技术人工物作为道德行动体:可能性、存在状态及伦理意涵
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摘要
学界对"技术人工物能否作为道德行动体存在"有两种截然不同的观点。持肯定答案的观点较多关注技术人工物不断增强的社会角色,持否定答案的较多关注道德行动体的标准哲学概念及其既有定义、特征。回答该问题的关键在技术人工物是否满足道德行动体的必要条件。具有意向性和自主性是存在物成为道德行动体的必要条件。技术人工物基于技术功能和物理结构两重性之上的三元意向性、基于技术中介理论的差异自主性,使其满足了成为道德行动体的必要条件。在"人-技术"综合存在中只有技术人工物的自主性和道德敏感性强于人的时,它才作为道德行动体存在。技术人工物作为道德行动体存在,既扩展了技术设计者的伦理责任,又拓展了伦理学的理论视域。
There are two views on"can technological artefacts be moral agents". The positive view gives priority to the social role of technology,while the negative pays more attention on the philosophical concept of moral agency. The key to this question is whether technical artifacts meeting the necessary condition of moral agents or not. A triad of intentionality and the differences of autonomy make technical artifacts meet it. Only when their autonomy and moral sensitivity is stronger than that of human are they moral agents in synthetic being of"human- technology". This extends designers' ethical responsibility,and expands the theoretical contents of ethics as well.
There are two views on"can technological artefacts be moral agents". The positive view gives priority to the social role of technology,while the negative pays more attention on the philosophical concept of moral agency. The key to this question is whether technical artifacts meeting the necessary condition of moral agents or not. A triad of intentionality and the differences of autonomy make technical artifacts meet it. Only when their autonomy and moral sensitivity is stronger than that of human are they moral agents in synthetic being of"human- technology". This extends designers' ethical responsibility,and expands the theoretical contents of ethics as well.
引文
[1]Peter Kroes,Peter-Paul Verbeek.The Moral Status of Technical Artefacts[M].Dordrecht:Springer Science+Business Media,2014.
[2]Kenneth Himma.Artificial agency,consciousness,and the criteria for moral agency[J].Ethics and Information Technology,2009(11):19-29.
[3]张帆.一种另类的行动哲学---论柯林斯的“行动树”模型[J].自然辩证法研究,2013(9):16-22.
[4]姚晓娜.“Moral Agent”是“道德代理人”吗?---一个伦理学概念辨析[J].道德与文明,2010(1):148-151.
[5]Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy[M].London and New York:Routledge,1998:5632-5637.
[6]Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy[EB/OL].[2014-03-26].http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-responsibility/.
[7]芦文龙.技术主体的伦理行为:规范、失范及其应对[D].大连:大连理工大学,2015:31-32.
[8]阴训法,陈凡.论“技术人工物”的三重性[J].自然辩证法研究,2004(7):28-31.
[9]Deborah Johnson.Computer systems:Moral Entities but Not Moral Agents[J].Ethics and Information Technology,2006(8):195-204.
[10]Peter-Paul Verbeek.What things do[M].Pennsylvania:The Pennsylvania State University Press,2005:116.
[11]Evan Selinger,Don Ihde,et al.Book Symposium on Peter Paul Verbeek’s Moralizing Technology[J].Philosophy&Technology,2012(4):605-631.
[12]刘宝杰.关于技术人工物的两重性理论的述评[J].自然辩证法研究,2011(5):51-56.
[13]Robert Pepperell.The Posthuman Condition[M].Wiltshire:Cromwell Press,2003:139.
[14]Emmanuel Monnier,Franois Lassagne等.机器智慧超越人类[J].缪伶超,编译.新发现,2015(1):28-42.
[15]Susan Anderson,Michael Anderson.The Relationship between Intelligent,Autonomously Functioning Machines and Ethics[EB/OL].[2015-12-29].Iacap.org.http://www.iacap.org/proceedings_IACAP13/paper_3.pdf,
[16]Sherwin Yu.Machine Morality:Computing Right and Wrong[EB/OL].[2015-05-10].Yale Scientific.http://www.yalescientific.org/2012/05/machine-morality-computing-right-andwrong/,
[17]Katinka Waelbers.Doing Good with Technologies[M].New York:Springer,2011:32.
[18]Patricia MacC ormack.Posthuman Ethics[M].Burlington:Ashgate Pub Co.,2012:1.
[2]Kenneth Himma.Artificial agency,consciousness,and the criteria for moral agency[J].Ethics and Information Technology,2009(11):19-29.
[3]张帆.一种另类的行动哲学---论柯林斯的“行动树”模型[J].自然辩证法研究,2013(9):16-22.
[4]姚晓娜.“Moral Agent”是“道德代理人”吗?---一个伦理学概念辨析[J].道德与文明,2010(1):148-151.
[5]Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy[M].London and New York:Routledge,1998:5632-5637.
[6]Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy[EB/OL].[2014-03-26].http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-responsibility/.
[7]芦文龙.技术主体的伦理行为:规范、失范及其应对[D].大连:大连理工大学,2015:31-32.
[8]阴训法,陈凡.论“技术人工物”的三重性[J].自然辩证法研究,2004(7):28-31.
[9]Deborah Johnson.Computer systems:Moral Entities but Not Moral Agents[J].Ethics and Information Technology,2006(8):195-204.
[10]Peter-Paul Verbeek.What things do[M].Pennsylvania:The Pennsylvania State University Press,2005:116.
[11]Evan Selinger,Don Ihde,et al.Book Symposium on Peter Paul Verbeek’s Moralizing Technology[J].Philosophy&Technology,2012(4):605-631.
[12]刘宝杰.关于技术人工物的两重性理论的述评[J].自然辩证法研究,2011(5):51-56.
[13]Robert Pepperell.The Posthuman Condition[M].Wiltshire:Cromwell Press,2003:139.
[14]Emmanuel Monnier,Franois Lassagne等.机器智慧超越人类[J].缪伶超,编译.新发现,2015(1):28-42.
[15]Susan Anderson,Michael Anderson.The Relationship between Intelligent,Autonomously Functioning Machines and Ethics[EB/OL].[2015-12-29].Iacap.org.http://www.iacap.org/proceedings_IACAP13/paper_3.pdf,
[16]Sherwin Yu.Machine Morality:Computing Right and Wrong[EB/OL].[2015-05-10].Yale Scientific.http://www.yalescientific.org/2012/05/machine-morality-computing-right-andwrong/,
[17]Katinka Waelbers.Doing Good with Technologies[M].New York:Springer,2011:32.
[18]Patricia MacC ormack.Posthuman Ethics[M].Burlington:Ashgate Pub Co.,2012:1.