财政补贴能促进企业的“绿化”吗?——基于中国重污染上市公司的研究
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摘要
引导企业实现绿色化生产经营,干预环境公共产品引起的市场失灵,实现生态环境领域国家治理体系和治理能力的现代化,已成为当前中国政府环境治理进程中不可忽视的重大问题。本文选取2010—2016年247家重污染上市公司为研究对象,利用企业环保投资与环境责任评分衡量企业的"绿色度",在控制异质性后实证检验了财政补贴对企业环保投资和绿色生产的激励效应。结果显示,财政补贴显著增强了企业的环境责任意识,促进了企业的环保投资。进一步分析认为,获得补贴之后,企业在政策引导下增强自身技术创新能力以及在政府监管压力下控制污染排放是产生这一激励作用的重要原因。因此,应当进一步改革政府对企业的补贴制度,加大与环保相关的技术研发补贴力度,并对不同性质、地区的企业实行差别化补贴,加强对补贴资金使用情况的监管,以实现企业的"绿化"。
"Pollution prevention and control" is one of the three major campaigns initiated by the 19 th National Congress of the Communist Party of China to build a moderately prosperous society in all respects.The ecological and environmental problems are,in the essentialanalysis,the problems of production methods and lifestyles.As far as production methods are concerned,alltypes of enterprises,especially heavy polluting enterprises,have an inescapableresponsibility.These enterprises are not only an important driving force for the rapid development of China's economy,but also a major producer of environmental pollution.Atpresent,China is experiencing one of the most dramatic "environmental storms" in history.Guiding enterprises to achieve green production and green management,intervening in market failure caused by environmental public products,and realizing the modernization of national governance system and governance capacity in the field of ecological environment have become major issues that cannot be ignored in the current process of environmental management of the Chinese government.However,it is difficult to achieve sustainable environmental protection goals by mandatory administrative orders,inspections,and direct closure or relocation of polluting enterprises,and such simple and violent direct interventions are difficult to achieve optimal trade-offs between environmental protection and economic development.Economic instruments that are compatible with the incentives of polluters are increasingly becoming the government's choice.Subsidizing the abatement is an important economic means.Since financial subsidy is an important way for government to intervene in environmental protection behavior of enterprises.Inthe process of energy saving,emission reduction and production greening,whichchannel does such a large-scale financial subsidy play a role,and how effective it actually is,all these are problems that need to be studied and analyzed in depth.This paper selects 247 heavily polluting listed companies from 2010 to 2016 as the research object,uses the enterprise environmental protection investment and environmental responsibility score to measure the "greenness" of the enterprise.After controlling the heterogeneity,it empirically tests the incentive effect of financial subsidies on corporate environmental protection investment and green production.The results show that financial subsidies significantly enhance the company's environmental responsibility awareness and promote the company's environmental investment.Further analysis believes that after obtaining subsidies,to enhance their technological innovation capabilities under the guidance of policies and to control pollution emissions under the pressure of government supervision are important reasons for this incentive of these enterprises.Based on the above conclusions,this paper proposes the following policy recommendations.First,continue to use financial subsidies and other economic means compatible with enterprise incentives to intervene in production and operation greening of enterprises,focusing on subsidies for clean technology innovation of enterprises,and encourage and motivate relevant enterprises to make some joint research and development of technical difficulties,large-scale investment and long-term clean technology.Secondly,different subsidies policies and standards should be formulated for enterprises with different property rights in different regions to clarify the use and scale of subsidized funds.Thirdly,strengthening supervision and management to further improve the environmental information disclosure machine of enterprises,which enables enterprises to conduct environmental behaviors in the sunshine and accept the supervision of all members of society.
"Pollution prevention and control" is one of the three major campaigns initiated by the 19 th National Congress of the Communist Party of China to build a moderately prosperous society in all respects.The ecological and environmental problems are,in the essentialanalysis,the problems of production methods and lifestyles.As far as production methods are concerned,alltypes of enterprises,especially heavy polluting enterprises,have an inescapableresponsibility.These enterprises are not only an important driving force for the rapid development of China's economy,but also a major producer of environmental pollution.Atpresent,China is experiencing one of the most dramatic "environmental storms" in history.Guiding enterprises to achieve green production and green management,intervening in market failure caused by environmental public products,and realizing the modernization of national governance system and governance capacity in the field of ecological environment have become major issues that cannot be ignored in the current process of environmental management of the Chinese government.However,it is difficult to achieve sustainable environmental protection goals by mandatory administrative orders,inspections,and direct closure or relocation of polluting enterprises,and such simple and violent direct interventions are difficult to achieve optimal trade-offs between environmental protection and economic development.Economic instruments that are compatible with the incentives of polluters are increasingly becoming the government's choice.Subsidizing the abatement is an important economic means.Since financial subsidy is an important way for government to intervene in environmental protection behavior of enterprises.Inthe process of energy saving,emission reduction and production greening,whichchannel does such a large-scale financial subsidy play a role,and how effective it actually is,all these are problems that need to be studied and analyzed in depth.This paper selects 247 heavily polluting listed companies from 2010 to 2016 as the research object,uses the enterprise environmental protection investment and environmental responsibility score to measure the "greenness" of the enterprise.After controlling the heterogeneity,it empirically tests the incentive effect of financial subsidies on corporate environmental protection investment and green production.The results show that financial subsidies significantly enhance the company's environmental responsibility awareness and promote the company's environmental investment.Further analysis believes that after obtaining subsidies,to enhance their technological innovation capabilities under the guidance of policies and to control pollution emissions under the pressure of government supervision are important reasons for this incentive of these enterprises.Based on the above conclusions,this paper proposes the following policy recommendations.First,continue to use financial subsidies and other economic means compatible with enterprise incentives to intervene in production and operation greening of enterprises,focusing on subsidies for clean technology innovation of enterprises,and encourage and motivate relevant enterprises to make some joint research and development of technical difficulties,large-scale investment and long-term clean technology.Secondly,different subsidies policies and standards should be formulated for enterprises with different property rights in different regions to clarify the use and scale of subsidized funds.Thirdly,strengthening supervision and management to further improve the environmental information disclosure machine of enterprises,which enables enterprises to conduct environmental behaviors in the sunshine and accept the supervision of all members of society.
引文
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(1)资料来源于OECD报告“Financing Business R&D and Investment”,网址:http://www.oecd.org/sti/inno/financingofbusinessrd.htm。
(2)“利益相关者”这一词最早的提出可以追溯到1984年,弗里曼出版的《战略管理:利益相关者管理的分析方法》一书,明确提出了利益相关者管理理论。
(3)根据2008年6月环保部发布的“关于印发《上市公司环保核查行业分类管理名录》的通知”(环办函[2008]373号):火电、钢铁、水泥、电解铝、煤炭、冶金、化工、石化、建材、造纸、酿造、制药、发酵、纺织、制革和采矿业等16类行业为重污染行业。
(4)值得注意的是,第一列的R2为调整后的R2,而后面几列由于均采用Ordered Logit模型进行回归,因而表中R2汇报的是Pseudo R2。
[2]Orsato,R.J..Competitive Environmental Strategies:When does it Pay to Be green?[J].California Management Rreview,2006,48,(2):127-143.
[3]Arouri,M.E.H.,A.B.Youssef,H.M’henni,and C.Rault.Energyconsumption,Economic Growth and CO2 Emissions in Middle East and North African Countries[J].Energy Policy,2012,(45):342-349.
[4]张功富.政府干预、环境污染与企业环保投资——基于重污染行业上市公司的经验证据[J].北京:经济与管理研究,2013,(9):38-44.
[5]白俊红,聂亮.技术进步与环境污染的关系——一个倒U形假说[J].上海:研究与发展管理,2017,(3):131-140.
[6]魏玮,何旭波.节能减排,研发补贴与可持续增长——基于动态可计算一般均衡的情景分析[J].北京:经济管理,2013,(11):1-12.
[7]石光,周黎安,郑世林,张友国.环境补贴与污染治理——基于电力行业的实证研究[J].北京:经济学(季刊),2016,(4):1439-1462.
[8]Girma,S.,H.G?rg,and A.Hanley.R&D and Exporting:A Comparison of British and Irish Firms[J].Review of World Economics,2008,144,(4):750-773.
[9]Chen,V.Z.,J.Li,D.M.Shapiro,and X.X.Zhang.Ownership Structure and Innovation:An Emerging Market Perspective[J].Asia Pacific Journal of Management,2014,31,(1):1-24.
[10]白俊红.中国的政府R&D资助有效吗? 来自大中型工业企业的经验证据[J].北京:经济学(季刊),2011,(4):1375-1400.
[11]Kleer,R..Government R&D Subsidies as a Signal for Private Investors[J].Research Policy,2010,39,(10):1361-1374.
[12]González,X.,J.Jaumandreu,and C.Pazó.Barriers to Innovation and Subsidy Effectiveness[J].RAND Journal of Economics,2005,36,(4):930-950.
[13]Hewitt-Dundas,N.,and S.Roper.Outputadditionality of Public Support for Innovation:Evidence for Irish Manufacturing Plants[J].European Planning Studies,2010,18,(1):107-122.
[14]胡永平.政府补贴、技术来源与创新绩效——基于重庆大中型工业企业的实证研究[J].太原:技术经济与管理研究,2014,(7):46-50.
[15]邵传林.制度环境、财政补贴与企业创新绩效——基于中国工业企业微观数据的实证研究[J].成都:软科学,2015,(9):34-37,42.
[16]王德祥,李昕.政府补贴、政治关联与企业创新投入[J].北京:财政研究,2017,(8):79-89.
[17]邵敏,包群.政府补贴与企业生产率——基于我国工业企业的经验分析[J].北京:中国工业经济,2012,(7):70-82.
[18]毛其淋,许家云.政府补贴对企业新产品创新的影响——基于补贴强度“适度区间”的视角[J].北京:中国工业经济,2015,(6):94-107.
[19]曹建海,邓菁.补贴预期、模式选择与创新激励效果——来自战略性新兴产业的经验证据[J].北京:经济管理,2014,(8):21-30.
[20]Skuras,D.,K.Tsekouras,E.Dimara,and D.Tzelepis.The Effects of Regional Capital Subsidies on Productivity Growth:A Case Study of the Greek Food and Beverage Manufacturing Industry[J].Journal of Regional Science,2006,46,(2):355-381.
[21]Faccio,M..Politically Connected Firms[J].American Economic Review,2006,96,(1)369-386.
[22]唐清泉,罗党论.政府补贴动机及其效果的实证研究——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].北京:金融研究,2007,(6):149-163.
[23]余明桂,回雅甫,潘红波.政治联系、寻租与地方政府财政补贴有效性[J].北京:经济研究,2010,(3):65-77.
[24]Hussinger,K..R&D and Subsidies at the Firm Level:An Application of Parametric and Semi-parametric Two-step Selection Models[J].Journal of Applied Econometrics,2008,23,(6):729-747.
[25]高艳慧,万迪昉,蔡地.政府研发补贴具有信号传递作用吗?——基于我国高技术产业面板数据的分析[J].天津:科学学与科学技术管理,2012,(1):5-11.
[26]魏志华,吴育辉,曾爱民.寻租、财政补贴与公司成长性——来自新能源概念类上市公司的实证证据[J].北京:经济管理,2015,(1):1-11.
[27]Greenstone,M.,and J.B.Kelsey.Envirodevonomics:A Research Agenda for an Emerging Field[J].Journal of Economic Literature,2015,53,(1):5-42.
[28]Levinson,A..Technology,Internationaltrade,and Pollution from US Manufacturing[J].American Economic Review,2009,99,(5):2177-2192.
[29]Shapiro,J.S.,and R.Walker.Why is Pollution from US Manufacturing Declining? The Roles of Environmental Regulation,Productivity,and Trade[J].American Economic Review,2018,108,(12):3814-3854.
[30]杨飞.环境税、环境补贴与清洁技术创新:理论与经验[J].杭州:财经论丛,2017,(8):19-27.
[31]约瑟夫·熊彼特.经济发展理论[M].哈佛大学出版社,1934.
[32]张宇,蒋殿春.FDI、环境监管与能源消耗:基于能耗强度分解的经验检验[J].北京:世界经济,2013,(3):103-123.
[33]Greenstone,M.,and R.Hanna.Environmental Regulations,Air and Water Pollution,and Infant Mortality in India[J].American Economic Review,2014,104,(10):3038-3072.
[34]卢洪友,唐飞,许文立.税收政策能增强企业的环境责任吗——来自我国上市公司的证据[J].蚌埠:财贸研究,2017,(1):85-91.
[35]Chiasson,M.W.,and E.Davidson.Taking Industry Seriously in Information Systems Research[J].Mis Quarterly,2005,29,(4):591-605.
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(1)资料来源于OECD报告“Financing Business R&D and Investment”,网址:http://www.oecd.org/sti/inno/financingofbusinessrd.htm。
(2)“利益相关者”这一词最早的提出可以追溯到1984年,弗里曼出版的《战略管理:利益相关者管理的分析方法》一书,明确提出了利益相关者管理理论。
(3)根据2008年6月环保部发布的“关于印发《上市公司环保核查行业分类管理名录》的通知”(环办函[2008]373号):火电、钢铁、水泥、电解铝、煤炭、冶金、化工、石化、建材、造纸、酿造、制药、发酵、纺织、制革和采矿业等16类行业为重污染行业。
(4)值得注意的是,第一列的R2为调整后的R2,而后面几列由于均采用Ordered Logit模型进行回归,因而表中R2汇报的是Pseudo R2。