金融生态环境、信贷资源配置对我国僵尸企业影响的研究——基于空间计量模型实证
|
摘要
以我国30个省、自治区、直辖市2003—2016年僵尸企业为样本,探究金融生态环境、信贷资源配置对僵尸企业的影响。研究结果显示:僵尸企业存在显著正向空间溢出效应;贷款规模与僵尸企业的数量正相关,中长期贷款相较于短期贷款对僵尸企业数量的影响更显著;金融生态环境对僵尸企业增长的直接抑制作用不显著,但其可通过降低贷款总额与僵尸企业数量的正相关关系间接抑制僵尸企业的形成;金融市场发展能减弱不同期限贷款和僵尸企业的正相关关系,制度和诚信文化建设则加剧了贷款与僵尸企业正相关关系,而政府治理、经济发展作用并不显著。基于上述实证结果,对"僵尸企业"出清提出相应的对策和建议。
Taking data from 2003 to 2016 of zombie enterprises in 30 provinces in China(except Tibet) as samples, this paper studies the influence of financial ecological environment and credit resource allocation on zombie enterprises. The results show the following. Firstly, there is a significant positive spatial spillover effect among zombie enterprises in China. Secondly, the loan scale is positively correlated with the increasing of zombie enterprises, and the impact between the medium-and long-term loans and the number of zombie enterprises is more significant than that of short-term loans. Thirdly, the direct inhibitory effect of financial ecological environment on the growth of zombie enterprises is not significant, but it reduces the positive correlation between the total loan amount and the increasing of zombie enterprises. Forthly, the development of financial market can weaken the positive correlation between loans of different maturities and zombie enterprises, while the construction of system and credit culture intensifies the positive correlation between loans and zombie enterprises. The role of government governance and economic development is not significant. Based on the above empirical results, this paper puts forward corresponding countermeasures and suggestions for dealing with "zombie enterprises".
Taking data from 2003 to 2016 of zombie enterprises in 30 provinces in China(except Tibet) as samples, this paper studies the influence of financial ecological environment and credit resource allocation on zombie enterprises. The results show the following. Firstly, there is a significant positive spatial spillover effect among zombie enterprises in China. Secondly, the loan scale is positively correlated with the increasing of zombie enterprises, and the impact between the medium-and long-term loans and the number of zombie enterprises is more significant than that of short-term loans. Thirdly, the direct inhibitory effect of financial ecological environment on the growth of zombie enterprises is not significant, but it reduces the positive correlation between the total loan amount and the increasing of zombie enterprises. Forthly, the development of financial market can weaken the positive correlation between loans of different maturities and zombie enterprises, while the construction of system and credit culture intensifies the positive correlation between loans and zombie enterprises. The role of government governance and economic development is not significant. Based on the above empirical results, this paper puts forward corresponding countermeasures and suggestions for dealing with "zombie enterprises".
引文
[1]聂辉华,江艇,张雨潇,方明月.中国僵尸企业研究报告--现状、原因和对策[R].北京:中国人民大学国发院,2017:20-23.
[2]国务院关于钢铁行业化解过实现脱困发展的意见国发[2016]6号[EB/OL].政府网,(2016-02-04)[2018-03-17].http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2016-02/04/content_5039353.htm.
[3]国务院关于积极稳妥降低企业杠杆率的意见国发[2016]54号[EB/OL].政府网,(2016-10-10)[2018-03-27].http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2016-10/10/content_5116835.htm.
[4]抓住处置“僵尸企业”这个牛鼻子去产能,更严格更坚决[EB/OL].新华网,(2016-12-19)[2018-04-21].http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2016-12/19/c_1120140099.htm.
[5]钱爱民,付东.金融生态环境、金融资源配置与产能过剩[J].经济与管理研究,2017,38(5):54-65.
[6]黄少卿,陈彦.中国僵尸企业的分布特征与分类处置[J].中国工业经济,2017(3):24-43.
[7]KANE E J.Dangers of capital forbearance:The case of the FSLIC and zombie S&Ls[J].Contemporary Economic Policy,1987(1):77-83.
[8]BRUCHE M,LLOBET G.Preventing zombie lending[J].Review of Financial Studies,2014,27(3):923-956.
[9]PEEK J,ROSENGREN E S.Unnatural selection:Perverse incentives and the misallocation of credit in Japan[J].American Economic Review,2003,95(95):1144-1166.
[10]HOSHI T,KASHYAP A K.Will the U.S.bank recapitalization succeed?Eight lessons from Japan[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2010,97(3):398-417.
[11]CABALLERO R J,HOSHI T,KASHYAP A K.Zombie lending and depressed restructuring in Japan[J].American Economic Review,2008,98(5):1943-1977.
[12]FUKUDA S,J NAKAMURA.“Why Did‘Zombie’Firms Recover in Japan?”[J].World Economy,2011,34(7):1124-1137.
[13]KWON H U.NARITA F,NARITA M.Resource reallocation and zombie lending in Japan in the 1990s[J].Review of Economic Dynamics,2015,18(4):709-732.
[14]聂辉华,江艇,张雨潇,方明月.我国僵尸企业的现状、原因与对策[J].宏观经济管理,2016,(9):63-68,88.
[15]KAWAI M,MORGAN P.Banking crises and“Japanization”:Origins and implications[R].Working Paper,430,2013.
[16]WATANABE W.Does a large loss of bank capital cause evergreening?Evidence from Japan[J].Journal of the Japanese and International Economies,2010,24(1):116-136.
[17]朱鹤,何帆.中国僵尸企业的数量测度及特征分析[J].北京工商大学学报(社会科学版),2016,31(4):116-126.
[18]游达明,张杨,袁宝龙.官员晋升锦标赛体制下环境规制、央地分权对环境污染的影响研究[J].中南大学学报(社会科学版),2018,24(3):66-77.
[19]陈运森,黄健峤.地域偏爱与僵尸企业的形成--来自中国的经验证据[J].经济管理,2017,39(9):149-166.
[20]张亮,唐任伍,成蕾.“僵尸企业”的成因、处置障碍与对策[J].经济纵横,2018(2):49-54.
[21]王立国,高越青.建立和完善市场退出机制有效化解产能过剩[J].宏观经济研究,2014(10):8-21.
[22]郭莹.供给侧结构性改革视角下僵尸企业的成因与出清路径[J].现代经济探讨,2016(12):54-58.
[23]顾振华,陈强远.中央和地方的双重政策保护与产能过剩[J].财经研究,2017,43(11):84-97.
[24]RAWDANOWICZ L,BOUIS R,WATANABE S.The benefits and costs of highly expansionary monetary policy[R].Working Paper No.1082,2013.
[25]LIN Y P,SRINIVASAN A,YAMADA T.The effect of government bank lending:Evidence from the financial crisis in Japan[R].Working Paper,2015.
[26]PAPAVA V G.The problem of zombification of the postcommunist necroeconomy[J].Problems of Economic Transition,2010,53(4):35-51.
[27]何帆,朱鹤.僵尸企业的处置策略[J].中国金融,2016(13):25-27.
[28]聂辉华,江艇,张雨潇,等.如何清理僵尸企业[J].中国经济报告,2016(9):69-71.
[29]陈超,李镕伊.债券融资成本与债券契约条款设计[J].金融研究,2014(1):44-57.
[30]叶志锋,李琦,肖庆飞.基于政银企三方视角的僵尸企业识别体系[J].价值工程,2017,36(32):60-64.
[31]刘奎甫,茅宁.“僵尸企业”国外研究述评[J].外国经济与管理,2016,38(10):3-19.
[32]耿强,江飞涛,傅坦.政策性补贴、产能过剩与中国的经济波动--引入产能利用率RBC模型的实证检验[J].中国工业经济,2011(5):27-36.
[33]孔东民,刘莎莎,王亚男.市场竞争、产权与政府补贴[J].经济研究,2013,48(2):55-67.
[34]张红凤,汲昌霖.政治关联、金融生态环境与企业融资--基于山东省上市公司数据的实证分析[J].经济理论与经济管理,2015(11):77-86.
[35]周琎,冼国明,明秀南.僵尸企业的识别与预警--来自中国上市公司的证据[J].财经研究,2018,44(4):130-142.
[36]方明月,张雨潇,聂辉华.中小民营企业成为僵尸企业之谜[J].学术月刊,2018,50(3):75-86.
[37]陈运森,黄健峤.地域偏爱与僵尸企业的形成--来自中国的经验证据[J].经济管理,2017,39(9):149-166.
[38]魏志华,王贞洁,吴育辉,等.金融生态环境、审计意见与债务融资成本[J].审计研究,2012(3):98-105.
[39]申广军.比较优势与僵尸企业:基于新结构经济学视角的研究[J].管理世界,2016(12):13-24,187.
[40]李霄阳,瞿强.中国僵尸企业:识别与分类[J].国际金融研究,2017,(8):3-13.
[41]CABALLERO R J,HOSHI T,KASHYAP A K.Zombie lending and depressed restructuring in Japan[J].American Economic Review,2008,98(5):1943-1977.
[42]樊纲,王小鲁,马光荣.中国市场化进程对经济增长的贡献[J].经济研究,2011,46(9):4-16.
[43]中国人民银行洛阳市中心支行课题组.区域金融生态环境评价指标体系研究[J].金融研究,2006(1):167-177.
[44]谭语嫣,谭之博,黄益平,等.僵尸企业的投资挤出效应:基于中国工业企业的证据[J].经济研究,2017,52(5):175-188.
[45]方明月,张雨潇,聂辉华.中小民营企业成为僵尸企业之谜[J].学术月刊,2018,50(3):75-86.
[46]魏志华,曾爱民,李博.金融生态环境与企业融资约束--基于中国上市公司的实证研究[J].会计研究,2014(5):73-80,95.
(1)主营业务收入2000万元及以上、固定资产投资项目计划总投资额500万元及以上的工业企业。
(2)考虑到数据可得性,在指标选择时剔除西藏。
(3)金融生态环境指标体系分为4个目标层、9个准则层、22个指标层,篇幅限制,此处从略,备索。
(4)为了避免在进行回归时,出现多重共线性问题,对贷款总额loan、中长期贷款lloan、短期贷款sloan、政府治理gov、经济基础enc、金融市场发展fmrt、制度和诚信文化建设reg变量进行去均值处理。
[2]国务院关于钢铁行业化解过实现脱困发展的意见国发[2016]6号[EB/OL].政府网,(2016-02-04)[2018-03-17].http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2016-02/04/content_5039353.htm.
[3]国务院关于积极稳妥降低企业杠杆率的意见国发[2016]54号[EB/OL].政府网,(2016-10-10)[2018-03-27].http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2016-10/10/content_5116835.htm.
[4]抓住处置“僵尸企业”这个牛鼻子去产能,更严格更坚决[EB/OL].新华网,(2016-12-19)[2018-04-21].http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2016-12/19/c_1120140099.htm.
[5]钱爱民,付东.金融生态环境、金融资源配置与产能过剩[J].经济与管理研究,2017,38(5):54-65.
[6]黄少卿,陈彦.中国僵尸企业的分布特征与分类处置[J].中国工业经济,2017(3):24-43.
[7]KANE E J.Dangers of capital forbearance:The case of the FSLIC and zombie S&Ls[J].Contemporary Economic Policy,1987(1):77-83.
[8]BRUCHE M,LLOBET G.Preventing zombie lending[J].Review of Financial Studies,2014,27(3):923-956.
[9]PEEK J,ROSENGREN E S.Unnatural selection:Perverse incentives and the misallocation of credit in Japan[J].American Economic Review,2003,95(95):1144-1166.
[10]HOSHI T,KASHYAP A K.Will the U.S.bank recapitalization succeed?Eight lessons from Japan[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2010,97(3):398-417.
[11]CABALLERO R J,HOSHI T,KASHYAP A K.Zombie lending and depressed restructuring in Japan[J].American Economic Review,2008,98(5):1943-1977.
[12]FUKUDA S,J NAKAMURA.“Why Did‘Zombie’Firms Recover in Japan?”[J].World Economy,2011,34(7):1124-1137.
[13]KWON H U.NARITA F,NARITA M.Resource reallocation and zombie lending in Japan in the 1990s[J].Review of Economic Dynamics,2015,18(4):709-732.
[14]聂辉华,江艇,张雨潇,方明月.我国僵尸企业的现状、原因与对策[J].宏观经济管理,2016,(9):63-68,88.
[15]KAWAI M,MORGAN P.Banking crises and“Japanization”:Origins and implications[R].Working Paper,430,2013.
[16]WATANABE W.Does a large loss of bank capital cause evergreening?Evidence from Japan[J].Journal of the Japanese and International Economies,2010,24(1):116-136.
[17]朱鹤,何帆.中国僵尸企业的数量测度及特征分析[J].北京工商大学学报(社会科学版),2016,31(4):116-126.
[18]游达明,张杨,袁宝龙.官员晋升锦标赛体制下环境规制、央地分权对环境污染的影响研究[J].中南大学学报(社会科学版),2018,24(3):66-77.
[19]陈运森,黄健峤.地域偏爱与僵尸企业的形成--来自中国的经验证据[J].经济管理,2017,39(9):149-166.
[20]张亮,唐任伍,成蕾.“僵尸企业”的成因、处置障碍与对策[J].经济纵横,2018(2):49-54.
[21]王立国,高越青.建立和完善市场退出机制有效化解产能过剩[J].宏观经济研究,2014(10):8-21.
[22]郭莹.供给侧结构性改革视角下僵尸企业的成因与出清路径[J].现代经济探讨,2016(12):54-58.
[23]顾振华,陈强远.中央和地方的双重政策保护与产能过剩[J].财经研究,2017,43(11):84-97.
[24]RAWDANOWICZ L,BOUIS R,WATANABE S.The benefits and costs of highly expansionary monetary policy[R].Working Paper No.1082,2013.
[25]LIN Y P,SRINIVASAN A,YAMADA T.The effect of government bank lending:Evidence from the financial crisis in Japan[R].Working Paper,2015.
[26]PAPAVA V G.The problem of zombification of the postcommunist necroeconomy[J].Problems of Economic Transition,2010,53(4):35-51.
[27]何帆,朱鹤.僵尸企业的处置策略[J].中国金融,2016(13):25-27.
[28]聂辉华,江艇,张雨潇,等.如何清理僵尸企业[J].中国经济报告,2016(9):69-71.
[29]陈超,李镕伊.债券融资成本与债券契约条款设计[J].金融研究,2014(1):44-57.
[30]叶志锋,李琦,肖庆飞.基于政银企三方视角的僵尸企业识别体系[J].价值工程,2017,36(32):60-64.
[31]刘奎甫,茅宁.“僵尸企业”国外研究述评[J].外国经济与管理,2016,38(10):3-19.
[32]耿强,江飞涛,傅坦.政策性补贴、产能过剩与中国的经济波动--引入产能利用率RBC模型的实证检验[J].中国工业经济,2011(5):27-36.
[33]孔东民,刘莎莎,王亚男.市场竞争、产权与政府补贴[J].经济研究,2013,48(2):55-67.
[34]张红凤,汲昌霖.政治关联、金融生态环境与企业融资--基于山东省上市公司数据的实证分析[J].经济理论与经济管理,2015(11):77-86.
[35]周琎,冼国明,明秀南.僵尸企业的识别与预警--来自中国上市公司的证据[J].财经研究,2018,44(4):130-142.
[36]方明月,张雨潇,聂辉华.中小民营企业成为僵尸企业之谜[J].学术月刊,2018,50(3):75-86.
[37]陈运森,黄健峤.地域偏爱与僵尸企业的形成--来自中国的经验证据[J].经济管理,2017,39(9):149-166.
[38]魏志华,王贞洁,吴育辉,等.金融生态环境、审计意见与债务融资成本[J].审计研究,2012(3):98-105.
[39]申广军.比较优势与僵尸企业:基于新结构经济学视角的研究[J].管理世界,2016(12):13-24,187.
[40]李霄阳,瞿强.中国僵尸企业:识别与分类[J].国际金融研究,2017,(8):3-13.
[41]CABALLERO R J,HOSHI T,KASHYAP A K.Zombie lending and depressed restructuring in Japan[J].American Economic Review,2008,98(5):1943-1977.
[42]樊纲,王小鲁,马光荣.中国市场化进程对经济增长的贡献[J].经济研究,2011,46(9):4-16.
[43]中国人民银行洛阳市中心支行课题组.区域金融生态环境评价指标体系研究[J].金融研究,2006(1):167-177.
[44]谭语嫣,谭之博,黄益平,等.僵尸企业的投资挤出效应:基于中国工业企业的证据[J].经济研究,2017,52(5):175-188.
[45]方明月,张雨潇,聂辉华.中小民营企业成为僵尸企业之谜[J].学术月刊,2018,50(3):75-86.
[46]魏志华,曾爱民,李博.金融生态环境与企业融资约束--基于中国上市公司的实证研究[J].会计研究,2014(5):73-80,95.
(1)主营业务收入2000万元及以上、固定资产投资项目计划总投资额500万元及以上的工业企业。
(2)考虑到数据可得性,在指标选择时剔除西藏。
(3)金融生态环境指标体系分为4个目标层、9个准则层、22个指标层,篇幅限制,此处从略,备索。
(4)为了避免在进行回归时,出现多重共线性问题,对贷款总额loan、中长期贷款lloan、短期贷款sloan、政府治理gov、经济基础enc、金融市场发展fmrt、制度和诚信文化建设reg变量进行去均值处理。