科学心理学的观念与人文科学的逻辑奠基
|
摘要
科学心理学观念的普遍兴起,是19世纪中叶错综复杂的思想史背景的产物。只有在人类思想及其历史作为整体的关系背景中,才能澄清这个观念的内在本性。也只有在系统地接受这个背景的制约关系中,这个观念才能获得其真理的实现。能否在人类思想作为整体中胜任并执行其理论职能,成为我们检验一种心理学体系之真理性的途径之一:科学心理学观念只有实现为现象学心理学,才能执行其为人文科学奠基的逻辑职能;反之亦然。这个关系还从否定方面暗示着,一切以异化的形式实现的心理学,都不可能真正承担起为人文科学奠基的逻辑职能,并因而违背了我们的常识。
The idea of scientific psychology popularized during the middle 19-th century as a result of the extremely complex intellectual background.Only in the contextual relationships with human thought and its history as a whole can the nature of the idea be clarified.And only with the systematic regulative constraints from the background can the idea get its genuine realization,thus being able to play its role in the whole context.Whether a system of psychology is qualified to assume its immanently assigned theoretical functions in the whole of human thought becomes one of the measures of testing its truth and genuineness.When the idea realizes itself as phenomenological psychology,it can successfully play its role for founding the humanities,and vise versa.This means at the same time negatively any psychology as a theoretical system that is alienated from the true nature of the idea can never play the role of founding the humanities.
The idea of scientific psychology popularized during the middle 19-th century as a result of the extremely complex intellectual background.Only in the contextual relationships with human thought and its history as a whole can the nature of the idea be clarified.And only with the systematic regulative constraints from the background can the idea get its genuine realization,thus being able to play its role in the whole context.Whether a system of psychology is qualified to assume its immanently assigned theoretical functions in the whole of human thought becomes one of the measures of testing its truth and genuineness.When the idea realizes itself as phenomenological psychology,it can successfully play its role for founding the humanities,and vise versa.This means at the same time negatively any psychology as a theoretical system that is alienated from the true nature of the idea can never play the role of founding the humanities.
引文
德布尔.(1995).胡塞尔思想的发展(李河译).北京:三联书店.
高觉敷.(1982).西方近代心理学史.北京:人民教育出版社.
高申春.(2012).胡塞尔与心理学的现象学道路.南京师大学报(社会科学版),179(1),90-96.
高申春,杜艳飞.(2018).卡西尔哲学思想的概念探微.吉林大学社会科学学报,58(5),162-170.
高申春,刘成刚.(2013).科学心理学的观念及其范畴含义解析.心理科学,36(3),761-767.
高申春,甄洁.(2018).卡西尔与心理学的现象学道路.华中师范大学学报(人文社会科学版),57(6),1-8.
胡塞尔.(1986).现象学的观念(倪梁康译).上海:上海译文出版社.
胡塞尔.(1995).纯粹现象学通论(李幼蒸译).北京:商务印书馆.
卡西尔.(1985).人论(甘阳译).上海:上海译文出版社.
施太格缪勒.(1986).当代哲学主流(上卷)(张金言,王炳文译).北京:商务印书馆.
Brentano,F.(1995).Psychology from an empirical standpoint.London:Routledge.
Cassirer,E.(1953).The philosophy of symbolic Forms(Volume One:Language).New Haven:Yale University Press.
Gawronsky,D.(1949).Ernst Cassirer:His life and his work.In P.A.Schilpp(Ed.),The philosophy of Ernst Cassirer.Evanston,Illinois:The Library Of Living Philosophers,Inc.
James,W.(1890/1907).The principles of psychology(Vol.I).New York,NY:Macmillan and Co.,Ltd.
Kusch,M.(1995).Psychologism:A Case study in the sociology of philosophical knowledge.London:Routledge.
高觉敷.(1982).西方近代心理学史.北京:人民教育出版社.
高申春.(2012).胡塞尔与心理学的现象学道路.南京师大学报(社会科学版),179(1),90-96.
高申春,杜艳飞.(2018).卡西尔哲学思想的概念探微.吉林大学社会科学学报,58(5),162-170.
高申春,刘成刚.(2013).科学心理学的观念及其范畴含义解析.心理科学,36(3),761-767.
高申春,甄洁.(2018).卡西尔与心理学的现象学道路.华中师范大学学报(人文社会科学版),57(6),1-8.
胡塞尔.(1986).现象学的观念(倪梁康译).上海:上海译文出版社.
胡塞尔.(1995).纯粹现象学通论(李幼蒸译).北京:商务印书馆.
卡西尔.(1985).人论(甘阳译).上海:上海译文出版社.
施太格缪勒.(1986).当代哲学主流(上卷)(张金言,王炳文译).北京:商务印书馆.
Brentano,F.(1995).Psychology from an empirical standpoint.London:Routledge.
Cassirer,E.(1953).The philosophy of symbolic Forms(Volume One:Language).New Haven:Yale University Press.
Gawronsky,D.(1949).Ernst Cassirer:His life and his work.In P.A.Schilpp(Ed.),The philosophy of Ernst Cassirer.Evanston,Illinois:The Library Of Living Philosophers,Inc.
James,W.(1890/1907).The principles of psychology(Vol.I).New York,NY:Macmillan and Co.,Ltd.
Kusch,M.(1995).Psychologism:A Case study in the sociology of philosophical knowledge.London:Routledge.