环境规制中利益相关者关系及规制路径分析
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摘要
本文以排污收费制度为建模背景,从环境规制中存在多个利益相关者的关系入手,建立了环境规制利益相关者作用机制的理论框架,在此基础上利用不完全信息动态博弈方法建立序贯模型进行博弈分析,客观揭示了环境规制中地方政府、环境规制部门与企业之间的关系。研究显示:环境规制是一个多元主体交互作用、相互博弈的复杂利益系统,涉及政府、企业、社会公众等多个利益相关者。环境规制中存在的正式制度失灵和非正式制度缺失是多个利益相关者存在的理论依据。环境规制中各利益相关者都应提高环境保护意识。地方政府应高标准制定和执行环境政策法规;环境规制部门要明确环境执法流程,严格环境执法;企业则应秉持生态红线意识,着力环保技术升级改造,杜绝贿赂成本。
引文
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[38]Kreps D M,Wilson R.Sequential Equilibria.[J].Economitrica,1982,(50):863-894.
[2]周生贤.构建生态文明建设和环境保护的四梁八柱[J].西部大开发,2015,(12):156-160.
[3]Oates W E,Portney P R.Chapter 8-The Political E-conomy of Environmental Policy[J].Handbook of Environ-mental Economics,2003,1(2):325-354.
[4]赵玉民,朱方明,贺立龙.环境规制的界定,分类与演进研究[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2009,19(6):85-90.
[5]Tietenberg T.Disclosure Strategies for Pollution Control[J].Environmental&Resource Economics,1998,11(3-4):587-602.
[6]F,Iraldo F,Frey M.The effect of environmental regulation on firms'competitive performance:the case of the building&construction sector in some EU regions[J].Journal of Environmental Management,2011,92(9):2136-44.
[7]Bond A,Pope J,Morrison-Saunders A,et al.Agame theory perspective on environmental assessment:What games are played and what does this tell us about decision making rationality and legitimacy?[J].Environmental Impact Assessment Review,2016,57:187-194.
[8]Nyiwul L.Conceptual framework of market enforcement of environmental regulations:significance and obstacles to the role of markets in policy design[J].Clean Technologies&Environmental Policy,2016,17(8):2173-2183.
[9]Flynn B.Is local truly better?Some reflections on sharing environmental policy between local governments and the EU[J].European Environment,2000,10(10):75-84.
[10]周黎安.中国地方官员的晋升锦标赛模式研究[J].经济研究,2007,(7):36-50.
[11]陶然,陆曦,苏福兵,等.地区竞争格局演变下的中国转轨:财政激励和发展模式反思[J].经济研究,2009,(7):21-33.
[12]Wilson J K,Damania R.Corruption,political competition and environmental policy[J].School of Economics Working Papers,2005,49(3):516-535.
[13]R.Cerqueti R,Coppier R.Corruption,evasion and environmental policy:a game theory approach[J].Ima Journal of Management Mathematics,2016,27(2).
[14]Harford J D.Firm behavior under imperfectly enforceable pollution standards and taxes[J].Journal of Environ-mental Economics and Management,1978,(5):26-43.
[15]Nowell C,Shogren J.Challenging the enforcement of environmental regulation[J].Journal of Regulatory E-conomics,1994,6(3):265-282.
[16]Malik A S.Markets for pollution control when firms are noncompliant[J].Journal of Environmental Economics&Management,2005,18(2):97-106.
[17]张成,陆旸,郭路,等.环境规制强度和生产技术进步[J].经济研究,2011,(2):113-124.
[18]蒋伏心,王竹君,白俊红.环境规制对技术创新影响的双重效应——基于江苏制造业动态面板数据的实证研究[J].中国工业经济,2013,(7):44-55.
[19]Yanase A.Global environment and dynamic games of environmental policy in an international duopoly[J].Journal of Economics,2009,97(2):121-140.
[20]王齐.政府管制与企业排污的博弈分析[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2004,14(3):119-122.
[21]原毅军,耿殿贺.环境政策传导机制与中国环保产业发展——基于政府、排污企业与环保企业的博弈研究[J].中国工业经济,2010,(10):65-74.
[22]张学刚,钟茂初.政府环境监管与企业污染的博弈分析及对策研究[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2011,21(2):31-35.
[23]邓峰.基于不完全执行污染排放管制的企业与政府博弈分析[J].预测,2008,27(1):67-71.
[24]张倩,曲世友.环境规制下政府与企业环境行为的动态博弈与最优策略研究[J].预测,2013,(4):35-40.
[25]李国平,张文彬.地方政府环境规制及其波动机理研究——基于最优契约设计视角[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2014,24(10):24-31.
[26]Duan W,Li C,Zhang P,et al.Game modeling and policy research on the system dynamics-based tripartite evolution for government environmental regulation[J].Cluster Computing,2016,19(4):1-14.
[27]潘峰,西宝,王琳.环境规制中地方政府与中央政府的演化博弈分析[J].运筹与管理,2015,24(3):88-93.
[28]潘峰,王琳,西宝.进化博弈视角下的政府间环境规制执行策略研究[J].软科学,2015,29(12):49-55.
[29]Pigon,A.C.The economics of welfare[M]..Newyork:Macmillan.1920.
[30]Regier,H.A,Marson R.V.,Berks F.Reforming the use of natural resources.in Berks Feds.Common property resources:ecology and community-based sustainable envelopment.London:Belhaven,1989.
[31]王育宝,李国平.环境治理的经济学分析[J].江西财经大学学报,2003,(6):27-31.
[32]蔡宁,吴刚,许庆瑞.论经济环境协调发展及其模式[J].中国环境管理,1995,(3):10-13.
[33]周光召,牛文元.中国可持续发展战略领导干部读本[M].北京:西苑出版社,2003:342-343.
[34]陈硕,高琳.央地关系:财政分权度量及作用机制再评估[J].管理世界,2012,(6):43-59.
[35]A Natural-Resource-Based View of the Firm.Hart S L.The Academy of Management Journal.1995.
[36]In Search of ISO:An Institutional Perspective on the Adoption of International Management Standards.Delmas,M.Stanford Graduate School of Business Working Paper.2003.
[37]陶岚,刘波罗.基于新制度理论的企业环保投入驱动因素分析——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].中国地质大学学报(社会科学版),2013,13(6):46-53.
[38]Kreps D M,Wilson R.Sequential Equilibria.[J].Economitrica,1982,(50):863-894.