Quality of information disclosure, property rights, and bank loans: A bank heterogeneity perspective
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摘要
Using the context of the financial reform and the development of the non-state sector in China in the past decade, we examine the roles that the quality of information disclosure and property rights play in the allocation of different types of bank credit. We find that foreign banks and policy banks exercise ‘‘financial discrimination," and that local commercial banks, large state- owned commercial banks, national joint-stock banks, local city commercial banks, and rural commercial banks not only exercise financial discrimination but also provide significant ‘‘financial support" to non-state-owned enterprises by providing more lending opportunities and larger loans. However, when enterprises commit information disclosure violations, the local commercial banks, national joint-stock banks, local city commercial banks, and rural commercial banks reverse their credit decisions and begin to exercise financial dis- crimination against non-state-owned enterprises. At the same time, large stateowned commercial banks continue to provide financial support to non-state-owned enterprises. We also find that the quality of the information disclosed by enterprises has a moderating effect rather than an intermediary effect on the relationship between property rights and bank loans. Overall, the results of this paper shine new light on the market-oriented reform of the banking industry, and provide new empirical evidence for the presence of financial discrimination in the supply of bank credit. Our findings also have practical implications for solving the financing difficulties of non-state-owned enterprises.
Using the context of the financial reform and the development of the non-state sector in China in the past decade, we examine the roles that the quality of information disclosure and property rights play in the allocation of different types of bank credit. We find that foreign banks and policy banks exercise ‘‘financial discrimination," and that local commercial banks, large state- owned commercial banks, national joint-stock banks, local city commercial banks, and rural commercial banks not only exercise financial discrimination but also provide significant ‘‘financial support" to non-state-owned enterprises by providing more lending opportunities and larger loans. However, when enterprises commit information disclosure violations, the local commercial banks, national joint-stock banks, local city commercial banks, and rural commercial banks reverse their credit decisions and begin to exercise financial dis- crimination against non-state-owned enterprises. At the same time, large stateowned commercial banks continue to provide financial support to non-state-owned enterprises. We also find that the quality of the information disclosed by enterprises has a moderating effect rather than an intermediary effect on the relationship between property rights and bank loans. Overall, the results of this paper shine new light on the market-oriented reform of the banking industry, and provide new empirical evidence for the presence of financial discrimination in the supply of bank credit. Our findings also have practical implications for solving the financing difficulties of non-state-owned enterprises.
Using the context of the financial reform and the development of the non-state sector in China in the past decade, we examine the roles that the quality of information disclosure and property rights play in the allocation of different types of bank credit. We find that foreign banks and policy banks exercise ‘‘financial discrimination," and that local commercial banks, large state- owned commercial banks, national joint-stock banks, local city commercial banks, and rural commercial banks not only exercise financial discrimination but also provide significant ‘‘financial support" to non-state-owned enterprises by providing more lending opportunities and larger loans. However, when enterprises commit information disclosure violations, the local commercial banks, national joint-stock banks, local city commercial banks, and rural commercial banks reverse their credit decisions and begin to exercise financial dis- crimination against non-state-owned enterprises. At the same time, large stateowned commercial banks continue to provide financial support to non-state-owned enterprises. We also find that the quality of the information disclosed by enterprises has a moderating effect rather than an intermediary effect on the relationship between property rights and bank loans. Overall, the results of this paper shine new light on the market-oriented reform of the banking industry, and provide new empirical evidence for the presence of financial discrimination in the supply of bank credit. Our findings also have practical implications for solving the financing difficulties of non-state-owned enterprises.
引文
Allen, F., Qian, J., Qian, M., 2005. Law, finance, and economic growth in China. J. Financ. Econ. 77 (1), 57–116.
Bai, Chongen, Lu, Jiangzhong, Tao, Zhigang, 2005. Empirical study on bank loans to private enterprises in China. Economics (Quarterly) 3, 605–622.
Brandt, L., Li, H., 2003. Bank discrimination in transition economies: ideology, information or incentives? J. Int. Money Financ. 31 (3), 387–413.
Chen, H., Chen, J.Z., Lobo, G.J., Wang, Y., 2010. Association between borrower and lender state ownership and accounting conservatism. J. Acc. Res. 48 (5), 973–1014.
Chen, X., Cheng, Q., Lo, A.K., 2013b. Accounting restatements and external financing choices. Contemp. Acc. Res. 30 (2), 750–779.
Chen, D., Li, O.Z., Xin, F., Yeung, B.Y., 2013a. Five-Year Plans, China Finance and Their Consequences. Available at SSRN 2259388.
Chen, Geng, Liu, Xing, Xin, Qingquan, 2015. Credit discrimination, financial development and loan maturity structure of private enterprise bank. Acc. Res. 4, 40–46.
Chen, Weidong, Zongliang, Zhang, Zhaojie, 2007. The basic characteristics and trend of the development of foreign banks in the five anniversary of China’s entry into WTO–a questionnaire analysis report on the development of foreign banks. Int. Financ. Res. 2, 50– 56.
Fang, Junxiong, 2007. Ownership, institutional environment and allocation of credit funds. Econ. Res. 12, 82.
Fang, Junxiong, 2010. Private listed company, really face bank credit discrimination? Managing World 11, 123–131.
Gamaut, R.L., Song, Y.Y., Wang, X., 2000. The Emerging Private Enterprise in China. The National University of Australia Press, Canberra.
Hu, Yuming, Lin, Wenxiong, Li, Siqi, Xie, Shilei, 2008. The role of big lender: Does our country’s banks have supervisory role? Econ. Res. 10, 522–564.
La Porta, R., Lopez-De-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., 2002. Investor protection and corporate valuation. J. Financ. 57, 1147–1170.
Lin, Yifu, Li, Zhiyun, 2004. Policy burden, moral hazard and soft budgetary constraints. Econ. Stud. 2, 17–27.
Liu, Mingkang, 2009. 30 Years of Reform and Opening up in China’s Banking Industry. China Finance Press, Beijing.
Liu, Xing, Chen, Xichan, 2018. CSRC penalties, analyst tracking and Corporate Bank debt financing. Acc. Res. 1, 607.
Liu, Xing, Jiang, Shuiquan, 2015. Bank equity relationship, banking competition and private enterprise financing constraints. Manage. Sci. China 23 (12), 1.
Lu, Zhengfei, Zhu, Jigao, Sun, Bianxia, 2008. Earnings management, accounting information and bank debt contract. World Manage. 3, 152.
Lu, Zhengfei, Zhu, Jigao, Fan, Zheng, 2009. Monetary tightening, credit discrimination and the loss of investors’ interests in private listed companies. Financ. Res. 8, 124–136.
Rao, Pingui, Jiang, Guohua, 2013. A study on the impact of monetary policy on the interaction between bank credit and commercial credit. Econ. Res. 1, 68–82.
Sengupta, P., 1998. Corporate disclosure quality and the cost of debt. information, uncertainty and credit rationing. Acc. Rev. 10, 459– 474.
Sun, Huixia, Chen, Jinming, Chen, Yunsen, 2013. Bank credit allocation, credit risk pricing and enterprise financing efficiency. Financ. Res. 11, 5557.
Sun, Zheng, Liu, Fengwei, Li, Zengquan, 2005. Marketization, government intervention and maturity structure of corporate debt. Econ. Res. 5, 52N63.
Sun, Zheng, Li, Zengquan, Wang, Jingbin, 2006. The nature of ownership, accounting information and debt contract: empirical evidence from listed companies in China. Manage. World 10, 100–107.
Sun, Liang, Liu, Jianhua, 2011. Banking reform, marketization and allocation of credit resources. Financ. Res. 1, 94–109.
Watts, R.L., Zimmerman, J.L., 1986. Positive Accounting Theory. Prentice Hall Inc, Englewood Cliffs.
Xin, Qingquan, Huang, Manli, Yi, Haoran, 2013. False statements of listed companies and punishment of Independent Directors’Supervision: an analysis based on the individual perspective of independent directors. Managing World 5, 131–143.
Yu, Minggui, Pan, Hongbo, 2008. Political relations, institutional environment and private enterprise loans. Managing World 8, 9–21.
Zhang, Chun, Lu, Wei, 2007. Information disclosure, market concerns and financing constraints. Acc. Res. 11, 32–38.
1According to a monetary policy implementation report disclosed by the People’s Bank of China,during the 2007-2012 period,the proportion of foreign currency loans,entrustment loans,trust loans,non-discounted bank drafts,corporate bonds,and equity financing in the real economy from the financial system was 65.82%,7.01%,6.44%,7.86%,9.46%,3.42%,respectively.In the data collection for this paper,we found that the amount of bank loan finance issued to listed companies was much greater than the amount of equity financing. That is,in addition to IPO financing,the external financing of listed companies in China is still dominated by bank borrowing.
2Source:Communist Party of China News Network.
3Excerpt from:Review of the main points of successive national financial work meetings.
4Calculation method:(Info-regression coefficient in regression(3))*(Info-regression coefficient in regression(4))/[(state regression coefficient in regression(4))+(Info regression coefficient in regression(3))*(Info regression coefficient in regression(4)),IE 0.242*1.097/ (0.466+0.242*1.097)=0.3629.
Bai, Chongen, Lu, Jiangzhong, Tao, Zhigang, 2005. Empirical study on bank loans to private enterprises in China. Economics (Quarterly) 3, 605–622.
Brandt, L., Li, H., 2003. Bank discrimination in transition economies: ideology, information or incentives? J. Int. Money Financ. 31 (3), 387–413.
Chen, H., Chen, J.Z., Lobo, G.J., Wang, Y., 2010. Association between borrower and lender state ownership and accounting conservatism. J. Acc. Res. 48 (5), 973–1014.
Chen, X., Cheng, Q., Lo, A.K., 2013b. Accounting restatements and external financing choices. Contemp. Acc. Res. 30 (2), 750–779.
Chen, D., Li, O.Z., Xin, F., Yeung, B.Y., 2013a. Five-Year Plans, China Finance and Their Consequences. Available at SSRN 2259388.
Chen, Geng, Liu, Xing, Xin, Qingquan, 2015. Credit discrimination, financial development and loan maturity structure of private enterprise bank. Acc. Res. 4, 40–46.
Chen, Weidong, Zongliang, Zhang, Zhaojie, 2007. The basic characteristics and trend of the development of foreign banks in the five anniversary of China’s entry into WTO–a questionnaire analysis report on the development of foreign banks. Int. Financ. Res. 2, 50– 56.
Fang, Junxiong, 2007. Ownership, institutional environment and allocation of credit funds. Econ. Res. 12, 82.
Fang, Junxiong, 2010. Private listed company, really face bank credit discrimination? Managing World 11, 123–131.
Gamaut, R.L., Song, Y.Y., Wang, X., 2000. The Emerging Private Enterprise in China. The National University of Australia Press, Canberra.
Hu, Yuming, Lin, Wenxiong, Li, Siqi, Xie, Shilei, 2008. The role of big lender: Does our country’s banks have supervisory role? Econ. Res. 10, 522–564.
La Porta, R., Lopez-De-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., 2002. Investor protection and corporate valuation. J. Financ. 57, 1147–1170.
Lin, Yifu, Li, Zhiyun, 2004. Policy burden, moral hazard and soft budgetary constraints. Econ. Stud. 2, 17–27.
Liu, Mingkang, 2009. 30 Years of Reform and Opening up in China’s Banking Industry. China Finance Press, Beijing.
Liu, Xing, Chen, Xichan, 2018. CSRC penalties, analyst tracking and Corporate Bank debt financing. Acc. Res. 1, 607.
Liu, Xing, Jiang, Shuiquan, 2015. Bank equity relationship, banking competition and private enterprise financing constraints. Manage. Sci. China 23 (12), 1.
Lu, Zhengfei, Zhu, Jigao, Sun, Bianxia, 2008. Earnings management, accounting information and bank debt contract. World Manage. 3, 152.
Lu, Zhengfei, Zhu, Jigao, Fan, Zheng, 2009. Monetary tightening, credit discrimination and the loss of investors’ interests in private listed companies. Financ. Res. 8, 124–136.
Rao, Pingui, Jiang, Guohua, 2013. A study on the impact of monetary policy on the interaction between bank credit and commercial credit. Econ. Res. 1, 68–82.
Sengupta, P., 1998. Corporate disclosure quality and the cost of debt. information, uncertainty and credit rationing. Acc. Rev. 10, 459– 474.
Sun, Huixia, Chen, Jinming, Chen, Yunsen, 2013. Bank credit allocation, credit risk pricing and enterprise financing efficiency. Financ. Res. 11, 5557.
Sun, Zheng, Liu, Fengwei, Li, Zengquan, 2005. Marketization, government intervention and maturity structure of corporate debt. Econ. Res. 5, 52N63.
Sun, Zheng, Li, Zengquan, Wang, Jingbin, 2006. The nature of ownership, accounting information and debt contract: empirical evidence from listed companies in China. Manage. World 10, 100–107.
Sun, Liang, Liu, Jianhua, 2011. Banking reform, marketization and allocation of credit resources. Financ. Res. 1, 94–109.
Watts, R.L., Zimmerman, J.L., 1986. Positive Accounting Theory. Prentice Hall Inc, Englewood Cliffs.
Xin, Qingquan, Huang, Manli, Yi, Haoran, 2013. False statements of listed companies and punishment of Independent Directors’Supervision: an analysis based on the individual perspective of independent directors. Managing World 5, 131–143.
Yu, Minggui, Pan, Hongbo, 2008. Political relations, institutional environment and private enterprise loans. Managing World 8, 9–21.
Zhang, Chun, Lu, Wei, 2007. Information disclosure, market concerns and financing constraints. Acc. Res. 11, 32–38.
1According to a monetary policy implementation report disclosed by the People’s Bank of China,during the 2007-2012 period,the proportion of foreign currency loans,entrustment loans,trust loans,non-discounted bank drafts,corporate bonds,and equity financing in the real economy from the financial system was 65.82%,7.01%,6.44%,7.86%,9.46%,3.42%,respectively.In the data collection for this paper,we found that the amount of bank loan finance issued to listed companies was much greater than the amount of equity financing. That is,in addition to IPO financing,the external financing of listed companies in China is still dominated by bank borrowing.
2Source:Communist Party of China News Network.
3Excerpt from:Review of the main points of successive national financial work meetings.
4Calculation method:(Info-regression coefficient in regression(3))*(Info-regression coefficient in regression(4))/[(state regression coefficient in regression(4))+(Info regression coefficient in regression(3))*(Info regression coefficient in regression(4)),IE 0.242*1.097/ (0.466+0.242*1.097)=0.3629.