收入再分配的理论基础:基于社会效率的原则
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摘要
现代主流经济学认为市场竞争中的初始分配收入是有效率的,而收入再分配则是对有效市场的破坏。但实际上,纯粹市场机制往往会抑制效率:一方面,由于个体的有限理性和有限认知以及自然利益冲突,一些不存在帕累托改进的变和博弈领域很难实现最大化的合作租金;另一方面,由于路径依赖效应以及马太效应,一些具有帕累托改进的情形实际上也无法有效推进。相反,通过引入收入再分配机制,这两种情形中的行为都可以得到更好的协调与合作,从而也更有效率。显然,这就从社会效率的角度为收入再分配提供了理论基础,而收入再分配的一个重要目的也在于,促进利益更为均等的帕累托改进和增进个体间进行合作最大化机会。因此,收入再分配不仅仅属于道德范畴,而且具有经济学研究的科学意义。
Modern mainstream economics considers the initial income distribution under market mechanism is efficient, while the income redistribution will destroy the efficient market. However, the sheer market mechanism often restrains the increase of efficiency. On the one hand, it is difficult to maximize the cooperation rent in the field with variable-sum game but Pareto optimization since individual bounded rationality, limited cognitive and the conflicts of interest. On the other hand, some situation with Pareto optimization is still unable to achieve actually due to path-dependent effects and the Matthew effect. Contrarily, the behavior in both two situations can get coordination and cooperation by adopt a certain mechanism of income redistribution. Obviously, it provides a theoretical foundation for income redistribution based on the perspective of social efficiency. Accordingly, the main purpose of income redistribution is to promote Pareto improvement with more equal interest and the maximum opportunities to cooperate. As a result, income redistribution is not only a moral domain, but also has a great deal of scientific significance.
Modern mainstream economics considers the initial income distribution under market mechanism is efficient, while the income redistribution will destroy the efficient market. However, the sheer market mechanism often restrains the increase of efficiency. On the one hand, it is difficult to maximize the cooperation rent in the field with variable-sum game but Pareto optimization since individual bounded rationality, limited cognitive and the conflicts of interest. On the other hand, some situation with Pareto optimization is still unable to achieve actually due to path-dependent effects and the Matthew effect. Contrarily, the behavior in both two situations can get coordination and cooperation by adopt a certain mechanism of income redistribution. Obviously, it provides a theoretical foundation for income redistribution based on the perspective of social efficiency. Accordingly, the main purpose of income redistribution is to promote Pareto improvement with more equal interest and the maximum opportunities to cooperate. As a result, income redistribution is not only a moral domain, but also has a great deal of scientific significance.
引文
①朱富强:《“为己利他”行为机理的社会基础:变和博弈》,载《改革与战略》,2010(12)。
②TPTPTP Van Damme,E.,“Stable Equilibria and Forward Induc-tion,”Journal of Economic Theory,1989,48:476—496.
③朱富强:《行为经济学的微观逻辑基础:基本假设和分析维度》,载《社会科学战线》,2011(10);《“公地悲剧”如何转化为“公共福祉”:基于现实的行为机理之思考》,载《中山大学学报》,2010(5)。
④[美]泽尔腾:《经济行为中的公平原则》,载《策略理性模型》,黄涛译,北京,首都经济贸易大学出版社,2000年。
⑤Herbert A.Simon,“A Mechanism for Social Selection and Suc-cessful Altruism”,Science,1990,250(12):1665—1668.
⑥Richard D.McKelvey&Thomas R.Palfrey,“An Experimental Studyof the Centipede Game”,Econometrica,1992,60(4):803—836.
①I.Stahl,Bargaining Theory,Stockholm:Economics ResearchInstitute,Stockholm School of Economics,1972.
②A.Rubinstein,“Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model”,Econometrica,1982,50(1):97—109.
③[美]拉斯缪森:《博弈与信息——博弈论概论》,第83页,王晖等译,生活、读书、新知三联书店,2003。
④[美]诺齐克:《无政府、国家和乌托邦》,第193页,姚大志译,北京,中国社会科学出版社,2008。
⑤[英]柯亨:《诺齐克与张伯伦:模式是如何保存自由的》,载《马克思与诺齐克之间:柯亨文选》,第7页,吕增奎编译,南京,凤凰出版传媒集团/江苏人民出版社,2007。
①Hardin,Russell,Difficulties in the Nation of Economic Ration-ality,Social Science Information,1984,23:453—467.
②《美1%最富族群28年内所得成长275%》,http://udn.com/NEWS/WORLD/WOR6/6679092.shtml。
③L.Thurow,Companies merge,families break up.New YorkTimes,1995,September3.
①刘霞:《中国汽车大国背后:外资拿走70%利润》,http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20100927/03408708269.shtml。
②[美]詹姆斯·加尔布雷斯:《掠夺型政府》,第93页,苏琦译,北京,中信出版社,2009。
①[美]威尔金森和皮克特:《不平等的痛苦:收入差距如何导致社会问题》,第52—53页,安鹏译,北京,新华出版社,2010。
②J.Elliott&L.Quinitanco,Britain is Getting More Suspicious,Sunday Times,2003,May18,p.5.
③E.Fehr,G.Kirchsteiger&A.Riedl,“Does Fairness PreventMarket Clearing?An Experimental Investigation”,QuarterlyJournal of Economics,1993,108:437—460;Fehr E.,GachterS.&Kirchsteiger G.,“Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement De-vice:Experimental Evidence”,Econometrica,1997,65:833—860.
④G.Akerlof,“Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange”,Quarter-ly Journal of Economics,1982,97:543—569.
⑤[美]克里斯特曼:《财产的神话:走向平等主义的所有权理论》,第205页,张绍宗译,桂林,广西师范大学出版社,2004。
⑥《通用汽车员工全国罢工》,http://finance.sina.com.cn/g/20070926/06521690830.shtml。
⑦《丰田工会顾全大局取消工资谈判集会》,http://www.zaobao.com/gj/gj100304_005.shtml。
①[美]艾尔斯:《经济进步理论:经济发展和文化变迁的基本原理研究》,第252、253页,徐颖莉等译,北京,商务印书馆,2011。
①[美]鲍什:《民主与再分配》,第6页,熊洁译,上海世纪出版集团/上海人民出版社,2011。
②[美]海尔布罗纳·米尔博格:《经济社会的起源》,第6页,李陈华、许敏兰译,格致出版社、上海人民出版社、上海三联书店,2008。
③J.B.Clark,The Distribution of Wealth.New York:Macmillan,1899:4.
④[美]巴罗:《自由社会中的市场和选择》,第32页,沈志彦译,格致出版社、上海三联书店、上海人民出版社,2010。
⑤《南非“经济奇迹”的背后》,http://star.news.sohu.com/s2010/economicmiracleinsouthafrica/。
⑥H.G.Johnson,Money Trade and Economic Growth—SurveyLectures in Economic Theory,London:George Allen and Urwin,1964:159.
①[美]艾尔斯:《经济进步理论:经济发展和文化变迁的基本原理研究》,第255页。
②TPTPTP Van Damme,E.,“Stable Equilibria and Forward Induc-tion,”Journal of Economic Theory,1989,48:476—496.
③朱富强:《行为经济学的微观逻辑基础:基本假设和分析维度》,载《社会科学战线》,2011(10);《“公地悲剧”如何转化为“公共福祉”:基于现实的行为机理之思考》,载《中山大学学报》,2010(5)。
④[美]泽尔腾:《经济行为中的公平原则》,载《策略理性模型》,黄涛译,北京,首都经济贸易大学出版社,2000年。
⑤Herbert A.Simon,“A Mechanism for Social Selection and Suc-cessful Altruism”,Science,1990,250(12):1665—1668.
⑥Richard D.McKelvey&Thomas R.Palfrey,“An Experimental Studyof the Centipede Game”,Econometrica,1992,60(4):803—836.
①I.Stahl,Bargaining Theory,Stockholm:Economics ResearchInstitute,Stockholm School of Economics,1972.
②A.Rubinstein,“Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model”,Econometrica,1982,50(1):97—109.
③[美]拉斯缪森:《博弈与信息——博弈论概论》,第83页,王晖等译,生活、读书、新知三联书店,2003。
④[美]诺齐克:《无政府、国家和乌托邦》,第193页,姚大志译,北京,中国社会科学出版社,2008。
⑤[英]柯亨:《诺齐克与张伯伦:模式是如何保存自由的》,载《马克思与诺齐克之间:柯亨文选》,第7页,吕增奎编译,南京,凤凰出版传媒集团/江苏人民出版社,2007。
①Hardin,Russell,Difficulties in the Nation of Economic Ration-ality,Social Science Information,1984,23:453—467.
②《美1%最富族群28年内所得成长275%》,http://udn.com/NEWS/WORLD/WOR6/6679092.shtml。
③L.Thurow,Companies merge,families break up.New YorkTimes,1995,September3.
①刘霞:《中国汽车大国背后:外资拿走70%利润》,http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20100927/03408708269.shtml。
②[美]詹姆斯·加尔布雷斯:《掠夺型政府》,第93页,苏琦译,北京,中信出版社,2009。
①[美]威尔金森和皮克特:《不平等的痛苦:收入差距如何导致社会问题》,第52—53页,安鹏译,北京,新华出版社,2010。
②J.Elliott&L.Quinitanco,Britain is Getting More Suspicious,Sunday Times,2003,May18,p.5.
③E.Fehr,G.Kirchsteiger&A.Riedl,“Does Fairness PreventMarket Clearing?An Experimental Investigation”,QuarterlyJournal of Economics,1993,108:437—460;Fehr E.,GachterS.&Kirchsteiger G.,“Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement De-vice:Experimental Evidence”,Econometrica,1997,65:833—860.
④G.Akerlof,“Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange”,Quarter-ly Journal of Economics,1982,97:543—569.
⑤[美]克里斯特曼:《财产的神话:走向平等主义的所有权理论》,第205页,张绍宗译,桂林,广西师范大学出版社,2004。
⑥《通用汽车员工全国罢工》,http://finance.sina.com.cn/g/20070926/06521690830.shtml。
⑦《丰田工会顾全大局取消工资谈判集会》,http://www.zaobao.com/gj/gj100304_005.shtml。
①[美]艾尔斯:《经济进步理论:经济发展和文化变迁的基本原理研究》,第252、253页,徐颖莉等译,北京,商务印书馆,2011。
①[美]鲍什:《民主与再分配》,第6页,熊洁译,上海世纪出版集团/上海人民出版社,2011。
②[美]海尔布罗纳·米尔博格:《经济社会的起源》,第6页,李陈华、许敏兰译,格致出版社、上海人民出版社、上海三联书店,2008。
③J.B.Clark,The Distribution of Wealth.New York:Macmillan,1899:4.
④[美]巴罗:《自由社会中的市场和选择》,第32页,沈志彦译,格致出版社、上海三联书店、上海人民出版社,2010。
⑤《南非“经济奇迹”的背后》,http://star.news.sohu.com/s2010/economicmiracleinsouthafrica/。
⑥H.G.Johnson,Money Trade and Economic Growth—SurveyLectures in Economic Theory,London:George Allen and Urwin,1964:159.
①[美]艾尔斯:《经济进步理论:经济发展和文化变迁的基本原理研究》,第255页。