment and loan linkage.In this paper,principal-agent theory is used to build a dynamic model of principal-agent dynamic game for different modes of investment and loan linkage.The paper analyzes the influence of banks' participation on the income of all parties and the influence mechanism of the three parties' access restrictions.The study found that when commercial banks and venture capital companies work together,they can give full play to the advantages of both banks and venture capital firms.According to the characteristics of China's market development,it proposes two modes of investment and loan linkage:the mode of equity investment fund through the venture capital incubator and the close cooperation model of third-party investment institutions.
引文
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[2]康雷宇.投贷联动:模式选择与风险防范[J].农村金融研究,2017(6):13-17.
[3]杨再平,白瑞明.探索商业银行投贷联动新模式——英国“中小企业成长基金”启示与借鉴[J].中国银行业, 2015(7):18-30.
[4]邵腾伟,吕秀梅.服务现代农业的金融工具选择及组合[J].财会月刊, 2017(17):86-94.
[5]林霞.商业银行服务民航业的问题和建议[J].武汉金融,2017(4):60-63.
[6]毕国器.经济调整期的中国矿业融资模式创新[J].中国矿业,2017,26(6):64-67.
[7]蔡洋萍,肖勇光.我国商业银行投货联动模式选择构想——以国家开发银行为例[J].北方经贸, 2014(7):174-175.
[8]胡浩.银行公司金融业务发展趋势与支持实体经济发展[J].金融论坛, 2017,22(7):6-13,66.
[9]连育青.供给侧结构性改革背景下商业银行信贷经营转型面临的问题与对策[J/OL].南方金融, 2017(5):71-75.
[10]张小东,康立.商业银行投贷联动的金融支持研究[J].国际金融研究, 2017(6):45-53.
[11]Jensen M.C., and Meckling W. Theory of the Firm:managerial behavior, agency costs, and capital structure[J].Journal of Financial Economics, 1976(3):305-360.
[12]Casamatta C. Financing and advising:Optimal financial contracts with venture capitalists[J]. The Journal of Finance,2003(58):2059-2086.
[13]晏文隽,郭菊娥.风险投资主体、银行和创业企业家三方委托代理研究[J].管理科学, 2009,22(2):91-98.
[14]查博,郭菊娥.风险投资三方委托代理关系——基于创业企业家过度自信与风投公司监督努力[J].系统管理学报,2015,24(2):190-199.