企业创新行为差异与政府技术创新支出效应
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摘要
政府为推进本国技术创新而发生的财政支出对企业创新行为具有重要影响。本文基于这一事实,构建包含企业创新行为差异的简单动态随机一般均衡模型,分析得出:由于技术创新密度不同,企业可分为技术创新型企业和技术稳定型企业。技术创新型企业提高技术研发投资比重,虽然不一定能迅速实现经济产出的提高,却可以推动本国经济从传统的粗放投资型转化为高质量的技术创新型。在一定时期内,政府技术创新支出是企业技术创新支出增加的主要外在推动力,对企业创新具有显著的助推作用,对宏观经济及发展具有重要的正向作用,但具体效果还取决于企业创新投入情况。相比较而言,当创新企业技术投入率达到一定界值时,政府技术创新支出的效率会更高。这些结论对完善创新政策、改进市场规则、进一步提升创新效率具有一定的政策含义。
In recent years, developing countries' convenience in using international technology spillovers has gradually disappeared, and independent technological innovation has become the main approach. To solve the problem of technological innovation, developed countries have generally adopted measures such as government subsidies and tax cuts, but there have been many disputes over the measures. The most important dispute has centered on whether a developing country's economic system, depending on the push of a construction investment, can be rapidly transformed into an economic system dominated by science and technology innovation by significantly improving the government's technological innovation expenditure while maintaining the economic growth rate. This has important theoretical and policy-related implications for the effects of China's government technology innovation expenditures on its economy.To study the role of government technology innovation expenditures on technological progress and other economic effects, based on analysis of the difference in China's industry technology input rate, we confirm the significant differences in technological innovation investment behaviors across different industries, test the effect of government funding support on different firms' technology innovation investments through the generalized method of moments, construct a simple dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model that includes the innovative heterogeneous firms, and simulate the impact of government technology innovation expenditures on technological progress and output.We obtain four results. First, according to the difference in China's industry technology input rates, firms can be divided into two categories: technologically innovative firms and technologically stable firms. A firm's profit is the most important internal source of the increase in firm innovation investment, and the sales profit rate plays an important role in guaranteeing and promoting investment in firms' technological innovation. Residents carry out investment structure allocation based on the capital profit rate, which further affects the proportion of capital of the two types of firms. Second, the increase in R&D investment proportion in technology innovation firms cannot rapidly drive the rise of output, but can promote the transformation of the domestic economy from the traditional extensive investment type to the technological innovation type. Third, government technology innovation expenditures are the main external driving force behind the increase in firms' technological innovation investment, which significantly boosts their technological progress and has an important positive effect on macroeconomics development. When a firm's own technology innovation investment rate is higher than a certain level, the government's technological innovation expenditure is more effective. Fourth, although the government's increase of technological innovation expenditure has less of an incentive effect on the total social output than its economic construction expenditure, it is necessary to sacrifice the economic growth rate to some extent to build an innovative country.Our paper makes three contributions to the literature. First, we design the production functions of technologically innovative and stable firms, develop a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model that includes innovation heterogeneity, solve the output equilibrium, and examine the economic effects of the government's technological innovation policy under this framework, which should provide a reference for improving the accuracy of policy evaluation and reducing deviation in future policy. Second, we study the impact of dynamic decisions about residents' capital investment structure on the change in capital structure and firms' technology innovation. Finally, we divide government expenditures into technological innovation expenditure and investment construction expenditure and analyze not only the impact of government technology innovation expenditure and economic construction expenditure on firms' technology innovation investment and output function, but also the other macroeconomic effects. Through these effects, the government can rationally adjust the ratio of economic construction expenditure to technological innovation expenditure according to the economic development needs.
In recent years, developing countries' convenience in using international technology spillovers has gradually disappeared, and independent technological innovation has become the main approach. To solve the problem of technological innovation, developed countries have generally adopted measures such as government subsidies and tax cuts, but there have been many disputes over the measures. The most important dispute has centered on whether a developing country's economic system, depending on the push of a construction investment, can be rapidly transformed into an economic system dominated by science and technology innovation by significantly improving the government's technological innovation expenditure while maintaining the economic growth rate. This has important theoretical and policy-related implications for the effects of China's government technology innovation expenditures on its economy.To study the role of government technology innovation expenditures on technological progress and other economic effects, based on analysis of the difference in China's industry technology input rate, we confirm the significant differences in technological innovation investment behaviors across different industries, test the effect of government funding support on different firms' technology innovation investments through the generalized method of moments, construct a simple dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model that includes the innovative heterogeneous firms, and simulate the impact of government technology innovation expenditures on technological progress and output.We obtain four results. First, according to the difference in China's industry technology input rates, firms can be divided into two categories: technologically innovative firms and technologically stable firms. A firm's profit is the most important internal source of the increase in firm innovation investment, and the sales profit rate plays an important role in guaranteeing and promoting investment in firms' technological innovation. Residents carry out investment structure allocation based on the capital profit rate, which further affects the proportion of capital of the two types of firms. Second, the increase in R&D investment proportion in technology innovation firms cannot rapidly drive the rise of output, but can promote the transformation of the domestic economy from the traditional extensive investment type to the technological innovation type. Third, government technology innovation expenditures are the main external driving force behind the increase in firms' technological innovation investment, which significantly boosts their technological progress and has an important positive effect on macroeconomics development. When a firm's own technology innovation investment rate is higher than a certain level, the government's technological innovation expenditure is more effective. Fourth, although the government's increase of technological innovation expenditure has less of an incentive effect on the total social output than its economic construction expenditure, it is necessary to sacrifice the economic growth rate to some extent to build an innovative country.Our paper makes three contributions to the literature. First, we design the production functions of technologically innovative and stable firms, develop a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model that includes innovation heterogeneity, solve the output equilibrium, and examine the economic effects of the government's technological innovation policy under this framework, which should provide a reference for improving the accuracy of policy evaluation and reducing deviation in future policy. Second, we study the impact of dynamic decisions about residents' capital investment structure on the change in capital structure and firms' technology innovation. Finally, we divide government expenditures into technological innovation expenditure and investment construction expenditure and analyze not only the impact of government technology innovation expenditure and economic construction expenditure on firms' technology innovation investment and output function, but also the other macroeconomic effects. Through these effects, the government can rationally adjust the ratio of economic construction expenditure to technological innovation expenditure according to the economic development needs.
引文
陈昆亭、龚六堂、邹恒甫,2004:《基本RBC方法模拟中国经济的数值试验》,《世界经济文汇》第2期。
戴晨、刘怡,2008:《税收优惠与财政补贴对企业R&D影响的比较分析》,《经济科学》第3期。
龚强、张一林、林毅夫,2014:《产业结构、风险特性与最优金融结构》,《经济研究》第4期。
何德旭、于树一,2018:《论支持供给侧结构性改革的积极财政政策》,《地方财政研究》第11期。
黎文靖、郑曼妮,2016:《实质性创新还是策略性创新?——宏观产业政策对微观企业创新的影响》,《经济研究》第4期。
李力、王博、刘潇潇、郝大鹏,2016:《短期资本、货币政策和金融稳定》,《金融研究》第9期。
李苗苗、肖洪钧、傅吉新,2014:《财政政策、企业R&D投入与技术创新能力》,《管理评论》第8期。
林毅夫、蔡昉、李周,1995:《中国的奇迹:发展战略与经济改革》,上海三联书店、上海人民出版社。
林毅夫、孙希芳、姜烨,2009:《经济发展中的最优金融结构理论初探》,《经济研究》第8期。
刘斌,2008:《我国DSGE模型的开发及在货币政策分析中的应用》,《金融研究》第10期。
陆国庆、王舟、张春宇,2014:《中国战略性新兴产业政府创新补贴的绩效研究》,《经济研究》第7期。
吕炜、高帅雄、周潮,2016:《财政政策、纵向产业关联与供给侧结构性改革》,《中国工业经济》第8期。
苗文龙、钟世和、周潮,2018:《金融周期、行业技术周期与经济结构优化》,《金融研究》第3期。
孙文莉、丁晓松、伍晓光,2013:《工资粘性、货币冲击与价格贸易条件》,《经济研究》第8期。
吴洪鹏、刘璐,2007:《挤出还是挤入——公共投资对民间投资的影响》,《世界经济》第2期。
张杰、陈志远、杨连星、新夫,2015:《中国创新补贴政策的绩效评估:理论与证据》,《经济研究》第10期。
张杰、郑文平,2018:《创新追赶战略抑制了中国专利质量么?》,《经济研究》第5期。
张一林、龚强、荣昭,2016:《技术创新、股权融资与金融结构转型》,《管理世界》第11期。
Aschhoff, B., 2009,“ The Effect of Subsides on R&D Investment and Success:Do Subsidy History and Size Matter?,” ZEW Discussion Paper No. 032, Mannheim.
Aerts, K., and T. Schmidtb, 2006, “Two for the Price of One? Additionality Effects of R&D Subsidies: A Comparison Between Flanders and Germany”, Research Policy,37(5), 806—822.
Aghion,P., and P. Howitt, 1992, “A Model of Growth through Creative Destruction”, Econometrica,60(2), 323—351.
Acemoglu, D., U. Akcigit , H. Alp, N. Bloom, and W. Kerr, 2018, “Innovation, Reallocation, and Growth”, American Economic Review,108(11), 3450—3491.
Czarnitzki,D., P. Hanel, and J. Rosa, 2011,“Evaluating the Impact of R&D Tax Credits on Innovation: A Micro Econometric Study on Canadian Firms”, Research Policy, 2011, 40(2), 217—229.
Diamond, A. M., 1999, “Dose Federal Funding ‘Crowd in’ Private Funding of Science?”, Contemporary Economic Policy,17(4), 423—431.
Gorg, H. ,and E. Strobl, 2007, “The Effect of R&D Subsidies on Private R&D”, Econometrica, 74, 215—234.
Grossman, G.,and E. Helpman, 1991, Innovation and Growth in the Global Economy, Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.
Hall,B., and J. V. Reenen, 2000, “How Effective are Fiscal Incentives for R&D? A New Review of the Evidence”, Research Policy,29( 4—5), 449—469.
Howell, S. T., 2015, “Financing Innovation: Evidence from R&D Grants”, American Economic Review,107(4), 1136—1164.
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Ozcelik, E., and E. Taymaze, 2008, “R&D Support Programs in Developing Countries: the Turkish Experience”, Research Policy,37(2), 258—275.
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① 学者们对中国30多年经济高速增长奇迹的解释主要有后发技术优势说、人口红利说、制度改革说等(林毅夫等,1995)。
(1)这一概念沿用于林毅夫等(2009)提出的观点“达到技术前沿的产业,技术和产品都更加成熟,创新研发的密度及相应的风险都相对更低”。
(2)技术创新型企业具有前沿技术创新的内生性,必须依靠自身的技术创新实现企业的生存和发展。技术稳定型企业主要指未达到技术前沿的、属于当前社会发展比较成型的行业,技术和产品都更加成熟,现有的技术水平基本可以满足人们的需求,研发密度较低。技术创新行业同技术密集型行业较为近似,即在生产结构中,技术知识所占比重大,科研费用高,例如新兴的电子计算机工业、机器人工业、航天工业、生物技术工业、新材料工业等,这些行业技术创新速度快、技术密度高。就作者掌握的文献看,目前仍缺少精确的行业分类界定,属于一个开放型概念。本文初步分为两类行业,但未做到对各个样本行业都能精确界定属于技术创新型还是技术稳定型;比较明确的是,技术投入率较高和较低两端的行业分别属于技术创新型行业和技术稳定型行业,据此也可以比较确定地将企业分为技术创新型和技术稳定型两类。
(3)政府技术创新支出主要指政府用于推动本国技术创新的科学技术支出,内容包括重点基础研究规划、自然科学基金、重点实验室及相关设施、重大科学工程、专项基础科研、专项技术基础等基础研究类支出,技术研究与开发、科技条件与服务等应用研究支出,试验发展支出,以及科学技术普及和交流等支出,高校和科研机构的科研支出等。
(4)根据2000—2006年的年度数据计算,教育支出加上科技支出占公共财政支出比例的均值为0.1341,最小值为0.1312,最大值为0.1362。
(5)Acemoglu et al.(2018)根据美国企业微观层面的产出、研发和专利的普查数据,从企业创新能力角度分为高类型(high-type firms)和低类型企业(low-type firms),本文从企业技术创新能力角度分为技术创新型企业和技术稳定型企业与其视角一样,字面意思更为直观。
(6)他们认为“政府创新补贴政策对企业私人研发的作用效应具有不确定性,无偿资助型的政府创新补贴政策则不能促进企业私人研发的提升”。其原因在于,本文数据是宏观数据,他们主要验证的是中小企业数据,但他们的研究结论提示决策者,不能想当然地认为政府对企业的创新补贴增加、企业研发投资必然增加。
(7)不可否认,本文这一结论的局限是,企业技术投资的增加并不意味着企业创新水平和创新质量的提升,下文的研究在一定程度上假设了企业技术投资增加与企业创新水平提高具有正向关系。而从实际经验来看,近年来地方政府相继实施的创新政策一定程度上推动了创新质量较低的实用新型和外观设计专利的数量上升,发明专利型创新却未得到显著的提升(黎文靖和郑曼妮,2016)。
(8)本文将技术创新型企业假定为产业链的上游企业原因有二:一是根据专利类型(发明、实用新型和外观设计),本文研究的技术创新主要指发明,根据《专利法》发明是指对产品、方法或者其改进所提出的新的技术方案,具体包括产品发明(开发出来的关于各种新产品、新材料、新物质等的技术方案)和方法发明(制造产品或解决某个技术课题而研究开发出来的操作方法,制造方法以及工艺流程等技术方案)。相对而言,这些发明大多用于产业链中上游。二是本文第二部分主要在于论证企业技术创新具有异质性,所用数据并非包括了所有的技术创新行业,上面提到的通讯设备制造业、汽车制造业两大行业只是一小部分,而且这些行业的产品既有下游商品,亦有很大比例的上游产品;同时,由于数据时段限制和行业细分程度限制,本文的样本行业未包括技术创新度较高的军工、精密仪器、电子仪器等行业,这些行业多是上游行业。当然,这样将技术创新型企业全部假定为上游企业具有一定的局限,但不影响对这种经济关系的分析。
(9)政府技术创新支出形式较为多样,经费使用主体包括各类企业、政府属研究机构和高等学校。根据2018年10月国家统计局及财政部公布的数据,企业、政府属研究机构、高等学校的研发支出所占比重分别为77.6%、13.8%和7.2%。尽管政府属研究机构和高等学校与企业性质不同,但与企业一样遵循投入产出效率最大化原则。为简化分析和突出重点,本文假定政府技术创新支出都投资到技术创新型企业。
(10)恶性增资,指一个项目投入大量资源后发现完成该项目取得收益的可能性很小,在各种客观信息表明应放弃该项目的情况下,经理人仍然继续投入额外的资源。
(11)承诺升级,指决策者对自己负有责任的项目,更具有一种动机要证明其决策的正确性,并期望从对这个失败项目本身的追加投资中得到挽回。
戴晨、刘怡,2008:《税收优惠与财政补贴对企业R&D影响的比较分析》,《经济科学》第3期。
龚强、张一林、林毅夫,2014:《产业结构、风险特性与最优金融结构》,《经济研究》第4期。
何德旭、于树一,2018:《论支持供给侧结构性改革的积极财政政策》,《地方财政研究》第11期。
黎文靖、郑曼妮,2016:《实质性创新还是策略性创新?——宏观产业政策对微观企业创新的影响》,《经济研究》第4期。
李力、王博、刘潇潇、郝大鹏,2016:《短期资本、货币政策和金融稳定》,《金融研究》第9期。
李苗苗、肖洪钧、傅吉新,2014:《财政政策、企业R&D投入与技术创新能力》,《管理评论》第8期。
林毅夫、蔡昉、李周,1995:《中国的奇迹:发展战略与经济改革》,上海三联书店、上海人民出版社。
林毅夫、孙希芳、姜烨,2009:《经济发展中的最优金融结构理论初探》,《经济研究》第8期。
刘斌,2008:《我国DSGE模型的开发及在货币政策分析中的应用》,《金融研究》第10期。
陆国庆、王舟、张春宇,2014:《中国战略性新兴产业政府创新补贴的绩效研究》,《经济研究》第7期。
吕炜、高帅雄、周潮,2016:《财政政策、纵向产业关联与供给侧结构性改革》,《中国工业经济》第8期。
苗文龙、钟世和、周潮,2018:《金融周期、行业技术周期与经济结构优化》,《金融研究》第3期。
孙文莉、丁晓松、伍晓光,2013:《工资粘性、货币冲击与价格贸易条件》,《经济研究》第8期。
吴洪鹏、刘璐,2007:《挤出还是挤入——公共投资对民间投资的影响》,《世界经济》第2期。
张杰、陈志远、杨连星、新夫,2015:《中国创新补贴政策的绩效评估:理论与证据》,《经济研究》第10期。
张杰、郑文平,2018:《创新追赶战略抑制了中国专利质量么?》,《经济研究》第5期。
张一林、龚强、荣昭,2016:《技术创新、股权融资与金融结构转型》,《管理世界》第11期。
Aschhoff, B., 2009,“ The Effect of Subsides on R&D Investment and Success:Do Subsidy History and Size Matter?,” ZEW Discussion Paper No. 032, Mannheim.
Aerts, K., and T. Schmidtb, 2006, “Two for the Price of One? Additionality Effects of R&D Subsidies: A Comparison Between Flanders and Germany”, Research Policy,37(5), 806—822.
Aghion,P., and P. Howitt, 1992, “A Model of Growth through Creative Destruction”, Econometrica,60(2), 323—351.
Acemoglu, D., U. Akcigit , H. Alp, N. Bloom, and W. Kerr, 2018, “Innovation, Reallocation, and Growth”, American Economic Review,108(11), 3450—3491.
Czarnitzki,D., P. Hanel, and J. Rosa, 2011,“Evaluating the Impact of R&D Tax Credits on Innovation: A Micro Econometric Study on Canadian Firms”, Research Policy, 2011, 40(2), 217—229.
Diamond, A. M., 1999, “Dose Federal Funding ‘Crowd in’ Private Funding of Science?”, Contemporary Economic Policy,17(4), 423—431.
Gorg, H. ,and E. Strobl, 2007, “The Effect of R&D Subsidies on Private R&D”, Econometrica, 74, 215—234.
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① 学者们对中国30多年经济高速增长奇迹的解释主要有后发技术优势说、人口红利说、制度改革说等(林毅夫等,1995)。
(1)这一概念沿用于林毅夫等(2009)提出的观点“达到技术前沿的产业,技术和产品都更加成熟,创新研发的密度及相应的风险都相对更低”。
(2)技术创新型企业具有前沿技术创新的内生性,必须依靠自身的技术创新实现企业的生存和发展。技术稳定型企业主要指未达到技术前沿的、属于当前社会发展比较成型的行业,技术和产品都更加成熟,现有的技术水平基本可以满足人们的需求,研发密度较低。技术创新行业同技术密集型行业较为近似,即在生产结构中,技术知识所占比重大,科研费用高,例如新兴的电子计算机工业、机器人工业、航天工业、生物技术工业、新材料工业等,这些行业技术创新速度快、技术密度高。就作者掌握的文献看,目前仍缺少精确的行业分类界定,属于一个开放型概念。本文初步分为两类行业,但未做到对各个样本行业都能精确界定属于技术创新型还是技术稳定型;比较明确的是,技术投入率较高和较低两端的行业分别属于技术创新型行业和技术稳定型行业,据此也可以比较确定地将企业分为技术创新型和技术稳定型两类。
(3)政府技术创新支出主要指政府用于推动本国技术创新的科学技术支出,内容包括重点基础研究规划、自然科学基金、重点实验室及相关设施、重大科学工程、专项基础科研、专项技术基础等基础研究类支出,技术研究与开发、科技条件与服务等应用研究支出,试验发展支出,以及科学技术普及和交流等支出,高校和科研机构的科研支出等。
(4)根据2000—2006年的年度数据计算,教育支出加上科技支出占公共财政支出比例的均值为0.1341,最小值为0.1312,最大值为0.1362。
(5)Acemoglu et al.(2018)根据美国企业微观层面的产出、研发和专利的普查数据,从企业创新能力角度分为高类型(high-type firms)和低类型企业(low-type firms),本文从企业技术创新能力角度分为技术创新型企业和技术稳定型企业与其视角一样,字面意思更为直观。
(6)他们认为“政府创新补贴政策对企业私人研发的作用效应具有不确定性,无偿资助型的政府创新补贴政策则不能促进企业私人研发的提升”。其原因在于,本文数据是宏观数据,他们主要验证的是中小企业数据,但他们的研究结论提示决策者,不能想当然地认为政府对企业的创新补贴增加、企业研发投资必然增加。
(7)不可否认,本文这一结论的局限是,企业技术投资的增加并不意味着企业创新水平和创新质量的提升,下文的研究在一定程度上假设了企业技术投资增加与企业创新水平提高具有正向关系。而从实际经验来看,近年来地方政府相继实施的创新政策一定程度上推动了创新质量较低的实用新型和外观设计专利的数量上升,发明专利型创新却未得到显著的提升(黎文靖和郑曼妮,2016)。
(8)本文将技术创新型企业假定为产业链的上游企业原因有二:一是根据专利类型(发明、实用新型和外观设计),本文研究的技术创新主要指发明,根据《专利法》发明是指对产品、方法或者其改进所提出的新的技术方案,具体包括产品发明(开发出来的关于各种新产品、新材料、新物质等的技术方案)和方法发明(制造产品或解决某个技术课题而研究开发出来的操作方法,制造方法以及工艺流程等技术方案)。相对而言,这些发明大多用于产业链中上游。二是本文第二部分主要在于论证企业技术创新具有异质性,所用数据并非包括了所有的技术创新行业,上面提到的通讯设备制造业、汽车制造业两大行业只是一小部分,而且这些行业的产品既有下游商品,亦有很大比例的上游产品;同时,由于数据时段限制和行业细分程度限制,本文的样本行业未包括技术创新度较高的军工、精密仪器、电子仪器等行业,这些行业多是上游行业。当然,这样将技术创新型企业全部假定为上游企业具有一定的局限,但不影响对这种经济关系的分析。
(9)政府技术创新支出形式较为多样,经费使用主体包括各类企业、政府属研究机构和高等学校。根据2018年10月国家统计局及财政部公布的数据,企业、政府属研究机构、高等学校的研发支出所占比重分别为77.6%、13.8%和7.2%。尽管政府属研究机构和高等学校与企业性质不同,但与企业一样遵循投入产出效率最大化原则。为简化分析和突出重点,本文假定政府技术创新支出都投资到技术创新型企业。
(10)恶性增资,指一个项目投入大量资源后发现完成该项目取得收益的可能性很小,在各种客观信息表明应放弃该项目的情况下,经理人仍然继续投入额外的资源。
(11)承诺升级,指决策者对自己负有责任的项目,更具有一种动机要证明其决策的正确性,并期望从对这个失败项目本身的追加投资中得到挽回。