前景理论视角下考虑战略顾客行为的供应链协调研究
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摘要
有限理性的战略顾客行为对于供应链优化运营管理有着重要的影响。本文分别在理性期望效用理论和前景理论视角下,构建了考虑战略顾客行为的短生命周期产品供应链集中决策与契约协调模型,并进行了对比数值分析,研究结果表明:(1)同样的促销价格下,前景理论视角下的供应链及其成员最优利润均远高于理性期望效用理论视角,而前景理论视角下的战略顾客最优净效用远低于理性期望效用理论视角。(2)理性期望效用理论视角下,随着促销价格的递增,供应链及其成员最优利润随之递减,战略顾客的最优净效用随之递增。(3)前景理论视角下,满足促销价低于成本的条件时,随着促销价格的递增,供应链及其成员最优利润随之递增,战略顾客的最优净效用随之递减。(4)无论是理性期望效用理论视角还是前景理论视角,采用一种改进的收益分享契约机制可以有效的实现供应链协调。
Facing with various kinds of ‘starvation marketing' retail strategy, customers usually need to trade off between buying product immediately and waiting for the sale. Most of the customers tend to make decisions of ‘risk-averse', showing the bounded rationality of strategic consumer behavior. This behavior has a significant impact on the supply chain operations management and optimization decisions. Studying the bounded rational behavior of strategic consumers and its impacts on the supply chain optimization decisions has an important theoretical and practical value. Rational expectation utility theory, prospect theory, strategic consumer behavior theory and contract theory are comprehensively applied to study this issue in the paper. The centralized decision and contract coordination model of the short-life-cycle product supply chain considering the strategic consumers are respectively built under the perspective of rational expectation utility theory(RET) and prospect theory(PT), and the corresponding numerical comparing analysis with the empirical parameters from Kahneman & Tversky is conducted in this paper. The results show that:(1) Given the same promotion price, the optimal retail price under the perspective of PT is higher than that under the perspective of RET, the optimal ordering quantity under the perspective of PT is lower than that under the perspective of RET, the optimal profit of the whole supply chain and its members under the perspective of PT are higher than that under the perspective of RET, and the strategic consumers' optimal net utility under the perspective of PT are lower than that under the perspective of RET.(2) Under the perspective of RET, as the promotion price increases, the optimal retail price decreases, the optimal ordering quantity increases, the supply chain's and its member's optimal profit decrease, and the strategic consumer's optimal net utility increases.(3) Under the perspective of PT, when the promotional price is lower than cost, as the promotion price increases, the optimal retail price increases, the optimal ordering quantity increases, the supply chain's and its member's optimal profit increase, and the strategic consumer's optimal net utility decreases.(4) Whether under the perspective of rational expectation utility theory or under the perspective of prospect theory, an improved revenue sharing contract mechanism can effectively achieve the supply chain coordination. The management insights can be drawn from the research results as follows:(1) The management decision maker of supply chain should fully understand the impact of bounded rational behavior of strategic consumers, study the risk-aversion and preference degree of bounded rational behavior of strategic consumers, re-estimate the actual probability of inventory backlog from the perspective of PT, and make coordinating pricing and ordering decisions. Further, the decision makers can take ‘starvation marketing' strategies of panic buying via appointment, limited sales and ‘human stock-out' to stimulate the desire to buy and promote buying now or buying ASAP, which is beneficial for the performance improvement of the supply chain and its members.(2) Under the perspective of RET, making a lower promotion price is beneficial for improving the operational performance of the supply chain and its members. Under the perspective of PT, strategic consumers behave with the characteristic of bounded rationality due to starvation marketing strategy; in this scenario, making a higher promotion price is beneficial for improving the operational performance of the supply chain and its members.(3) Compared with the perspective of RET, making a higher retail price and ordering relatively few products under the perspective of PT, is beneficial for improving the operational performance of the supply chain and its members.(4) Whether under the perspective of RET or under the perspective of PT, an improved revenue sharing contract mechanism can effectively achieve the supply chain coordination: the wholesale price is set as the revenue keeping rate ? multiplied the cost by the supplier, then, the retailer decides in accordance with the optimal retail price and ordering quantity of supply chain, and the retailer shares the revenue sharing rate 1-? proportion of operations revenue to the supplier. This revenue sharing contract coordination mechanism can effectively improve operational performance of the supply chain and its members. This study proposes the theory of bounded rational behavior of strategic consumer, and discusses its impact on the short-life-cycle product supply chain coordination decision, which has a strong academic value and innovation meaning. In practice, this study also provides decision support for understanding the strategic consumer behavior and making the right decisions.
Facing with various kinds of ‘starvation marketing' retail strategy, customers usually need to trade off between buying product immediately and waiting for the sale. Most of the customers tend to make decisions of ‘risk-averse', showing the bounded rationality of strategic consumer behavior. This behavior has a significant impact on the supply chain operations management and optimization decisions. Studying the bounded rational behavior of strategic consumers and its impacts on the supply chain optimization decisions has an important theoretical and practical value. Rational expectation utility theory, prospect theory, strategic consumer behavior theory and contract theory are comprehensively applied to study this issue in the paper. The centralized decision and contract coordination model of the short-life-cycle product supply chain considering the strategic consumers are respectively built under the perspective of rational expectation utility theory(RET) and prospect theory(PT), and the corresponding numerical comparing analysis with the empirical parameters from Kahneman & Tversky is conducted in this paper. The results show that:(1) Given the same promotion price, the optimal retail price under the perspective of PT is higher than that under the perspective of RET, the optimal ordering quantity under the perspective of PT is lower than that under the perspective of RET, the optimal profit of the whole supply chain and its members under the perspective of PT are higher than that under the perspective of RET, and the strategic consumers' optimal net utility under the perspective of PT are lower than that under the perspective of RET.(2) Under the perspective of RET, as the promotion price increases, the optimal retail price decreases, the optimal ordering quantity increases, the supply chain's and its member's optimal profit decrease, and the strategic consumer's optimal net utility increases.(3) Under the perspective of PT, when the promotional price is lower than cost, as the promotion price increases, the optimal retail price increases, the optimal ordering quantity increases, the supply chain's and its member's optimal profit increase, and the strategic consumer's optimal net utility decreases.(4) Whether under the perspective of rational expectation utility theory or under the perspective of prospect theory, an improved revenue sharing contract mechanism can effectively achieve the supply chain coordination. The management insights can be drawn from the research results as follows:(1) The management decision maker of supply chain should fully understand the impact of bounded rational behavior of strategic consumers, study the risk-aversion and preference degree of bounded rational behavior of strategic consumers, re-estimate the actual probability of inventory backlog from the perspective of PT, and make coordinating pricing and ordering decisions. Further, the decision makers can take ‘starvation marketing' strategies of panic buying via appointment, limited sales and ‘human stock-out' to stimulate the desire to buy and promote buying now or buying ASAP, which is beneficial for the performance improvement of the supply chain and its members.(2) Under the perspective of RET, making a lower promotion price is beneficial for improving the operational performance of the supply chain and its members. Under the perspective of PT, strategic consumers behave with the characteristic of bounded rationality due to starvation marketing strategy; in this scenario, making a higher promotion price is beneficial for improving the operational performance of the supply chain and its members.(3) Compared with the perspective of RET, making a higher retail price and ordering relatively few products under the perspective of PT, is beneficial for improving the operational performance of the supply chain and its members.(4) Whether under the perspective of RET or under the perspective of PT, an improved revenue sharing contract mechanism can effectively achieve the supply chain coordination: the wholesale price is set as the revenue keeping rate ? multiplied the cost by the supplier, then, the retailer decides in accordance with the optimal retail price and ordering quantity of supply chain, and the retailer shares the revenue sharing rate 1-? proportion of operations revenue to the supplier. This revenue sharing contract coordination mechanism can effectively improve operational performance of the supply chain and its members. This study proposes the theory of bounded rational behavior of strategic consumer, and discusses its impact on the short-life-cycle product supply chain coordination decision, which has a strong academic value and innovation meaning. In practice, this study also provides decision support for understanding the strategic consumer behavior and making the right decisions.
引文
[1]Muth JF.Rational expectations and the theory of price movements[J].Econometrica,1961,29(3):315-335.
[2]Su X.Inter-temporal pricing with strategic consumer behavior[J].Management Science,2007,53(5):726-741.
[3]Su X.Optimal Pricing with Speculators and Strategic Consumers[J].Management Science,2010,56(1):25-40.
[4]Levin Y,Mc Gill J,Nediak M.Dynamic pricing in the presence of strategic consumers and oligopolistic competition[J].Management Science,2009,55(1):32-46.
[5]Levin Y,Mc Gill J,Nediak M.Optimal Dynamic Pricing of Perishable Items by a Monopolist Facing Strategic Consumers[J].Production&Operations Management,2010,19(1):40-60
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[7]Cachon GP,Swinney R.Purchasing,pricing and quick response in the presence of strategic consumers[J].Management Science,2009,55(3):497-511
[8]黄松,杨超,张曦.考虑战略顾客行为时的两阶段报童模型[J].系统管理学报,2011,20(1):63-70.
[9]黄松,杨超,张曦.考虑战略顾客行为带预算约束的多产品报童问题[J].中国管理科学,2011,19(3):70-78.
[10]Su X,Zhang F.Strategic consumer behavior,commitment,and supply chain performance[J].Management Science,2008,54(10):1759-1773.
[11]李娟,黄培清,顾锋.基于顾客战略行为下的供应链系统的绩效研究[J].中国管理科学,2007,15(4):77-82.
[12]黄松,杨超,张曦.考虑战略顾客行为时的供应链性能分析与协调[J].管理科学学报,2012,15(2):47-58.
[13]Su X,Zhang F.On the Value of Commitment and Availability Guarantees When Selling to Strategic Consumers[J].Management Science.2009,55(5):713-726.
[14]Yin R,Aviv Y,Pazgal A,Tang,CS.Optimal Markdown Pricing:Implications of Inventory Display Formats in the Presence of Strategic Customers[J].Management Science,2009,55(8):1391-1408
[15]Lai G,Debo LG,Sycara K.Buy Now and Match Later:Impact of Posterior Price Matching on Profit with Strategic Consumers[J].Manufacturing&Service Operations Management,2010,12(1):33-55
[16]Osadchiy N,Vulcano,G.Selling with binding reservations in the presence of strategic consumers[J].Management Science,2010,56(12):2173-2190.
[17]Cachon GP,Swinney R.The value of fast fashion:rapid production,enhanced design,and strategic consumer behavior[J].Management Science,2011,57(4):778–795.
[18]Swinney R.Selling to Strategic Consumers When Product Value Is uncertain:The value of matching supply and demand[J].Management Science,2011,57(10):1737-1751.
[19]计国君,杨光勇.战略顾客下最惠顾客保证对提前购买的价值[J].管理科学学报,2010,13(7):16-25.
[20]Simon HA.Models of Bounded Rationality[M].Cambridge,MA:MIT Press,1982.
[21]Simon HA.A Behavior al Model of Rational Choice[J].The Quarterly Journal of Economics,1955,69(1):99-118.
[22]Simon HA.Administrative behavior-A study of decision making processes in administrative organization[M].New York:Macmillan Publishing Co,Inc,1971.
[23]Rubinstein A.Modeling Bounded Rationality[M].Cambridge,MA,MIT Press,1998.
[24]Loch CH,Wu Y.Behavioral Operations Management(Foundations and Trends in Technology,Information and Operations Management)[M].Now Publishers Inc,2007.
[25]Loch CH,Wu Y.Social Preferences and Supply Chain Performance:An Experimental Study[J].Management Science,2008,54(11):1835-1849.
[26]赵藜.考虑消费者有限理性行为的动态定价研究[D].上海交通大学,2012.
[27]尼克·威尔金森.行为经济学[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2012.
[28]Kahneman D,Tversky A.Prospect theory:An analysis of decision making under risk[J].Econometrica,1979,47(2):263-291.
[29]Tversky A,Kahneman D.Advances in prospect theory:Cumulative representation of uncertainty[J].Journal of Risk and Uncertainty,1992,5(4):297-323.
[30]徐红利,周晶,徐薇.基于累积前景理论的随机网络用户均衡模型[J].管理科学学报,2011,14(7):1-7.
[2]Su X.Inter-temporal pricing with strategic consumer behavior[J].Management Science,2007,53(5):726-741.
[3]Su X.Optimal Pricing with Speculators and Strategic Consumers[J].Management Science,2010,56(1):25-40.
[4]Levin Y,Mc Gill J,Nediak M.Dynamic pricing in the presence of strategic consumers and oligopolistic competition[J].Management Science,2009,55(1):32-46.
[5]Levin Y,Mc Gill J,Nediak M.Optimal Dynamic Pricing of Perishable Items by a Monopolist Facing Strategic Consumers[J].Production&Operations Management,2010,19(1):40-60
[6]Parlaktürk,AK.The Value of Product Variety When Selling to Strategic Consumers[J].Manufacturing&Service Operations Management,2012,14(3):371-385
[7]Cachon GP,Swinney R.Purchasing,pricing and quick response in the presence of strategic consumers[J].Management Science,2009,55(3):497-511
[8]黄松,杨超,张曦.考虑战略顾客行为时的两阶段报童模型[J].系统管理学报,2011,20(1):63-70.
[9]黄松,杨超,张曦.考虑战略顾客行为带预算约束的多产品报童问题[J].中国管理科学,2011,19(3):70-78.
[10]Su X,Zhang F.Strategic consumer behavior,commitment,and supply chain performance[J].Management Science,2008,54(10):1759-1773.
[11]李娟,黄培清,顾锋.基于顾客战略行为下的供应链系统的绩效研究[J].中国管理科学,2007,15(4):77-82.
[12]黄松,杨超,张曦.考虑战略顾客行为时的供应链性能分析与协调[J].管理科学学报,2012,15(2):47-58.
[13]Su X,Zhang F.On the Value of Commitment and Availability Guarantees When Selling to Strategic Consumers[J].Management Science.2009,55(5):713-726.
[14]Yin R,Aviv Y,Pazgal A,Tang,CS.Optimal Markdown Pricing:Implications of Inventory Display Formats in the Presence of Strategic Customers[J].Management Science,2009,55(8):1391-1408
[15]Lai G,Debo LG,Sycara K.Buy Now and Match Later:Impact of Posterior Price Matching on Profit with Strategic Consumers[J].Manufacturing&Service Operations Management,2010,12(1):33-55
[16]Osadchiy N,Vulcano,G.Selling with binding reservations in the presence of strategic consumers[J].Management Science,2010,56(12):2173-2190.
[17]Cachon GP,Swinney R.The value of fast fashion:rapid production,enhanced design,and strategic consumer behavior[J].Management Science,2011,57(4):778–795.
[18]Swinney R.Selling to Strategic Consumers When Product Value Is uncertain:The value of matching supply and demand[J].Management Science,2011,57(10):1737-1751.
[19]计国君,杨光勇.战略顾客下最惠顾客保证对提前购买的价值[J].管理科学学报,2010,13(7):16-25.
[20]Simon HA.Models of Bounded Rationality[M].Cambridge,MA:MIT Press,1982.
[21]Simon HA.A Behavior al Model of Rational Choice[J].The Quarterly Journal of Economics,1955,69(1):99-118.
[22]Simon HA.Administrative behavior-A study of decision making processes in administrative organization[M].New York:Macmillan Publishing Co,Inc,1971.
[23]Rubinstein A.Modeling Bounded Rationality[M].Cambridge,MA,MIT Press,1998.
[24]Loch CH,Wu Y.Behavioral Operations Management(Foundations and Trends in Technology,Information and Operations Management)[M].Now Publishers Inc,2007.
[25]Loch CH,Wu Y.Social Preferences and Supply Chain Performance:An Experimental Study[J].Management Science,2008,54(11):1835-1849.
[26]赵藜.考虑消费者有限理性行为的动态定价研究[D].上海交通大学,2012.
[27]尼克·威尔金森.行为经济学[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2012.
[28]Kahneman D,Tversky A.Prospect theory:An analysis of decision making under risk[J].Econometrica,1979,47(2):263-291.
[29]Tversky A,Kahneman D.Advances in prospect theory:Cumulative representation of uncertainty[J].Journal of Risk and Uncertainty,1992,5(4):297-323.
[30]徐红利,周晶,徐薇.基于累积前景理论的随机网络用户均衡模型[J].管理科学学报,2011,14(7):1-7.