民营资本的宗族烙印:来自融资约束视角的证据
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摘要
本文使用中国明朝至1990年各个城市的族谱数据测度宗族文化,并构建中国民营上市企业的融资约束KZ指标,研究后发现,地区内的宗族文化越浓厚,民营企业面临的融资约束越小,在考虑内生性问题后结论依然稳健。机制检验发现,信任、信息交互和道德规范是三条潜在的影响路径,并且在经历行业危机的冲击时,前述影响更明显。进一步的研究显示,在宗族文化浓厚的地区,更多宗族成员参与企业的股权融资,企业可以依托宗族从上下游获得更多商业信用,但并不能从正规的金融机构获取更多的信贷支持。并且发现,对于在当地拥有较大宗族势力以及在本地经营的企业家而言,宗族文化的影响更为明显,而人口流动带来的人口结构变迁会削弱宗族文化的影响。最后,在宗族文化浓厚的地区,企业的融资成本更低。
Clan culture has had a strong influence on China's social and economic development, one that sets it apart from other national cultures(Hsu, 1963). Greif & Tabellini(2010) pointed out that in history, China has been dominated by clan culture while Europe has been dominated by city culture, and this cultural difference has led to distinct institutional systems in China and Europe. Freedman(1958, 1966), a British sinologist and anthropologist, was a notable early scholar of Chinese clan culture. Later, clan culture was widely discussed in the fields of sociology and anthropology, and considered to be an important factor affecting the autonomy of Chinese villages(Watson, 1982; Yang, 1994; Kennedy, 2002; Manion, 2006; Su et al., 2011). In recent years, the concept of clans has been introduced into the field of economics, and scholars have confirmed that clans have many economic functions, such as allocating economic resources and providing public goods(Peng, 2004; Xu & Yao, 2014; Zhang, 2017). Regrettably, there have been few clan-related studies in the field of corporate finance.Financial constraints are key factors that hinder the development of Chinese companies. According to the World Bank report, 75% of non-financial listed companies in China report that financial constraints are the main obstacles to development(Claessens & Tzioumis, 2006). In particular, Chinese private companies have frequently faced financing difficulties(Poncet et al., 2010; Guariglia et al., 2011; Cull et al., 2015), which suggests that behind the rapid development of the private economy in China, there may be a unique mechanism that allows them to overcome these constraints. Allen et al.(2005) pointed out that China's relationship and reputation mechanism can play an important role in replacing legal protections and the financial system; clan culture, which highly values relationships and reputation, may provide a new perspective for understanding the financial constraints of private companies.Based on the work of Greif & Tabellini(2017), Zhang(2017), and Chen et al.(2017), this paper uses clan genealogy to measure clan culture intensity, and uses the financial data of listed companies to construct the KZ index(Kaplan & Zingales, 1997; Luo, 2011; Chen & Wang, 2012; Kang et al., 2017) to measure the financial constraints of private listed companies. The results show that in regions with strong clan culture, the financial constraints of private companies are smaller. We confirm these results using rice suitability and terrain slope as instrumental variables, and company relocation of companies as a test scenario. Further, we use the Chinese General Social Survey(CGSS) to confirm that greater trust, information interaction, and ethics are the three mechanisms by which clan culture affects companies' financial constraints. In addition, we find that when companies face industry crises, they experience fewer financial constraints in areas with strong clan culture. Further research shows that in areas with strong clan culture, more clan members participate in equity financing of companies. Companies can also obtain higher commercial credit from upstream and downstream companies, and are more willing to trade with clan members, even though they cannot obtain more credit support from formal financial institutions. In addition, an influential network of clans can enhance the mitigation effect of clan culture on financing constraints; however, when an entrepreneur operates a company outside his hometown or there is more immigration in the region, this will reduce the effect. Finally, in areas with strong clan culture, the financing cost of companies will be lower. A cultural revolution is taking place in the field of finance and economics(Zingales, 2015). China continues to emphasize traditional culture, and thus it provides an ideal focus for cutting-edge academic research in this area. This paper focuses on China's unique clan culture, and is the first to confirm its positive effect in alleviating financial constraints and promoting economic development from the micro perspective of corporate finance. It also shows how clan culture affects financial constraints, by influencing equity financing and commercial credit. This paper provides empirical evidence for how private companies overcome financing difficulties and achieve rapid development, and will guide policy makers in using traditional culture to encourage economic transformation and growth.
Clan culture has had a strong influence on China's social and economic development, one that sets it apart from other national cultures(Hsu, 1963). Greif & Tabellini(2010) pointed out that in history, China has been dominated by clan culture while Europe has been dominated by city culture, and this cultural difference has led to distinct institutional systems in China and Europe. Freedman(1958, 1966), a British sinologist and anthropologist, was a notable early scholar of Chinese clan culture. Later, clan culture was widely discussed in the fields of sociology and anthropology, and considered to be an important factor affecting the autonomy of Chinese villages(Watson, 1982; Yang, 1994; Kennedy, 2002; Manion, 2006; Su et al., 2011). In recent years, the concept of clans has been introduced into the field of economics, and scholars have confirmed that clans have many economic functions, such as allocating economic resources and providing public goods(Peng, 2004; Xu & Yao, 2014; Zhang, 2017). Regrettably, there have been few clan-related studies in the field of corporate finance.Financial constraints are key factors that hinder the development of Chinese companies. According to the World Bank report, 75% of non-financial listed companies in China report that financial constraints are the main obstacles to development(Claessens & Tzioumis, 2006). In particular, Chinese private companies have frequently faced financing difficulties(Poncet et al., 2010; Guariglia et al., 2011; Cull et al., 2015), which suggests that behind the rapid development of the private economy in China, there may be a unique mechanism that allows them to overcome these constraints. Allen et al.(2005) pointed out that China's relationship and reputation mechanism can play an important role in replacing legal protections and the financial system; clan culture, which highly values relationships and reputation, may provide a new perspective for understanding the financial constraints of private companies.Based on the work of Greif & Tabellini(2017), Zhang(2017), and Chen et al.(2017), this paper uses clan genealogy to measure clan culture intensity, and uses the financial data of listed companies to construct the KZ index(Kaplan & Zingales, 1997; Luo, 2011; Chen & Wang, 2012; Kang et al., 2017) to measure the financial constraints of private listed companies. The results show that in regions with strong clan culture, the financial constraints of private companies are smaller. We confirm these results using rice suitability and terrain slope as instrumental variables, and company relocation of companies as a test scenario. Further, we use the Chinese General Social Survey(CGSS) to confirm that greater trust, information interaction, and ethics are the three mechanisms by which clan culture affects companies' financial constraints. In addition, we find that when companies face industry crises, they experience fewer financial constraints in areas with strong clan culture. Further research shows that in areas with strong clan culture, more clan members participate in equity financing of companies. Companies can also obtain higher commercial credit from upstream and downstream companies, and are more willing to trade with clan members, even though they cannot obtain more credit support from formal financial institutions. In addition, an influential network of clans can enhance the mitigation effect of clan culture on financing constraints; however, when an entrepreneur operates a company outside his hometown or there is more immigration in the region, this will reduce the effect. Finally, in areas with strong clan culture, the financing cost of companies will be lower. A cultural revolution is taking place in the field of finance and economics(Zingales, 2015). China continues to emphasize traditional culture, and thus it provides an ideal focus for cutting-edge academic research in this area. This paper focuses on China's unique clan culture, and is the first to confirm its positive effect in alleviating financial constraints and promoting economic development from the micro perspective of corporate finance. It also shows how clan culture affects financial constraints, by influencing equity financing and commercial credit. This paper provides empirical evidence for how private companies overcome financing difficulties and achieve rapid development, and will guide policy makers in using traditional culture to encourage economic transformation and growth.
引文
陈冬华、胡晓莉、梁上坤、新夫,2013:《宗教传统与公司治理》,《经济研究》第9期。
陈斌开、陈思宇,2018:《移动的社会资本——传统宗族文化是否影响移民就业?》,《经济研究》第3期。
戴亦一、肖金利、潘越,2016:《“乡音”能否降低公司代理成本?——基于方言视角的研究》,《经济研究》第12期。
古志辉,2015:《全球化情境中的儒家伦理与代理成本》,《管理世界》第3期。
郭云南、张琳弋、姚洋,2013:《宗族网络、融资与农民自主创业》,《金融研究》第9期。
何孝星、叶展,2017:《股权激励会影响企业融资约束吗?——基于我国上市公司的经验证据》,《经济管理》第1期。
姜付秀、石贝贝、马云飙,2016:《信息发布者的财务经历与企业融资约束》,《经济研究》第6期。
林建浩、吴冰燕、李仲达,2016:《家庭融资中的有效社会网络:朋友圈还是宗族?》,《金融研究》第1期。
潘越、肖金利、戴亦一,2017:《文化多样性与企业创新:基于方言视角的研究》,《金融研究》第10期。
阮荣平、郑风田,2013:《市场化进程中的宗族网络与乡村企业》,《经济学(季刊)》第1期。
王小鲁、樊纲、余静文,2017:《中国分省份市场化指数报告(2016)》,社会科学文献出版社。
魏志华、曾爱民、李博,2014:《金融生态环境与企业融资约束——基于中国上市公司的实证研究》,《会计研究》第5期。
周群力、丁骋骋,2013:《姓氏与信用:农户信用评级中的宗族网络》,《世界经济》第8期。
张川川、李涛,2016:《网络与文化双重视角下的宗族与创业:影响与机制》,《经济研究》工作论文,http://www.erj.cn/cn/lwInfo.aspx?m=20100921113738390893&n=20160108112447193456。
张川川、马光荣,2017:《宗族文化、男孩偏好与女性发展》,《世界经济》第3期。
Ahern,E.M.,1976,“Segmentation in Chinese Lineages:A View Through Written Genealogies”,American Ethnologist,3(1).
Allen,F.,J.Qian,and M.Qian,2005,“Law,Finance,and Economic Growth in China”,Journal of Financial Economics,77(1),57—116.
Chan,A.,1997,“Corporate Culture of A Clan Organization”,Management Decision,35(2),94—99.
Chen,G.,R.Chittoor,B.Vissa,2014,“Modornizing Without Westernizing:Social Structure and Economic Action in the Indian Financial Sector”,Academy of Management Journal,58(2),511—573.
Chen,S.S.,and Y.Wang,2012,“Financial Constraints and Share Repurchases”,Journal of Financial Economics,105(2).
Chen,T.,K.S.Kung,and C.Ma,2017,“Long Live Keju! the Persistent Effects of China’s Imperial Examination System”,Working Paper.
Claessens,S.,and K.Tzioumis,2006,“Measuring Firms’ Access to Finance”,World Bank.
Cull,R.,W.Li,B.Sun,and L.C.Xu,2015,“Government Connections and Financial Constraints:Evidence From a Large Representative Sample of Chinese Firms ”,Journal of Corporate Finance,32(1129),271—294.
Dimaggio,P.,1997,“Culture and Cognition”,Annual Review of Sociology,26(1—2),153—158.
Du,X.,2017,“What’s in a Surname?the Effect of Auditor-CEO Surname Sharing on Financial Misstatement”,Journal of Business Ethics,1—26.
Fei,H.T.,1946,“Peasantry and Gentry:An Interpretation of Chinese Social Structure and Its Changes”,American Journal of Sociology,52(1),1—17.
Fei,J.C.H.,and T.J.Liu,1983,“The Growth and Decline of Chinese Family Clans”,Journal of Interdisciplinary History,12(3),375—408.
Freedman,M.,1958,Lineage Organization in Southeastern China,Athlone Press.
Freedman,M.,1966,Chinese Lineage and Society:Fukien and Kwangtung,Athlone Press.
Fukuyama,F.,1995,Trust:The Social Virtues and Creation of Prosperity,New York:Free Press.
Glaeser,E.L.,D.I.Laibson,J.A.Scheinkman,and C.L.Soutter,2000,“Measuring Trust”,Quarterly Journal of Economics,115(3),811—846.
Greif,A.,and G.Tabellini,2010,“Cultural and Institutional Bifurcation:China and Europe Compared”,American Economic Review,100(2),135—140.
Greif,A.,and G.Tabellini,2017,“The Clan and the Corporation:Sustaining Cooperation in China and Europe”,Journal of Comparative Economics,45(1),1—35.
Guiso,L.,P.Sapienza,and L.Zingales,2004,“The Role of Social Capital in Financial Development”,American Economic Review,94(3),526—556.
Guiso,L.,P.Sapienza,and L.Zingales,2006,“Does Culture Affect Economic Outcomes?”,Journal of Economic Perspectives,20.
Hadlock,C.J.,and J.R.Pierce,2010,“New Evidence on Measuring Financial Constraints:Moving Beyond the KZ Index”,Review of Financial Studies,23(5),1909—1940.
Hsu,F.L.K.,1963,Clan,Caste and Club,New York:Van Nostrand Reinhold Company Press.
Kang,M.,W.Wang,and C.Eom,2017,“Corporate Investment and Stock Liquidity:Evidence on the Price Impact of Trade”,Review of Financial Economics,33(1),1—11.
Kaplan,S.,and L.Zingales,1997,“Do Investment-cash Flow Sensitivities Provide Useful Measures of Financing Constraints?”,Quarterly Journal of Economics,112,169—215.
Karlan,D.,M.Mobius,T.Rosenblat,and A.Szeidl,2009,“Trust and Social Collateral”,Quarterly Journal of Economics,124(3),1307—1361.
Liu,X.,2016,“Corruption Culture and Corporate Misconduct”,Journal of Financial Economics,122(2),307—327.
Lu,Z.,J.Zhu,and W.Zhang,2012,“Bank Discrimination,Holding Bank Ownership,and Economic Consequences:Evidence from China”,Journal of Banking & Finance,36(2),341—354.
Manion,M.,1996,“The Electoral Connection in the Chinese Countryside”,American Political Science Review,90,736—748.
Mateut,S.,2014,“Reverse Trade Credit or Default Risk?Explaining the Use of Prepayments by Firms”,Journal of Corporate Finance,29(29),303—326.
Peng,Y.,2004,“Kinship Networks and Entrepreneurs in China’s Transitional Economy”,American Journal of Sociology,109(5).
Peng,Y.,2010,“When Formal Laws and Informal Norms Collide:Lineage Networks Versus Birth Control Policy in China”,American Journal of Sociology,116(3),770.
Su,F.,T.Ran,X.Sun,and M.Liu,2011,“Clans,Electoral Procedures and Voter Turnout:Evidence From Villagers’ Committee Elections in Transitional China”,Political Studies,59(2),432—457.
Tsai,K.S.,2002,Back-Alley Banking:Private Entrepreneurs in China,Cornell University Press.
Tsai,L.L.,2007,Accountability Without Democracy:Solidary Groups and Public Goods Provision in Rural China,Cambridge University Press.
Watson,J.L.,1982,“Chinese Kinship Reconsidered:Anthropological Perspectives on Historical Research”,China Quarterly,92(92),589—622.
Wen,T.J.,2001,“Centenary Reflections on the ‘Three Dimensional Problem’ of Rural China”,Inter-Asia Cultural Studies,2(2).
Xu,Y.,and Y.Yao,2015,“Informal Institutions,Collective Action,and Public Investment in Rural China”,American Political Science Review,109(2),371—391.
Yonker,S.E.,2017,“Do Managers Give Hometown Labor an Edge?”,Review of Financial Studies,30(10),3581—3604.
Zhang,C.,2017,“Culture and the Economy:Clan,Entrepreneurship,and Development of the Private Sector in China”,Working paper.Available at SSRN:http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2865105.
Zingales,L.,2015,“The ‘Cultural Revolution’ in Finance”,Journal of Financial Economics,117(1),1—4.
(1)剔除因实际控制人变更而迁址的企业,因为新的实际控制人的宗族资源可能会对其融资过程产生影响。
(2)水稻种植适宜性数据来源于联合国粮农组织,数值越大越适宜种植水稻。
(3)来源于中国科学院资源环境科学数据中心,数值越小地形越平坦。
(4)当行业企业数量较少时,单个企业的业绩表现可能影响行业危机的认定,因此剔除行业企业数少于5的行业样本。此外,控制时间和行业的交乘项会影响Distress的系数估计,因此仅控制行业和年份固定效应。
(5)数据库中披露的实际控制人信息不够完全,一些有多个实际控制人的企业样本,数据库中披露为“xxx等一致行动人”,为了更加干净的识别宗族文化的影响,本文和实际控制人相关的研究均只保留企业实际控制人为单个自然人的样本。
(6)同一地区内的同姓个体更可能具有宗族联系,即使没有直接的血缘联系,也可以通过“认本家”的方式形成宗族关联(Du,2017)。
(7)企查查数据库(https://www.qichacha.com/)可以查询企业信息,如注册资本、实际控制人、高管等信息。
(8)例如,2018年2月被媒体广泛报道的河南邱氏宗祠,耗资1.2亿,奢华程度堪比故宫,其背后需要大量的人力、财力支持。信息来源:http://www.sohu.com/a/223279181_609752。
(9)由于企业实际控制人的籍贯地不是证监会强制披露的信息,本部分剔除了实际控制人信息缺失的样本。
陈斌开、陈思宇,2018:《移动的社会资本——传统宗族文化是否影响移民就业?》,《经济研究》第3期。
戴亦一、肖金利、潘越,2016:《“乡音”能否降低公司代理成本?——基于方言视角的研究》,《经济研究》第12期。
古志辉,2015:《全球化情境中的儒家伦理与代理成本》,《管理世界》第3期。
郭云南、张琳弋、姚洋,2013:《宗族网络、融资与农民自主创业》,《金融研究》第9期。
何孝星、叶展,2017:《股权激励会影响企业融资约束吗?——基于我国上市公司的经验证据》,《经济管理》第1期。
姜付秀、石贝贝、马云飙,2016:《信息发布者的财务经历与企业融资约束》,《经济研究》第6期。
林建浩、吴冰燕、李仲达,2016:《家庭融资中的有效社会网络:朋友圈还是宗族?》,《金融研究》第1期。
潘越、肖金利、戴亦一,2017:《文化多样性与企业创新:基于方言视角的研究》,《金融研究》第10期。
阮荣平、郑风田,2013:《市场化进程中的宗族网络与乡村企业》,《经济学(季刊)》第1期。
王小鲁、樊纲、余静文,2017:《中国分省份市场化指数报告(2016)》,社会科学文献出版社。
魏志华、曾爱民、李博,2014:《金融生态环境与企业融资约束——基于中国上市公司的实证研究》,《会计研究》第5期。
周群力、丁骋骋,2013:《姓氏与信用:农户信用评级中的宗族网络》,《世界经济》第8期。
张川川、李涛,2016:《网络与文化双重视角下的宗族与创业:影响与机制》,《经济研究》工作论文,http://www.erj.cn/cn/lwInfo.aspx?m=20100921113738390893&n=20160108112447193456。
张川川、马光荣,2017:《宗族文化、男孩偏好与女性发展》,《世界经济》第3期。
Ahern,E.M.,1976,“Segmentation in Chinese Lineages:A View Through Written Genealogies”,American Ethnologist,3(1).
Allen,F.,J.Qian,and M.Qian,2005,“Law,Finance,and Economic Growth in China”,Journal of Financial Economics,77(1),57—116.
Chan,A.,1997,“Corporate Culture of A Clan Organization”,Management Decision,35(2),94—99.
Chen,G.,R.Chittoor,B.Vissa,2014,“Modornizing Without Westernizing:Social Structure and Economic Action in the Indian Financial Sector”,Academy of Management Journal,58(2),511—573.
Chen,S.S.,and Y.Wang,2012,“Financial Constraints and Share Repurchases”,Journal of Financial Economics,105(2).
Chen,T.,K.S.Kung,and C.Ma,2017,“Long Live Keju! the Persistent Effects of China’s Imperial Examination System”,Working Paper.
Claessens,S.,and K.Tzioumis,2006,“Measuring Firms’ Access to Finance”,World Bank.
Cull,R.,W.Li,B.Sun,and L.C.Xu,2015,“Government Connections and Financial Constraints:Evidence From a Large Representative Sample of Chinese Firms ”,Journal of Corporate Finance,32(1129),271—294.
Dimaggio,P.,1997,“Culture and Cognition”,Annual Review of Sociology,26(1—2),153—158.
Du,X.,2017,“What’s in a Surname?the Effect of Auditor-CEO Surname Sharing on Financial Misstatement”,Journal of Business Ethics,1—26.
Fei,H.T.,1946,“Peasantry and Gentry:An Interpretation of Chinese Social Structure and Its Changes”,American Journal of Sociology,52(1),1—17.
Fei,J.C.H.,and T.J.Liu,1983,“The Growth and Decline of Chinese Family Clans”,Journal of Interdisciplinary History,12(3),375—408.
Freedman,M.,1958,Lineage Organization in Southeastern China,Athlone Press.
Freedman,M.,1966,Chinese Lineage and Society:Fukien and Kwangtung,Athlone Press.
Fukuyama,F.,1995,Trust:The Social Virtues and Creation of Prosperity,New York:Free Press.
Glaeser,E.L.,D.I.Laibson,J.A.Scheinkman,and C.L.Soutter,2000,“Measuring Trust”,Quarterly Journal of Economics,115(3),811—846.
Greif,A.,and G.Tabellini,2010,“Cultural and Institutional Bifurcation:China and Europe Compared”,American Economic Review,100(2),135—140.
Greif,A.,and G.Tabellini,2017,“The Clan and the Corporation:Sustaining Cooperation in China and Europe”,Journal of Comparative Economics,45(1),1—35.
Guiso,L.,P.Sapienza,and L.Zingales,2004,“The Role of Social Capital in Financial Development”,American Economic Review,94(3),526—556.
Guiso,L.,P.Sapienza,and L.Zingales,2006,“Does Culture Affect Economic Outcomes?”,Journal of Economic Perspectives,20.
Hadlock,C.J.,and J.R.Pierce,2010,“New Evidence on Measuring Financial Constraints:Moving Beyond the KZ Index”,Review of Financial Studies,23(5),1909—1940.
Hsu,F.L.K.,1963,Clan,Caste and Club,New York:Van Nostrand Reinhold Company Press.
Kang,M.,W.Wang,and C.Eom,2017,“Corporate Investment and Stock Liquidity:Evidence on the Price Impact of Trade”,Review of Financial Economics,33(1),1—11.
Kaplan,S.,and L.Zingales,1997,“Do Investment-cash Flow Sensitivities Provide Useful Measures of Financing Constraints?”,Quarterly Journal of Economics,112,169—215.
Karlan,D.,M.Mobius,T.Rosenblat,and A.Szeidl,2009,“Trust and Social Collateral”,Quarterly Journal of Economics,124(3),1307—1361.
Liu,X.,2016,“Corruption Culture and Corporate Misconduct”,Journal of Financial Economics,122(2),307—327.
Lu,Z.,J.Zhu,and W.Zhang,2012,“Bank Discrimination,Holding Bank Ownership,and Economic Consequences:Evidence from China”,Journal of Banking & Finance,36(2),341—354.
Manion,M.,1996,“The Electoral Connection in the Chinese Countryside”,American Political Science Review,90,736—748.
Mateut,S.,2014,“Reverse Trade Credit or Default Risk?Explaining the Use of Prepayments by Firms”,Journal of Corporate Finance,29(29),303—326.
Peng,Y.,2004,“Kinship Networks and Entrepreneurs in China’s Transitional Economy”,American Journal of Sociology,109(5).
Peng,Y.,2010,“When Formal Laws and Informal Norms Collide:Lineage Networks Versus Birth Control Policy in China”,American Journal of Sociology,116(3),770.
Su,F.,T.Ran,X.Sun,and M.Liu,2011,“Clans,Electoral Procedures and Voter Turnout:Evidence From Villagers’ Committee Elections in Transitional China”,Political Studies,59(2),432—457.
Tsai,K.S.,2002,Back-Alley Banking:Private Entrepreneurs in China,Cornell University Press.
Tsai,L.L.,2007,Accountability Without Democracy:Solidary Groups and Public Goods Provision in Rural China,Cambridge University Press.
Watson,J.L.,1982,“Chinese Kinship Reconsidered:Anthropological Perspectives on Historical Research”,China Quarterly,92(92),589—622.
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(1)剔除因实际控制人变更而迁址的企业,因为新的实际控制人的宗族资源可能会对其融资过程产生影响。
(2)水稻种植适宜性数据来源于联合国粮农组织,数值越大越适宜种植水稻。
(3)来源于中国科学院资源环境科学数据中心,数值越小地形越平坦。
(4)当行业企业数量较少时,单个企业的业绩表现可能影响行业危机的认定,因此剔除行业企业数少于5的行业样本。此外,控制时间和行业的交乘项会影响Distress的系数估计,因此仅控制行业和年份固定效应。
(5)数据库中披露的实际控制人信息不够完全,一些有多个实际控制人的企业样本,数据库中披露为“xxx等一致行动人”,为了更加干净的识别宗族文化的影响,本文和实际控制人相关的研究均只保留企业实际控制人为单个自然人的样本。
(6)同一地区内的同姓个体更可能具有宗族联系,即使没有直接的血缘联系,也可以通过“认本家”的方式形成宗族关联(Du,2017)。
(7)企查查数据库(https://www.qichacha.com/)可以查询企业信息,如注册资本、实际控制人、高管等信息。
(8)例如,2018年2月被媒体广泛报道的河南邱氏宗祠,耗资1.2亿,奢华程度堪比故宫,其背后需要大量的人力、财力支持。信息来源:http://www.sohu.com/a/223279181_609752。
(9)由于企业实际控制人的籍贯地不是证监会强制披露的信息,本部分剔除了实际控制人信息缺失的样本。