知识产权保护与技术选择差异——基于市场规模视角的考察
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摘要
采用中国2006—2013的省际面板数据,从市场规模角度分析知识产权保护对发展中国家技术选择的影响机制。研究显示,在人力资本存量超过一定水平后,知识产权保护会在市场规模的约束下作用于技术选择。这种作用具体表现为:市场规模在临界值范围内时,知识产权保护对技术选择存在反向影响;市场规模高于一定临界值时,知识产权保护对技术选择水平有双向作用。这预示着政府期望通过改变知识产权保护程度来影响技术选择水平偏好,受限于人力资本规模存量及市场规模。目前,中国各省市的技术发展水平尚未达到需要加强知识产权保护的临界点。
Based on China's inter-provincial panel data from 2006 to 2013,this paper analyzes the impact of intellectualproperty protection on technology selection of developing countries from the perspective of market size. The research showsthat only when the human capital stock is above a certain critical value,the protection of intellectual property rights and thesize of the market will affect the preference of technology selection. This effect is shown in the following aspects:when themarket size is below a certain critical value,strengthening intellectual property protection will reduce the level of technologyselection;when the market size is higher than a certain critical value,intellectual property protection has a two-way effecton the technology selection level. This means that the government expects to improve the preference of technology selectionlevel,and there are constraints on the scale of human capital and market. The current technological development level ofChina's provinces and cities has not yet reached the threshold that needs to strengthen intellectual property protection.
Based on China's inter-provincial panel data from 2006 to 2013,this paper analyzes the impact of intellectualproperty protection on technology selection of developing countries from the perspective of market size. The research showsthat only when the human capital stock is above a certain critical value,the protection of intellectual property rights and thesize of the market will affect the preference of technology selection. This effect is shown in the following aspects:when themarket size is below a certain critical value,strengthening intellectual property protection will reduce the level of technologyselection;when the market size is higher than a certain critical value,intellectual property protection has a two-way effecton the technology selection level. This means that the government expects to improve the preference of technology selectionlevel,and there are constraints on the scale of human capital and market. The current technological development level ofChina's provinces and cities has not yet reached the threshold that needs to strengthen intellectual property protection.
引文
[1]斯蒂格利茨.斯蒂格利茨经济学文选:第三卷[M].纪沫,宛圆渊,李鹏飞,译.北京:中国金融出版社,2007:260-381.
[2]刘小鲁.知识产权保护、自主研发比重与后发国家的技术进步[J].管理世界,2011(10):10-19.
[3]LIN J Y,TAN G.Policy burdens,accountability,and thesoft budget constraint[J].Amrecian economic review:pa-pers and proceedings,1999,89(2):236-245.
[4]LIN J Y. Development strategy,viability,and economicconvergence[J]. Economic development&cultural change,2003,51(2):277-308.
[5]林毅夫,刘明兴,刘培林,等.关于技术选择指数的测算与计量[R].北京大学中国经济研究中心工作论文,2002.
[6]威廉·M.兰德斯,理查德·A.波斯纳.知识产权法的经济结构[M].金海军,译.北京:北京大学出版社,2005:375-422.
[7]MASKUS K E, PENUBARTI M.How trade-related areintellectual property rights?[J].Journal of international e-conomics 1995,39(3-4):227-248.
[8]RAFIQUZZAMAN M.The impact of patent rights on in-ternational trade:evidence from Canada[J]. The Canadianjournal of economics,2002,35(2):307-330.
[9]AWOKUSE T O,Hong Y.Does stronger intellectual prop-erty rights protection induce more bilateral trade?[J].World development,38(8):1094-1104.
[10]余长林.知识产权保护与我国的进口贸易增长:基于扩展贸易引力模型的经验分析[J].管理世界,2011(6):11-23.
[11]NURKSE R.Problems of capital formation in underde-veloped countries[M]. New York:Oxford UniversityPress,1953.
[12]COLM G.Discussion of dension[J]. American economicreview,1962,52(2):57-59.
[13]波特.国家竞争优势[M]//巴特利特,戈歇尔.跨国管理.赵曙明,主译.东北财经大学出版社,1990:186-215.
[14]ROMER P M.Endogenous technological change[J].Jour-nal of political economy,1990,98(5):71-102.
[15]HELPMAN E.Innovation,imitation and intellectual prop-erty rights[J].Econometria,1993,61(6),1247-1280.
[16]GLASS A J,SAGGI K. Intellectual property rights andforeign direct investment[J].Journal of international eco-nomics,2002,56(2):387-410.
[17]郭春野,庄子银.知识产权保护与“南方”国家的自主创新激励[J].经济研究,2012(9):32-45.
[18]GLASS A J,WU X D. Intellectual property rights andquality improvement[J]. Journal of development eco-nomics,2007,82(2):393-415.
[19]ROSENSTEIN RODAN P. How to industrialize an underdeveloped area[M]//Isard W. Regional EconomicPlanning,1961:205-211.
[20]范红忠.有效需求规模假说、研发投入与国家自主创新能力[J].经济研究,2007(3):33-44.
[21]ACEMOGLU D, ANTRS P, HELPMAN E. Contractsand the division of labor[Z]. Harvard Institute of Eco-nomic Research Working Papers,2005.
[22]梅特卡夫.演化经济学与创造性毁灭[M].冯健,译.北京:中国人民大学出版社,2007.
[23]HARRIS C,VICKERS J. Racing with uncertainty[J].Review of economic studies,1987,54(1):1-21.
[24]戴维·罗默.高级宏观经济学[M].中译本,北京:商务印书馆,1999.
[25]陈勇,唐朱昌.中国工业的技术选择与技术进步:1985—2003[J].经济研究,2006(9):50-61.
[26]林毅夫,董先安,殷韦.技术选择、技术扩散与经济收敛[J].财经问题研究,2004(6):3-10.
[27]王东霞.技术进步、产业结构变动与劳动就业[M].北京:经济科学出版社,2017.
[28]李飞跃.技术选择与经济发展[J].世界经济,2012(2):45-62.
[29]韩玉雄,李怀祖.关于中国知识产权保护水平的定量分析[J].科学学研究,2005(3):377-382.
[30]DAVID L C,JAMES R,MARKUSEN et al.Estimating theknowledge-capital model of the multinational enterprise[J].American economic review,2001,91(3):693-708.
[31]EGGER P.How corruption influences foreign direct in-vestment:a panel data study[J].Economic developmentand cultural change,2006,54(2):459-486.
[2]刘小鲁.知识产权保护、自主研发比重与后发国家的技术进步[J].管理世界,2011(10):10-19.
[3]LIN J Y,TAN G.Policy burdens,accountability,and thesoft budget constraint[J].Amrecian economic review:pa-pers and proceedings,1999,89(2):236-245.
[4]LIN J Y. Development strategy,viability,and economicconvergence[J]. Economic development&cultural change,2003,51(2):277-308.
[5]林毅夫,刘明兴,刘培林,等.关于技术选择指数的测算与计量[R].北京大学中国经济研究中心工作论文,2002.
[6]威廉·M.兰德斯,理查德·A.波斯纳.知识产权法的经济结构[M].金海军,译.北京:北京大学出版社,2005:375-422.
[7]MASKUS K E, PENUBARTI M.How trade-related areintellectual property rights?[J].Journal of international e-conomics 1995,39(3-4):227-248.
[8]RAFIQUZZAMAN M.The impact of patent rights on in-ternational trade:evidence from Canada[J]. The Canadianjournal of economics,2002,35(2):307-330.
[9]AWOKUSE T O,Hong Y.Does stronger intellectual prop-erty rights protection induce more bilateral trade?[J].World development,38(8):1094-1104.
[10]余长林.知识产权保护与我国的进口贸易增长:基于扩展贸易引力模型的经验分析[J].管理世界,2011(6):11-23.
[11]NURKSE R.Problems of capital formation in underde-veloped countries[M]. New York:Oxford UniversityPress,1953.
[12]COLM G.Discussion of dension[J]. American economicreview,1962,52(2):57-59.
[13]波特.国家竞争优势[M]//巴特利特,戈歇尔.跨国管理.赵曙明,主译.东北财经大学出版社,1990:186-215.
[14]ROMER P M.Endogenous technological change[J].Jour-nal of political economy,1990,98(5):71-102.
[15]HELPMAN E.Innovation,imitation and intellectual prop-erty rights[J].Econometria,1993,61(6),1247-1280.
[16]GLASS A J,SAGGI K. Intellectual property rights andforeign direct investment[J].Journal of international eco-nomics,2002,56(2):387-410.
[17]郭春野,庄子银.知识产权保护与“南方”国家的自主创新激励[J].经济研究,2012(9):32-45.
[18]GLASS A J,WU X D. Intellectual property rights andquality improvement[J]. Journal of development eco-nomics,2007,82(2):393-415.
[19]ROSENSTEIN RODAN P. How to industrialize an underdeveloped area[M]//Isard W. Regional EconomicPlanning,1961:205-211.
[20]范红忠.有效需求规模假说、研发投入与国家自主创新能力[J].经济研究,2007(3):33-44.
[21]ACEMOGLU D, ANTRS P, HELPMAN E. Contractsand the division of labor[Z]. Harvard Institute of Eco-nomic Research Working Papers,2005.
[22]梅特卡夫.演化经济学与创造性毁灭[M].冯健,译.北京:中国人民大学出版社,2007.
[23]HARRIS C,VICKERS J. Racing with uncertainty[J].Review of economic studies,1987,54(1):1-21.
[24]戴维·罗默.高级宏观经济学[M].中译本,北京:商务印书馆,1999.
[25]陈勇,唐朱昌.中国工业的技术选择与技术进步:1985—2003[J].经济研究,2006(9):50-61.
[26]林毅夫,董先安,殷韦.技术选择、技术扩散与经济收敛[J].财经问题研究,2004(6):3-10.
[27]王东霞.技术进步、产业结构变动与劳动就业[M].北京:经济科学出版社,2017.
[28]李飞跃.技术选择与经济发展[J].世界经济,2012(2):45-62.
[29]韩玉雄,李怀祖.关于中国知识产权保护水平的定量分析[J].科学学研究,2005(3):377-382.
[30]DAVID L C,JAMES R,MARKUSEN et al.Estimating theknowledge-capital model of the multinational enterprise[J].American economic review,2001,91(3):693-708.
[31]EGGER P.How corruption influences foreign direct in-vestment:a panel data study[J].Economic developmentand cultural change,2006,54(2):459-486.