外部盈利压力、多元化股权投资与企业的金融化
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摘要
近年来,企业的金融化倾向越来越普遍,并逐渐形成了"脱实向虚"效应。已有研究大多认为推动企业金融化倾向的主要是货币政策、金融市场发展等宏观因素,而忽视了股东价值导向产生的公司特质因素。基于此,文章研究了我国上市公司的金融资产收益特征及持有金融机构与房地产公司股权行为对公司实体投资不足产生的影响,并且进一步探究了外部盈利压力和内部治理机制对金融投资挤出实体投资所产生的影响。研究发现:(1)母公司层面的公司金融投资收益提升以及公司持有金融机构与房地产企业股权的行为都会促使企业减少实体投资,从而造成企业的投资不足,即存在金融投资对实体投资的挤出效应。(2)从外部治理机制来看,由资本市场盈利预测和股价形成的外部盈利压力会加强公司金融资产投资对实体投资的挤出效应,从而强化企业金融化造成的影响。(3)从内部治理机制上看,在双重效应的共同作用下,代理问题产生的缓解力量超过了股东价值导致的推动力量,使得多元化股权投资最终缓解了金融化的投资挤出效应。上述研究结论表明,公司治理机制与投资者保护机制的改善和优化,可以在一定程度上抑制企业金融化倾向。
In recent years,financialization appears in Chinese firms to inspire financial investment to exclude real ones,which also exists in the United States and other nations. As the microcosmic basis of financialization,the phenomenon of firm financialization whether exists and its causes have attracted wide attention of scholars. Previous research in firm financialization focuses on macroeconomic factors like monetary policies;therefore,it attributes financialization to general investment decisions in firms which are affected by macroeconomic background. However,research in internal factors especially in corporate governance has been ignored to some extent. Because of the complex background of financialization,the impact of internal governance factors on firm financialization is also in urgent need of effective analyses,and then effective supervision and policy guidance are generated to avoid potential risks of the real economy. This paper firstly uses a modified empirical model in measuring idiosyncratic effects on firm financialization from corporate governance. In this model,inefficient investment is settled as the object instead of total investment in order to measure idiosyncratic motivations in financialization,and then we use the PSM method to balance the effects from irrational factors in firms' investment decisions. On this basis,we carry out an empirical analysis in using semi-annual data of listed companies in China from 2007 to 2016. We firstly measure excluding effects in real investment from financialization under the background of corporate governance,which carries out both at the parent firm level and conglomerate level to obtain comprehensive results. Then we measure the impact from external earning pressure and diversified equity investment on excluding effects to analyze impressions from internal shareholders and external ones. It comes to the following conclusions:First,On the basis of excluding irrational investment decisionmaking,firm financialization represented by financial investment returns and holding equity of financial institutions has produced significant excluding effects of real investment. Second,external earning pressure strengthens excluding effects to some extent. Third,the impact of diversified equity investment on financialization shows two-sided effects:one is to strengthen excluding effects at the parent firm level,while the other is to reduce the effects at the conglomerate level. The conclusions of this paper indicate that the shareholder value orientation in Chinese firms essentially strengthens excluding effects from financialization both in internal and external paths. On the one hand,financialization effects are relieved while the equity investment of parent firms weakens total shareholder values;on the other hand,outside shareholder values strengthen financialization effects by earning pressure from external capital markets. In short,this paper expands the existing research from the following two aspects. First,it provides new paths in analyzing how the shareholder value orientation influence financialization effects,which strengthens the financialization theory. Second,this paper also constructs an empirical model for measuring the impact of corporate heterogeneity on financialization,which provides a certain basis for the follow-up study of firm financialization in the micro-field.
In recent years,financialization appears in Chinese firms to inspire financial investment to exclude real ones,which also exists in the United States and other nations. As the microcosmic basis of financialization,the phenomenon of firm financialization whether exists and its causes have attracted wide attention of scholars. Previous research in firm financialization focuses on macroeconomic factors like monetary policies;therefore,it attributes financialization to general investment decisions in firms which are affected by macroeconomic background. However,research in internal factors especially in corporate governance has been ignored to some extent. Because of the complex background of financialization,the impact of internal governance factors on firm financialization is also in urgent need of effective analyses,and then effective supervision and policy guidance are generated to avoid potential risks of the real economy. This paper firstly uses a modified empirical model in measuring idiosyncratic effects on firm financialization from corporate governance. In this model,inefficient investment is settled as the object instead of total investment in order to measure idiosyncratic motivations in financialization,and then we use the PSM method to balance the effects from irrational factors in firms' investment decisions. On this basis,we carry out an empirical analysis in using semi-annual data of listed companies in China from 2007 to 2016. We firstly measure excluding effects in real investment from financialization under the background of corporate governance,which carries out both at the parent firm level and conglomerate level to obtain comprehensive results. Then we measure the impact from external earning pressure and diversified equity investment on excluding effects to analyze impressions from internal shareholders and external ones. It comes to the following conclusions:First,On the basis of excluding irrational investment decisionmaking,firm financialization represented by financial investment returns and holding equity of financial institutions has produced significant excluding effects of real investment. Second,external earning pressure strengthens excluding effects to some extent. Third,the impact of diversified equity investment on financialization shows two-sided effects:one is to strengthen excluding effects at the parent firm level,while the other is to reduce the effects at the conglomerate level. The conclusions of this paper indicate that the shareholder value orientation in Chinese firms essentially strengthens excluding effects from financialization both in internal and external paths. On the one hand,financialization effects are relieved while the equity investment of parent firms weakens total shareholder values;on the other hand,outside shareholder values strengthen financialization effects by earning pressure from external capital markets. In short,this paper expands the existing research from the following two aspects. First,it provides new paths in analyzing how the shareholder value orientation influence financialization effects,which strengthens the financialization theory. Second,this paper also constructs an empirical model for measuring the impact of corporate heterogeneity on financialization,which provides a certain basis for the follow-up study of firm financialization in the micro-field.
引文
[1]杜勇,张欢,陈建英.金融化对实体企业未来主业发展的影响:促进还是抑制[J].中国工业经济,2017,(12):113-131.
[2]胡奕明,王雪婷,张瑾.金融资产配置动机:“蓄水池”或“替代”?-来自中国上市公司的证据[J].经济研究,2017,(1):181-194.
[3]黄小琳,朱松,陈关亭.持股金融机构对企业负债融资与债务结构的影响-基于上市公司的实证研究[J].金融研究,2015,(12):130-145.
[4]钱雪松,袁梦婷,孔东民.股权关联影响了企业间信贷价格吗-基于我国上市公司委托贷款数据的经验分析[J].金融研究,2013,(9):165-179.
[5]宋军,陆旸.非货币金融资产和经营收益率的U形关系-来自我国上市非金融公司的金融化证据[J].金融研究,2015,(6):111-127.
[6]王菁,程博.外部盈利压力会导致企业投资不足吗?-基于中国制造业上市公司的数据分析[J].会计研究,2014,(3):33-40.
[7]徐永新,薛健,陈晓.从委托理财收益率看上市公司委托代理问题[J].南开管理评论,2009,(5):101-108.
[8]张成思,张步昙.中国实业投资率下降之谜:经济金融化视角[J].经济研究,2016,(12):32-46.
[9]Crotty J.The neoliberal paradox:The impact of destructive product market competition and Impatient Finance on nonfinancial corporations in the neoliberal era[J].Review of Radical Political Economics,2003,35(3):271-279.
[10]Dallery T.Post-Keynesian theories of the firm under financialization[J].Review of Radical Political Economics,2009,41(4):492-515.
[11]Demir F.Financial liberalization,private investment and portfolio choice:Financialization of real sectors in emerging markets[J].Journal of Development Economics,2009,88(2):314-324.
[12]Hann R N,Ogneva M,Ozbas O.Corporate diversification and the cost of capital[J].The Journal of Finance,2013,68(5):1961-1999.
[13]John K,Litov L,Yeung B.Corporate governance and risk-taking[J].The Journal of Finance,2008,63(4):1679-1728.
[14]Laeven L,Levine R.Is there a diversification discount in financial conglomerates?[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2007,85(2):331-367.
[15]Lazonick W,O’Sullivan M.Maximizing shareholder value:A new ideology for corporate governance[J].Economy and Society,2000,29(1):13-35.
[16]Matsumoto D A.Management’s incentives to avoid negative earnings surprises[J].The Accounting Review,2002,77(3):483-514.
[17]Orhangazi?.Financialisation and capital accumulation in the non-financial corporate sector:A theoretical and empirical investigation on the US economy:1973-2003[J].Cambridge Journal of Economics,2008,32(6):863-886.
[18]Rajan R,Servaes H,Zingales L.The cost of diversity:The diversification discount and inefficient investment[J].The Journal of Finance,2000,55(1):35-80.
[19]Richardson S.Over-investment of free cash flow[J].Review of Accounting Studies,2006,11(2-3):159-189.
[20]Zhang Y,Gimeno J.Earnings pressure and competitive behavior:Evidence from the U.S.electricity industry[J].Academy of Management Journal,2010,53(4):743-768.
(1)在2017年修订的《企业会计准则第22号-金融工具的确认与计量》中,金融资产的分类缩减为“以摊余成本计量的金融资产”“以公允价值计量且其变动计入其他综合收益的金融资产”和“以公允价值计量且其变动计入当期损益的金融资产”三类,相对于2007年版本,更加注重金融资产的合同现金流这一实质特征。本文的分析口径与之基本吻合。
(1)鉴于篇幅原因,金融化解释变量与投资不足的原始实证结果、PSM配对的协变量分布特征等因素省略,如有需要可向作者索取。
(2)在金融收益率的计量上,基于胡亦明等(2017)和杜勇等(2017)的研究,本文以货币资产和流动性金融资产为基础计算金融投资收益,并以滞后6期的收益率均值E(RFit)作为代理变量;在资产预期风险的使用上,本文借鉴John等(2008)、李文贵和余明桂(2012)的方法,针对过去6期的半年度金融资产综合收益率计算预期风险σFit和实体投资的预期风险σAit。
(1)限于篇幅,具体计算方法省略,可参照Matsumoto(2002)、Zhang和Gimeno(2010)。同时,由于本文使用半年度数据,外部盈利压力的计算按照相应的时间节点倒推一年作为计算周期。
(1)我们根据母公司实体投资占合并报表中实体投资的比率构建投资的“转移”水平,进行了与表3类似的检验,显示“转移”水平的提升与金融化收益率产生的集团公司层面投资挤出效应正向相关。这表明公司将实体投资“转移”到子公司的行为的确会导致金融化效应的提升。这对多元化股权投资部分的分析形成了佐证。限于篇幅,该部分省略,如有需要可向作者索取。
[2]胡奕明,王雪婷,张瑾.金融资产配置动机:“蓄水池”或“替代”?-来自中国上市公司的证据[J].经济研究,2017,(1):181-194.
[3]黄小琳,朱松,陈关亭.持股金融机构对企业负债融资与债务结构的影响-基于上市公司的实证研究[J].金融研究,2015,(12):130-145.
[4]钱雪松,袁梦婷,孔东民.股权关联影响了企业间信贷价格吗-基于我国上市公司委托贷款数据的经验分析[J].金融研究,2013,(9):165-179.
[5]宋军,陆旸.非货币金融资产和经营收益率的U形关系-来自我国上市非金融公司的金融化证据[J].金融研究,2015,(6):111-127.
[6]王菁,程博.外部盈利压力会导致企业投资不足吗?-基于中国制造业上市公司的数据分析[J].会计研究,2014,(3):33-40.
[7]徐永新,薛健,陈晓.从委托理财收益率看上市公司委托代理问题[J].南开管理评论,2009,(5):101-108.
[8]张成思,张步昙.中国实业投资率下降之谜:经济金融化视角[J].经济研究,2016,(12):32-46.
[9]Crotty J.The neoliberal paradox:The impact of destructive product market competition and Impatient Finance on nonfinancial corporations in the neoliberal era[J].Review of Radical Political Economics,2003,35(3):271-279.
[10]Dallery T.Post-Keynesian theories of the firm under financialization[J].Review of Radical Political Economics,2009,41(4):492-515.
[11]Demir F.Financial liberalization,private investment and portfolio choice:Financialization of real sectors in emerging markets[J].Journal of Development Economics,2009,88(2):314-324.
[12]Hann R N,Ogneva M,Ozbas O.Corporate diversification and the cost of capital[J].The Journal of Finance,2013,68(5):1961-1999.
[13]John K,Litov L,Yeung B.Corporate governance and risk-taking[J].The Journal of Finance,2008,63(4):1679-1728.
[14]Laeven L,Levine R.Is there a diversification discount in financial conglomerates?[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2007,85(2):331-367.
[15]Lazonick W,O’Sullivan M.Maximizing shareholder value:A new ideology for corporate governance[J].Economy and Society,2000,29(1):13-35.
[16]Matsumoto D A.Management’s incentives to avoid negative earnings surprises[J].The Accounting Review,2002,77(3):483-514.
[17]Orhangazi?.Financialisation and capital accumulation in the non-financial corporate sector:A theoretical and empirical investigation on the US economy:1973-2003[J].Cambridge Journal of Economics,2008,32(6):863-886.
[18]Rajan R,Servaes H,Zingales L.The cost of diversity:The diversification discount and inefficient investment[J].The Journal of Finance,2000,55(1):35-80.
[19]Richardson S.Over-investment of free cash flow[J].Review of Accounting Studies,2006,11(2-3):159-189.
[20]Zhang Y,Gimeno J.Earnings pressure and competitive behavior:Evidence from the U.S.electricity industry[J].Academy of Management Journal,2010,53(4):743-768.
(1)在2017年修订的《企业会计准则第22号-金融工具的确认与计量》中,金融资产的分类缩减为“以摊余成本计量的金融资产”“以公允价值计量且其变动计入其他综合收益的金融资产”和“以公允价值计量且其变动计入当期损益的金融资产”三类,相对于2007年版本,更加注重金融资产的合同现金流这一实质特征。本文的分析口径与之基本吻合。
(1)鉴于篇幅原因,金融化解释变量与投资不足的原始实证结果、PSM配对的协变量分布特征等因素省略,如有需要可向作者索取。
(2)在金融收益率的计量上,基于胡亦明等(2017)和杜勇等(2017)的研究,本文以货币资产和流动性金融资产为基础计算金融投资收益,并以滞后6期的收益率均值E(RFit)作为代理变量;在资产预期风险的使用上,本文借鉴John等(2008)、李文贵和余明桂(2012)的方法,针对过去6期的半年度金融资产综合收益率计算预期风险σFit和实体投资的预期风险σAit。
(1)限于篇幅,具体计算方法省略,可参照Matsumoto(2002)、Zhang和Gimeno(2010)。同时,由于本文使用半年度数据,外部盈利压力的计算按照相应的时间节点倒推一年作为计算周期。
(1)我们根据母公司实体投资占合并报表中实体投资的比率构建投资的“转移”水平,进行了与表3类似的检验,显示“转移”水平的提升与金融化收益率产生的集团公司层面投资挤出效应正向相关。这表明公司将实体投资“转移”到子公司的行为的确会导致金融化效应的提升。这对多元化股权投资部分的分析形成了佐证。限于篇幅,该部分省略,如有需要可向作者索取。