摘要
将中国2004年对外贸易数据及2004-2007年MFN平均税率数据匹配至HS02分类标准下的1139种商品,利用OLS和工具变量法实证分析了WTO成员方在多边谈判中"搭便车"行为对MFN税率的影响。研究发现,在中国参加的多边谈判中确实存在成员方"搭便车"现象;"搭便车"行为对MFN税率存在微弱的积极影响。据此,本文在提出积极参加多边谈判的同时,注重区域及双边谈判的政策建议,减少单纯对多边谈判的依赖进而避免目前由于谈判无效率引起的扭曲现象。
This article matches China's foreign trade data in 2004 and the 2004-2007 average MFN rate data to the 1139 kinds of goodsclassification under standards HS02,and uses OLS and instrumental variables in the empirical analysis of the impact of "free rider" behavior of the Member States on the MFN rates in multilateral negotiations. The study findsthat member states"free-rider" phenomenon exists in China's participation in multilateral negotiations; "free rider" behavior has weak positive impact on MFN rates. Accordingly, this paper advises that China should keep active attitude in multilateral negotiations, pay attention to regional agreements and bilateral negotiations policy to reduce reliance on multilateral negotiations and avoid distortions caused by the current inefficiency of the negotiations.
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(1)赫芬达尔--赫希曼指数(Herfindahl Hirschman Index,HHI)通常被用来衡量市场集中度。HHI以一个行业中各市场竞争主体占行业总收入或总资产百分比(即市场份额)的平方和来计量,HHI值越大表明市场集中程度越高。其计算公式为HHI=∑i?AMi2 /(∑i?AMi)2主体的收入。本。其中,Mi表示该市场中每一个市场竞争文将这一指标作为核心变量HHIi,表示商品的进口集中程度,即Hi=∑i?GATTMij2/(∑i?MFNMij)2。其中,GATT代表享受最惠国待遇的关贸总协定成员国,MFN代表所有享受最惠国待遇的国家。