《巴塞尔Ⅲ》何以获得遵行之法律分析及启示
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摘要
2017年12月完成修订的《巴塞尔Ⅲ》虽然在性质上属于不具有约束力的国际金融"软法",但是在实践中获得了国家和银行业的广泛遵行。从法律层面看,《巴塞尔Ⅲ》获得广泛遵行的原因可归结为其制定过程的民主合法性、实施框架的灵活渐进性和监督机制的外在约束性。国际金融监管规则在制定、实施和监督层面的上述三大特征对于新兴金融监管领域规则的发展具有重要借鉴意义。作为《巴塞尔Ⅲ》的积极遵行者,中国未来应该实质参与该协议的后续修订过程,审慎实施协议标准并有效运用该协议的监督机制,促使《巴塞尔Ⅲ》对中国银行业的健康发展发挥更加积极的作用。
Although Basel Ⅲ reform has been finalized in December 2017, which belongs to non-binding international financial "soft law" in nature, it is widely complied with by nations and banking industries in practice.From the legal aspect, the reasons for the compliance of Basel Ⅲ could be attributed to democratic legitimacy of the rule-making process, flexibility and progressivity of the implementation framework, and external constrains of the supervisory mechanism. As a positive follower of Basel Ⅲ, China should substantially take part in the follow-up revising processes, prudently implement the standards and effectively draw on the supervisory mechanism. It can contribute to the sound development of China's banking industry.
Although Basel Ⅲ reform has been finalized in December 2017, which belongs to non-binding international financial "soft law" in nature, it is widely complied with by nations and banking industries in practice.From the legal aspect, the reasons for the compliance of Basel Ⅲ could be attributed to democratic legitimacy of the rule-making process, flexibility and progressivity of the implementation framework, and external constrains of the supervisory mechanism. As a positive follower of Basel Ⅲ, China should substantially take part in the follow-up revising processes, prudently implement the standards and effectively draw on the supervisory mechanism. It can contribute to the sound development of China's banking industry.
引文
(1)Basel III:International Regulatory Framework for Banks,https://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3.htm?m=3%7C14%7C572,visited on 3 January 2018.
(2)10年中陆续出台的《巴塞尔Ⅲ》各项文件包括:2010年公布、2011年修订的《巴塞尔Ⅲ:为实现更具弹性银行和银行系统的一个全球监管框架》;2013年修订的《巴塞尔Ⅲ:流动性覆盖率和流动性风险监管工具》;2014年修订的《巴塞尔Ⅲ:净稳定资金比率》;2014年出台的《巴塞尔Ⅲ:杠杆率框架和披露要求》;等等。
(1)See RCAP on Consistency:Jurisdictional Assessments,https://www.bis.org/bcbs/implementation/rcap_jurisdictional.htm;Thirteenth Progress Report on Adoption of the Basel Regulatory Framework,https://www.bis.org/bcbs/implementation/rcap_reports.htm#latest_report;Basel II,2.5 and III Implementation,https://www.bis.org/fsi/fsipapers.htm,visited on 27 January2018.
(2)See Edith Brown Weiss&Dinah Shelton,Conclusions:Understanding Compliance with Soft Law,in Dinah Shelton(ed.),Commitment and Compliance:The Role of Non-binding Norms in the International Legal System 536-539(Oxford University Press2000).
(3)参见[美]迪米特里斯·肖发拉:《巴塞尔协议III:全球银行业的大挑战》,游春译,中国金融出版社2014年版,第1页。
(1)G20,http://g20.org/gyg20/G20jj/201510/t20151027_871.html,visited on 27 January2018.
(2)Basel Committee Membership,http://www.bis.org/bcbs/membership.htm,visited on27 January 2018.
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(4)Basel Committee Charter,https://www.bis.org/bcbs/charter.htm#consultation,visited on 3 February 2018.
(5)Basel Committee Membership,https://www.bis.org/bcbs/membership.htm,visited on3 February 2018.
(1)See Susan Block-Lieb&Terence Halliday,Legitimation and Global Lawmaking,Fordham Law Legal Studies Research Paper No.952492,2006,http://ssrn.com/abstract=952492,visited on 3 February 2018.
(2)See Chris Brummer,Soft Law and the Global Financial System-Rule Making in the 21st Century,96(Cambridge University Press 2012).
(3)See Alan Boyle,Soft Law in International Law-making,in Malcolm D.Evans(ed.),International Law 124(Oxford University Press 2006).
(4)See Edith Brown Weiss&Dinah Shelton,Conclusions:Understanding Compliance with Soft Law,in Dinah Shelton(ed.),Commitment and Compliance:The Role of Non-binding Norms in the International Legal System 537(Oxford University Press 2000).
(5)BCG Basel Committee Groups,http://www.bis.org/bcbs/mesc.htm,visited on 3March 2018.
(1)Basel Committee Charter,Ⅷ,http://www.bis.org/bcbs/charter.htm#consultation_process,visited on 3 March 2018.
(2)参见张庆麟、刘天姿:《论全球金融治理中的软法》,《国际经济法学刊》(第18卷第1期),北京大学出版社2011年版,第272-273页。
(3)See Jeffery Atik,EU Implementation of BaselⅢin the Shadow of Euro Crisis,38 Review of Banking&Financial Law 293(2014).
(4)See Anumeet Toor,International Financial Regulation and the Basel Accord:How the Impact of a Soft Law Whisper Results in Compliance throughout the Globe,2016,http://ssrn.com/abstract=2970253,visited on 3 March 2018,p.11.
(1)参见涂亦楠:《论国际金融软法及其硬化--以国际信贷法为例》,《湖北大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》2012年第3期,第82页。
(2)参见王兆星:《国际银行监管规则改革趋势和几点思考》,《金融监管研究》2016年第1期,第7-8页。
(3)参见鲁政委、何帆:《资本计提的平衡之道--〈巴塞尔协议III〉最新修订研究》,https://wallstreetcn.com/articles/3051173,2018年2月1日访问。
(4)《〈巴塞尔协议Ⅲ〉监管框架最终完成》,http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/i/jyjl/m/201712/20171202683497.shtml,2018年2月1日访问。
(5)《〈巴塞尔协议Ⅲ〉修订完成将从2022年起逐步实施》,http://www.financialnews.com.cn/hq/yw/201712/t20171229_130603.html,2018年2月3日访问。
(6)Duvvuri Subbarao,Basel III in International and Indian Contexts-Ten Questions We Should Know the Answers for,http://www.bis.org/review/r120904b.pdf?ql=1,visited on26 March 2018.
(7)Promoting Capacity Building in Financial Institutions in Emerging Countries in South Asia,ADB Technical Assistance Report,2014,p.3.
(1)About the FSI,https://www.bis.org/fsi/,visited on 26 March 2018.
(2)FSI Connect,https://www.bis.org/fsi/fsiconnect.htm,visited on 26 March 2018.
(3)BaselⅢDefinition of Capital-Frequently Asked Questions(Update of FAQs Published in July 2011),https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs204.htm,visited on 26 March 2018.
(4)这73个国家和地区银行监管机构的区域分布为:非洲16个,美洲16个,亚洲11个,欧洲24个,中东6个。See Roland Raskopf et al.,Supervisory Priorities in Non-Basel Committee Jurisdictions,https://www.bis.org/fsi/fsipapers.htm,visited on 26 March 2018.
(5)See Daniel E.Ho,Compliance with International Soft Law:Why Do Countries Implement the Basel Accord?,5 Journal of International Economic Law 647-688(2002).
(1)Implementation and Effects of the G20 Financial Regulatory Reforms,http://www.fsb.org/2015/11/implementation-and-effects-of-the-g20-financial-regulatory-reforms/,visited on26 March 2018.
(2)Progress Report on Basel III Implementation(Update Published in October 2012),http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs232.htm,visited on 26 March 2018.进展报告的主要内容包括:对《巴塞尔Ⅲ》采纳情况的监察;评价成员方对《巴塞尔Ⅲ》遵行的一致性和能力;分析监管结果。See Implementation of Basel Standards:A Report to G20 Leaders on Implementation of the BaselⅢRegulatory Reforms,http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d345.pdf,visited on 26March 2018.各成员方也会公布有关规则实施的国内文件,See Status of BaselⅡBasel2.5 and BaselⅢAdoption:Links to Domestic Implementation Documents,http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs/b3prog_dom_impl.htm,visited on 26 March 2018。
(3)Implementation of Basel Standards-Regulatory Consistency Assessment Program(RCAP),http://www.bis.org/bcbs/implementation.htm?m=3%7C14%7C587,visited on 26March 2018.
(4)See Chris Brummer,Soft Law and the Global Financial System-Rule Making in the 21st Century 140(Cambridge University Press 2012).
(1)Melissa Boey,Regulating“Bankerspace”:Challenging the Legitimacy of the Basel Accords as Soft Law,87 Southern California Law Review(Postscript)103(2014).
(2)See Chris Brummer,How International Financial Law Works(and How It Doesn’t),99 The Georgetown Law Journal 285(2011).
(3)See Roberta Romano,For Diversity in the International Regulation of Financial Institutions:Critiquing and Recalibrating the Basel Architecture,452 Yale Law&Economics Research Paper 49(2012).
(4)See Edgar Demetrio Tovar-Garía&Ruslana Kozubekova,The Third Pillar of the Basel Accord:Evidence of Borrower Discipline in the Kyrgyz Banking System,7 Journal of Eurasian Studies 196(2016).
(5)See Matt Schlickenmaier,Basel III and Credit Risk Measurement:Variations Among G20 Countries,14 San Diego International Law Journal 197(2013).
(6)See David Min,Understanding the Failures of Market Discipline,92 Washington University Law Review 1495(2015).
(1)BaselⅢ:A Global Regulatory Framework for More Resilient Banks and Banking Systems,http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf,visited on 26 March 2018.
(2)Douglas D.Evanoffa et al.,Enhancing Market Discipline in Banking:The Role of Subordinated Debt in Financial Regulatory Reform,63 Journal of Economics and Business2-3(2011).
(3)包括澳大利亚、加拿大(魁北克和安大略省)、法国、德国、中国香港、意大利、日本、荷兰、新加坡、西班牙、瑞典、英国和美国(商品期货交易委员会和证券监管委员会),Consultation Report,An Overview of the Work of the IOSCO Technical Committee,http://www.iasplus.com/en/binary/iosco/0703ioscoworkplan.pdf,visited on 20 January 2018。
(1)Resolution of the Presidents’Committee on the Composition of the IOSCO Board(Resolution 5/2013 as Amended by Resolution 2/2015),http://www.iosco.org/about/?subsection=resolutions,visited on 20 January 2018.
(2)阿根廷、巴西、中国、埃及、印度、肯尼亚、马拉西亚等新兴市场国家和发展中国家的18个证券监管部门。See IOSCO Board,http://www.iosco.org/about/?subsection=display_committee&cmtid=11,visited on 20 January 2018.
(3)How the IFRS Interpretations Committee Helps Implementation,https://www.ifrs.org/supporting-implementation/how-the-ifrs-interpretations-committee-helps-implementation/,visited on 20 January 2018.
(4)Upcoming IOSCO Training Programs,https://www.iosco.org/training/?subsection=iosco_training_programs,visited on 20 January 2018.
(5)Monitoring Implementation of the PFMI,https://www.bis.org/cpmi/info_mios.htm?m=3%7C16%7C599,visited on 20 January 2018.
(1)2018年3月13日,中国银监会和保监会合并为“中国银行保险监督管理委员会”,简称“银保会”。银保会的“三定”方案(定职能、定机构、定编制)尚未出台,其称谓甚至职能的变化未来可能会体现在BCBS成员构成和国内银行业监管活动中。参见《金融监管迎“一行两会”新格局“银保合”弥补监管空白》,新华网,http://www.xinhuanet.com/finance/2018-03/14/c_129829237.htm,2018年3月26日访问。
(2)About the Basel Committee’s Work structure,https://www.bis.org/bcbs/mesc.htm,visited on 26 March 2018.
(3)See Peter Knaack,An Unlikely Champion of Global Finance:Why Is China Exceeding International Banking Standards?,2 Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 45(2017).
(4)Andrew Walter,Emerging Countries and Basel III-Why Is Engagement Still Low?,The Centre for International Governance Innovation,2015,p.4.
(5)《〈巴塞尔协议Ⅲ〉监管框架最终完成》,http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/i/jyjl/m/201712/20171202683497.shtml,2018年1月5日访问。
(1)See Andrew Walter,Emerging Countries and Basel III-Why Is Engagement Still Low?,The Centre for International Governance Innovation,2015,p.10.
(2)2007年至2016年的10年间,中国外资银行的市场份额缩水一半。参见《外资银行在华十年,经历了怎样的变局?》,http://mini.eastday.com/a/171216082152586.html,2018年3月5日访问。
(3)例如关于逆周期资本缓冲的报告,中国只提交了1份不足10页的个人意见。而英国提供了12份来自5种不同类型主体的报告,平均篇幅长达30页。See Andrew Walter,Emerging Countries and BaselⅢ-Why Is Engagement Still Low?,The Centre for International Governance Innovation,2015,p.11.
(4)参见《中国银行业监督管理委员会令》(2012年第1号);《商业银行资本管理办法(试行)》第23条。
(1)参见徐翀等:《巴塞尔协议Ⅲ的全球实施进展与启示》,《华北金融》2017年第3期,第45页。
(2)See Edith Brown Weiss&Dinah Shelton,Conclusions:Understanding Compliance with Soft Law,in Dinah Shelton(ed.),Commitment and Compliance:The Role of Non-binding Norms in the International Legal System 535-553(Oxford University Press2000).
(3)有学者甚至认为,《巴塞尔Ⅲ》当前已经构成国际习惯法。参见韩龙、包承恩:《巴塞尔III性质之探》,《国际金融研究》2014年第2期,第55-57页。
(4)参见巴曙松:《巴塞尔资本协议Ⅲ的新进展》,《中国金融》2010年第20期,第99页。
(5)参见杜权、庄瑾亮:《巴塞尔协议Ⅲ在我国适用性问题的再审视--兼论监管政策对中小银行的影响》,《浙江金融》2016年第1期,第52页。
(6)2017年12月6日银监会就《商业银行流动性风险管理办法(修订征求意见稿)》公开征求意见,http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/chinese/home/docView/93528924E8EB491F99027F2946D4AFD8.html,2018年1月5日访问。
(7)See Jeanne Gobat et al.,The Net Stable Funding Ratio:Impact and Issues for Consideration,IMF Working Paper,WP/14/106,p.3.
(1)RCAP on Consistency:Jurisdictional Assessments,https://www.bis.org/bcbs/implementation/rcap_jurisdictional.htm#china,visited on 2 February 2018.
(2)See Knaack Peter,An Unlikely Champion of Global Finance:Why Is China Exceeding International Banking Standards?,2 Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 65(2017).
(3)参见黎四奇:《对我国资本充足率监管中次级债发行的辩证思考》,《湖南公安高等专科学校学报》2009年第3期,第76页。
(4)参见吴松汉等:《巴Ⅲ实施总结与中小银行应对之道》,《金融电子化》2016年第6期,第28-29页。
(5)参见陈歆:《完善监管资本定义推进新监管标准实施》,《金融会计》2014年第6期,第46页。
(6)参见钱毅等:《巴塞尔新资本协议的公司治理意蕴》,《中国金融》2011年第7期,第57页。
(7)See Pierre-Etienne Chabanel,Implementing Basel III:Challenges,Options&Opportunities,White Paper,http://www.Moodysanalytics.com,visited on 23 March 2018.
(2)10年中陆续出台的《巴塞尔Ⅲ》各项文件包括:2010年公布、2011年修订的《巴塞尔Ⅲ:为实现更具弹性银行和银行系统的一个全球监管框架》;2013年修订的《巴塞尔Ⅲ:流动性覆盖率和流动性风险监管工具》;2014年修订的《巴塞尔Ⅲ:净稳定资金比率》;2014年出台的《巴塞尔Ⅲ:杠杆率框架和披露要求》;等等。
(1)See RCAP on Consistency:Jurisdictional Assessments,https://www.bis.org/bcbs/implementation/rcap_jurisdictional.htm;Thirteenth Progress Report on Adoption of the Basel Regulatory Framework,https://www.bis.org/bcbs/implementation/rcap_reports.htm#latest_report;Basel II,2.5 and III Implementation,https://www.bis.org/fsi/fsipapers.htm,visited on 27 January2018.
(2)See Edith Brown Weiss&Dinah Shelton,Conclusions:Understanding Compliance with Soft Law,in Dinah Shelton(ed.),Commitment and Compliance:The Role of Non-binding Norms in the International Legal System 536-539(Oxford University Press2000).
(3)参见[美]迪米特里斯·肖发拉:《巴塞尔协议III:全球银行业的大挑战》,游春译,中国金融出版社2014年版,第1页。
(1)G20,http://g20.org/gyg20/G20jj/201510/t20151027_871.html,visited on 27 January2018.
(2)Basel Committee Membership,http://www.bis.org/bcbs/membership.htm,visited on27 January 2018.
(3)See RCAP on Consistency:Jurisdictional Assessments,https://www.bis.org/bcbs/implementation/rcap_jurisdictional.htm,visited on 27 January 2018.
(4)Basel Committee Charter,https://www.bis.org/bcbs/charter.htm#consultation,visited on 3 February 2018.
(5)Basel Committee Membership,https://www.bis.org/bcbs/membership.htm,visited on3 February 2018.
(1)See Susan Block-Lieb&Terence Halliday,Legitimation and Global Lawmaking,Fordham Law Legal Studies Research Paper No.952492,2006,http://ssrn.com/abstract=952492,visited on 3 February 2018.
(2)See Chris Brummer,Soft Law and the Global Financial System-Rule Making in the 21st Century,96(Cambridge University Press 2012).
(3)See Alan Boyle,Soft Law in International Law-making,in Malcolm D.Evans(ed.),International Law 124(Oxford University Press 2006).
(4)See Edith Brown Weiss&Dinah Shelton,Conclusions:Understanding Compliance with Soft Law,in Dinah Shelton(ed.),Commitment and Compliance:The Role of Non-binding Norms in the International Legal System 537(Oxford University Press 2000).
(5)BCG Basel Committee Groups,http://www.bis.org/bcbs/mesc.htm,visited on 3March 2018.
(1)Basel Committee Charter,Ⅷ,http://www.bis.org/bcbs/charter.htm#consultation_process,visited on 3 March 2018.
(2)参见张庆麟、刘天姿:《论全球金融治理中的软法》,《国际经济法学刊》(第18卷第1期),北京大学出版社2011年版,第272-273页。
(3)See Jeffery Atik,EU Implementation of BaselⅢin the Shadow of Euro Crisis,38 Review of Banking&Financial Law 293(2014).
(4)See Anumeet Toor,International Financial Regulation and the Basel Accord:How the Impact of a Soft Law Whisper Results in Compliance throughout the Globe,2016,http://ssrn.com/abstract=2970253,visited on 3 March 2018,p.11.
(1)参见涂亦楠:《论国际金融软法及其硬化--以国际信贷法为例》,《湖北大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》2012年第3期,第82页。
(2)参见王兆星:《国际银行监管规则改革趋势和几点思考》,《金融监管研究》2016年第1期,第7-8页。
(3)参见鲁政委、何帆:《资本计提的平衡之道--〈巴塞尔协议III〉最新修订研究》,https://wallstreetcn.com/articles/3051173,2018年2月1日访问。
(4)《〈巴塞尔协议Ⅲ〉监管框架最终完成》,http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/i/jyjl/m/201712/20171202683497.shtml,2018年2月1日访问。
(5)《〈巴塞尔协议Ⅲ〉修订完成将从2022年起逐步实施》,http://www.financialnews.com.cn/hq/yw/201712/t20171229_130603.html,2018年2月3日访问。
(6)Duvvuri Subbarao,Basel III in International and Indian Contexts-Ten Questions We Should Know the Answers for,http://www.bis.org/review/r120904b.pdf?ql=1,visited on26 March 2018.
(7)Promoting Capacity Building in Financial Institutions in Emerging Countries in South Asia,ADB Technical Assistance Report,2014,p.3.
(1)About the FSI,https://www.bis.org/fsi/,visited on 26 March 2018.
(2)FSI Connect,https://www.bis.org/fsi/fsiconnect.htm,visited on 26 March 2018.
(3)BaselⅢDefinition of Capital-Frequently Asked Questions(Update of FAQs Published in July 2011),https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs204.htm,visited on 26 March 2018.
(4)这73个国家和地区银行监管机构的区域分布为:非洲16个,美洲16个,亚洲11个,欧洲24个,中东6个。See Roland Raskopf et al.,Supervisory Priorities in Non-Basel Committee Jurisdictions,https://www.bis.org/fsi/fsipapers.htm,visited on 26 March 2018.
(5)See Daniel E.Ho,Compliance with International Soft Law:Why Do Countries Implement the Basel Accord?,5 Journal of International Economic Law 647-688(2002).
(1)Implementation and Effects of the G20 Financial Regulatory Reforms,http://www.fsb.org/2015/11/implementation-and-effects-of-the-g20-financial-regulatory-reforms/,visited on26 March 2018.
(2)Progress Report on Basel III Implementation(Update Published in October 2012),http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs232.htm,visited on 26 March 2018.进展报告的主要内容包括:对《巴塞尔Ⅲ》采纳情况的监察;评价成员方对《巴塞尔Ⅲ》遵行的一致性和能力;分析监管结果。See Implementation of Basel Standards:A Report to G20 Leaders on Implementation of the BaselⅢRegulatory Reforms,http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d345.pdf,visited on 26March 2018.各成员方也会公布有关规则实施的国内文件,See Status of BaselⅡBasel2.5 and BaselⅢAdoption:Links to Domestic Implementation Documents,http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs/b3prog_dom_impl.htm,visited on 26 March 2018。
(3)Implementation of Basel Standards-Regulatory Consistency Assessment Program(RCAP),http://www.bis.org/bcbs/implementation.htm?m=3%7C14%7C587,visited on 26March 2018.
(4)See Chris Brummer,Soft Law and the Global Financial System-Rule Making in the 21st Century 140(Cambridge University Press 2012).
(1)Melissa Boey,Regulating“Bankerspace”:Challenging the Legitimacy of the Basel Accords as Soft Law,87 Southern California Law Review(Postscript)103(2014).
(2)See Chris Brummer,How International Financial Law Works(and How It Doesn’t),99 The Georgetown Law Journal 285(2011).
(3)See Roberta Romano,For Diversity in the International Regulation of Financial Institutions:Critiquing and Recalibrating the Basel Architecture,452 Yale Law&Economics Research Paper 49(2012).
(4)See Edgar Demetrio Tovar-Garía&Ruslana Kozubekova,The Third Pillar of the Basel Accord:Evidence of Borrower Discipline in the Kyrgyz Banking System,7 Journal of Eurasian Studies 196(2016).
(5)See Matt Schlickenmaier,Basel III and Credit Risk Measurement:Variations Among G20 Countries,14 San Diego International Law Journal 197(2013).
(6)See David Min,Understanding the Failures of Market Discipline,92 Washington University Law Review 1495(2015).
(1)BaselⅢ:A Global Regulatory Framework for More Resilient Banks and Banking Systems,http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf,visited on 26 March 2018.
(2)Douglas D.Evanoffa et al.,Enhancing Market Discipline in Banking:The Role of Subordinated Debt in Financial Regulatory Reform,63 Journal of Economics and Business2-3(2011).
(3)包括澳大利亚、加拿大(魁北克和安大略省)、法国、德国、中国香港、意大利、日本、荷兰、新加坡、西班牙、瑞典、英国和美国(商品期货交易委员会和证券监管委员会),Consultation Report,An Overview of the Work of the IOSCO Technical Committee,http://www.iasplus.com/en/binary/iosco/0703ioscoworkplan.pdf,visited on 20 January 2018。
(1)Resolution of the Presidents’Committee on the Composition of the IOSCO Board(Resolution 5/2013 as Amended by Resolution 2/2015),http://www.iosco.org/about/?subsection=resolutions,visited on 20 January 2018.
(2)阿根廷、巴西、中国、埃及、印度、肯尼亚、马拉西亚等新兴市场国家和发展中国家的18个证券监管部门。See IOSCO Board,http://www.iosco.org/about/?subsection=display_committee&cmtid=11,visited on 20 January 2018.
(3)How the IFRS Interpretations Committee Helps Implementation,https://www.ifrs.org/supporting-implementation/how-the-ifrs-interpretations-committee-helps-implementation/,visited on 20 January 2018.
(4)Upcoming IOSCO Training Programs,https://www.iosco.org/training/?subsection=iosco_training_programs,visited on 20 January 2018.
(5)Monitoring Implementation of the PFMI,https://www.bis.org/cpmi/info_mios.htm?m=3%7C16%7C599,visited on 20 January 2018.
(1)2018年3月13日,中国银监会和保监会合并为“中国银行保险监督管理委员会”,简称“银保会”。银保会的“三定”方案(定职能、定机构、定编制)尚未出台,其称谓甚至职能的变化未来可能会体现在BCBS成员构成和国内银行业监管活动中。参见《金融监管迎“一行两会”新格局“银保合”弥补监管空白》,新华网,http://www.xinhuanet.com/finance/2018-03/14/c_129829237.htm,2018年3月26日访问。
(2)About the Basel Committee’s Work structure,https://www.bis.org/bcbs/mesc.htm,visited on 26 March 2018.
(3)See Peter Knaack,An Unlikely Champion of Global Finance:Why Is China Exceeding International Banking Standards?,2 Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 45(2017).
(4)Andrew Walter,Emerging Countries and Basel III-Why Is Engagement Still Low?,The Centre for International Governance Innovation,2015,p.4.
(5)《〈巴塞尔协议Ⅲ〉监管框架最终完成》,http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/i/jyjl/m/201712/20171202683497.shtml,2018年1月5日访问。
(1)See Andrew Walter,Emerging Countries and Basel III-Why Is Engagement Still Low?,The Centre for International Governance Innovation,2015,p.10.
(2)2007年至2016年的10年间,中国外资银行的市场份额缩水一半。参见《外资银行在华十年,经历了怎样的变局?》,http://mini.eastday.com/a/171216082152586.html,2018年3月5日访问。
(3)例如关于逆周期资本缓冲的报告,中国只提交了1份不足10页的个人意见。而英国提供了12份来自5种不同类型主体的报告,平均篇幅长达30页。See Andrew Walter,Emerging Countries and BaselⅢ-Why Is Engagement Still Low?,The Centre for International Governance Innovation,2015,p.11.
(4)参见《中国银行业监督管理委员会令》(2012年第1号);《商业银行资本管理办法(试行)》第23条。
(1)参见徐翀等:《巴塞尔协议Ⅲ的全球实施进展与启示》,《华北金融》2017年第3期,第45页。
(2)See Edith Brown Weiss&Dinah Shelton,Conclusions:Understanding Compliance with Soft Law,in Dinah Shelton(ed.),Commitment and Compliance:The Role of Non-binding Norms in the International Legal System 535-553(Oxford University Press2000).
(3)有学者甚至认为,《巴塞尔Ⅲ》当前已经构成国际习惯法。参见韩龙、包承恩:《巴塞尔III性质之探》,《国际金融研究》2014年第2期,第55-57页。
(4)参见巴曙松:《巴塞尔资本协议Ⅲ的新进展》,《中国金融》2010年第20期,第99页。
(5)参见杜权、庄瑾亮:《巴塞尔协议Ⅲ在我国适用性问题的再审视--兼论监管政策对中小银行的影响》,《浙江金融》2016年第1期,第52页。
(6)2017年12月6日银监会就《商业银行流动性风险管理办法(修订征求意见稿)》公开征求意见,http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/chinese/home/docView/93528924E8EB491F99027F2946D4AFD8.html,2018年1月5日访问。
(7)See Jeanne Gobat et al.,The Net Stable Funding Ratio:Impact and Issues for Consideration,IMF Working Paper,WP/14/106,p.3.
(1)RCAP on Consistency:Jurisdictional Assessments,https://www.bis.org/bcbs/implementation/rcap_jurisdictional.htm#china,visited on 2 February 2018.
(2)See Knaack Peter,An Unlikely Champion of Global Finance:Why Is China Exceeding International Banking Standards?,2 Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 65(2017).
(3)参见黎四奇:《对我国资本充足率监管中次级债发行的辩证思考》,《湖南公安高等专科学校学报》2009年第3期,第76页。
(4)参见吴松汉等:《巴Ⅲ实施总结与中小银行应对之道》,《金融电子化》2016年第6期,第28-29页。
(5)参见陈歆:《完善监管资本定义推进新监管标准实施》,《金融会计》2014年第6期,第46页。
(6)参见钱毅等:《巴塞尔新资本协议的公司治理意蕴》,《中国金融》2011年第7期,第57页。
(7)See Pierre-Etienne Chabanel,Implementing Basel III:Challenges,Options&Opportunities,White Paper,http://www.Moodysanalytics.com,visited on 23 March 2018.