“远敌”与“近敌”:伊斯兰极端主义的内部论争
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摘要
作为"远敌"的西方世界和"近敌"的伊斯兰世界"叛教者政府",哪一个才是优先打击目标,是伊斯兰极端主义者们论争的焦点问题之一。"远敌"和"近敌"的排序,也在很大程度上影响着伊斯兰极端组织的战略实践。以"远敌"为优先袭击目标的伊斯兰极端组织,往往将美国和西方国家在阿拉伯世界的人员和利益作为袭击重点,同时努力向西方世界内部渗透,伺机发动大规模的暴恐袭击,挫败"异教徒"在伊斯兰世界的势力,促使穆斯林"觉醒",进而建立一个涵盖所有伊斯兰世界的"哈里发国";而以"近敌"为优先袭击目标的伊斯兰极端组织,则将所在国的政权和领导人视为"叛教者",其优先的战略目标是对所在国或者周边地区发动暴恐袭击,通过暴力活动制造混乱进而夺取政治权力,建立"伊斯兰国家"。不同伊斯兰极端组织在"远敌"和"近敌"优先次序上的实践,源于不同的伊斯兰极端主义政治逻辑,因此对伊斯兰极端主义"远敌"和"近敌"战略的分析,有助于我们理解伊斯兰极端主义的政治逻辑,为国际社会更好地应对伊斯兰极端主义思想及实践提供一定启示。
Although both the "far enemy" represented by the western world and the "near enemy" represented by "Kufr" governments in the Arab-Islamic world are "mortal enemies" of Islamic extremists, which enemy should be the priority target of strike has become one of the heatedly debated issues among Islamic extremists. The answer to this question largely determines the concrete strategic practices of Islamic extremist organizations. On the one hand, the Islamic extremists who advocate the "far-enemy priority" consider the individuals and interests of the United States and other western countries in the Arab world the focus of their attack, try to infiltrate into the western world and watch for an opportunity to launch massive terrorist attacks in due course so as to facilitate the downfall of Islamic "Kufr" governments, prompt Muslims to "awaken" and then create a "Caliphate" in the Islamic world. On the other hand, other Islamic extremists believe that it is of overarching importance to target and overthrow the "Kufr" governments in the Arab-Islamic world and facilitate the establishment of an "Islamic State" by plotting terrorist attacks and seizing political power through violent activities and chaos. Different opinions concerning the prioritization of "near enemy" and "far enemy" stem from diametrically different political logic followed by varied Islamic extremist organizations. Therefore, the analysis of their strategic line of thinking will be conducive to a better understanding of the political logic and ideologies of Islamic extremists and will shed some light on the international community in their grappling with the ideologies and practices of Islamic extremist organizations.
Although both the "far enemy" represented by the western world and the "near enemy" represented by "Kufr" governments in the Arab-Islamic world are "mortal enemies" of Islamic extremists, which enemy should be the priority target of strike has become one of the heatedly debated issues among Islamic extremists. The answer to this question largely determines the concrete strategic practices of Islamic extremist organizations. On the one hand, the Islamic extremists who advocate the "far-enemy priority" consider the individuals and interests of the United States and other western countries in the Arab world the focus of their attack, try to infiltrate into the western world and watch for an opportunity to launch massive terrorist attacks in due course so as to facilitate the downfall of Islamic "Kufr" governments, prompt Muslims to "awaken" and then create a "Caliphate" in the Islamic world. On the other hand, other Islamic extremists believe that it is of overarching importance to target and overthrow the "Kufr" governments in the Arab-Islamic world and facilitate the establishment of an "Islamic State" by plotting terrorist attacks and seizing political power through violent activities and chaos. Different opinions concerning the prioritization of "near enemy" and "far enemy" stem from diametrically different political logic followed by varied Islamic extremist organizations. Therefore, the analysis of their strategic line of thinking will be conducive to a better understanding of the political logic and ideologies of Islamic extremists and will shed some light on the international community in their grappling with the ideologies and practices of Islamic extremist organizations.
引文
(1)吴云贵:《试析伊斯兰极端主义形成的社会思想根源》,载《世界宗教文化》2015年第3期,第2-3页。
(2)Aaron Y.Zelin,“The War between ISIS and AL-Qaeda for Supremacy of the Global Jihadist Movement,”The Washington Institute for Near East Policy,No.20,June 2014,p.6,http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/ResearchNote_20_Zelin.pdf.
(3)Graeme Wood,“What ISIS Really Wants,”The Atlantic,February 24,2015,https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/02/what-isis-really-wants-reader-response-atlantic/385710.
(1)关于西方学术界对于伊斯兰极端主义产生和发展的论争,参见Stuart Gottlieb,ed.,Debating Terrorism and Counterterrorism:Conflict Perspectives on Causes,Contexts and Responses,Washington D.C.:CQ Press,2010。
(2)Randall Law,Terrorism:A History,Cambridge:Polity,2009;Marc Sageman,Understanding Terror Network,Philadelphia:University of Pennsylvania Press,2004.
(3)Tahir Abbas,ed.,Islamic Political Radicalism:A European Perspective,Edinburgh:Edinburgh University Press,2007.
(4)刘中民:《中东变局以来中东恐怖主义的新发展及其根源》,载《西亚非洲》2014年第6期,第3页。其他关于伊斯兰极端主义和恐怖主义探讨的文章,可以参见刘中民、俞海杰:《“伊斯兰国”的极端主义意识形态探析》,载《西亚非洲》2016年第3期,第41-61页;吴冰冰:《圣战观念与当代伊斯兰恐怖主义》,载《阿拉伯世界研究》2006年第1期,第36-41页。
(1)曾向红:《适当性逻辑的竞争:“基地”与“伊斯兰国”的架构叙事》,载《世界经济与政治》2016年第4期,第80页。
(2)关于极端组织“伊斯兰国”和“基地”组织之间的关系历程,可以参见王晋:《“伊斯兰国”与恐怖主义的变形》,载《外交评论》2015年第2期,第51-76页;周明、曾向红:《“基地”与“伊斯兰国”的战略差异及走势》,载《外交评论》2016年第4期,第130-156页。
(1)Sayyid Qutb,Milestones,New Delhi:Islamic Book Service,p.70.
(2)巴勒斯坦民族解放运动领导人阿拉法特在第一次海湾战争中支持伊拉克萨达姆政府,因此被科威特政府所嫉恨,在第一次海湾战争结束后,科威特政府开始驱逐国内的巴勒斯坦人,马克迪西也被迫离开科威特返回约旦。
(3)Robert Worth,“Credentials Challenged,Radical Quotes West Point,”New York Times,April 29,2009,https://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/30/world/middleeast/30jihad.html?_r=1&hp.
(1)Murad Batal al-Shishani,“Abu Mus’ab al-Suri and the Third Generation of Salafi-Jihadists,”Terrorism Monitor,Vol.3,No.16,2005,p.16.
(2)Murad Batal al-Shishani,“Abu Mus’ab al-Suri and the Third Generation of Salafi-Jihadists,”Terrorism Monitor,Vol.3,No.16,2005,p.16.
(3)Roxanne L Euben and Muhammad Qasim Zaman,Princeton Readings in Islamist Thought:Texts and Contexts from Al-Banna to Bin Laden,Princeton:Princeton University Press,2009,p.1.
(1)Sayyid Qutb,Milestones,New Delhi:Islamic Book Service,2002,p.33.
(2)Sayyid Qutb,Milestones,New Delhi:Islamic Book Service,2002,p.12.
(3)Joas Wagemakers,A Quietist Jihadi:The Ideology and Influence of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi,Cambridge and New York:Cambridge University Press,2012,p.217.
(4)Joas Wagemakers,A Quietist Jihadi:The Ideology and Influence of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi,Cambridge and New York:Cambridge University Press,2012,p.218.
(5)Brynjar Lia,Architect of Global Jihad:The Life of Al-Qaeda Strategist Abu Mus’ab al-Suri,London:Hurst Publisher Ltd.,2007,p.364.
(1)苏里经常使用“umami”一词,“umami”原意为“全球性”“国际性”,反映出苏里对于号召全球穆斯林参加“独狼圣战”的目标。
(2)Brynjar Lia,Architect of Global Jihad:The Life of Al-Qaeda Strategist Abu Mus’ab al-Suri,London:Hurst Publisher Ltd.,2007,p.369.
(3)Brynjar Lia,Architect of Global Jihad:The Life of Al-Qaeda Strategist Abu Mus’ab al-Suri,London:Hurst Publisher Ltd.,2007,p.369.
(4)Sayyid Qutb,Milestones,New Delhi:Islamic Book Service,2002,p.21.
(5)James Brandon,“Jordan’s Jihad Scholar al-Maqdisi is Freed from Prison,”Terrorism Monitor,Vol.6,No.7,2008,p.4.
(1)Sayyid Qutb,Milestones,New Delhi:Islamic Book Service,2002,p.32.
(2)Sayyid Qutb,Milestones,New Delhi:Islamic Book Service,2002,p.70.
(3)James Brandon,“Jordan’s Jihad Scholar al-Maqdisi is Freed from Prison,”Terrorism Monitor,Vol.6,No.7,2008,p.6.
(4)Brynjar Lia,Architect of Global Jihad:The Life of Al-Qaeda Strategist Abu Mus’ab al-Suri,London:Hurst Publisher Ltd.,2007,p.362.
(5)Brynjar Lia,Architect of Global Jihad:The Life of Al-Qaeda Strategist Abu Mus’ab al-Suri,London:Hurst Publisher Ltd.,2007,p.363.
(1)对于伊本·泰米耶的观点是否直接影响到了赛义德·库特布乃至苏里和马克迪西等人,学术界并无统一意见。认为伊本·泰米耶观点与近现代伊斯兰极端主义思想人物传习有序的著作,参见Devin R Springer,James L.Regens and David N.Edger,Islamic Radicalism and Global Jihad,Washington D.C.:Georgetown University Press,2008;而认为伊本·泰米耶与近现代伊斯兰极端主义者并无因果联系的著述,参见Joas Wagemakers,A Quietist Jihadi:The Ideology and Influence of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi,Cambridge and New York:Cambridge University Press,2012。
(2)Roxanne L.Euben and Muhammad Qasim Zaman,Princeton Reading in Islamist Thought:Texts and Contexts From al-Banna to Bin Laden,Princeton:Princeton University Press,2009,p.323.
(3)James Brandon,“Jordan’s Jihad Scholar al-Maqdisi is Freed from Prison,”Terrorism Monitor,Vol.6,No.7,2008,p.5.
(4)穆尔吉埃派(al-Murji’ah)是伊斯兰教早期派别之一。约于7世纪中叶出现于麦地那和大马士革等地区。它与逊尼派、什叶派和哈瓦利吉派同为伊斯兰教早期的四大政治派别。“穆尔吉埃”一词系阿拉伯语的音译,意为“延缓者”“推缓者”“留待以后判断者”,因该派在教义上对穆斯林中犯大罪的人(包括当权者)是否构成叛教罪等有争议的问题,坚持“暂不作判断,可推延到末日由真主裁判”,因而得名。该派思想较为温和宽容,提倡团结和平,反对战争和分裂。
(5)Sayyid Qutb,Milestones,New Delhi:Islamic Book Service,2002,pp.80-82.
(1)Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon,The Age of Scared Terror,Radical Islam’s War against America,New York:Random House,2002,p.68.
(2)Brynjar Lia,Architect of Global Jihad:The Life of Al-Qaeda Strategist Abu Mus’ab al-Suri,London:Hurst Publisher Ltd.,2007,p.408.
(3)Brynjar Lia,Architect of Global Jihad:The Life of Al-Qaeda Strategist Abu Mus’ab al-Suri,London:Hurst Publisher Ltd.,2007,p.409.
(1)David L Johnston,“Hassan al-Hudaybi and the Muslim Brotherhood:Can Islamic Fundamentalism Eschew the Islamic State?”Comparative Islamic Studies,Vol.3,No.1,2007,p.42.
(2)马克迪西认为,“忠诚与抗拒”来自于《古兰经》:“易卜拉欣和他的教徒,是你们的好模范。当时,他们曾对自己的宗族说:‘我们对于你们,和你们舍真主而崇拜的,确是无干的,我们不承认你们。我们彼此间的仇恨,永远存在。直到你们只信仰真主。’但易卜拉欣对他父亲所说的话,不可做你们的模范。他曾说:“我必定为你求饶,我不能为你抵御真主的一些刑罚。”他们曾说:“我们的主啊!我们只信托你,我们只依归你,只有你是最后的归宿。”(60:4)
(1)Nibras Kaimi,“A Virulent Ideology in Mutation:Zarqawi Upstages Maqdisi,”hudson.org,September 12,2005,pp.63-64,https://hudson.org/content/researchattachments/attachment/1368/kazimi_vol2.pdf.
(2)Joas Wagemakers,“A Purist Jihadi-Salafi:The Ideology of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi,”British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies,Vol.36,No.2,2009,pp.281-297.
(1)《古兰经》(4:59)。
(2)Sheikh Yusuf Al-Qaradawi,State in Islam,Cairo:Al-Falah Foundation,2004,p.178.
(3)[美]托马斯·李普曼:《伊斯兰教与穆斯林世界》,陆文岳、英珊译,北京:新华出版社1985年版,第144页。
(1)Brynjar Lia,Architect of Global Jihad:The Life of Al-Qaeda Strategist Abu Mus’ab al-Suri,London:Hurst Publisher Ltd.,2007,p.408.
(2)Brynjar Lia,Architect of Global Jihad:The Life of Al-Qaeda Strategist Abu Mus’ab al-Suri,London:Hurst Publisher Ltd.,2007,p.409.
(3)Brynjar Lia,Architect of Global Jihad:The Life of Al-Qaeda Strategist Abu Mus’ab al-Suri,London:Hurst Publisher Ltd.,2007,p.373.
(1)Brynjar Lia,Architect of Global Jihad:The Life of Al-Qaeda Strategist Abu Mus’ab al-Suri,London:Hurst Publisher Ltd.,2007,p.310.
(2)Brynjar Lia,Architect of Global Jihad:The Life of Al-Qaeda Strategist Abu Mus’ab al-Suri,London:Hurst Publisher Ltd.,2007,p.311.
(1)Brynjar Lia,Architect of Global Jihad:The Life of Al-Qaeda Strategist Abu Mus’ab al-Suri,London:Hurst Publisher Ltd.,2007,pp.403-404.
(2)Brynjar Lia,Architect of Global Jihad:The Life of Al-Qaeda Strategist Abu Mus’ab al-Suri,London:Hurst Publisher Ltd.,2007,pp.396-397.
(3)关于“基地”组织在北非的活动情况,可以参见王晋:《“基地”马格里布分支的组织演变与行为模式》,载《阿拉伯世界研究》2015年第2期,第52-64页。
(1)Brynjar Lia,Architect of Global Jihad:The Life of Al-Qaeda Strategist Abu Mus’ab al-Suri,London:Hurst Publisher Ltd.,2007,p.75.
(2)Aaron Y.Zelin,“The War between ISIS and AL-Qaeda for Supremacy of the Global Jihadist Movement,”The Washington Institute for Near East Policy,No.20,June 2014,p.6,http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/ResearchNote_20_Zelin.pdf.
(3)Graeme Wood,“What ISIS Really Wants,”The Atlantic,February 24,2015,https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/02/what-isis-really-wants-reader-response-atlantic/385710.
(1)关于西方学术界对于伊斯兰极端主义产生和发展的论争,参见Stuart Gottlieb,ed.,Debating Terrorism and Counterterrorism:Conflict Perspectives on Causes,Contexts and Responses,Washington D.C.:CQ Press,2010。
(2)Randall Law,Terrorism:A History,Cambridge:Polity,2009;Marc Sageman,Understanding Terror Network,Philadelphia:University of Pennsylvania Press,2004.
(3)Tahir Abbas,ed.,Islamic Political Radicalism:A European Perspective,Edinburgh:Edinburgh University Press,2007.
(4)刘中民:《中东变局以来中东恐怖主义的新发展及其根源》,载《西亚非洲》2014年第6期,第3页。其他关于伊斯兰极端主义和恐怖主义探讨的文章,可以参见刘中民、俞海杰:《“伊斯兰国”的极端主义意识形态探析》,载《西亚非洲》2016年第3期,第41-61页;吴冰冰:《圣战观念与当代伊斯兰恐怖主义》,载《阿拉伯世界研究》2006年第1期,第36-41页。
(1)曾向红:《适当性逻辑的竞争:“基地”与“伊斯兰国”的架构叙事》,载《世界经济与政治》2016年第4期,第80页。
(2)关于极端组织“伊斯兰国”和“基地”组织之间的关系历程,可以参见王晋:《“伊斯兰国”与恐怖主义的变形》,载《外交评论》2015年第2期,第51-76页;周明、曾向红:《“基地”与“伊斯兰国”的战略差异及走势》,载《外交评论》2016年第4期,第130-156页。
(1)Sayyid Qutb,Milestones,New Delhi:Islamic Book Service,p.70.
(2)巴勒斯坦民族解放运动领导人阿拉法特在第一次海湾战争中支持伊拉克萨达姆政府,因此被科威特政府所嫉恨,在第一次海湾战争结束后,科威特政府开始驱逐国内的巴勒斯坦人,马克迪西也被迫离开科威特返回约旦。
(3)Robert Worth,“Credentials Challenged,Radical Quotes West Point,”New York Times,April 29,2009,https://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/30/world/middleeast/30jihad.html?_r=1&hp.
(1)Murad Batal al-Shishani,“Abu Mus’ab al-Suri and the Third Generation of Salafi-Jihadists,”Terrorism Monitor,Vol.3,No.16,2005,p.16.
(2)Murad Batal al-Shishani,“Abu Mus’ab al-Suri and the Third Generation of Salafi-Jihadists,”Terrorism Monitor,Vol.3,No.16,2005,p.16.
(3)Roxanne L Euben and Muhammad Qasim Zaman,Princeton Readings in Islamist Thought:Texts and Contexts from Al-Banna to Bin Laden,Princeton:Princeton University Press,2009,p.1.
(1)Sayyid Qutb,Milestones,New Delhi:Islamic Book Service,2002,p.33.
(2)Sayyid Qutb,Milestones,New Delhi:Islamic Book Service,2002,p.12.
(3)Joas Wagemakers,A Quietist Jihadi:The Ideology and Influence of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi,Cambridge and New York:Cambridge University Press,2012,p.217.
(4)Joas Wagemakers,A Quietist Jihadi:The Ideology and Influence of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi,Cambridge and New York:Cambridge University Press,2012,p.218.
(5)Brynjar Lia,Architect of Global Jihad:The Life of Al-Qaeda Strategist Abu Mus’ab al-Suri,London:Hurst Publisher Ltd.,2007,p.364.
(1)苏里经常使用“umami”一词,“umami”原意为“全球性”“国际性”,反映出苏里对于号召全球穆斯林参加“独狼圣战”的目标。
(2)Brynjar Lia,Architect of Global Jihad:The Life of Al-Qaeda Strategist Abu Mus’ab al-Suri,London:Hurst Publisher Ltd.,2007,p.369.
(3)Brynjar Lia,Architect of Global Jihad:The Life of Al-Qaeda Strategist Abu Mus’ab al-Suri,London:Hurst Publisher Ltd.,2007,p.369.
(4)Sayyid Qutb,Milestones,New Delhi:Islamic Book Service,2002,p.21.
(5)James Brandon,“Jordan’s Jihad Scholar al-Maqdisi is Freed from Prison,”Terrorism Monitor,Vol.6,No.7,2008,p.4.
(1)Sayyid Qutb,Milestones,New Delhi:Islamic Book Service,2002,p.32.
(2)Sayyid Qutb,Milestones,New Delhi:Islamic Book Service,2002,p.70.
(3)James Brandon,“Jordan’s Jihad Scholar al-Maqdisi is Freed from Prison,”Terrorism Monitor,Vol.6,No.7,2008,p.6.
(4)Brynjar Lia,Architect of Global Jihad:The Life of Al-Qaeda Strategist Abu Mus’ab al-Suri,London:Hurst Publisher Ltd.,2007,p.362.
(5)Brynjar Lia,Architect of Global Jihad:The Life of Al-Qaeda Strategist Abu Mus’ab al-Suri,London:Hurst Publisher Ltd.,2007,p.363.
(1)对于伊本·泰米耶的观点是否直接影响到了赛义德·库特布乃至苏里和马克迪西等人,学术界并无统一意见。认为伊本·泰米耶观点与近现代伊斯兰极端主义思想人物传习有序的著作,参见Devin R Springer,James L.Regens and David N.Edger,Islamic Radicalism and Global Jihad,Washington D.C.:Georgetown University Press,2008;而认为伊本·泰米耶与近现代伊斯兰极端主义者并无因果联系的著述,参见Joas Wagemakers,A Quietist Jihadi:The Ideology and Influence of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi,Cambridge and New York:Cambridge University Press,2012。
(2)Roxanne L.Euben and Muhammad Qasim Zaman,Princeton Reading in Islamist Thought:Texts and Contexts From al-Banna to Bin Laden,Princeton:Princeton University Press,2009,p.323.
(3)James Brandon,“Jordan’s Jihad Scholar al-Maqdisi is Freed from Prison,”Terrorism Monitor,Vol.6,No.7,2008,p.5.
(4)穆尔吉埃派(al-Murji’ah)是伊斯兰教早期派别之一。约于7世纪中叶出现于麦地那和大马士革等地区。它与逊尼派、什叶派和哈瓦利吉派同为伊斯兰教早期的四大政治派别。“穆尔吉埃”一词系阿拉伯语的音译,意为“延缓者”“推缓者”“留待以后判断者”,因该派在教义上对穆斯林中犯大罪的人(包括当权者)是否构成叛教罪等有争议的问题,坚持“暂不作判断,可推延到末日由真主裁判”,因而得名。该派思想较为温和宽容,提倡团结和平,反对战争和分裂。
(5)Sayyid Qutb,Milestones,New Delhi:Islamic Book Service,2002,pp.80-82.
(1)Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon,The Age of Scared Terror,Radical Islam’s War against America,New York:Random House,2002,p.68.
(2)Brynjar Lia,Architect of Global Jihad:The Life of Al-Qaeda Strategist Abu Mus’ab al-Suri,London:Hurst Publisher Ltd.,2007,p.408.
(3)Brynjar Lia,Architect of Global Jihad:The Life of Al-Qaeda Strategist Abu Mus’ab al-Suri,London:Hurst Publisher Ltd.,2007,p.409.
(1)David L Johnston,“Hassan al-Hudaybi and the Muslim Brotherhood:Can Islamic Fundamentalism Eschew the Islamic State?”Comparative Islamic Studies,Vol.3,No.1,2007,p.42.
(2)马克迪西认为,“忠诚与抗拒”来自于《古兰经》:“易卜拉欣和他的教徒,是你们的好模范。当时,他们曾对自己的宗族说:‘我们对于你们,和你们舍真主而崇拜的,确是无干的,我们不承认你们。我们彼此间的仇恨,永远存在。直到你们只信仰真主。’但易卜拉欣对他父亲所说的话,不可做你们的模范。他曾说:“我必定为你求饶,我不能为你抵御真主的一些刑罚。”他们曾说:“我们的主啊!我们只信托你,我们只依归你,只有你是最后的归宿。”(60:4)
(1)Nibras Kaimi,“A Virulent Ideology in Mutation:Zarqawi Upstages Maqdisi,”hudson.org,September 12,2005,pp.63-64,https://hudson.org/content/researchattachments/attachment/1368/kazimi_vol2.pdf.
(2)Joas Wagemakers,“A Purist Jihadi-Salafi:The Ideology of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi,”British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies,Vol.36,No.2,2009,pp.281-297.
(1)《古兰经》(4:59)。
(2)Sheikh Yusuf Al-Qaradawi,State in Islam,Cairo:Al-Falah Foundation,2004,p.178.
(3)[美]托马斯·李普曼:《伊斯兰教与穆斯林世界》,陆文岳、英珊译,北京:新华出版社1985年版,第144页。
(1)Brynjar Lia,Architect of Global Jihad:The Life of Al-Qaeda Strategist Abu Mus’ab al-Suri,London:Hurst Publisher Ltd.,2007,p.408.
(2)Brynjar Lia,Architect of Global Jihad:The Life of Al-Qaeda Strategist Abu Mus’ab al-Suri,London:Hurst Publisher Ltd.,2007,p.409.
(3)Brynjar Lia,Architect of Global Jihad:The Life of Al-Qaeda Strategist Abu Mus’ab al-Suri,London:Hurst Publisher Ltd.,2007,p.373.
(1)Brynjar Lia,Architect of Global Jihad:The Life of Al-Qaeda Strategist Abu Mus’ab al-Suri,London:Hurst Publisher Ltd.,2007,p.310.
(2)Brynjar Lia,Architect of Global Jihad:The Life of Al-Qaeda Strategist Abu Mus’ab al-Suri,London:Hurst Publisher Ltd.,2007,p.311.
(1)Brynjar Lia,Architect of Global Jihad:The Life of Al-Qaeda Strategist Abu Mus’ab al-Suri,London:Hurst Publisher Ltd.,2007,pp.403-404.
(2)Brynjar Lia,Architect of Global Jihad:The Life of Al-Qaeda Strategist Abu Mus’ab al-Suri,London:Hurst Publisher Ltd.,2007,pp.396-397.
(3)关于“基地”组织在北非的活动情况,可以参见王晋:《“基地”马格里布分支的组织演变与行为模式》,载《阿拉伯世界研究》2015年第2期,第52-64页。
(1)Brynjar Lia,Architect of Global Jihad:The Life of Al-Qaeda Strategist Abu Mus’ab al-Suri,London:Hurst Publisher Ltd.,2007,p.75.