加强失信人监管与缓解民营企业过度负债
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摘要
2015年已有研究文献得出了民营企业更过度负债的结论,出人意料,也引起了人们对民营企业过度负债问题的重视。选取中国A股上市公司2009—2016年所披露的财务数据为研究样本,研究党的十八大以后政府持续加强失信人监管对缓解民营企业过度负债的有效性,并进一步分析企业代理成本和外部市场化水平对加强失信人监管力度与缓解民营企业过度负债关系的调节作用。研究发现,党的十八大以来加强失信人监管后有效缓解了民营企业过度负债水平,且监管力度与民营企业过度负债缓解显著正相关,民营企业过度负债程度转变为低于国有企业;民营企业的代理成本越高,上述关系的有效性越弱;市场化水平越高,上述政策执行越到位。
In 2015,the conclusion that the private enterprises have been over-indebted in the research literature is surprising,and it has also caused people to pay attention to the problem of excessive debt of private enterprises. Selecting the financial experience data disclosed by the A-share-listed companies in China from 2009 to 2016 as research samples,studying the government's continuous strengthening of the supervision of the defaulters after the 18 th National Congress of the People's Republic of China,to alleviate the excessive debt of the private enterprises. The effectiveness of the analysis and further analysis of the agency costs and the level of external marketization strengthen the regulatory role of trustee supervision and ease the excessive debt relationship of private enterprises. The study finds that since the 18 th National Congress of the Chinese CommunistParty strengthened supervision of fiduciaries,it has effectively relieved the excessive debt level of private enterprises,and the supervision has been significantly positively related to the over-liberation of private enterprises. The over-indebtedness of private enterprises has been transformed into lower than that of state-owned enterprises;The higher the agency cost,the weaker the effectiveness of the above-mentioned relationship;the higher the marketization level,the higher the implementation of the aforementioned policies;and the lower the level of marketization,the more effective the above policies will be.
In 2015,the conclusion that the private enterprises have been over-indebted in the research literature is surprising,and it has also caused people to pay attention to the problem of excessive debt of private enterprises. Selecting the financial experience data disclosed by the A-share-listed companies in China from 2009 to 2016 as research samples,studying the government's continuous strengthening of the supervision of the defaulters after the 18 th National Congress of the People's Republic of China,to alleviate the excessive debt of the private enterprises. The effectiveness of the analysis and further analysis of the agency costs and the level of external marketization strengthen the regulatory role of trustee supervision and ease the excessive debt relationship of private enterprises. The study finds that since the 18 th National Congress of the Chinese CommunistParty strengthened supervision of fiduciaries,it has effectively relieved the excessive debt level of private enterprises,and the supervision has been significantly positively related to the over-liberation of private enterprises. The over-indebtedness of private enterprises has been transformed into lower than that of state-owned enterprises;The higher the agency cost,the weaker the effectiveness of the above-mentioned relationship;the higher the marketization level,the higher the implementation of the aforementioned policies;and the lower the level of marketization,the more effective the above policies will be.
引文
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[27]Jensen M C. Agency costs of free cash flow,corporate finance,and takeovers[J]. American Economic Rview,1986,76(2):323-339.
[28]张铁铸,沙曼.管理层能力权力与在职消费研究[J].南开管理评论,2014(5):63-72.
[29]段新生,葛令艳.上市公司代理成本与负债融资关系的实证研究[J].财会通讯,2011(27):103-105.
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[32]沙浩.商业银行盈利能力和代理成本与效率之间关系——基于14家上市银行的实证分析[J].金融与经济,2010(12):50-52.
[33]贺京同,刘倩,贺坤.市场化程度、供给侧管理与货币政策效果[J].南开学报,2016(2):1-12.
[34]姜付秀,黄继承.市场化进程与资本结构动态调整[J].管理世界,2011(3):124-134,6.
[35]苏坤,李鹏.制度环境对债务期限结构的影响研究[J].上海金融,2012(11):30-35,116.
[36]罗雨薇.市场化指数、治理结构与企业绩效关系研究[J].统计与决策,2014(24):192-194.
[37]Denis D J,Mckeon S B. Debt financing and financial flexibility evidence from proactive leverage increases[J].Review of Financial Studies,2012,25(6):1897-1929.
[38]姜付秀,黄磊,张敏.产品市场竞争、公司治理与代理成本[J].世界经济,2009(10):46-59.
[39]王小鲁,樊纲,余静文.中国分省份市场化指数报告(2016)[M].北京:中国社会科学文献出版社,2017.
[2]方军雄.所有制、制度环境和信贷资金配置[J].经济研究,2007(12):82-92.
[3]肖泽忠,邹宏.中国上市公司资本结构的影响因素和股权融资偏好[J].经济研究,2008(6):119-133.
[4]Li K,Yue H,Zhao L. Ownership,institutions,and capital structure:evidence form China[J]. Journal of Comparative Economics,2009,37(3):471-490.
[5]Chang C,Chen X,Liao G. What are the reliably important determinants of capital structure in China?[J].Pacific Basin Finance Journal,2014,30(9):87-113.
[6]Deangelo H,Deangelo L Whitedv T M.Capital structure dynamic and transitory debt[J].Journal of Comparative Economics,2011,99(2):235-261.
[7]盛明泉,张敏,马黎捃,等.国有产权、预算软约束与资本结构动态调整[J].管理世界,2012(3):151-157.
[8]Petersen M,Rajan R G.Trade credit:theories and evidence[J].The Review of Financial Studies,1997,10(3):661-691.
[9]杨华领,雷会锋.民营企业信用风险与负债融资关系实证分析[J].财会通讯,2011(8):149-150.
[10]张信东,张莉.金字塔股权结构下企业的零负债现象——基于中国民营上市公司的实证研究[J].经济与管理研究,2013(8):48-56.
[11]陆正飞,高强.中国上市公司融资行为研究——基于问卷调査的分析[J].会计研究,2003(10):16-24.
[12]Drobetz W,Wanzenried G. What deteimines the speed of adjustment to the target capital structure?[J].Applied Financial Econnmics,2006,16(3):941-958.
[13]姜付秀,屈耀辉,陆正飞,等.产品市场竞争与资本结构动态调整[J].经济研究,2008(4):99-108.
[14]Titman S,Tsyplakov S. Dynamic model of optimal capital structure[J].Review of Finance,2007,11(3):401-451.
[15]应振洲,赵旭.委托代理条件下资本结构与市场竞争强度关系研究[J].上海管理科学,2008(5):25-28.
[16]张会丽,陆正飞.控股水平、负债主体与资本结构适度性[J].南开管理评论,2013(5):142-151.
[17]肖作平.资本结构影响因素和双向效应动态模型——来自中国上市公司面板数据的证据[J].会计研究,2004(2):36-41.
[18]王跃堂,王亮亮,彭洋.产权性质、债务税盾与资本结构[J].经济研究,2010(9):122-136.
[19]陆正华,黄文瑜.市场环境、企业负债和产能过剩的关系分析[J].商业经济研究,2017(4):104-105.
[20]张雪华,王伟,王萌.基于民营企业的民间融资与负债融资水平研究[J].财会通讯,2017(3):114-118.
[21]Haselmann R,Pistor K,Vig V. How law affects lending[J]. Review of Financial Studies,2010,23(2):549-580.
[22]黄继承,朱冰,向东.法律环境与资本结构动态调整[J].管理世界,2014(5):142-156.
[23]林慧婷,何玉润,王茂林,等.媒体报道与企业资本结构动态调整[J].会计研究,2016(9):41-46.
[24]蔡利,马可哪呐.政府审计与国有企业治理效率——基于央企控股上市公司的经验证据[J].审计研究,2014(6):48-56.
[25]Jensen M C,MecklingW H. Theory of the firm:managerial behavior,agency cost and ownership structure[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1976,3(4):305-360.
[26]黄速建,余菁.国有企业的性质、目标与社会责任[J].中国工业经济,2006(2):68-76.
[27]Jensen M C. Agency costs of free cash flow,corporate finance,and takeovers[J]. American Economic Rview,1986,76(2):323-339.
[28]张铁铸,沙曼.管理层能力权力与在职消费研究[J].南开管理评论,2014(5):63-72.
[29]段新生,葛令艳.上市公司代理成本与负债融资关系的实证研究[J].财会通讯,2011(27):103-105.
[30]Cai K,Fairchild R,Guney Y. Debt maturity structure of Chinese companies[J].Pacific—Basin Finance Journal,2008,16(3):268-297.
[31]刘新民,崔宁,王垒.两类代理成本之于金字塔结构下公司效率的中介作用研究[J].现代财经,2017(1):53-65.
[32]沙浩.商业银行盈利能力和代理成本与效率之间关系——基于14家上市银行的实证分析[J].金融与经济,2010(12):50-52.
[33]贺京同,刘倩,贺坤.市场化程度、供给侧管理与货币政策效果[J].南开学报,2016(2):1-12.
[34]姜付秀,黄继承.市场化进程与资本结构动态调整[J].管理世界,2011(3):124-134,6.
[35]苏坤,李鹏.制度环境对债务期限结构的影响研究[J].上海金融,2012(11):30-35,116.
[36]罗雨薇.市场化指数、治理结构与企业绩效关系研究[J].统计与决策,2014(24):192-194.
[37]Denis D J,Mckeon S B. Debt financing and financial flexibility evidence from proactive leverage increases[J].Review of Financial Studies,2012,25(6):1897-1929.
[38]姜付秀,黄磊,张敏.产品市场竞争、公司治理与代理成本[J].世界经济,2009(10):46-59.
[39]王小鲁,樊纲,余静文.中国分省份市场化指数报告(2016)[M].北京:中国社会科学文献出版社,2017.