基于电商平台销售的E-供应链主导模型与佣金协调机制研究
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  • 英文篇名:Research on the Dominant Models and Commission Coordination Mechanism of E-Supply Chain Based on E-commerce Sales Platform
  • 作者:王玉燕 ; 于兆青
  • 英文作者:WANG Yu-yan;YU Zhao-qing;School of Management Science and Engineering,Shandong University of Finance and Economics;
  • 关键词:电商平台 ; E-供应链 ; 佣金协调机制
  • 英文关键词:e-commerce platform;;E-supply chain;;commission coordination mechanism
  • 中文刊名:ZGGK
  • 英文刊名:Chinese Journal of Management Science
  • 机构:山东财经大学管理科学与工程学院;
  • 出版日期:2019-05-15
  • 出版单位:中国管理科学
  • 年:2019
  • 期:v.27;No.175
  • 基金:国家自然科学基金资助项目(71501111);; 山东省软科学重点资助项目(2016RZB01049);; 山东省泰山学者专项经费项目(ts201511045)
  • 语种:中文;
  • 页:ZGGK201905012
  • 页数:10
  • CN:05
  • ISSN:11-2835/G3
  • 分类号:112-121
摘要
将电商平台纳入E-供应链的决策中,考虑系统主导模式的差异和佣金在系统中的作用,文章对E-供应链主导模式和协调机制进行研究。文章首先构建了E-供应链的两种分散决策模型(制造商主导模型和电商平台主导模型)和集中决策模型;针对每种模型,求解相应的最优决策,并对不同模型之间的最优决策进行比较分析;在此基础上,设计出每种主导模型的佣金协调机制;最后,采用数值分析,对模型结论进行验证。研究表明:(1)在分散决策模式下,掌控E-供应链主导权的一方能够获得更高的收益。当制造商主导系统时,产品销售价格、电商平台的服务水平、制造商的利润、以及E-供应链系统利润均高于电商平台主导系统时的水平。产品销售价格、电商平台的服务水平、电商平台的利润、以及E-供应链系统的利润均随着佣金率的增大而增大,制造商的利润则随着佣金率的增大而减小。(2)在集中决策模式下,销售价格、电商平台的服务水平以及E-供应链系统的利润均达到最大;而且销售价格、服务水平以及E-供应链系统利润不受佣金变化的影响。(3)佣金协调机制可以实现系统的协调。这些研究结论有利于进一步丰富完善E-供应链的理论基础,为电商企业的决策提供参考指南。
        The rise and prosperity of e-commerce,breaking the traditional business model,which provides lower operation cost for enterprises and more convenient means of purchase for consumers,makes enterprises,e-commerce platform and logistics enterprises to form E-supply chain system.According to the current profit model of e-commerce platform in E-supply chain system,the third party,e-commerce platform is incorporated into system decision.Considering the difference of dominant patterns and the role of commission in E-supply chain system,the dominant models and coordination mechanism of E-supply chain based on e-commerce platform which is fully taken into account in decision process are studied in this paper.First,two decentralized decision-making models of E-supply chain,including manufacturer's dominant model and e-commerce platform's dominant model,and centralized decision-making model are con-structed.Then,for each model,the corresponding optimal decisions is solved.And the comparative analysis of the optimal decisions is carried out.On this basis,commission coordination mechanism is designed to achieve coordination for each dominant model.Finally,conclusions are demonstrated with numerical examples.The results indicate that:(1)In the decentralized decision-making models,the dominance of Esupply chain contributes positively to the increase of dominant enterprise's profit.When manufacturer dominating system,the selling price,the service level of e-commerce platform,and the profits of manufacturer and E-supply chain system are higher,so do they increase with the increase of the commission rate.Nevertheless,the profit of the manufacturer decreases as commission rate increases.(2)In the centralized decision-making model,the selling price,the service level of the e-commerce platform and the profit of E-supply chain system are highest,besides,they are not affected by commission rate.The commission rate has nothing to do with system's revenue under the centralized decision-making model,but in the decentralized decision-making models,the profits of manufacturer and e-commerce platform changes in the opposite direction with the commission rate changes.Therefore,the article embraces commission rate as a coordination tool,and designs commission coordination mechanism to achieve the coordination of the system by resizing commission rate.In commission coordination mechanism,if ρsatisfies ρ=(1-λ)(1-c/p)+(λks~2)/(2pq),0<λ<1 the commission coordination mechanism can achieve system coordination.The research results will further enrich and perfect the theoretical basis of E-supply chain,and provide reference guides for enterprises to make decisions.However,only E-supply chain structure of a single manufacturer and a single electrical platform are constructed as the research object.In future work,the " many-to-one" E-supply chain should be taken into consideration.
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