考虑全局投标者后悔心理行为的组合拍卖的投标均衡策略
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摘要
许多实验研究表明投标者在拍卖过程中往往表现出预期后悔心理行为,并且投标者的预期后悔心理行为将会对投标策略产生影响,但以往大多是针对单物品拍卖研究考虑投标者后悔心理行为的投标均衡策略,而针对多物品拍卖情形的研究较少关注。本文着重研究了考虑投标者后悔心理行为的组合拍卖的投标均衡策略问题,在全局投标者存在预期后悔心理行为的假设下,依据Engelbrecht-Wiggans和Katok提出的后悔函数刻画了投标者的后悔心理行为,在此基础上,构建了组合拍卖模型,通过分析给出了全局投标者投标均衡策略需要满足的充分和必要条件。进一步地,依据构建的模型,通过数值实验分析了局部投标者人数、组合效应系数和全局投标者后悔参数对全局投标者投标策略的影响。最后,通过一个关于无线电频谱组合拍卖的算例说明了本文给出的模型及投标均衡策略确定方法的潜在应用和优越性。
Numerous experimental studies have shown that the bidders usually exhibit the anticipated regret behaviors in auctions and such behaviors will have an impacts on the final bidding strategies. However,most previous research on the equilibrium bidding strategy with consideration of the bidder 's regret behaviors is conducted for the situation of the single item auction,while the multi-item auction gets less attention. This paper investigates the equilibrium bidding strategy in combinatorial auctions considering the bidder's regret behaviors.Based on the assumption of the global bidder's anticipated regret,the bidders' regret behavior is characterized by the regret function proposed by Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok. On the basis of this,a combinatorial auction model is constructed and the necessary and sufficient conditions for the global bidder 's equilibrium bidding strategy are given. Furthermore,according to the model,the numerical experiments are conducted to investigate the impacts of the number of local bidders,combined effect coefficient and the global bidder's regret parameter on the global bidder's bidding strategy. Finally,a case study in the field of the combinatorial auctions of spectrum is introduced to illustrate the superiority and potential application of the above study.
Numerous experimental studies have shown that the bidders usually exhibit the anticipated regret behaviors in auctions and such behaviors will have an impacts on the final bidding strategies. However,most previous research on the equilibrium bidding strategy with consideration of the bidder 's regret behaviors is conducted for the situation of the single item auction,while the multi-item auction gets less attention. This paper investigates the equilibrium bidding strategy in combinatorial auctions considering the bidder's regret behaviors.Based on the assumption of the global bidder's anticipated regret,the bidders' regret behavior is characterized by the regret function proposed by Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok. On the basis of this,a combinatorial auction model is constructed and the necessary and sufficient conditions for the global bidder 's equilibrium bidding strategy are given. Furthermore,according to the model,the numerical experiments are conducted to investigate the impacts of the number of local bidders,combined effect coefficient and the global bidder's regret parameter on the global bidder's bidding strategy. Finally,a case study in the field of the combinatorial auctions of spectrum is introduced to illustrate the superiority and potential application of the above study.
引文
[1]田剑,高杰.不同一口价网上组合拍卖规则下拍卖方收益分析[J].系统管理学报,2012,21(2):246-251.
[2]王宏.组合拍卖的理论与实践:一个文献综述[J].产业经济评论,2009,8(1):111-146.
[3]陈剑,陈熙龙,宋西平.拍卖理论与网上拍卖[M].北京:清华大学出版社,2005.
[4] Krishna V,Rosenthal R. Simultaneous auctions with synergies[J]. Games&Economic Behavior,1996,17(1):1-31.
[5]李研,宋起柱,赵蔚,吕廷杰.频谱拍卖机制研究[J].中国无线电,2010,6:8-12.
[6]汪定伟.组合拍卖必要的投标人数的理论分析[J].系统管理学报,2014,23(4):524-528.
[7] Rassenti S J,Smith V L,Bulfin R L. A combinatorial auction mechanism for airport time slot allocation[J].Bell Journal of Economics,1982,13(2):402-417.
[8]王飞,徐肖豪,张静,陈凯. GHP时隙分配问题的组合拍卖竞胜标模型与算法[J].系统工程,2010,28(2):30-35.
[9]陈李钢,李一军,艾文国.组合拍卖在门户网站广告机会分配中的应用[J].运筹与管理,2011,20(2):108-116.
[10] Engelbrecht-Wiggans R. The effect of regret on optimal bidding in auctions[J]. Management Science,1989,35(6):685-692.
[11] Engelbrecht-Wiggans R,Katok E. Regret in auctions:theory and evidence[J]. Economic Theory,2007,33(1):81-101.
[12] Fishman P,Durham N C. Regret in first-price sealed bid auctions[D]. Durham:Duke University,2002.
[13] Filiz E,Ozbay E Y. Auctions with anticipated regret:theory and experiment[J]. The American Economic Review,2006,97(4):1407-1461.
[14] Du S,Abendroth L J,Chandran S. Bidders’regret in auctions[J]. Advances in Consumer Research,2006,33(5):516.
[15] Engelbrecht-Wiggans R,Katok E. Regret and feedback information in first-price sealed-bid auctions[J].Management Science,2008,54(4):808-819.
[16]高广鑫,樊治平.考虑投标者后悔的一级密封拍卖的最优投标策略[J].管理科学,2016,1(29):1-14.
[17] Engelbrecht-Wiggans R,Katok E. A direct test of risk aversion and regret in first price sealed-bid auctions[J]. Decision Analysis,2009,6(2):75-86.
[18] Astor P,Adam M,Jhnig C,et al. Measuring regret:emotional aspects of auction design[C]. Helsinki:AIS Electronic Library(AISel)for ECIS Proceedings,2011.88-100.
[19]黄河,陈剑.采购组合拍卖投标均衡策略研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,2007,27(10):93-97.
[20] Riley J G,Samuelson W F. Optimal auctions[J]. The American Economic Review,1981,71(3):381-392.
[21] Matthews S. Comparing auctions for risk averse buyers:a buyer’s point of view[J]. Econometrica:Journal of The Econometric Society,1987,55(3):633-646.
[22] McAfee R P,McMillan J. Auctions with a stochastic number of bidders[J]. Journal of Economic Theory,1987,43(1):1-19.
[23] Dang C,Hu Q,Liu J. Bidding strategies in online auctions with different ending rules and value assumptions[J]. Electronic Commerce Research and Applications,2015,14(2):104-111.
[24] Davis A M,Katok E,Kwasnica A M. Do auctioneers pick optimal reserve prices?[J]. Management Science,2011,57(1):177-192.
[25] Jiang Z Z,Fang S C,Fan Z P,et al. Selecting optimal selling format of a product in B2C online auctions with boundedly rational customers[J]. European Journal of Operational Research,2013,226(1):139-153.
[26]高广鑫,樊治平.考虑投标者有限理性行为的网上临时一口价拍卖的卖方收益分析[J].中国管理科学,2017,25(7):102-112.
[27] Qian X,Fang S C,Huang M,et al. Reverse auctions with regret-anticipated bidders[J]. Annals of Operations Research,2017,published online.
[28] Klemperer P. How(not)to run auctions:the european3G telecom auctions[J]. Social Science Electronic Publishing,2002,46(4):829-845.
[29] Binmore K,Klemperer P. The biggest auction ever:the sale of the british 3G telecom licenses[J]. General Information,2002,112(478):C74-C96.
[2]王宏.组合拍卖的理论与实践:一个文献综述[J].产业经济评论,2009,8(1):111-146.
[3]陈剑,陈熙龙,宋西平.拍卖理论与网上拍卖[M].北京:清华大学出版社,2005.
[4] Krishna V,Rosenthal R. Simultaneous auctions with synergies[J]. Games&Economic Behavior,1996,17(1):1-31.
[5]李研,宋起柱,赵蔚,吕廷杰.频谱拍卖机制研究[J].中国无线电,2010,6:8-12.
[6]汪定伟.组合拍卖必要的投标人数的理论分析[J].系统管理学报,2014,23(4):524-528.
[7] Rassenti S J,Smith V L,Bulfin R L. A combinatorial auction mechanism for airport time slot allocation[J].Bell Journal of Economics,1982,13(2):402-417.
[8]王飞,徐肖豪,张静,陈凯. GHP时隙分配问题的组合拍卖竞胜标模型与算法[J].系统工程,2010,28(2):30-35.
[9]陈李钢,李一军,艾文国.组合拍卖在门户网站广告机会分配中的应用[J].运筹与管理,2011,20(2):108-116.
[10] Engelbrecht-Wiggans R. The effect of regret on optimal bidding in auctions[J]. Management Science,1989,35(6):685-692.
[11] Engelbrecht-Wiggans R,Katok E. Regret in auctions:theory and evidence[J]. Economic Theory,2007,33(1):81-101.
[12] Fishman P,Durham N C. Regret in first-price sealed bid auctions[D]. Durham:Duke University,2002.
[13] Filiz E,Ozbay E Y. Auctions with anticipated regret:theory and experiment[J]. The American Economic Review,2006,97(4):1407-1461.
[14] Du S,Abendroth L J,Chandran S. Bidders’regret in auctions[J]. Advances in Consumer Research,2006,33(5):516.
[15] Engelbrecht-Wiggans R,Katok E. Regret and feedback information in first-price sealed-bid auctions[J].Management Science,2008,54(4):808-819.
[16]高广鑫,樊治平.考虑投标者后悔的一级密封拍卖的最优投标策略[J].管理科学,2016,1(29):1-14.
[17] Engelbrecht-Wiggans R,Katok E. A direct test of risk aversion and regret in first price sealed-bid auctions[J]. Decision Analysis,2009,6(2):75-86.
[18] Astor P,Adam M,Jhnig C,et al. Measuring regret:emotional aspects of auction design[C]. Helsinki:AIS Electronic Library(AISel)for ECIS Proceedings,2011.88-100.
[19]黄河,陈剑.采购组合拍卖投标均衡策略研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,2007,27(10):93-97.
[20] Riley J G,Samuelson W F. Optimal auctions[J]. The American Economic Review,1981,71(3):381-392.
[21] Matthews S. Comparing auctions for risk averse buyers:a buyer’s point of view[J]. Econometrica:Journal of The Econometric Society,1987,55(3):633-646.
[22] McAfee R P,McMillan J. Auctions with a stochastic number of bidders[J]. Journal of Economic Theory,1987,43(1):1-19.
[23] Dang C,Hu Q,Liu J. Bidding strategies in online auctions with different ending rules and value assumptions[J]. Electronic Commerce Research and Applications,2015,14(2):104-111.
[24] Davis A M,Katok E,Kwasnica A M. Do auctioneers pick optimal reserve prices?[J]. Management Science,2011,57(1):177-192.
[25] Jiang Z Z,Fang S C,Fan Z P,et al. Selecting optimal selling format of a product in B2C online auctions with boundedly rational customers[J]. European Journal of Operational Research,2013,226(1):139-153.
[26]高广鑫,樊治平.考虑投标者有限理性行为的网上临时一口价拍卖的卖方收益分析[J].中国管理科学,2017,25(7):102-112.
[27] Qian X,Fang S C,Huang M,et al. Reverse auctions with regret-anticipated bidders[J]. Annals of Operations Research,2017,published online.
[28] Klemperer P. How(not)to run auctions:the european3G telecom auctions[J]. Social Science Electronic Publishing,2002,46(4):829-845.
[29] Binmore K,Klemperer P. The biggest auction ever:the sale of the british 3G telecom licenses[J]. General Information,2002,112(478):C74-C96.