学者型CEO能否抑制企业税收规避
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摘要
利用2001—2016年的沪深A股上市公司样本数据,实证检验了学者型CEO对企业税收规避的影响。研究发现:学者型CEO显著抑制了企业税收规避;相比于国有企业,学者型CEO对企业税收规避的影响在民营企业中更为突出;高层次的CEO学术经历对企业税收规避的抑制作用更为显著。作用机理检验表明,CEO学术经历主要通过增强CEO的社会责任感和风险规避心态,抑制了企业的税收规避行为。
Using the sample of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2001 to 2016,this paper empirically tested the effect of scholar-type CEOs on corporate tax avoidance. Our results reveal that scholar-type CEOs have significantly curbed corporate tax avoidance,which is more pronounced in private companies rather than that in state-owned companies. And a higher level of academic experiences may have a stronger impact. The test on influencin mechanism show that,academic experiences of CEOs affect enterprise tax avoidance mainly through the enhancement of CEO's sense of social responsibility and risk avoidance.
Using the sample of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2001 to 2016,this paper empirically tested the effect of scholar-type CEOs on corporate tax avoidance. Our results reveal that scholar-type CEOs have significantly curbed corporate tax avoidance,which is more pronounced in private companies rather than that in state-owned companies. And a higher level of academic experiences may have a stronger impact. The test on influencin mechanism show that,academic experiences of CEOs affect enterprise tax avoidance mainly through the enhancement of CEO's sense of social responsibility and risk avoidance.
引文
[1]Hanlon M,Heitzman S.A Review of Tax Research[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2010,50(2/3):127-178.
[2]Dyreng S,Hanlon M,Maydew E L.The Effects of Executives on Corporate Tax Avoidance[J].The Accounting Review,2010,85(4):1163-1189.
[3]Hambrick D C,Mason P A.Upper Echelons:The Organization as a Reflection of Its Top Managers[J].Academy of Management Review,1984,9(2):193-206.
[4]周楷唐,麻志明,吴联生.高管学术经历与公司债务融资成本[J].经济研究,2017(7):169-183.
[5]张晓亮,杨海龙,唐小飞.CEO学术经历与企业创新[J].科研管理,2019(2):154-163.
[6]Cho C H,Jung J H,Kwak B,et al.Professors on the Board:Do They Contribute to Society Outside the Classroom?[J].Journal of Business Ethics,2017,141(2):393-409.
[7]沈华玉,张军,余应敏.高管学术经历、外部治理水平与审计费用[J].审计研究,2018(4):86-94.
[8]Bowman R F.Teacher as Servant Leader[J].The Clearing House:A Journal of Educational Strategies,Issues and Ideas,2005,78(6):257-260.
[9]Jiang B,Murphy P J.Do Business School Professors Make Good Executive Managers?[J].Academy of Management Perspectives,2007,21(3):29-50.
[10]Crocker K J,Slemrod J.Corporate Tax Evasion with Agency Cost[J].Journal of Public Economics,2005,89(9/10):1593-1610.
[11]Desai M A,Dharmapala D.Corporate Tax Avoidance and High-Powered Incentives[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2006,79(1):145-179.
[12]Frank M M,Lynch L J,Rego S O.Tax Reporting Aggressiveness and Its Relation to Aggressive Financial Reporting[J].The Accounting Review,2009,84(2):467-496.
[13]蔡宏标,饶品贵.机构投资者、税收征管与企业避税[J].会计研究,2015(10):59-65,97.
[14]Rego S,Wilson R.Equity Risk Incentives and Corporate Tax Aggressiveness[J].Journal of Accounting Research,2012,50(3):775-810.
[15]Armstrong C S,Blouin J L,Jagolinzer A D,et al.Corporate Governance,Incentives,and Tax Avoidance[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2015,60(1):1-17.
[16]Francis B B,Hasan I,Sun X,et al.CEO Political Preference and Corporate Tax Sheltering[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2016,38:37-53.
[17]Law K K F,Mills L F.Military Experience and Corporate Tax Avoidance[J].Review of Accounting Studies,2017,22(1):141-184.
[18]Koester A,Shevlin T,Wangerin D.The Role of Managerial Ability in Corporate Tax Avoidance[J].Management Science,2016,63(10):3285-3310.
[19]谭雪,杜兴强.国际化董事会、审计师行业专长与税收规避[J].山西财经大学学报,2015(11):113-124.
[20]刘行,梁娟,建蕾.实际控制人的境外居留权会使民营企业更多避税吗?[J].财经研究,2016(9):133-144.
[21]张胜,魏汉泽,李常安.实际控制人居留权特征与企业税收规避[J].会计研究,2016(4):77-84,96.
[22]Graham J R,Hanlon M,Shevlin T,et al.Incentives for Tax Planning and Avoidance:Evidence from the Field[J].The Accounting Review,2013,89(3):991-1023.
[23]Robinson J R,Xue Y,Zhang M H.Tax Planning and Financial Expertise in the Audit Committee[R].Austin:Working Paper,2012.
(1)参考Hanlon和Heitzman(2010)[1]的研究,本文将税收规避定义为企业所有以减少缴纳所得税为目的的行为和手段,既包括合法的税收筹划和规避,也包括逃税行为。由于实证研究无法对避税行为的合法性进行清晰界定,本文借鉴以往的文献,不对避税和逃税行为进行区分。
(2)如果企业所得税费用和税前利润均小于0,则实际所得税率为正,但这与实际不符。
(3)网址为:http://stockdata.stock.hexun.com/zrbg/。
[2]Dyreng S,Hanlon M,Maydew E L.The Effects of Executives on Corporate Tax Avoidance[J].The Accounting Review,2010,85(4):1163-1189.
[3]Hambrick D C,Mason P A.Upper Echelons:The Organization as a Reflection of Its Top Managers[J].Academy of Management Review,1984,9(2):193-206.
[4]周楷唐,麻志明,吴联生.高管学术经历与公司债务融资成本[J].经济研究,2017(7):169-183.
[5]张晓亮,杨海龙,唐小飞.CEO学术经历与企业创新[J].科研管理,2019(2):154-163.
[6]Cho C H,Jung J H,Kwak B,et al.Professors on the Board:Do They Contribute to Society Outside the Classroom?[J].Journal of Business Ethics,2017,141(2):393-409.
[7]沈华玉,张军,余应敏.高管学术经历、外部治理水平与审计费用[J].审计研究,2018(4):86-94.
[8]Bowman R F.Teacher as Servant Leader[J].The Clearing House:A Journal of Educational Strategies,Issues and Ideas,2005,78(6):257-260.
[9]Jiang B,Murphy P J.Do Business School Professors Make Good Executive Managers?[J].Academy of Management Perspectives,2007,21(3):29-50.
[10]Crocker K J,Slemrod J.Corporate Tax Evasion with Agency Cost[J].Journal of Public Economics,2005,89(9/10):1593-1610.
[11]Desai M A,Dharmapala D.Corporate Tax Avoidance and High-Powered Incentives[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2006,79(1):145-179.
[12]Frank M M,Lynch L J,Rego S O.Tax Reporting Aggressiveness and Its Relation to Aggressive Financial Reporting[J].The Accounting Review,2009,84(2):467-496.
[13]蔡宏标,饶品贵.机构投资者、税收征管与企业避税[J].会计研究,2015(10):59-65,97.
[14]Rego S,Wilson R.Equity Risk Incentives and Corporate Tax Aggressiveness[J].Journal of Accounting Research,2012,50(3):775-810.
[15]Armstrong C S,Blouin J L,Jagolinzer A D,et al.Corporate Governance,Incentives,and Tax Avoidance[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2015,60(1):1-17.
[16]Francis B B,Hasan I,Sun X,et al.CEO Political Preference and Corporate Tax Sheltering[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2016,38:37-53.
[17]Law K K F,Mills L F.Military Experience and Corporate Tax Avoidance[J].Review of Accounting Studies,2017,22(1):141-184.
[18]Koester A,Shevlin T,Wangerin D.The Role of Managerial Ability in Corporate Tax Avoidance[J].Management Science,2016,63(10):3285-3310.
[19]谭雪,杜兴强.国际化董事会、审计师行业专长与税收规避[J].山西财经大学学报,2015(11):113-124.
[20]刘行,梁娟,建蕾.实际控制人的境外居留权会使民营企业更多避税吗?[J].财经研究,2016(9):133-144.
[21]张胜,魏汉泽,李常安.实际控制人居留权特征与企业税收规避[J].会计研究,2016(4):77-84,96.
[22]Graham J R,Hanlon M,Shevlin T,et al.Incentives for Tax Planning and Avoidance:Evidence from the Field[J].The Accounting Review,2013,89(3):991-1023.
[23]Robinson J R,Xue Y,Zhang M H.Tax Planning and Financial Expertise in the Audit Committee[R].Austin:Working Paper,2012.
(1)参考Hanlon和Heitzman(2010)[1]的研究,本文将税收规避定义为企业所有以减少缴纳所得税为目的的行为和手段,既包括合法的税收筹划和规避,也包括逃税行为。由于实证研究无法对避税行为的合法性进行清晰界定,本文借鉴以往的文献,不对避税和逃税行为进行区分。
(2)如果企业所得税费用和税前利润均小于0,则实际所得税率为正,但这与实际不符。
(3)网址为:http://stockdata.stock.hexun.com/zrbg/。