非传统国际金融“立法”主体的合法性研究与中国实践——以跨政府网络为例
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摘要
自2008年金融危机爆发以来,在全球金融治理的背景下,以跨政府网络为代表的非传统国际金融立法主体获得广泛关注。它们所制定的国际金融标准虽然本身不具有法律约束力,却在金融监管中发挥出事实上的效力,也因此引发探究该主体合法性之必要。本文从立法主体的代表性、立法程序的公平性、立法成果的有效性三个方面对跨政府网络进行全面评析后,认为它们具有合法性,但尚存完善空间。结合中国参与跨政府网络的立法实践,中国金融立法话语权的增强可从发展本国市民社会组织、推动立法程序改革、警惕立法成果实施"陷阱"三个方面寻求突破。
Since the breakout of the global financial crisis, in the background of global financial governance, the untraditionally international financial legislators represented by transgovernmental network has caused widely concern. The international standards they made are non-binding, however, the standards take de facto effect in financial regulation. This article accesses the representation of legislative subjects, the justice of legislative procedures, and effectiveness of legislative outcome, it turns out that they are legitimate, but should be improved further. Taking Chinese practice into consideration, China could develop national civil society organizations,promote the revolution of legislative procedures, and be alert to the implementation "trap" of legislative outcomes,to improve China's financial legislative voice.
Since the breakout of the global financial crisis, in the background of global financial governance, the untraditionally international financial legislators represented by transgovernmental network has caused widely concern. The international standards they made are non-binding, however, the standards take de facto effect in financial regulation. This article accesses the representation of legislative subjects, the justice of legislative procedures, and effectiveness of legislative outcome, it turns out that they are legitimate, but should be improved further. Taking Chinese practice into consideration, China could develop national civil society organizations,promote the revolution of legislative procedures, and be alert to the implementation "trap" of legislative outcomes,to improve China's financial legislative voice.
引文
[1]See Rüdiger Wolfrum,Legitimacy of International Law from a Legal Perspective:Some Introductory Considerations,in Rüdiger Wolfrum and Volker R(o|¨)ben(ed.),Legitimacy in International Law,Springer,2008,p.6.
[2]由于跨政府网络的“立法”与传统上国家间立法的概念有所不同,因此本文在标题中给“立法”二字加上引号,避免与传统上国家间立法概念相混淆。
[3]参见[美]艾伦·布坎南、罗伯特·基欧汉:《全球治理机制的合法性》,赵晶晶、杨娜译,《南京大学学报》2011年第2期。
[4]根据传统国际法理论,主权国家是唯一具有“完全国际法律人格”的实体,也被视为创制国际法律规则、制定国际法律义务的权威主体。国际组织作为主权国家的“代理人”,根据国际条约享有“派生性国际法律人格”,在组织章程的规定下享有立法权能。因此二者被视为传统国际立法主体,在国际金融立法活动中同样成立。See Jeffrey L.Dunoff,Steven R.Ratner,David Wippman,International Law Norms,Actors,Process—A Problem-Oriented Approach Third Edition,Wolters Kluwer,2010,pp.107,111.
[5]See Chris Brummer,Soft Law and the Global Financial System-Rule Making in the 21st Century,Cambridge University Press,2012,p.65.
[6]Anne-Marie Slaughter,David T.Zaring,Networking Goes International:An Update,Annual Review of Law&Social Science,Vol.2,2006,p.215.Kal Raustiala,The Architecture of International Cooperation:Transgovemmental Networks and the Future of International Law,UCLA School of Law Research Paper No.02-26,p.4-5.
[7]参见廖凡:《国际金融法学的新发展》,中国社会科学出版社2013年版,第260页。
[8]CPMI的前身是国际支付结算体系委员会(Committee on Payment and Settlement System,简称CPSS),2014年9月,CPSS改名为CPMI。See Implementation monitoring of PFMI:Level 2 assessment report for Hong Kong SAR,May 2017,at www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d159.pdf.,May 25,2017.
[9]See Ann-Marie Slaughter&David T.Zaring,supra note 6,p.218..
[10]Basel Committee Charter,art.3,5,at http://www.bis.org/bcbs/charter.htm.,May 29,2017.By-Laws of IOSCO,part.15,at http://www.iosco.org/about/?subsection=by-laws.,May 29,2017.Charter of the Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures,at http://www.bis.org/cpmi/info.htm?m=3%7C16%7C29.,May 29,2017.
[11]参见张庆麟、刘天姿:《论全球金融治理中的软法》,《国际经济法学刊》2011年第1期。
[12]参见漆彤:《2020年的国际法:国际金融软法的效力及其趋势展望》,载《“2020年的国际法”暨中国青年国际法学者论坛会议论文集》2011年,第136页。
[13]See R.Mülerson,Discussion Following Presentations by Tullio Treves and Rein Müllersonin,in Rüdiger Wolfrum and Volker R(o|¨)ben(eds.),Legitimacy in International Law,Berlin;New York:Springer,2008,pp.214-215.
[14]See Wolfrum,supra note 1,p.6.
[15]See Allen Buchanan and Robert O.Keohane,The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions,Ethics&International Affairs.Vol.20,2006,p.405.
[16]See Wolfrum,supra note 1,p.6.
[17]See,Nele Matz,Financial Institutions between Effectiveness and Legitimacy-A Legal Analysis of the World Bank,Global Environment Daciity and Protoype Carbon Fund,International Environmental Agreement,Vol.5,2005,p.265.
[18]See Evisa Kica and Diana M.Bowman,Regulation by Means of Standardization:Key Legitimacy Issues of Health and Safety Nanotechnology Standards,Jurimetrics,Vol.11,2013,p.22.
[19]See Sigrid Quack,Law,Expertise and Legitimacy in Transnational Economic Governance:An Introduction,Socio-Economic Review,Vol.8,2010,p.7.
[20]See Anne-Marie Slaughter,Agencies On the Loose?Holding Government Networks Accountable,Harvard Law School Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series Working Paper No.6,1999,p.10.
[21]See Eric J.Pan,Challenge of International Cooperation and Institutional Design in Financial Supervision:Beyond Transgovemmental Networks,Chicago Journal of International Law,Vol.11,2011,p.282.
[22]See Clarie R.Kelly,Financial Crisis and Civil Society,Chicago Journal of lnternational Law,Vol.2,2011,p.546.
[23]See Laura Pedraza-Farina,Conceptions of Civil Society in International Lawmaking and Implementation:A Theoretical Framework,Michigan Journal of International Law,Vol.34,2013,p.664.
[24]See Allen Buchanan and Robert O.Keohane,The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions,Rudiger Wolfirum and Volker Roben(eds.).,Legitimacy in International Law,Springer,2008,p.34.
[25]十国银行集团包括,比利时、加拿大、法国、德国、意大利、日本、卢森堡、荷兰、瑞典、英国、美国、瑞士银行和欧洲中央银行。
[26]澳大利亚、加拿大(魁北克和安大略省)、法国、德国、香港、意大利、日本、荷兰、新加坡、西班牙、瑞典、英国、美国(商品期货交易委员会CFTC和证券监管委员会SEC),Consultation Report,An Overview of the Work of the IOSCO Technical Committee,at http://www.iasplus.com/en/binary/iosco/0703ioscoworkplan.pdf.,May 25,2017.
[27]Basel Committee membership,at http://www.bis.org/bcbs/membership.htm.,May 25,2017.
[28]IOSCO Technical Committee invites Brazil,China and India to join its membership,at http://www.iosco.org/search/.,May 25,2017.
[29]Resolution of the Presidents'Committee on the composition of the IOSCO Board(Resolution 5/2013 as amended by Resolution2/2015),at http://www.iosco.org/search/.,May 25,2017.
[30]其中美国既包括联邦储备系统管理委员会,又包括纽约联邦储备银行。Membership,at http://www.bis.org/cpmi/imembership.htm.,May 26,2017.
[31]See Jan Wouters,Dylan Geraets,The G20 and Informal International Lawmaking,Working Paper No.86_March 2012,p.28.
[32]See Pan,supra note 21,p.282.
[33]于2010年出台《巴塞尔Ⅲ:流动性风险计量、标准和监测的国际框架》,确立了全球统一的流动性风险监管指标,包括短期监管指标(LCR-流动性覆盖率)和长期监管指标(NSFR—净稳定资金比例)。巴曙松,金玲玲等:《巴塞尔资本协议Ⅲ的实施——基于金融结构的视角》,中国人民大学出版社2014年版,第129-130页。
[34]例如,在2011年出台的《巴塞尔Ⅲ》中的杠杆率标准无法解决各国会计准则存在的差异,及各国对杠杆率框架下的衍生产品、证券融资交易等敞口的计量方法存在不同的理解,影响了全球实施一致性,因此2014年BCBS对杠杆率标准进行了修订。
[35]See Susan Block-Lieb,Terence Halliday,Legitimation and Global Lawmaking,Fordham Law Legal Studies Research Paper No.952492,2006,p.14.at http://ssm.com/abstract=952492,May 16,2017.
[36]See Pan,supra note 21,p.282.
[37]BCG Basel Committee Groups,at http://www.bis.org/bcbs/mesc.htm.,May 31,2017.
[38]Basel Committee Charter,Ⅷ,at http://www.bis.org/bcbs/charter.htm#consultation_process.,May 31,2017.
[39]IAIS,at https://www.iaisweb.org/page/events/stakeholder-meetings//file/66450/public-background-session-icp-13-reinsurance-29-may-2017.,May 30,2017.
[40]See David Zaring,Informal Procedure,Hard and Soft,in International Administration,Chicago Journal of International Law,Vol.2,2005,p.573.
[41]The New Basel Capital Accord,at http://www.bis.org/press/p030429.htm,May 31,2017.
[42]See Pierre-Hugues Verdier,Transnational Regulatory Networks and Their Limits,The Yale Journal of International Law,Vol.34,2009,p.141.
[43]See Kelly,supra note 22,p.551.
[44]参见[英]克恩·亚历山大、拉胡尔·都莫、约翰·伊特威尔著:《金融体系的全球治理》,赵彦志译,东北财经大学出版社2010年版,第45页。
[45]如BCBS、CPMI等均采用“协商一致表决制”,IOSCO也将“协商一致表决制”规定为最佳决策方式。
[46]《国际货币基金组织协定》第28(a)条。
[47]See Brummer,supra note 5,p.96.
[48]二十国集团,at http://www.g20.org/gyg20/G20jj/201510/t20151027-871.html.,2017年5月16日。
[49]参见盛建明、钟楹:《关于WTO“协商一致”与“一揽子协定”决策原则的实证分析及其改革路径研究》,《河北法学》2015年第3期。
[50]See Brummer,supra note 5,p.97.
[51]See Katharina Gnath and Claudia Schmucker,The Role of the Emerging Countries in the G20:Agenda-Setter,Veto Player or Spectator?In C.Herrmann and J.P.Terhechte(eds.),European Yearbook of International Economic Law,2012,pp.671-680.
[52]By-Laws of IOSCO.,at http://www.iosco.org/library/by_laws/pdf/IOSCO-By-Laws-Section-l-English.pdf,May 16,2017.
[53]IAIS,2015 By-Laws,at http://iaisweb.org/index.cfm?event=getPage&nodeId=25208,May 16,2017.
[54]Statutes of the International Association of Deposit Insurers,at http://www.iadi.org/en/about-iadi/organisation/statutes-bylaws/.,May30,2017.
[55]参见陈海明、仲霞:《国际组织的投票表决与协商一致决策机制》,《长安大学学报(社会科学版)》2012年第14期。
[56]Institutional Alliances&Derivative Legitimacy,Michigan Journal of International Law,Vol.29,2008,p.619.
[57]参见周仲飞:《全球金融法的诞生》,《法学研究》2013年第5期。
[58]The Compendium of Standards,at http://www.fsb.org/what-we-do/about-the-compendium-of-standards/.,May 29,2017.
[59]Key Standards for Sound Financial Systems,at http://www.fsb.org/what-we-do/about-the-compendium-of-standards/key_standards/.,May 29,2017.
[60]参见[美]道格拉斯·沃纳、[英]迈克尔·泰勒:《全球金融危机和金融稳定委员会:硬化国际金融软法?》,管斌、杨阳译,《金融服务法评论》2013年第2期。
[61]Charter of the Financial Stability Board,art 16,at http://www.fsb.org/about/organisation-and-govemance/,May 29,2017.
[62]Initiative on Cooperation and Information Exchange,at http://www.fsb.org/what-we-do/implementation-monitoring/initiative-oncooperation-and-information-exchange/.,May 29,2017.
[63]参见注57,周仲飞文。
[64]See Robert P.Delonis,International Financial Standards and Codes:Mandatory Regulation without Representation,N.Y.U.Journal of International Law and Politics,Vol.36,2004,p.565.
[65]除了巴基斯坦外,格鲁吉亚,爱尔兰,亚美尼亚,阿尔巴尼亚等国均在意向书中作出遵行承诺。Pakistan Letter ofIntent,para.27,at http://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/2015/pak/120315.pdf.,Georgia Letter of Intent,at http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/loi/2012/geo/032712.pdf.,Ireland Letter of Intent,at http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/loi/2012/irl/021012.pdf.,Armenia Letter of Intent,at http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/loi/2015/arm/102215.pdf.,Albania Letter of Intent.at http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/loi/2015/alb/042815.pdf.,July.21,2016.
[66]The Financial Sector Assessment Program(FSAP),May 16,2017,at http://www.imf.org/extermal/np/exr/facts/fsap.htm.,May 30,2017.
[67]See Maurizia De Bellis,The New Public Law in a Global(Dis)Ordear-A Peispective from Italy,Jean Monnet Working Paper 16/10,2010,p.17.
[68]Assessment Committee,at http://www.iosco.org/about/?subsection=display_committee&cmtid=19.,May 29,2017.
[69]See Stavros Gadinis,Three Pathways to Global Standards:Private,Regulator,and Ministry Network,American Journal of International Law,Vol.1,2015,p.32.
[70]Implementation of Basel Standards-Regulatory Consistency Assessment Program(RCAP),at http://www.bis.org/bcbs/implementation.htm?m=3%7C14%7C587.,August.1,2016.其中管辖区域审查,被设计为由国内技术专家承担的同业审查(Peer Reviews)。此外,在管辖区域评价中,每个成员方需要在评价前填好相关问卷并定期更新。这些问卷将有助于国内的监管者和金融稳定机构对国内《巴塞尔Ⅲ》实施情况进行自我评估,并作出相应改进。Basel Committee on Banking Supervision,Regulatory Consistency Assessment Programme(RCAP),at http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d361.pdf.,May 31,2017.
[71]Progress Report on BaselⅢImplementation(update published in October 2012),at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs232.htm.,August.1,2016.进展报告主要包括三个内容,一是对《巴塞尔Ⅲ》采纳情况的监察;二是评价成员对《巴塞尔Ⅲ》遵行的一致性和能力;三是分析监管结果。See Implementation of Basel Standards,A Report to G20 Leaders on Implementation of the BaselⅢRegulatory Reforms,at http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d345.pdf.,August.1,2016.各成员方也会公布有关规则是实施的国内文件。Status of BaselⅡ,Basel 2.5 and BaselⅢadoption:Links to Domestic Implementation Documents,at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs/b3prog_dom_impl.htm.,May 31,2017.
[72]参见瞿栋:《全球金融治理体系发展动向及我国的应对策略》,《国外社会科学》2014年第4期。
[73]参见杜英歌、刘延平:《中国非政府组织面临的立法困境及改革》,《东北大学学报(社会科学版)》2011年第13期。
[74]参见李丹萍:《境外非政府组织在华运作的法律规制——地方实践引发的思考》,《云南大学学报法学版》2013年第26期。
[2]由于跨政府网络的“立法”与传统上国家间立法的概念有所不同,因此本文在标题中给“立法”二字加上引号,避免与传统上国家间立法概念相混淆。
[3]参见[美]艾伦·布坎南、罗伯特·基欧汉:《全球治理机制的合法性》,赵晶晶、杨娜译,《南京大学学报》2011年第2期。
[4]根据传统国际法理论,主权国家是唯一具有“完全国际法律人格”的实体,也被视为创制国际法律规则、制定国际法律义务的权威主体。国际组织作为主权国家的“代理人”,根据国际条约享有“派生性国际法律人格”,在组织章程的规定下享有立法权能。因此二者被视为传统国际立法主体,在国际金融立法活动中同样成立。See Jeffrey L.Dunoff,Steven R.Ratner,David Wippman,International Law Norms,Actors,Process—A Problem-Oriented Approach Third Edition,Wolters Kluwer,2010,pp.107,111.
[5]See Chris Brummer,Soft Law and the Global Financial System-Rule Making in the 21st Century,Cambridge University Press,2012,p.65.
[6]Anne-Marie Slaughter,David T.Zaring,Networking Goes International:An Update,Annual Review of Law&Social Science,Vol.2,2006,p.215.Kal Raustiala,The Architecture of International Cooperation:Transgovemmental Networks and the Future of International Law,UCLA School of Law Research Paper No.02-26,p.4-5.
[7]参见廖凡:《国际金融法学的新发展》,中国社会科学出版社2013年版,第260页。
[8]CPMI的前身是国际支付结算体系委员会(Committee on Payment and Settlement System,简称CPSS),2014年9月,CPSS改名为CPMI。See Implementation monitoring of PFMI:Level 2 assessment report for Hong Kong SAR,May 2017,at www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d159.pdf.,May 25,2017.
[9]See Ann-Marie Slaughter&David T.Zaring,supra note 6,p.218..
[10]Basel Committee Charter,art.3,5,at http://www.bis.org/bcbs/charter.htm.,May 29,2017.By-Laws of IOSCO,part.15,at http://www.iosco.org/about/?subsection=by-laws.,May 29,2017.Charter of the Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures,at http://www.bis.org/cpmi/info.htm?m=3%7C16%7C29.,May 29,2017.
[11]参见张庆麟、刘天姿:《论全球金融治理中的软法》,《国际经济法学刊》2011年第1期。
[12]参见漆彤:《2020年的国际法:国际金融软法的效力及其趋势展望》,载《“2020年的国际法”暨中国青年国际法学者论坛会议论文集》2011年,第136页。
[13]See R.Mülerson,Discussion Following Presentations by Tullio Treves and Rein Müllersonin,in Rüdiger Wolfrum and Volker R(o|¨)ben(eds.),Legitimacy in International Law,Berlin;New York:Springer,2008,pp.214-215.
[14]See Wolfrum,supra note 1,p.6.
[15]See Allen Buchanan and Robert O.Keohane,The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions,Ethics&International Affairs.Vol.20,2006,p.405.
[16]See Wolfrum,supra note 1,p.6.
[17]See,Nele Matz,Financial Institutions between Effectiveness and Legitimacy-A Legal Analysis of the World Bank,Global Environment Daciity and Protoype Carbon Fund,International Environmental Agreement,Vol.5,2005,p.265.
[18]See Evisa Kica and Diana M.Bowman,Regulation by Means of Standardization:Key Legitimacy Issues of Health and Safety Nanotechnology Standards,Jurimetrics,Vol.11,2013,p.22.
[19]See Sigrid Quack,Law,Expertise and Legitimacy in Transnational Economic Governance:An Introduction,Socio-Economic Review,Vol.8,2010,p.7.
[20]See Anne-Marie Slaughter,Agencies On the Loose?Holding Government Networks Accountable,Harvard Law School Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series Working Paper No.6,1999,p.10.
[21]See Eric J.Pan,Challenge of International Cooperation and Institutional Design in Financial Supervision:Beyond Transgovemmental Networks,Chicago Journal of International Law,Vol.11,2011,p.282.
[22]See Clarie R.Kelly,Financial Crisis and Civil Society,Chicago Journal of lnternational Law,Vol.2,2011,p.546.
[23]See Laura Pedraza-Farina,Conceptions of Civil Society in International Lawmaking and Implementation:A Theoretical Framework,Michigan Journal of International Law,Vol.34,2013,p.664.
[24]See Allen Buchanan and Robert O.Keohane,The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions,Rudiger Wolfirum and Volker Roben(eds.).,Legitimacy in International Law,Springer,2008,p.34.
[25]十国银行集团包括,比利时、加拿大、法国、德国、意大利、日本、卢森堡、荷兰、瑞典、英国、美国、瑞士银行和欧洲中央银行。
[26]澳大利亚、加拿大(魁北克和安大略省)、法国、德国、香港、意大利、日本、荷兰、新加坡、西班牙、瑞典、英国、美国(商品期货交易委员会CFTC和证券监管委员会SEC),Consultation Report,An Overview of the Work of the IOSCO Technical Committee,at http://www.iasplus.com/en/binary/iosco/0703ioscoworkplan.pdf.,May 25,2017.
[27]Basel Committee membership,at http://www.bis.org/bcbs/membership.htm.,May 25,2017.
[28]IOSCO Technical Committee invites Brazil,China and India to join its membership,at http://www.iosco.org/search/.,May 25,2017.
[29]Resolution of the Presidents'Committee on the composition of the IOSCO Board(Resolution 5/2013 as amended by Resolution2/2015),at http://www.iosco.org/search/.,May 25,2017.
[30]其中美国既包括联邦储备系统管理委员会,又包括纽约联邦储备银行。Membership,at http://www.bis.org/cpmi/imembership.htm.,May 26,2017.
[31]See Jan Wouters,Dylan Geraets,The G20 and Informal International Lawmaking,Working Paper No.86_March 2012,p.28.
[32]See Pan,supra note 21,p.282.
[33]于2010年出台《巴塞尔Ⅲ:流动性风险计量、标准和监测的国际框架》,确立了全球统一的流动性风险监管指标,包括短期监管指标(LCR-流动性覆盖率)和长期监管指标(NSFR—净稳定资金比例)。巴曙松,金玲玲等:《巴塞尔资本协议Ⅲ的实施——基于金融结构的视角》,中国人民大学出版社2014年版,第129-130页。
[34]例如,在2011年出台的《巴塞尔Ⅲ》中的杠杆率标准无法解决各国会计准则存在的差异,及各国对杠杆率框架下的衍生产品、证券融资交易等敞口的计量方法存在不同的理解,影响了全球实施一致性,因此2014年BCBS对杠杆率标准进行了修订。
[35]See Susan Block-Lieb,Terence Halliday,Legitimation and Global Lawmaking,Fordham Law Legal Studies Research Paper No.952492,2006,p.14.at http://ssm.com/abstract=952492,May 16,2017.
[36]See Pan,supra note 21,p.282.
[37]BCG Basel Committee Groups,at http://www.bis.org/bcbs/mesc.htm.,May 31,2017.
[38]Basel Committee Charter,Ⅷ,at http://www.bis.org/bcbs/charter.htm#consultation_process.,May 31,2017.
[39]IAIS,at https://www.iaisweb.org/page/events/stakeholder-meetings//file/66450/public-background-session-icp-13-reinsurance-29-may-2017.,May 30,2017.
[40]See David Zaring,Informal Procedure,Hard and Soft,in International Administration,Chicago Journal of International Law,Vol.2,2005,p.573.
[41]The New Basel Capital Accord,at http://www.bis.org/press/p030429.htm,May 31,2017.
[42]See Pierre-Hugues Verdier,Transnational Regulatory Networks and Their Limits,The Yale Journal of International Law,Vol.34,2009,p.141.
[43]See Kelly,supra note 22,p.551.
[44]参见[英]克恩·亚历山大、拉胡尔·都莫、约翰·伊特威尔著:《金融体系的全球治理》,赵彦志译,东北财经大学出版社2010年版,第45页。
[45]如BCBS、CPMI等均采用“协商一致表决制”,IOSCO也将“协商一致表决制”规定为最佳决策方式。
[46]《国际货币基金组织协定》第28(a)条。
[47]See Brummer,supra note 5,p.96.
[48]二十国集团,at http://www.g20.org/gyg20/G20jj/201510/t20151027-871.html.,2017年5月16日。
[49]参见盛建明、钟楹:《关于WTO“协商一致”与“一揽子协定”决策原则的实证分析及其改革路径研究》,《河北法学》2015年第3期。
[50]See Brummer,supra note 5,p.97.
[51]See Katharina Gnath and Claudia Schmucker,The Role of the Emerging Countries in the G20:Agenda-Setter,Veto Player or Spectator?In C.Herrmann and J.P.Terhechte(eds.),European Yearbook of International Economic Law,2012,pp.671-680.
[52]By-Laws of IOSCO.,at http://www.iosco.org/library/by_laws/pdf/IOSCO-By-Laws-Section-l-English.pdf,May 16,2017.
[53]IAIS,2015 By-Laws,at http://iaisweb.org/index.cfm?event=getPage&nodeId=25208,May 16,2017.
[54]Statutes of the International Association of Deposit Insurers,at http://www.iadi.org/en/about-iadi/organisation/statutes-bylaws/.,May30,2017.
[55]参见陈海明、仲霞:《国际组织的投票表决与协商一致决策机制》,《长安大学学报(社会科学版)》2012年第14期。
[56]Institutional Alliances&Derivative Legitimacy,Michigan Journal of International Law,Vol.29,2008,p.619.
[57]参见周仲飞:《全球金融法的诞生》,《法学研究》2013年第5期。
[58]The Compendium of Standards,at http://www.fsb.org/what-we-do/about-the-compendium-of-standards/.,May 29,2017.
[59]Key Standards for Sound Financial Systems,at http://www.fsb.org/what-we-do/about-the-compendium-of-standards/key_standards/.,May 29,2017.
[60]参见[美]道格拉斯·沃纳、[英]迈克尔·泰勒:《全球金融危机和金融稳定委员会:硬化国际金融软法?》,管斌、杨阳译,《金融服务法评论》2013年第2期。
[61]Charter of the Financial Stability Board,art 16,at http://www.fsb.org/about/organisation-and-govemance/,May 29,2017.
[62]Initiative on Cooperation and Information Exchange,at http://www.fsb.org/what-we-do/implementation-monitoring/initiative-oncooperation-and-information-exchange/.,May 29,2017.
[63]参见注57,周仲飞文。
[64]See Robert P.Delonis,International Financial Standards and Codes:Mandatory Regulation without Representation,N.Y.U.Journal of International Law and Politics,Vol.36,2004,p.565.
[65]除了巴基斯坦外,格鲁吉亚,爱尔兰,亚美尼亚,阿尔巴尼亚等国均在意向书中作出遵行承诺。Pakistan Letter ofIntent,para.27,at http://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/2015/pak/120315.pdf.,Georgia Letter of Intent,at http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/loi/2012/geo/032712.pdf.,Ireland Letter of Intent,at http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/loi/2012/irl/021012.pdf.,Armenia Letter of Intent,at http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/loi/2015/arm/102215.pdf.,Albania Letter of Intent.at http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/loi/2015/alb/042815.pdf.,July.21,2016.
[66]The Financial Sector Assessment Program(FSAP),May 16,2017,at http://www.imf.org/extermal/np/exr/facts/fsap.htm.,May 30,2017.
[67]See Maurizia De Bellis,The New Public Law in a Global(Dis)Ordear-A Peispective from Italy,Jean Monnet Working Paper 16/10,2010,p.17.
[68]Assessment Committee,at http://www.iosco.org/about/?subsection=display_committee&cmtid=19.,May 29,2017.
[69]See Stavros Gadinis,Three Pathways to Global Standards:Private,Regulator,and Ministry Network,American Journal of International Law,Vol.1,2015,p.32.
[70]Implementation of Basel Standards-Regulatory Consistency Assessment Program(RCAP),at http://www.bis.org/bcbs/implementation.htm?m=3%7C14%7C587.,August.1,2016.其中管辖区域审查,被设计为由国内技术专家承担的同业审查(Peer Reviews)。此外,在管辖区域评价中,每个成员方需要在评价前填好相关问卷并定期更新。这些问卷将有助于国内的监管者和金融稳定机构对国内《巴塞尔Ⅲ》实施情况进行自我评估,并作出相应改进。Basel Committee on Banking Supervision,Regulatory Consistency Assessment Programme(RCAP),at http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d361.pdf.,May 31,2017.
[71]Progress Report on BaselⅢImplementation(update published in October 2012),at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs232.htm.,August.1,2016.进展报告主要包括三个内容,一是对《巴塞尔Ⅲ》采纳情况的监察;二是评价成员对《巴塞尔Ⅲ》遵行的一致性和能力;三是分析监管结果。See Implementation of Basel Standards,A Report to G20 Leaders on Implementation of the BaselⅢRegulatory Reforms,at http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d345.pdf.,August.1,2016.各成员方也会公布有关规则是实施的国内文件。Status of BaselⅡ,Basel 2.5 and BaselⅢadoption:Links to Domestic Implementation Documents,at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs/b3prog_dom_impl.htm.,May 31,2017.
[72]参见瞿栋:《全球金融治理体系发展动向及我国的应对策略》,《国外社会科学》2014年第4期。
[73]参见杜英歌、刘延平:《中国非政府组织面临的立法困境及改革》,《东北大学学报(社会科学版)》2011年第13期。
[74]参见李丹萍:《境外非政府组织在华运作的法律规制——地方实践引发的思考》,《云南大学学报法学版》2013年第26期。