参与全球价值链重构与中美贸易摩擦
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摘要
本文通过三国模型从行业收益角度分析了全球价值链地位以及参与度的提升对贸易摩擦的影响,发现中国参与全球价值链重构对其自身遭遇的贸易摩擦有"催化剂效应"和"润滑剂效应"。基于2000—2014年TTBD与WIOD匹配的制造业数据,本文通过实证分析发现:中国与贸易伙伴在某行业全球价值链分工地位越接近,中国与该贸易伙伴发生贸易摩擦的频率越高,体现在相关行业的贸易摩擦数量越多;中国某行业的相对全球价值链参与度越高,该行业的相关贸易摩擦越容易得到解决,体现在贸易摩擦的持续时间越短。将以上结论放在中美贸易摩擦的分析中也同样适用。因此,随着中国制造业在全球价值链上的赶超与攀升,中国与美国贸易摩擦的加剧有着内在的必然性,并且这个摩擦将呈现常态化、长期化、复杂化的趋势。对于中国而言,需要冷静对待参与全球价值链重构的"催化剂效应",并重视参与价值链重构的"润滑剂效应",保持自身的改革与开放战略定力,借助外力坚定不移地深化改革,继续提升自身在全球价值链中的地位;与此同时,积极参与国际经济规则的制定与完善,建立和完善政府的应对机制,构建国际贸易摩擦的企业应对体系,积极主动地应对国际贸易摩擦。
This paper analyzes the impact of global value chains status and participation on trade frictions through a three-country model from the perspective of industry benefits. It finds that China's participation in global value chains restructuring has "catalytic effect" and "lubricant effect" on its own trade frictions. Based on the manufacturing data matching the TTBD and WIOD from 2000 to 2014, this paper finds through empirical analysis that the closer the position of China and its trading partners in the global value chains of an industry, the higher frequency of trade frictions between China and the trading partners. The greater the number of trade frictions reflected in related industries; The higher the relative global value chains participation of an industry in China, the easier it is to resolve the relevant trade frictions in the industry, and the shorter the duration of trade frictions.The same applies to the analysis of the above-mentioned conclusions in the Sino-US trade frictions. Therefore, as China's manufacturing industry catches up and climbs in the global value chains, the intensification of trade frictions between China and the United States is inherently inevitable, and the frictions will be normalized, longterm, and complicated. For China, it is necessary to calmly deal with the "catalyst effect" involved in the reconstruction of global value chains and attach importance to the "lubricant effect" involved in the reconstruction of the value chains, to maintain a strategic focus on its own reform and opening up, and to unswervingly rely on external forces. Deepen reform and continue to enhance its position in the global value chains; at the same time,actively participate in the formulation and improvement of international economic rules, establish and improve the government's response mechanism, build a corporate response system for international trade frictions, and actively respond to international trade frictions.
This paper analyzes the impact of global value chains status and participation on trade frictions through a three-country model from the perspective of industry benefits. It finds that China's participation in global value chains restructuring has "catalytic effect" and "lubricant effect" on its own trade frictions. Based on the manufacturing data matching the TTBD and WIOD from 2000 to 2014, this paper finds through empirical analysis that the closer the position of China and its trading partners in the global value chains of an industry, the higher frequency of trade frictions between China and the trading partners. The greater the number of trade frictions reflected in related industries; The higher the relative global value chains participation of an industry in China, the easier it is to resolve the relevant trade frictions in the industry, and the shorter the duration of trade frictions.The same applies to the analysis of the above-mentioned conclusions in the Sino-US trade frictions. Therefore, as China's manufacturing industry catches up and climbs in the global value chains, the intensification of trade frictions between China and the United States is inherently inevitable, and the frictions will be normalized, longterm, and complicated. For China, it is necessary to calmly deal with the "catalyst effect" involved in the reconstruction of global value chains and attach importance to the "lubricant effect" involved in the reconstruction of the value chains, to maintain a strategic focus on its own reform and opening up, and to unswervingly rely on external forces. Deepen reform and continue to enhance its position in the global value chains; at the same time,actively participate in the formulation and improvement of international economic rules, establish and improve the government's response mechanism, build a corporate response system for international trade frictions, and actively respond to international trade frictions.
引文
[1]王孝松,吕越,赵春明.贸易壁垒与全球价值链嵌入——以中国遭遇反倾销为例[J].中国社会科学,2017,(1):108-124.
[2]王直,魏尚进,祝坤福.总贸易核算法:官方贸易统计与全球价值链的度量[J].中国社会科学,2015,(9):108-127.
[3]余东华,孙婷,张鑫宇.要素价格扭曲如何影响制造业国际竞争力[J].中国工业经济,2018,(2):63-81.
[4]张杰,陈志远,刘元春.中国出口国内附加值的测算与变化机制[J].经济研究,2013,48(10):124-137.
[5]张雨,戴翔.出口产品升级和市场多元化能够缓解中国贸易摩擦吗[J].世界经济研究,2013,(6):73-78.
[6]周念利.中国服务业改革对制造业微观生产效率的影响测度及异质性考察——基于服务中间投入的视角[J].金融研究,2014,(9):84-98.
[7]Blonigen,B.A.Industrial Policy and Downstream Export Performance[J].The Economic Journal,2015,126(595):1635-1659.
[8]Dean,J.M.,K.C.Fung,and Z.Wang.Measuring Vertical Specialization:The Case of China[J].Review of International Economics,2011,(4):609-625.
[9]De Bièvre,D.,A.Yildirim,and A.Poletti.About the Melting of Icebergs:Discovering the Political-Economic Determinants of Dispute Initiation and Resolution in the WTO[R].Assessing the World Trade Organisation:Fit for Purpose,2017.
[10]Erbahar,A.,and Z.Yuan.Cascading Trade Protection:Evidence from the U.S.[J].Journal of International Economics,2017,108(2):274-299.
[11]Feinberg,R.M.,and B.T.Hirsch.Industry Rent Seeking and the Filing of“Unfair Trade”Complaints[J].International Journal of Industrial Organization,1989,7(3):325-340.
[12]Finger,J.M.The Industry-Country Incidence of Less-Than-Fair-Value Cases in U.S.Import Trade[A].Bureau of Economic and Business Research.Export Diversification and the New Protectionism:The Experience of Latin America[C].United States:University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign,1981.
[13]Furusawa,T.,and T.J.Prusa.Antidumping Enforcement in a Reciprocal Model of Dumping:Theory and Evidence[J].Empirical Studies of Commercial Policy,1996,14(2):14-46.
[14]Hansen,W.L.The International Trade Commission and the Politics of Protectionism[J].American Political Science Review,1990,84(1):21-46.
[15]Herander,M.G.and J.B.Schwartz.An Empirical Test of the Impact of the Threat of U.S.Trade Policy:The Case of Antidumping Duties[J].Southern Economic Journal,1984,51(1):59-59.
[16]Hoekman,B.M.,and M.P.Leidy.Cascading Contingent Protection[J].European Economic Review,1992,36(4):883-892.
[17]Kim,S.Y.,and G.Spilker.Global Value Chains and the Political Economy of WTO Disputes[R].The Political Economy of International Organizations Working Paper,2018.
[18]Konings,J.,and H.Vandenbussche.Antidumping Protection Hurts Exporters:Firm-Level Evidence[J].Review of World Economics,2013,149(2):295-320.
[19]]Koopman,R.,W.Powers,and Z.Wang.Give Credit Where Credit Is Due:Tracing Value Added in Global Production Chains[R].NBER Working Paper,2010.
[20]Krupp,C.Antidumping Cases in the US Chemical Industry:A Panel Data Approach[J].The Journal of Industrial Economics,1994,(1):299-311.
[21]Krupp,C.,and S.Skeath.Evidence on the Upstream and Downstream Impacts of Antidumping Cases[J].North American Journal of Economics and Finance,2002,13(2):163-178.
[22]Lichtenberg,F.,and H.Tan.An industry-level Analysis of Import Relief Petitions Filed by U.S.Manufacturers(1958—1985)[A].Hong Tan,and H.Shimada.Troubled Industries In the United States and Japan[C].United States:St Martin’s Press,1994.
[23]Ossa,R.Trade Wars and Trade Talks with Data[J].American Economic Review,2014,104(12):41-46.
[24]Prusa,T.J.The Selection of Antidumping Cases for ITC Determination[J].Empirical Studies of Commercial Policy,1991,14(2):47-74.
[25]Sabry,F.An Analysis of the Decision to File the Dumping Estimates,and the Outcome of Antidumping Petitions[J].The International Trade Journal,2000,14(2):109-145.
[26]Sleuwaegen,L.,R.Belderbos,and C.Jie-A-Joen.Cascading Contingent Protection and Vertical Market Structure[J].International Journal of Industrial Organization,1998,16(6):697-718.
[27]Vandenbussche,H.and C.Viegelahn.Input Reallocation within Firms[R].KU LEUVEN Department of Economics,2016.
[28]Yildirim,A.B.Overcoming Resistance to Compliance:Internationalization of Production and the Politics of WTO Dispute Settlement[R].University of Antwerp,2017.
[29]Yildirim,A.B.Domestic Political Implications of Global Value Chains:Explaining EU Responses to Litigation at the World Trade Organization[J].Comparative European Politics,2018,16(4):549-580.
(1)FVA为国外增加值,其中,下标FIN意为含于最终产品中的外国增加值;INT意为含于中间产品中的外国增加值;此外,(FVAFINCXCS+FVAINTCXCS)与其他两项略有差异,意为C国x行业供给国内下游s行业的增加值部分。
[2]王直,魏尚进,祝坤福.总贸易核算法:官方贸易统计与全球价值链的度量[J].中国社会科学,2015,(9):108-127.
[3]余东华,孙婷,张鑫宇.要素价格扭曲如何影响制造业国际竞争力[J].中国工业经济,2018,(2):63-81.
[4]张杰,陈志远,刘元春.中国出口国内附加值的测算与变化机制[J].经济研究,2013,48(10):124-137.
[5]张雨,戴翔.出口产品升级和市场多元化能够缓解中国贸易摩擦吗[J].世界经济研究,2013,(6):73-78.
[6]周念利.中国服务业改革对制造业微观生产效率的影响测度及异质性考察——基于服务中间投入的视角[J].金融研究,2014,(9):84-98.
[7]Blonigen,B.A.Industrial Policy and Downstream Export Performance[J].The Economic Journal,2015,126(595):1635-1659.
[8]Dean,J.M.,K.C.Fung,and Z.Wang.Measuring Vertical Specialization:The Case of China[J].Review of International Economics,2011,(4):609-625.
[9]De Bièvre,D.,A.Yildirim,and A.Poletti.About the Melting of Icebergs:Discovering the Political-Economic Determinants of Dispute Initiation and Resolution in the WTO[R].Assessing the World Trade Organisation:Fit for Purpose,2017.
[10]Erbahar,A.,and Z.Yuan.Cascading Trade Protection:Evidence from the U.S.[J].Journal of International Economics,2017,108(2):274-299.
[11]Feinberg,R.M.,and B.T.Hirsch.Industry Rent Seeking and the Filing of“Unfair Trade”Complaints[J].International Journal of Industrial Organization,1989,7(3):325-340.
[12]Finger,J.M.The Industry-Country Incidence of Less-Than-Fair-Value Cases in U.S.Import Trade[A].Bureau of Economic and Business Research.Export Diversification and the New Protectionism:The Experience of Latin America[C].United States:University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign,1981.
[13]Furusawa,T.,and T.J.Prusa.Antidumping Enforcement in a Reciprocal Model of Dumping:Theory and Evidence[J].Empirical Studies of Commercial Policy,1996,14(2):14-46.
[14]Hansen,W.L.The International Trade Commission and the Politics of Protectionism[J].American Political Science Review,1990,84(1):21-46.
[15]Herander,M.G.and J.B.Schwartz.An Empirical Test of the Impact of the Threat of U.S.Trade Policy:The Case of Antidumping Duties[J].Southern Economic Journal,1984,51(1):59-59.
[16]Hoekman,B.M.,and M.P.Leidy.Cascading Contingent Protection[J].European Economic Review,1992,36(4):883-892.
[17]Kim,S.Y.,and G.Spilker.Global Value Chains and the Political Economy of WTO Disputes[R].The Political Economy of International Organizations Working Paper,2018.
[18]Konings,J.,and H.Vandenbussche.Antidumping Protection Hurts Exporters:Firm-Level Evidence[J].Review of World Economics,2013,149(2):295-320.
[19]]Koopman,R.,W.Powers,and Z.Wang.Give Credit Where Credit Is Due:Tracing Value Added in Global Production Chains[R].NBER Working Paper,2010.
[20]Krupp,C.Antidumping Cases in the US Chemical Industry:A Panel Data Approach[J].The Journal of Industrial Economics,1994,(1):299-311.
[21]Krupp,C.,and S.Skeath.Evidence on the Upstream and Downstream Impacts of Antidumping Cases[J].North American Journal of Economics and Finance,2002,13(2):163-178.
[22]Lichtenberg,F.,and H.Tan.An industry-level Analysis of Import Relief Petitions Filed by U.S.Manufacturers(1958—1985)[A].Hong Tan,and H.Shimada.Troubled Industries In the United States and Japan[C].United States:St Martin’s Press,1994.
[23]Ossa,R.Trade Wars and Trade Talks with Data[J].American Economic Review,2014,104(12):41-46.
[24]Prusa,T.J.The Selection of Antidumping Cases for ITC Determination[J].Empirical Studies of Commercial Policy,1991,14(2):47-74.
[25]Sabry,F.An Analysis of the Decision to File the Dumping Estimates,and the Outcome of Antidumping Petitions[J].The International Trade Journal,2000,14(2):109-145.
[26]Sleuwaegen,L.,R.Belderbos,and C.Jie-A-Joen.Cascading Contingent Protection and Vertical Market Structure[J].International Journal of Industrial Organization,1998,16(6):697-718.
[27]Vandenbussche,H.and C.Viegelahn.Input Reallocation within Firms[R].KU LEUVEN Department of Economics,2016.
[28]Yildirim,A.B.Overcoming Resistance to Compliance:Internationalization of Production and the Politics of WTO Dispute Settlement[R].University of Antwerp,2017.
[29]Yildirim,A.B.Domestic Political Implications of Global Value Chains:Explaining EU Responses to Litigation at the World Trade Organization[J].Comparative European Politics,2018,16(4):549-580.
(1)FVA为国外增加值,其中,下标FIN意为含于最终产品中的外国增加值;INT意为含于中间产品中的外国增加值;此外,(FVAFINCXCS+FVAINTCXCS)与其他两项略有差异,意为C国x行业供给国内下游s行业的增加值部分。