完全信息静态博弈下农业保险分析——以甘肃省为例
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摘要
为促进甘肃省农业保险政策的完善及提高农户对农业保险的有效需求,进而促进甘肃省农业保险的可持续发展,针对农业保险市场上政府、保险公司和农户三大利益主体之间的相互影响关系,采用完全信息静态博弈理论对各个利益主体的收益进行博弈分析,同时结合甘肃省实地调研数据,选取逻辑回归分析方法提取影响农户参与农业保险的主要因素。分析得出:在保险公司和农户的博弈中,保险公司在农户有投保意愿时应当做出的积极回应为不经营策略,如果选择经营,则会损失更多;农户在保险公司做出经营策略的时候,应当积极投保,这样才能获得收益,如果保险公司选择不经营,农户无论做出什么选择,都会损失预防灾情的资金,并且如果农户选择投保还会损失更多;在政府与保险公司的博弈中,可以看出,政府的最佳收益为0,说明政府不支持保险公司进行农业保险业务是最佳策略;而对保险公司来说,只有在政府支持的情况下,才能获得最佳收益。这说明,只有在政府支持的情况下,保险公司经营农业保险的积极性才能提高。逻辑回归分析表明文化程度、务农人数、耕地面积、农业收入占家庭收入比重、了解农业保险程度对农户农业保险购买行为具有显著的影响。
In order to perfect the policy of Gansu agricultural insurance,improve farmers' effective demand foragricultural insurance and then promote the sustainable development of Gansu agricultural insurance,thisresearch analyzed the profits of the major interest subjects in agricultural insurance market by constructing thecomplete information static game model,which was based on the interplay among the government,insurancecompanies and farmers.And the main factors influencing the purchase of agricultural insurance were extractedby logistic regression analysis model combined with the survey data of Gansu Province.The results showed thatthe positive response for insurance companies was not to operate agricultural insurance when farmers hadinsurance willingness in the game between insurance companies and farmers.It would cost more if theinsurance companies chose to operate agricultural insurance.Farmers should be active to insure to take profitswhen insurance companies chose to operate agricultural insurance.Farmers would definitely lose moneypreventing disaster when insurance companies chose not to operate agricultural insurance and farmers would lose more if they chose to buy agricultural insurance.Best interest of government was 0 in the game betweengovernment and insurance companies,and optimal strategy of government was not to support the insurancecompany to operate agricultural insurance.But insurance companies would get the best interest only whengovernment supported agricultural insurance,so insurance companies would not improve the enthusiasm tooperate agricultural insurance without the support of government.Logistic regression analysis proved thatfarmer's education degree,the number of farming in a family,farmland area,agricultural income proportionand the knowledge about agricultural insurance mainly influenced farmers' behavior to purchase agriculturalinsurance.
In order to perfect the policy of Gansu agricultural insurance,improve farmers' effective demand foragricultural insurance and then promote the sustainable development of Gansu agricultural insurance,thisresearch analyzed the profits of the major interest subjects in agricultural insurance market by constructing thecomplete information static game model,which was based on the interplay among the government,insurancecompanies and farmers.And the main factors influencing the purchase of agricultural insurance were extractedby logistic regression analysis model combined with the survey data of Gansu Province.The results showed thatthe positive response for insurance companies was not to operate agricultural insurance when farmers hadinsurance willingness in the game between insurance companies and farmers.It would cost more if theinsurance companies chose to operate agricultural insurance.Farmers should be active to insure to take profitswhen insurance companies chose to operate agricultural insurance.Farmers would definitely lose moneypreventing disaster when insurance companies chose not to operate agricultural insurance and farmers would lose more if they chose to buy agricultural insurance.Best interest of government was 0 in the game betweengovernment and insurance companies,and optimal strategy of government was not to support the insurancecompany to operate agricultural insurance.But insurance companies would get the best interest only whengovernment supported agricultural insurance,so insurance companies would not improve the enthusiasm tooperate agricultural insurance without the support of government.Logistic regression analysis proved thatfarmer's education degree,the number of farming in a family,farmland area,agricultural income proportionand the knowledge about agricultural insurance mainly influenced farmers' behavior to purchase agriculturalinsurance.
引文
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[9]黄亚林.政策性农业保险各主体利益协同研究[M].北京:中国金融出版社,2014:137-140.
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[11]郭志刚.社会统计分析方法——SPSS软件应用[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,1999:78-99.
[12]陈晓安,叶成徽.农业保险中的政府角色:理论诠释与中国的选择[J].保险研究,2012(2):40-48.
[13]李冬妍,赵欣彤.论我国农业保险制度建设中政府行为的优化[J].经济问题,2011(6):94-96.
[14]黄英君.我国农业保险发展的政府诱导机制研究[J].农业经济问题,2010(5):56-61.
[15]杨雪美,冯文丽.农户的风险意识、保险认知与政策性农业保险——基于河北试点的实证分析[J].农村经济,2013(9):70-74.
[16]柏正杰.农民收入对农业保险需求的影响分析——基于甘肃省黄土高原区1028户农户的调查数据[J].甘肃社会科学,2012(4):225-228.
[17]杜鹏.农户农业保险需求的影响因素研究——基于湖北省五县市342户农户的调查[J].农业经济问题,2011(11):78-83.
[2]Wright B D,Hewitt J A.All-Risk Crop Insurance:Lessons from Theory and Experience[A].Hueth D L,Furtan W H.Economics of Agricultural Crop Insurance:Theory and Evidence[C].Boston:Kluwer Academic Publishers,1994.
[3]Joseph W Glauber,Keith J Collins.Crop Insurance,Disaster Assistance,and the Role of the Federal Government in Providing Catastrophic Risk Protection[J].Agricultural Finance Review,2002(2):82-103.
[4]张祖荣.中国政策性农业保险若干问题探析——基于政策性农业保险行为主体的视角[J].内蒙古社会科学,2012(5):106-111.
[5]谭中明,徐勇谋.政策性农业保险参与主体博弈分析及风险防范策略[J].保险研究,2009(11):52-57.
[6]龙文军,张显峰.农业保险主体行为的博弈分析[J].中国农村经济,2003(5):76-79.
[7]王国成.博弈论精粹[M].哈尔滨:哈尔滨工业大学出版社,2008:223-254.
[8]张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海:上海人民出版社,2004:49-56.
[9]黄亚林.政策性农业保险各主体利益协同研究[M].北京:中国金融出版社,2014:137-140.
[10]黄亚林,李明贤.湖南省农业保险市场需求分析——以溆浦县为例[J].中国保险,2012(8):30-33.
[11]郭志刚.社会统计分析方法——SPSS软件应用[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,1999:78-99.
[12]陈晓安,叶成徽.农业保险中的政府角色:理论诠释与中国的选择[J].保险研究,2012(2):40-48.
[13]李冬妍,赵欣彤.论我国农业保险制度建设中政府行为的优化[J].经济问题,2011(6):94-96.
[14]黄英君.我国农业保险发展的政府诱导机制研究[J].农业经济问题,2010(5):56-61.
[15]杨雪美,冯文丽.农户的风险意识、保险认知与政策性农业保险——基于河北试点的实证分析[J].农村经济,2013(9):70-74.
[16]柏正杰.农民收入对农业保险需求的影响分析——基于甘肃省黄土高原区1028户农户的调查数据[J].甘肃社会科学,2012(4):225-228.
[17]杜鹏.农户农业保险需求的影响因素研究——基于湖北省五县市342户农户的调查[J].农业经济问题,2011(11):78-83.