河长制再设计:行政问责与横向生态补偿
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摘要
河长制承袭了中国的治水传统,经过基层探索和顶层设计,演化为适合现实国情的环境治理制度。河长制作为命令控制型的手段,强调政府在环境治理中的作用,但它赋予地方行政首长以治水权利和责任,明晰了水环境服务的产权边界和责任主体,有利于引入横向生态补偿的谈判与协商机制。本文提出在流域治理中使河长制与环境政治市场相嵌套的必要性和可行性,并为此进行了制度设计。首先,流域的同级河长之间通过谈判协商,可以就区段间的断面水质考核标准达成协议,这种协议通过双边横向补偿机制赋予河长治水以内在动力,具有帕累托效率,而且可以解决行政区划间的分割问题,补齐河长制的"短板";其次,当存在信息不对称导致交易成本过高,双方在谈判中的讨价还价出现价格鸿沟时,有必要通过引入来自中央与各级地方政府的配套资金来填补这种鸿沟,解决双方的参与约束和激励相容约束问题;最后,对于多河段(多河长)的流域,本文设计了流域治水基金的区段奖罚制度,其中又分为静态模式、动态模式和动静结合模式,因地制宜地适应各种不同情况。该基金独立运营,形成类似提供排他性俱乐部产品的"河长俱乐部"。
The River Chief System has inherited the traditional Chinese water governance tradition,through the exploration at the grassroots level and the top-level design,which has evolved into a system of environmental governance suitable to the actual conditions of China.As a command and control means,the River Chief System emphasizes the role of government in environmental governance,but it gives local administrative the rights and responsibilities of water management,clarifies property rights boundary and the main responsibility of water environment service,which is conducive to the introduction of negotiations and competition mechanism of political environment market.This paper puts forward the necessity and possibility of making the River Chief System nested with the political environment market in the river basin governance,and designs the system for this purpose.First of all,through negotiation and consultation between the flat river chief of river basins,water quality standards agreement among sections can be reached,which endows internal power to river chief’s rivercontrol,with Pareto efficiency,and solves the division problem among administrative divisions and complete the"short board"of the River Chief System.Secondly,when information asymmetry resulting in high transaction costs,the bargain price gap may emerge during the negotiation of two sides.It is necessary to introduce counterpart fund from the central and local governments at all levels to fill this gap,to solve the participation constraint and incentive compatibility constraint of both sides.Finally,as to the basin of multi-zone,this paper designed the section reward and punishment system for basin flood control fund,which contains static model,dynamic model and hybrid model,and can adapt to different situations.The fund operates independently,similar to"river chief clubs"offering exclusive club products.
The River Chief System has inherited the traditional Chinese water governance tradition,through the exploration at the grassroots level and the top-level design,which has evolved into a system of environmental governance suitable to the actual conditions of China.As a command and control means,the River Chief System emphasizes the role of government in environmental governance,but it gives local administrative the rights and responsibilities of water management,clarifies property rights boundary and the main responsibility of water environment service,which is conducive to the introduction of negotiations and competition mechanism of political environment market.This paper puts forward the necessity and possibility of making the River Chief System nested with the political environment market in the river basin governance,and designs the system for this purpose.First of all,through negotiation and consultation between the flat river chief of river basins,water quality standards agreement among sections can be reached,which endows internal power to river chief’s rivercontrol,with Pareto efficiency,and solves the division problem among administrative divisions and complete the"short board"of the River Chief System.Secondly,when information asymmetry resulting in high transaction costs,the bargain price gap may emerge during the negotiation of two sides.It is necessary to introduce counterpart fund from the central and local governments at all levels to fill this gap,to solve the participation constraint and incentive compatibility constraint of both sides.Finally,as to the basin of multi-zone,this paper designed the section reward and punishment system for basin flood control fund,which contains static model,dynamic model and hybrid model,and can adapt to different situations.The fund operates independently,similar to"river chief clubs"offering exclusive club products.
引文
柯武刚、史漫飞:《制度经济学--社会秩序与公共政策》,韩朝华译,商务印书馆2000年。
青木昌彦:《比较制度分析》,周黎安译,上海远东出版社,2001年。
张弓:《中国古代的治水与水利农业文明--评魏特夫的“治水专制主义”论》,《史学理论研究》1993年第4期。
Muradian,R.,Rival,L.,2012.Between Markets and Hierarchies:the Challenge of Governing Ecosystem Services,Ecosystem Services,1(1):93-100.
丹尼尔·H.科尔:《污染与财产权--环境保护的所有权制度比较研究》,王社坤译,北京大学出版社2009年。
Robin,J.K.,F.Joshua,J.K.Christopher,2010.Determining when payments are an effective policy approach to ecosystem service provision,Ecological Economics,(69):2069-2074.
A一张图读懂河长制,中国水利报,http://www.gdwater.gov.cn/zwgk/zcfg/zcjd/201612/t20161214_268237.html.
A由于我国实行了乡村基层民主制,村长是由选举产生的,他们之中很多人可能担任河长。
A目前已经有一些地方政府自发开展了环境奖惩基金的探索,其原理和规则大同小异,共同点是各参与地区都需要向上一级财政缴纳保证金和通过上一级财政进行奖罚资金的结转,即这些尝试只能在同一口财政“锅”里吃饭的地区之间进行,无法在财政归属不同的地区之间实行。
A实验表明,公平分摊将对不愿捐款者构成强大压力,消除可能的搭便车行为。在公平分摊机制上,流域各区段河长对基金会的捐资可以根据河段的长度与流量来确定,也可以根据河段的排污量来确定。
A俱乐部产品介于纯粹公共产品和私人产品之间,具有对外排他性和一定程度的拥挤性,而且可以通过选择性激励(selective incentive)和社会压力克服搭便车行为。布坎南和图洛克通过模型证明,对于规模有限的决策集团,俱乐部产品可以产生让成员自愿接受强制规则的效果。
青木昌彦:《比较制度分析》,周黎安译,上海远东出版社,2001年。
张弓:《中国古代的治水与水利农业文明--评魏特夫的“治水专制主义”论》,《史学理论研究》1993年第4期。
Muradian,R.,Rival,L.,2012.Between Markets and Hierarchies:the Challenge of Governing Ecosystem Services,Ecosystem Services,1(1):93-100.
丹尼尔·H.科尔:《污染与财产权--环境保护的所有权制度比较研究》,王社坤译,北京大学出版社2009年。
Robin,J.K.,F.Joshua,J.K.Christopher,2010.Determining when payments are an effective policy approach to ecosystem service provision,Ecological Economics,(69):2069-2074.
A一张图读懂河长制,中国水利报,http://www.gdwater.gov.cn/zwgk/zcfg/zcjd/201612/t20161214_268237.html.
A由于我国实行了乡村基层民主制,村长是由选举产生的,他们之中很多人可能担任河长。
A目前已经有一些地方政府自发开展了环境奖惩基金的探索,其原理和规则大同小异,共同点是各参与地区都需要向上一级财政缴纳保证金和通过上一级财政进行奖罚资金的结转,即这些尝试只能在同一口财政“锅”里吃饭的地区之间进行,无法在财政归属不同的地区之间实行。
A实验表明,公平分摊将对不愿捐款者构成强大压力,消除可能的搭便车行为。在公平分摊机制上,流域各区段河长对基金会的捐资可以根据河段的长度与流量来确定,也可以根据河段的排污量来确定。
A俱乐部产品介于纯粹公共产品和私人产品之间,具有对外排他性和一定程度的拥挤性,而且可以通过选择性激励(selective incentive)和社会压力克服搭便车行为。布坎南和图洛克通过模型证明,对于规模有限的决策集团,俱乐部产品可以产生让成员自愿接受强制规则的效果。