基于“营改增”视角的地方政府商住用地出让行为研究
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摘要
利用广东省地级市2008—2015年面板数据,采用强度双重差分模型,实证检验了"营改增"对地方政府商住用地出让行为的影响。研究结果表明,"营改增"使财政压力较大的地方政府增加商住用地出让收入,但并不倾向拍卖出让方式,而是倾向挂牌出让方式,且显著提高挂牌出让方式的价格;"营改增"之后,地方政府通过挂牌出让方式不仅可以获得高额商住用地出让金,而且可以引入优势企业对地区发展产生溢出效应。在未来的财税制度改革、土地财政调控与转型过程中,不仅要考虑如何缓解财政压力,而且要考虑完善挂牌出让流程,或者构建透明的土地出让干预机制。
By making use of the panel data of the prefecture-level cities in Guangdong Province from 2008 to 2015, this study employs the strength DID model to conduct an empirical test of the impact of replacing business tax with value-added tax on the local governments' behavior of commercial and residential land transfer. The findings show that replacing business tax with value-added tax can give the local governments that are faced with higher financial pressure more income from commercial and residential land transfer, but the listing-for-sale method is preferred to the auction method,and the prices of the listing-for-sale method are significantly raised. After RBTVAT, local governments can not only obtain greater amounts of commercial and residential land transfer fees, but also introduce the strong enterprises to have a spillover effect on the regional development through the listing-for-sale method. Therefore, in the future process of fiscal and tax system reform, land finance regulation and transformation, the local governments should not only consider how to relieve financial pressure, but also consider improving the process of listing-for-sale, or constructing a transparent intervention mechanism for land transfer.
By making use of the panel data of the prefecture-level cities in Guangdong Province from 2008 to 2015, this study employs the strength DID model to conduct an empirical test of the impact of replacing business tax with value-added tax on the local governments' behavior of commercial and residential land transfer. The findings show that replacing business tax with value-added tax can give the local governments that are faced with higher financial pressure more income from commercial and residential land transfer, but the listing-for-sale method is preferred to the auction method,and the prices of the listing-for-sale method are significantly raised. After RBTVAT, local governments can not only obtain greater amounts of commercial and residential land transfer fees, but also introduce the strong enterprises to have a spillover effect on the regional development through the listing-for-sale method. Therefore, in the future process of fiscal and tax system reform, land finance regulation and transformation, the local governments should not only consider how to relieve financial pressure, but also consider improving the process of listing-for-sale, or constructing a transparent intervention mechanism for land transfer.
引文
[1]高培勇,汪德华.本轮财税体制改革进程评估:2013.11-2016.10(上)[J].财贸经济, 2016,(11):5-17.
[2]周彬,杜两省.营改增对财政收入的影响及财税体制改革应对[J].当代财经, 2016,(6):25-33.
[3]郭贯成,汪勋杰.地方政府土地财政的动机、能力、约束与效应:一个分析框架[J].当代财经, 2013,(11):25-35.
[4]卢洪友,王云霄,祁毓.“营改增”的财政体制影响效应研究[J].经济社会体制比较, 2016,(3):71-83.
[5]高培勇.“营改增”的功能定位与前行脉络[J].税务研究, 2013,(7):3-10.
[6]陈钊,王旸.“营改增”是否促进了分工:来自中国上市公司的证据[J].管理世界, 2016,(3):36-45.
[7]娄成武,王玉波.地方政府土地财政公共治理变革研究[J].当代财经, 2011,(10):37-46.
[8]Han L., Kung J. K.. Fiscal Incentives and Policy Choices of Local Governments:Evidence from China[J]. Journal of Development Economics, 2015, 116:89-104.
[9]李勇刚,高波,任保全.分税制改革、土地财政与公共品供给来自中国35个大中城市的经验证据[J].山西财经大学学报, 2013,(11):13-24.
[10]Wang Y., Hui E. C.. Are Local Governments Maximizing Land Revenue? Evidence from China[J]. China Economic Review, 2017, 43:196-215.
[11]王媛,杨广亮.为经济增长而干预:地方政府的土地出让策略分析[J].管理世界, 2016,(5):18-31.
[12]Cai H., Henderson J., Zhang Q.. China's Land Market Auctions:Evidence of Corruption[J]. The RAND Journal of Economics, 2013, 44(3):488-521.
[13]赵文哲,杨继东.地方政府财政缺口与土地出让方式基于地方政府与国有企业互利行为的解释[J].管理世界,2015,(4):11-24.
[14]Wu Q., Li Y., Yan S.. The Incentives of China's Urban Land Finance[J]. Land Use Policy, 2015, 42:432-442.
[15]王庶,邵桂根,岳希明.营改增后中央地方分成方案及其影响分析[J].税务研究, 2016,(9):40-45.
[16]Pan J., Huang J., Chiang T.. Empirical Study of the Local Government Deficit, Land Finance and Real Estate Markets in China[J]. China Economic Review, 2015, 32(C):57-67.
[17]王健,吴群,彭山桂,李永乐.“营改增”是否影响了地方政府土地财政收入[J].财贸研究, 2017,(12):82-94.
[18]范子英,彭飞.“营改增”的减税效应和分工效应:基于产业互联的视角[J].经济研究, 2017,(2):82-95.
[19]田志伟,胡怡建.“营改增”对财政经济的动态影响:基于CGE模型的分析[J].财经研究, 2014,(2):4-18.
[20]杨继东,杨其静.保增长压力、刺激计划与工业用地出让[J].经济研究, 2016,(1):99-113.
[21]陈思霞,许文立,张领祎.财政压力与地方经济增长来自中国所得税分享改革的政策实验[J].财贸经济, 2017,(4):37-53.
[22]Huang Z., Du X.. Government Intervention and Land Misallocation:Evidence from China[J]. Cities, 2017, 60:323-332.
(1)这与王媛和杨广亮(2016)、 Cai等(2013)学者的观点一致,[11-12]即市场化程度较高的出让方式主要考虑拍卖。
(2)各试点省市陆续出台了《关于实施营业税改征增值税试点期间过渡性扶持政策的通知》。
(1)由于数据来源限制,统计数据为土地出让收入,包括工业用地出让收入。
(1)由于本文选取广东省为样本,其在2012年11月1日开始实施“营改增”,并考虑到政策效应具有一定的时滞,因此,本文将考察年份定在2013年。
(2)数值1.67亿元为样本城市2013年财政赤字规模相对于2012年财政赤字规模增长的平均值。
[2]周彬,杜两省.营改增对财政收入的影响及财税体制改革应对[J].当代财经, 2016,(6):25-33.
[3]郭贯成,汪勋杰.地方政府土地财政的动机、能力、约束与效应:一个分析框架[J].当代财经, 2013,(11):25-35.
[4]卢洪友,王云霄,祁毓.“营改增”的财政体制影响效应研究[J].经济社会体制比较, 2016,(3):71-83.
[5]高培勇.“营改增”的功能定位与前行脉络[J].税务研究, 2013,(7):3-10.
[6]陈钊,王旸.“营改增”是否促进了分工:来自中国上市公司的证据[J].管理世界, 2016,(3):36-45.
[7]娄成武,王玉波.地方政府土地财政公共治理变革研究[J].当代财经, 2011,(10):37-46.
[8]Han L., Kung J. K.. Fiscal Incentives and Policy Choices of Local Governments:Evidence from China[J]. Journal of Development Economics, 2015, 116:89-104.
[9]李勇刚,高波,任保全.分税制改革、土地财政与公共品供给来自中国35个大中城市的经验证据[J].山西财经大学学报, 2013,(11):13-24.
[10]Wang Y., Hui E. C.. Are Local Governments Maximizing Land Revenue? Evidence from China[J]. China Economic Review, 2017, 43:196-215.
[11]王媛,杨广亮.为经济增长而干预:地方政府的土地出让策略分析[J].管理世界, 2016,(5):18-31.
[12]Cai H., Henderson J., Zhang Q.. China's Land Market Auctions:Evidence of Corruption[J]. The RAND Journal of Economics, 2013, 44(3):488-521.
[13]赵文哲,杨继东.地方政府财政缺口与土地出让方式基于地方政府与国有企业互利行为的解释[J].管理世界,2015,(4):11-24.
[14]Wu Q., Li Y., Yan S.. The Incentives of China's Urban Land Finance[J]. Land Use Policy, 2015, 42:432-442.
[15]王庶,邵桂根,岳希明.营改增后中央地方分成方案及其影响分析[J].税务研究, 2016,(9):40-45.
[16]Pan J., Huang J., Chiang T.. Empirical Study of the Local Government Deficit, Land Finance and Real Estate Markets in China[J]. China Economic Review, 2015, 32(C):57-67.
[17]王健,吴群,彭山桂,李永乐.“营改增”是否影响了地方政府土地财政收入[J].财贸研究, 2017,(12):82-94.
[18]范子英,彭飞.“营改增”的减税效应和分工效应:基于产业互联的视角[J].经济研究, 2017,(2):82-95.
[19]田志伟,胡怡建.“营改增”对财政经济的动态影响:基于CGE模型的分析[J].财经研究, 2014,(2):4-18.
[20]杨继东,杨其静.保增长压力、刺激计划与工业用地出让[J].经济研究, 2016,(1):99-113.
[21]陈思霞,许文立,张领祎.财政压力与地方经济增长来自中国所得税分享改革的政策实验[J].财贸经济, 2017,(4):37-53.
[22]Huang Z., Du X.. Government Intervention and Land Misallocation:Evidence from China[J]. Cities, 2017, 60:323-332.
(1)这与王媛和杨广亮(2016)、 Cai等(2013)学者的观点一致,[11-12]即市场化程度较高的出让方式主要考虑拍卖。
(2)各试点省市陆续出台了《关于实施营业税改征增值税试点期间过渡性扶持政策的通知》。
(1)由于数据来源限制,统计数据为土地出让收入,包括工业用地出让收入。
(1)由于本文选取广东省为样本,其在2012年11月1日开始实施“营改增”,并考虑到政策效应具有一定的时滞,因此,本文将考察年份定在2013年。
(2)数值1.67亿元为样本城市2013年财政赤字规模相对于2012年财政赤字规模增长的平均值。