管理层权力与上市公司R&D迎合投资
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摘要
理性的管理者会通过公司投资迎合资本市场中投资者非理性引起的错误定价,并且这种迎合行为会受到管理层权力大小的影响。本文在检验非有效市场中上市公司R&D迎合投资存在性的基础上,考察了管理层权力对R&D迎合投资的影响,结果发现:在控制了股权融资渠道的影响后,上市公司仍然存在较强的R&D投资-误定价敏感性,表明股票错误定价会通过理性迎合渠道影响公司R&D投资;上市公司R&D迎合投资-误定价敏感性与管理层权力显著正相关,并且在管理层持股堑壕效应较大和当股价被高估时更为显著。本文拓展了关于错误定价影响公司投资过程中代理问题的研究,也为考察管理层权力的影响提供了新的视角。
Rational managers can make investments to cater to the mispricing caused by investors' irrationality in the market, and such catering behavior will be infl uenced by managerial power. After exploring the existence of listed companies' R&D catering investment in an ineffi cient market, this paper investigates the effects of managerial power on the catering R&D investment. Several fi ndings appear: Chinese listed companies have strong R&D investment-mispricing sensitivities even after the effects of equity fi nancing channel controlled, which suggests that mispricing affects R&D investment by rational catering channel. Catering R&D investment-mispricing sensitivity of listed companies has a positive relationship with managerial power, and this relationship is more significant when managerial entrenchment effect is higher or stock is overpriced rather than underpriced. This study expands the research on agency problem in the context of the effect of mispricing on corporate investment, and also provides a new perspective to investigate managerial power effect.
Rational managers can make investments to cater to the mispricing caused by investors' irrationality in the market, and such catering behavior will be infl uenced by managerial power. After exploring the existence of listed companies' R&D catering investment in an ineffi cient market, this paper investigates the effects of managerial power on the catering R&D investment. Several fi ndings appear: Chinese listed companies have strong R&D investment-mispricing sensitivities even after the effects of equity fi nancing channel controlled, which suggests that mispricing affects R&D investment by rational catering channel. Catering R&D investment-mispricing sensitivity of listed companies has a positive relationship with managerial power, and this relationship is more significant when managerial entrenchment effect is higher or stock is overpriced rather than underpriced. This study expands the research on agency problem in the context of the effect of mispricing on corporate investment, and also provides a new perspective to investigate managerial power effect.
引文
[1]Abernethy,M.A.,Y.F.Kuang and B.Qin.The Influence of CEO Power on Compensation Contract Design[J].The Accounting Review,2015,90(4):1265-1306.
[2]Baker,M.,J.C.Stein and J.Wurgler.When Does the Market Matter?Stock Prices and the Investment of Equity-Dependent Firms[J].The Quarterly Journal of Economics,2003,118(3):969-1005.
[3]Baxamusa,M.How Well Do Market Timing,Catering,and Classical Theories Explain Corporate Decisions?[J].Journal of Financial Research,2011,34(2):217-239.
[4]Bebchuk,L.A.and J.M.Fried.Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem[J].The Journal of Economic Perspectives,2003,17(3):71-92.
[5]Bebchuk,L.A.,J.M.Fried and D.I.Walker.Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation[J].University of Chicago Law Review,2002,69(3):751-846.
[6]Chen,H.Board Capital,CEO Power and R&D Investment in Electronics Firms[J].Corporate Governance:An International Review,2014,22(5):422-436.
[7]Cheng,S.R&D Expenditures and CEO Compensation[J].The Accounting Review,2004,79(2):305-328.
[8]Dong,M.,D.A.Hirshleifer and S.H.Teoh.Stock Market Overvaluation,Moon Shots,and Corporate Innovation[R].SSRNworking paper,2016.
[9]Grundy,B.D.and H.Li.Investor Sentiment,Executive Compensation,and Corporate Investment[J].Journal of Banking&Finance,2010,34(10):2439-2449.
[10]Lin,C.,P.Lin,F.M.Song and C.Li.Managerial Incentives,CEO Characteristics and Corporate Innovation in China’S Private Sector[J].Journal of Comparative Economics,2011,39(2):176-190.
[11]Morck,R.,A.Shleifer and R.W.Vishny.Management Ownership and Market Valuation:An Empirical Analysis[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1988,20(1-2):293-315.
[12]Pantzalis,C.and J.C.Park.Agency Costs and Equity Mispricing[J].Asia-Pacific Journal of Financial Studies,2014,43(1):89-123.
[13]Polk,C.and P.Sapienza.The Stock Market and Corporate Investment:A Test of Catering Theory[J].Review of Financial Studies,2009,22(1):187-217.
[14]Rhodes-Kropf,M.,D.T.Robinson and S.Viswanathan.Valuation Waves and Merger Activity:The Empirical Evidence[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2005,77(3):561-603.
[15]Strobl,G.Stock-Based Managerial Compensation,Price Informativeness,and the Incentive to Overinvest[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2014,29:594-606.
[16]傅颀,汪祥耀,路军.管理层权力、高管薪酬变动与公司并购行为分析[J].会计研究,2014,(11):30-37.
[17]李科,徐龙炳,朱伟骅.卖空限制与股票错误定价--融资融券制度的证据[J].经济研究,2014,(10):165-178.
[18]栗新,王铁男.投资者对研发投入的反应--资本结构的信号作用[J].宁夏大学学报(人文社会科学版),2017,(03):153-160.
[19]陆蓉,何婧,崔晓蕾.资本市场错误定价与产业结构调整[J].经济研究,2017,(11):104-118.
[20]罗婷,朱青,李丹.解析R&D投入与公司价值之间的关系[J].金融研究,2009,(06):100-110.
[21]屈文洲,叶震南,闫丽梅.股价泡沫真的会影响公司资本投资吗?--基于股权融资机制和迎合机制的实证检验[J].证券市场导报,2016,(06):33-41.
[22]权小锋,吴世农,文芳.管理层权力、私有收益与薪酬操纵[J].经济研究,2010,(11):73-87.
[23]施光耀,刘国芳,梁彦军.中国上市公司市值管理评价研究[J].管理学报,2008,(01):78-87.
[24]谢佩洪,汪春霞.管理层权力、企业生命周期与投资效率--基于中国制造业上市公司的经验研究[J].南开管理评论,2017,(01):57-66.
[25]肖虹,曲晓辉.R&D投资迎合行为:理性迎合渠道与股权融资渠道?--基于中国上市公司的经验证据[J].会计研究,2012,(02):42-49.
[26]徐斌,俞静.究竟是大股东利益输送抑或投资者乐观情绪推高了定向增发折扣--来自中国证券市场的证据[J].财贸经济,2010,(04):40-46.
[27]张庆,朱迪星.投资者情绪、管理层持股与企业实际投资--来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].南开管理评论,2014,(04):120-127.
[28]赵刚,梁上坤,王卫星.超募融资、管理层权力与私有收益--基于IPO市场的经验证据[J].会计研究,2017,(04):31-37.
[29]朱红军,陈世敏,张成.市场情绪、会计信息质量与IPO首日回报[J].财经研究,2013,(09):70-81.
1.需要特别说明的是,本文的研究主要针对上市公司R&D的迎合投资,因此着重论证理性迎合渠道的存在性,但并未就此否定股权融资渠道的存在性。
2.在本文的样本公司中,实施股权再融资的公司占总样本的比重仅为14.94%,显示出较低的股权再融资比例,这与我国上市公司股权融资受到制度限制不无关系,也在一定程度上表明上市公司客观上难以很好地利用股权再融资的机会窗口。由于大部分公司没有实施股权再融资,因而导致按照全样本统计的Equiss的均值(3.016)失去了经济意义。如果只按照实施过股权再融资的公司统计,2007~2015年样本公司中股权再融资的平均规模约为5.83亿元人民币。
3.各列中Mis和Power×Mis的联合显著性均通过了F检验,后文表中涉及交互项的结果也进行了类似检验。
4.要准确划分管理层持股不同效应产生的区间界限是非常困难的。但为避免按照不同临界值分组对研究结果产生的影响,首先,本文采用多种临界值进行测试,按照以下两种标准分组检验:(1)超过45%、10~45%、0~10%和未持股;(2)超过50%、15~50%、0~15%和未持股。其次,本文采用剔除了股权再融资的样本进行检验。各种测试结果与表4类似。
5.对表4第(1)列和第(3)列中Mis的系数差异进行检验时的卡方值为8.40(p=0.004),对第(3)列和第(5)列中Mis的系数差异进行检验时的卡方值为11.06(p=0.001),对第(5)列和第(7)列中Mis的系数差异进行检验时的卡方值为1.39(p=0.238)。另外,限于篇幅,本文仅报告了Power1的检验结果,采用Power2的检验与表4类似,结果备索。
6.对表5中第(1)列和第(4)列中Mis的系数差异进行检验时的卡方值为1.02(p=0.313),从统计上没有证据表明二者存在显著差异。
[2]Baker,M.,J.C.Stein and J.Wurgler.When Does the Market Matter?Stock Prices and the Investment of Equity-Dependent Firms[J].The Quarterly Journal of Economics,2003,118(3):969-1005.
[3]Baxamusa,M.How Well Do Market Timing,Catering,and Classical Theories Explain Corporate Decisions?[J].Journal of Financial Research,2011,34(2):217-239.
[4]Bebchuk,L.A.and J.M.Fried.Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem[J].The Journal of Economic Perspectives,2003,17(3):71-92.
[5]Bebchuk,L.A.,J.M.Fried and D.I.Walker.Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation[J].University of Chicago Law Review,2002,69(3):751-846.
[6]Chen,H.Board Capital,CEO Power and R&D Investment in Electronics Firms[J].Corporate Governance:An International Review,2014,22(5):422-436.
[7]Cheng,S.R&D Expenditures and CEO Compensation[J].The Accounting Review,2004,79(2):305-328.
[8]Dong,M.,D.A.Hirshleifer and S.H.Teoh.Stock Market Overvaluation,Moon Shots,and Corporate Innovation[R].SSRNworking paper,2016.
[9]Grundy,B.D.and H.Li.Investor Sentiment,Executive Compensation,and Corporate Investment[J].Journal of Banking&Finance,2010,34(10):2439-2449.
[10]Lin,C.,P.Lin,F.M.Song and C.Li.Managerial Incentives,CEO Characteristics and Corporate Innovation in China’S Private Sector[J].Journal of Comparative Economics,2011,39(2):176-190.
[11]Morck,R.,A.Shleifer and R.W.Vishny.Management Ownership and Market Valuation:An Empirical Analysis[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1988,20(1-2):293-315.
[12]Pantzalis,C.and J.C.Park.Agency Costs and Equity Mispricing[J].Asia-Pacific Journal of Financial Studies,2014,43(1):89-123.
[13]Polk,C.and P.Sapienza.The Stock Market and Corporate Investment:A Test of Catering Theory[J].Review of Financial Studies,2009,22(1):187-217.
[14]Rhodes-Kropf,M.,D.T.Robinson and S.Viswanathan.Valuation Waves and Merger Activity:The Empirical Evidence[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2005,77(3):561-603.
[15]Strobl,G.Stock-Based Managerial Compensation,Price Informativeness,and the Incentive to Overinvest[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2014,29:594-606.
[16]傅颀,汪祥耀,路军.管理层权力、高管薪酬变动与公司并购行为分析[J].会计研究,2014,(11):30-37.
[17]李科,徐龙炳,朱伟骅.卖空限制与股票错误定价--融资融券制度的证据[J].经济研究,2014,(10):165-178.
[18]栗新,王铁男.投资者对研发投入的反应--资本结构的信号作用[J].宁夏大学学报(人文社会科学版),2017,(03):153-160.
[19]陆蓉,何婧,崔晓蕾.资本市场错误定价与产业结构调整[J].经济研究,2017,(11):104-118.
[20]罗婷,朱青,李丹.解析R&D投入与公司价值之间的关系[J].金融研究,2009,(06):100-110.
[21]屈文洲,叶震南,闫丽梅.股价泡沫真的会影响公司资本投资吗?--基于股权融资机制和迎合机制的实证检验[J].证券市场导报,2016,(06):33-41.
[22]权小锋,吴世农,文芳.管理层权力、私有收益与薪酬操纵[J].经济研究,2010,(11):73-87.
[23]施光耀,刘国芳,梁彦军.中国上市公司市值管理评价研究[J].管理学报,2008,(01):78-87.
[24]谢佩洪,汪春霞.管理层权力、企业生命周期与投资效率--基于中国制造业上市公司的经验研究[J].南开管理评论,2017,(01):57-66.
[25]肖虹,曲晓辉.R&D投资迎合行为:理性迎合渠道与股权融资渠道?--基于中国上市公司的经验证据[J].会计研究,2012,(02):42-49.
[26]徐斌,俞静.究竟是大股东利益输送抑或投资者乐观情绪推高了定向增发折扣--来自中国证券市场的证据[J].财贸经济,2010,(04):40-46.
[27]张庆,朱迪星.投资者情绪、管理层持股与企业实际投资--来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].南开管理评论,2014,(04):120-127.
[28]赵刚,梁上坤,王卫星.超募融资、管理层权力与私有收益--基于IPO市场的经验证据[J].会计研究,2017,(04):31-37.
[29]朱红军,陈世敏,张成.市场情绪、会计信息质量与IPO首日回报[J].财经研究,2013,(09):70-81.
1.需要特别说明的是,本文的研究主要针对上市公司R&D的迎合投资,因此着重论证理性迎合渠道的存在性,但并未就此否定股权融资渠道的存在性。
2.在本文的样本公司中,实施股权再融资的公司占总样本的比重仅为14.94%,显示出较低的股权再融资比例,这与我国上市公司股权融资受到制度限制不无关系,也在一定程度上表明上市公司客观上难以很好地利用股权再融资的机会窗口。由于大部分公司没有实施股权再融资,因而导致按照全样本统计的Equiss的均值(3.016)失去了经济意义。如果只按照实施过股权再融资的公司统计,2007~2015年样本公司中股权再融资的平均规模约为5.83亿元人民币。
3.各列中Mis和Power×Mis的联合显著性均通过了F检验,后文表中涉及交互项的结果也进行了类似检验。
4.要准确划分管理层持股不同效应产生的区间界限是非常困难的。但为避免按照不同临界值分组对研究结果产生的影响,首先,本文采用多种临界值进行测试,按照以下两种标准分组检验:(1)超过45%、10~45%、0~10%和未持股;(2)超过50%、15~50%、0~15%和未持股。其次,本文采用剔除了股权再融资的样本进行检验。各种测试结果与表4类似。
5.对表4第(1)列和第(3)列中Mis的系数差异进行检验时的卡方值为8.40(p=0.004),对第(3)列和第(5)列中Mis的系数差异进行检验时的卡方值为11.06(p=0.001),对第(5)列和第(7)列中Mis的系数差异进行检验时的卡方值为1.39(p=0.238)。另外,限于篇幅,本文仅报告了Power1的检验结果,采用Power2的检验与表4类似,结果备索。
6.对表5中第(1)列和第(4)列中Mis的系数差异进行检验时的卡方值为1.02(p=0.313),从统计上没有证据表明二者存在显著差异。