技术人工物的自然类分析
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摘要
自然类是自然的而不是人为的分组。自然类的划分标准是结构、功能与要素的统一,还有时间性标准。从结构、功能与要素以及时间性四个因素分析技术人工物,可以确定人工类属于自然类,自然类的划分标准同样适用于人工类的划分。技术人工物实在性问题是分析技术哲学的重要问题。人工物的核心要素、核心结构与专有功能相互统一的实在,决定了技术人工物的实在性。
Natural categorization is done naturally instead of artificially. The criterion for the division of natural categorization is the unity of structure,function and element as well as temporal standard. The attribute of artificial categorization can be changed into natural one if we conduct analysis of technical artifacts from the perspectives of structure,function,element and temporality. The standards for natural categorization are applicable to the division of artificial categorization. The problem of substantiality of technical artifacts is an important problem of technical philosophy. The substantiality of the kernel elements of technical artifacts,kernel structure and its specific function determines the substantiality of technical artifacts.
Natural categorization is done naturally instead of artificially. The criterion for the division of natural categorization is the unity of structure,function and element as well as temporal standard. The attribute of artificial categorization can be changed into natural one if we conduct analysis of technical artifacts from the perspectives of structure,function,element and temporality. The standards for natural categorization are applicable to the division of artificial categorization. The problem of substantiality of technical artifacts is an important problem of technical philosophy. The substantiality of the kernel elements of technical artifacts,kernel structure and its specific function determines the substantiality of technical artifacts.
引文
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[5]朱建平.论克里普克与普特南自然类词项语义学观之异同[J].电子科技大学学报(社科版),2011(1):74-79.
[6]Hnak Green.充满化学物质的大脑[EB/OL].(2014-7-29)[2017-2-21]http://open.163.com/movie/2016/11/H/E/M C44CI350_M C44DM AHE.html.
[7]Hnak Green.认识你的大脑[EB/OL].(2014-7-29)[2017-2-21]http://open.163.com/movie/2016/11/6/D/MC44CI350_M C44E8E6D.html.
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[12]吴国林.论分析技术哲学的可能进路[J].中国社会科学,2016(10):29-51.
[13]MARC J DE VRIES.Gilbert Simondon and the Dual Nature of Technical Artifacts[J].Techné:Research in Philosophy and Technology,2008,12(1):23-35.
[14]张华夏,张志林.技术解释研究[M].北京:科学出版社,2005.
[15]雅克·莫诺.偶然性与必然性[M].上海:上海人民出版社,1977.
[16]肖峰.哲学视域中的技术[M].北京:人民出版社,2007.
(1)Brian Ellis.The philosophy of nature a guide to the new essentialism[M].England:Acumen Publishing Limited,2002:82.
(1)Brian Ellis.The philosophy of nature a guide to the new essentialism[M].England:Acumen Publishing Limited,2002:26-27.
(1)按照弗兰森与克劳斯对人工类功能与结构关系的讨论,功能与形式、结构并不是一一对应的关系。
[2]Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.Natural Kinds[EB/OL].(2008-9-17)[2017-2-15]http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/natural-kinds/.
[3]QUINE W V.Ontological Relativity and Other Essays[M].New York:Columbia University Press,1969.
[4]IAN HACKING.Putnam's Theory of Natural Kinds and Their Names Is Not the Same as Kripke's[J].Principia,2007,11(1):1-24.
[5]朱建平.论克里普克与普特南自然类词项语义学观之异同[J].电子科技大学学报(社科版),2011(1):74-79.
[6]Hnak Green.充满化学物质的大脑[EB/OL].(2014-7-29)[2017-2-21]http://open.163.com/movie/2016/11/H/E/M C44CI350_M C44DM AHE.html.
[7]Hnak Green.认识你的大脑[EB/OL].(2014-7-29)[2017-2-21]http://open.163.com/movie/2016/11/6/D/MC44CI350_M C44E8E6D.html.
[8]FISCHER R W,Joseph L.Natural Kinds and Conceptual Change[J].Erkenntnis,2008,69(3):415-418.
[9]西蒙.人工科学:复杂性面面观[M].武夷山,译.上海:上海科技教育出版社,2004.
[10]MAARTEN F,PETER K,THOMAS A C R,PIETER E V.Artefact Kinds:Ontology and the Human-Made World[M].Switzerland:Springer International Publishing,2014.
[11]潘恩荣.技术人工物的结构与功能之间的关系[D].杭州:浙江大学人文学院,2008.
[12]吴国林.论分析技术哲学的可能进路[J].中国社会科学,2016(10):29-51.
[13]MARC J DE VRIES.Gilbert Simondon and the Dual Nature of Technical Artifacts[J].Techné:Research in Philosophy and Technology,2008,12(1):23-35.
[14]张华夏,张志林.技术解释研究[M].北京:科学出版社,2005.
[15]雅克·莫诺.偶然性与必然性[M].上海:上海人民出版社,1977.
[16]肖峰.哲学视域中的技术[M].北京:人民出版社,2007.
(1)Brian Ellis.The philosophy of nature a guide to the new essentialism[M].England:Acumen Publishing Limited,2002:82.
(1)Brian Ellis.The philosophy of nature a guide to the new essentialism[M].England:Acumen Publishing Limited,2002:26-27.
(1)按照弗兰森与克劳斯对人工类功能与结构关系的讨论,功能与形式、结构并不是一一对应的关系。