学者独立董事的选聘机制研究——人力资本和社会资本的视角
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摘要
本文基于学者独立董事独特的人力资本和社会资本的视角,探讨了聘请学者独立董事的选聘机制及其边界条件,并利用中国上市公司数据对选聘机制进行了实证检验。研究发现,国际化程度、创新活跃度和连锁董事网络效应都对企业聘请学者独立董事倾向有显著正向影响。进一步研究发现,博士董事长和环境复杂性对选聘机制的调节效应会因企业聘请学者独立董事概率的不同而不同,具体来看,博士董事长在小部分企业(0.9<聘请学者独立董事概率<0.95)会增强连锁董事网络效应对聘请学者独立董事倾向的正向影响,在大部分企业(0.3<聘请学者独立董事概率<0.9)会削弱连锁董事网络效应对聘请学者独立董事倾向的正向影响;博士董事长在国际化程度、创新活跃度与聘请学者独立董事倾向二者关系中都没有显著调节效应。环境复杂性在部分企业(0.5<聘请学者独立董事概率<0.9)会增强连锁董事网络效应对聘请学者独立董事倾向的正向影响,在部分企业(聘请学者独立董事概率<0.65)会削弱创新活跃性对聘请学者独立董事倾向的正向影响,环境复杂性在国际化程度与聘请学者独立董事倾向二者关系中没有显著调节效应。本文的研究结论为洞悉企业聘请学者独立董事的动因提供了实证依据。
Since the implementation of the independent director policy in 2001,academic directors are common on the boards of Chinese listed companies.A large numbers of research analyzed the functions of independent directors,however,little attention paid to academic directors.This paper focuses on the appointments of academic directors,which helps to investigate why firms appoint academic directors.Based academic directors' unique human and social capital,this study examines the antecedents of academic directors' appointments.This paper posits that academic directors may be appointed for their unique human and social capital:1) They possessed the better organized abstract knowledge,because most of them have doctoral degrees and have experienced 3-6 years of systematically academic training when they were pursuing doctoral degrees,and formed their own knowledge framework through "induced learning" or "deliberate learning".2)They possessed more comprehensive theoretical knowledge in specific fields,which enabled them to have a broader and more comprehensive understanding of key issues and arriving at promising solutions.3) They had strong abilities to process and analyze information based on abstract knowledge.4) They had a higher social status and reputation.5)They might help firms to obtain university resources,such as outstanding graduates,professional knowledge,patents,or technical information.This paper argues that the unique human and social capital is the key factor which directly influences academic directors' appointment.Using listed firms' data,it empirically tests the influence of firm characteristics on the odds of academic directors,and the moderating role of chair characteristics and environmental complexity between their relationship. And it also further explores moderating effects of chairman's characteristic and environmental complexity on the appointment mechanism. First,it shows that the degree of internationalization has a significant positive impact on the odds of academic directors,and in some firms,the doctoral chair plays a significant positive moderating role,which indicates that the higher degree of internationalization is,the higher odds ratio of academic directors,and the doctoral chair may strengthen the odds ratio.Second,it concludes that innovativeness has a significant positive impact on the odds of academic directors,however,in some firms,environmental complexity plays a significant negative moderating role,indicating that the more innovative is,the higher odds ratio of academic directors,but environmental complexity may reduce the odds ratio.Third,it shows that network effect has a significant positive effect on the odds of academic directors,indicating that behavior of appointing academic directors can be spread in the network of directors.This paper further explores the appointments of academic directors from different disciplines,who possess different human and social capital.Firstly,it shows that the degree of internationalization has significantly positive effects on the odds of managerial and technical scholars,and negative effects on the odds of financial scholars.Secondly,it shows that the R&D intensity has significantly positive effects on the odds of financial and technical scholars,and negative effects on the odds of managerial scholars.Finally,it concludes that network effects have significantly positive effects on the odds of all kinds of scholars.This paper may contribute to the literature as following: Firstly,it analyzes the unique human and social capital of academic directors from the conceptual level,which provides a new perspective for understanding the antecedents of academic directors' appointment.Secondly,to some extent,it explains why listed firms generally have academic directors on boards,it examines the appointment mechanism of academic directors,and the results highlight the reasons on appointing academic directors.Thirdly,it enriches the research on the heterogeneity of directors,prior research has neglected the heterogeneity of similar directors,and the results provide some advice to hire "appropriate" board members.
Since the implementation of the independent director policy in 2001,academic directors are common on the boards of Chinese listed companies.A large numbers of research analyzed the functions of independent directors,however,little attention paid to academic directors.This paper focuses on the appointments of academic directors,which helps to investigate why firms appoint academic directors.Based academic directors' unique human and social capital,this study examines the antecedents of academic directors' appointments.This paper posits that academic directors may be appointed for their unique human and social capital:1) They possessed the better organized abstract knowledge,because most of them have doctoral degrees and have experienced 3-6 years of systematically academic training when they were pursuing doctoral degrees,and formed their own knowledge framework through "induced learning" or "deliberate learning".2)They possessed more comprehensive theoretical knowledge in specific fields,which enabled them to have a broader and more comprehensive understanding of key issues and arriving at promising solutions.3) They had strong abilities to process and analyze information based on abstract knowledge.4) They had a higher social status and reputation.5)They might help firms to obtain university resources,such as outstanding graduates,professional knowledge,patents,or technical information.This paper argues that the unique human and social capital is the key factor which directly influences academic directors' appointment.Using listed firms' data,it empirically tests the influence of firm characteristics on the odds of academic directors,and the moderating role of chair characteristics and environmental complexity between their relationship. And it also further explores moderating effects of chairman's characteristic and environmental complexity on the appointment mechanism. First,it shows that the degree of internationalization has a significant positive impact on the odds of academic directors,and in some firms,the doctoral chair plays a significant positive moderating role,which indicates that the higher degree of internationalization is,the higher odds ratio of academic directors,and the doctoral chair may strengthen the odds ratio.Second,it concludes that innovativeness has a significant positive impact on the odds of academic directors,however,in some firms,environmental complexity plays a significant negative moderating role,indicating that the more innovative is,the higher odds ratio of academic directors,but environmental complexity may reduce the odds ratio.Third,it shows that network effect has a significant positive effect on the odds of academic directors,indicating that behavior of appointing academic directors can be spread in the network of directors.This paper further explores the appointments of academic directors from different disciplines,who possess different human and social capital.Firstly,it shows that the degree of internationalization has significantly positive effects on the odds of managerial and technical scholars,and negative effects on the odds of financial scholars.Secondly,it shows that the R&D intensity has significantly positive effects on the odds of financial and technical scholars,and negative effects on the odds of managerial scholars.Finally,it concludes that network effects have significantly positive effects on the odds of all kinds of scholars.This paper may contribute to the literature as following: Firstly,it analyzes the unique human and social capital of academic directors from the conceptual level,which provides a new perspective for understanding the antecedents of academic directors' appointment.Secondly,to some extent,it explains why listed firms generally have academic directors on boards,it examines the appointment mechanism of academic directors,and the results highlight the reasons on appointing academic directors.Thirdly,it enriches the research on the heterogeneity of directors,prior research has neglected the heterogeneity of similar directors,and the results provide some advice to hire "appropriate" board members.
引文
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[29] Fleming L.Sorenson O.Science as a Map in Technological Search[J].Strategic Management Journal,2004,25,(8-9):909-928.
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(1)由于新浪网提供了详细的董事个人资料信息,这有助于进一步确认学者独立董事名单中同名成员是否是“真正”的学者独立董事。
(2)董事会成员候选人的选择,如聘请女性董事,可以通过连锁董事网扩散(Hillman等,2007)[18]。本文借鉴Hillman等(2007)[18]的研究,将聘请学者独立董事的行为在连锁董事网络中的扩散定义为网络效应。
(3)考虑到各地普通高等学校数量近10年内并未发生显著变化,本文以最新(2015年)普通高等学校在企业注册地的数据作为控制变量的值。
(4)Logit模型估计的是企业聘请学者独立董事发生的对数概率,如果估计系数为正,表示对应的几率比大于1,国际化程度、创新活跃性或连锁董事网络效应增加了企业聘请学者独立董事的概率。
[2]McDonald M.L., J.D.Westphal, and M.E.Graebner. What Do They Know? The Effects of Outside Director Acquisition Experience on Firm Acquisition Performance[J].Strategic Management Journal, 2008,29,(11):1155-1177.
[3]Westphal J.D.Collaboration in the Boardroom:The Consequences of Social Ties in the CEO/Board Relationship[J].Academy of Management Journal,1999,(42):7-24.
[4]Hillman A.J.,and T.Dalziel.Boards of Directors and Firm Performance: Integrating Agency Theory and Resource Dependence Perspectives[J].Academy of Management Review,2003, 28,(3):383-396.
[5]刘浩,唐松,楼俊.独立董事:监督还是咨询?——银行背景独立董事对企业信贷融资影响研究[J].北京:管理世界,2012,(1):141-156.
[6]胡元木.技术独立董事可以提高R&D产出效率吗?——来自中国证券市场的研究[J].天津:南开管理评论,2012,(2):136-142.
[7]刘春,李善民,孙亮.独立董事具有咨询功能吗?——异地独立董事在异地并购中功能的经验研究[J].北京:管理世界,2015,(3):124-136.
[8]Audretsch D.,and P.E.Stephan.Company-scientist Locational Links:The Case of Biotechnology[J].American Economic Review,1996,86,(3):641-652.
[9]Audretsch D.B.,and E.Lehmann.Entrepreneurial Access and Absorption of Knowledge Spillovers:Strategic Board and Managerial Composition for Competitive Advantage[J].Journal of Small Business Management,2006,44,(2):155-166.
[10]White J.T.,T.Woidtke,H.A.Black,and R.L.Schweitzer.Appointments of Academic Directors[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2014,(28):135-151.
[11]沈艺峰,王夫乐,陈维.“学院派”的力量:来自具有学术背景独立董事的经验[J].北京:经济管理,2016,38,(5):176-186.
[12]Pfeffer J.,and G.R.Salancik.The External Control of Organizations:A Resource Dependence Perspective[M].Harper & Row Publishers,1978.
[13]Lester R.H.,A.Hillman,A.Zardkoohi,and A.A.Cannella.Former Government Officials as Outside Directors:The Role of Human and Social Capital[J].Academy of Management Journal,2008,51,(5):999-1013.
[14]Pfeffer J.Size and Composition of Corporate Boards of Directors:The Organization and its Environment[J].Administrative Science Quarterly,1972,17,(2):218-228.
[15]Linck J.S.,M.Netter J,and T.Yang.The Determinants of Board Structure[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2008,87,(2):308-328.
[16]Coles J.L.,N.D.Daniel,and L.Naveen.Boards:Does one Size Fit all? [J].Journal of Financial Economics,2008,87,(2):329-356.
[17]Anderson,R.C.,D.M.Reeb,A.Upadhyay,and W.Zhao.The Economics of Director Heterogeneity[J].Financial Management,2011,40 ,(1):5-38.
[18]Hillman A.J.,C.Shropshire,and A.A.Cannella.Organizational Predictors of Women on Corporate Boards[J].Academy of Management Journal,2007,50,(4):941-952.
[19]Olson J.F.,and M.T.Adams.Composing a Balanced and Effective Board to Meet New Governance Mandates[J].Business Lawyer,2004,59,(2):421-452.
[20]杨锴,赵希男,周岩.治理能力优势多样性导向的独立董事选聘研究[J].北京:经济管理,2018,(2):55-71.
[21]Sternberg R.J.Cognitive Conceptions of Expertise.In Expertise in Context:Human and Machine[M].AAAI/MIT Press:Cambridge,MA,1997.
[22] Zollo M.,and H.Singh.Deliberate Learning in Corporate Acquisitions:Post-Acquisition Strategies and Integration Capability in U.S.Bank Mergers[J].Strategic Management Journal,2004,25,(13):1233-1256.
[23]Coff R.Bidding Wars over R&D-Intensive Firms:Knowledge,Opportunism,and the Market for Corporate Control[J].Academy of Management Journal,2003,46,(1):74-86.
[24]Jiang B.,and P.J.Murphy.Do Business School Professors Make Good Executive Managers? [J].Academy of Management Perspectives,2007,21,(3):29-50.
[25]Maher P.M.,M.C.Munro,and F.L.Stormer.Building a Better Board:Six Keys to Enhancing Corporate Director Performance[J].Strategy & Leadership,2000,28,(5):1-3.
[26]Fleming L.Recombinant Uncertainty in Technological Search[J].Management Science,2001,(47):117-132.
[27]Cyert R.,and J.March,A Behavioral Theory of the Firm[M].Prentice-Hall:Englewood Cliffs,NJ,1963.
[28]张晓棠,安立仁.双元创新搜索、情境分离与创新绩效[J].北京:科学学研究,2015,(8):1240-1250.
[29] Fleming L.Sorenson O.Science as a Map in Technological Search[J].Strategic Management Journal,2004,25,(8-9):909-928.
[30]Cohen W.,and D.Levinthal.Absorptive Capacity:A New Perspective on Learning and Innovation[J].Administrative Science Quarterly,1990,35,(1):128-152.
[31]Dasgupta P.,and P.David.Toward a New Economics of Science[J].Research Policy,1994,23,(5):487-521.
[32]万涛,魏洪雨.高校技术转移的问题与对策研究——以湖北省为例[J].武汉:科技创业月刊,2009,(9):10-11,14.
[33]陈运森,谢德仁.网络位置、独立董事治理与投资效率[J].北京:管理世界,2011,(7):113-127.
[34]Davison,A.G.,B.W.Stening,and W.T.Wai.Auditor Concentration and the Impact of Interlocking Directorates[J].Journal of Accounting Research,1984,22,(1):313-317.
[35]Davis G.F.Agents Without Principles? The Spread of the Poison Pill Through the Intercorporate Network[J].Administrative Science Quarterly,1991,36 ,(4):583-613.
[36]Haunschild P.R.Interorganizational Imitation:The Impact of Interlocks on Corporate Acquisition Activity[J].Administrative Science Quarterly,1993,(38):564-592.
[37]Palmer D.A.,P.D.Jennings,and X.G.Zhou.Late Adoption of the Multidivisional Form by Large U.S.Corporations:Institutional,Political,and Economic Accounts[J].Administrative Science Quarterly,1993,38,(1):100-131.
[38]Klette T.J.R&D,Scope Economies,and Plant Performance[J].Rand Journal of Economics,1996,27,(3):502-522.
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(1)由于新浪网提供了详细的董事个人资料信息,这有助于进一步确认学者独立董事名单中同名成员是否是“真正”的学者独立董事。
(2)董事会成员候选人的选择,如聘请女性董事,可以通过连锁董事网扩散(Hillman等,2007)[18]。本文借鉴Hillman等(2007)[18]的研究,将聘请学者独立董事的行为在连锁董事网络中的扩散定义为网络效应。
(3)考虑到各地普通高等学校数量近10年内并未发生显著变化,本文以最新(2015年)普通高等学校在企业注册地的数据作为控制变量的值。
(4)Logit模型估计的是企业聘请学者独立董事发生的对数概率,如果估计系数为正,表示对应的几率比大于1,国际化程度、创新活跃性或连锁董事网络效应增加了企业聘请学者独立董事的概率。