气代煤政策中气荒现象的成因解析:政府和市场相继失灵的视角
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摘要
良好的政策意愿不必然产生预期的政策效果,政策制定和执行的细节很大程度决定了政策的成败。针对具体的政策案例,解析政策失灵的成因兼具学术和实践价值。本文以2017年采暖季发生的气荒为例,从包括政府失灵和市场失灵相继失灵的视角,选取山西省的两个城市作为案例,剖析其成因。研究发现气荒中政府失灵的主要原因包括政策设计时未充分考虑资源供应情况,以及在政策执行时发生的多层级部门间的层层加码。这导致天然气需求增加过快,超过供给的增长,造成供需失衡。这种失衡在一个厚度缺乏、交易拥堵与安全性低的市场中得不到有效缓解,引发了气荒。
Well-intended public policy may not produce desired results. The details of policy design and implementation may determine the success or failure of public policies. Demystifying why specific policies fail or produce undesired ancillary consequences can provide valuable information for policy design and implementation. In this paper,the shortage of natural gas in the heating season of 2017 while implementing the "replacing coal with natural gas" policy was taken as an example,to illustrate how well-intended policy could fail. We developed a framework of cascading failures of both government failure and market failure to explain what happened in the outbreak of natural gas shortage,and chose two cities in Shanxi Province as cases to perform the analysis. We found that the policy was made without fully considering the availability of natural gas in the heating season and updating ancillary regulation,and was implemented with an amplification of the tasks through top-down administrative levels. Government failure significantly increased the demand of natural gas,which surpassed the increase of supply. However,the imbalance was not able to be alleviated in a failed market, which had low market thickness,congestion in both prices and constructions,and inadequate security,and eventually led to a shortage of natural gas. China is transitioning in a greener direction. Waves of environmental policies are being made. The result of this paper can provide insights for future policy making and implementation.
Well-intended public policy may not produce desired results. The details of policy design and implementation may determine the success or failure of public policies. Demystifying why specific policies fail or produce undesired ancillary consequences can provide valuable information for policy design and implementation. In this paper,the shortage of natural gas in the heating season of 2017 while implementing the "replacing coal with natural gas" policy was taken as an example,to illustrate how well-intended policy could fail. We developed a framework of cascading failures of both government failure and market failure to explain what happened in the outbreak of natural gas shortage,and chose two cities in Shanxi Province as cases to perform the analysis. We found that the policy was made without fully considering the availability of natural gas in the heating season and updating ancillary regulation,and was implemented with an amplification of the tasks through top-down administrative levels. Government failure significantly increased the demand of natural gas,which surpassed the increase of supply. However,the imbalance was not able to be alleviated in a failed market, which had low market thickness,congestion in both prices and constructions,and inadequate security,and eventually led to a shortage of natural gas. China is transitioning in a greener direction. Waves of environmental policies are being made. The result of this paper can provide insights for future policy making and implementation.
引文
[1]Liu,J.,Mauzerall,D.L.,Chen,Q.,Zhang,Q.,Song,Y.,Peng,W.,Klimont,Z.,Qiu,X.,Zhang,S.,Hu,M.,Lin,W.,Smith,K.R.,Zhu,T..Air Pollutant Emissions from Chinese Households:A Major and Underappreciated Ambient Pollution Source.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences,2016(28).
[2]张数球,李晓波.“气荒”成因与对策[J].天然气技术,2010(6).
[3]Paltsev,S.,Zhang,D..Natural Gas Pricing Reform in China:Getting Closer to a Market System?Energy Policy,2015(86).
[4]肖嵩.从气荒现象看天然气的市场发展与供气调峰[J].城市燃气,2010(10).
[5]郑丹.“气荒”之后看“气荒”[J].中国石油石化,2018(5-6).
[6]刘毅军.产业链视角下的“气荒”解读[J].天然气工业,2010(1).
[7]董秀成,李佳蔓.我国天然气“气荒”成因及对策研究[J].价格理论与实践,2018(2).
[8]刘满平.当前“气荒”产生的原因、影响及政策建议[J].城市燃气,2018(2).
[9]冯雁,沈晓悦,贾蕾,侯东林.从天然气供需关系看我国“气荒”原因[J].环境与可持续发展,2018(6).
[10]徐博,仝晓波.“气荒”的定义亟需科学准确界定[N].中国能源报,2018-10-22.
[11]刘满平.当前“气荒”产生的原因、影响及政策建议[J].城市燃气,2018(2).
[12]周淑慧.对当前我国天然气供应紧张问题的思考[J].国际石油经济,2018(2).
[13]谈飞.复杂网络上交通拥塞与级联失效的若干研究[D].浙江大学,2014.
[14]Buldyrev,S.V.,Parshani,R.,Paul,G.,Stanley,H.E.,Havlin,S.Catastrophic Cascade of Failures in Interdependent Networks.Nature,2010(7291).
[15]Li,D.,Jiang,Y.,Kang,R.,Havlin,S..Spatial Correlation Analysis of Cascading Failures:Congestions and Blackouts.Scientific Reports,2014(4).
[16]Pahwa,S.,Scoglio,C.,Scala,A..Abruptness of Cascade Failures in Power Grids.Scientific Reports,2014(1).
[17]Wang,A.,Luo,Y.,Tu,G.,Liu,P..Vulnerability Assessment Scheme for Power System Transmission Networks Based on the Fault Chain Theory.IEEETransactions on Power Systems,2011(1).
[18]孙可,韩祯祥,曹一家.复杂电网连锁故障模型评述[J].电网技术,2005(13).
[19]包铭磊,包铭磊,杨阳,丁一,邵常政,桑茂盛.考虑天然气系统影响的电力系统连锁故障评估[J].电网技术,2019(1).
[20]薛禹胜,谢云云,文福拴,董朝阳.关于电力系统相继故障研究的评述[J].电力系统自动化,2013(19).
[21]Light,P.C..A Cascade of Failures:Why Government Fails,and How to Stop it.Center for Effective Public Management at Brookings,2014.
[22]Weimer,D.L.,Vining,A.R..Policy analysis:Concepts and Practice.New York:Routledge,2017.
[23]McMillan,J..Reinventing the Bazaar:A Natural History of Markets.New York:WW Norton&Company,2003.
[24]Roth,A.E..What have We Learned from Market Design?Economic Journal,2008(527).
[25]Glaeser,E.L..A Review Essay on Alvin Roth’s Who Gets What-and Why.Journal of Economic Literature,2017(4).
[26]Gans,J.S.,Stern S..Is There A Market for Ideas?Social Science Electronic Publishing,2010(3).
[27]Xu,Y..China’s Functioning Market for Sulfur Dioxide Scrubbing Technologies.Environmental Science&Technology,2011(21).
[28]中华人民共和国建设部.城镇燃气设计规范(GB50028-2006)[S],2006.
[29]周慧之.抑制LNG疯涨,合同执行应优先于告诫[J].南方能源观察,2018(1).
[30][34]珀川.管道气竞价:需要冷静,谨防操纵[J].南方能源观察,2017(10).
[31]黄燕华.气荒到底有多荒?不能只相信耳朵[J].南方能源观察,2017(11).
[32]林伯强.加快天然气价格改革步伐[J].价格与市场,2010(1).
[33]王富平,冯琦,崔陈冬,胡奥林.中国天然气差别价格体系研究[J].天然气工业,2017(12).
[35]Roth,A.E..The Art of Designing Markets.Harvard Business Review,2007(10).
[36]周慧之.管道气竞价:改革方向比操作瑕疵更重要[J].南方能源观察,2017(10).
[37]张抗.“气荒”中的冷思考[J].国际石油经济,2010(1).
(1)“2+26”城市即《京津冀及周边地区2017年大气污染防治工作方案》中列出的我国北方地区冬季清洁取暖规划首批实施城市。
(2)实际完成的改造户数并不等同于最终的通气户数:报装数>安装数(改造数)>通气数>常用数。北京市、天津市和山西省的实际完成数目统计的是煤改清洁能源的完成数;山东省的数据是7个“2+26”城市的完成户数,不是全省的完成户数。
(3)山西省的市级指标合计略小于省级指标,主要源于临汾一市的数值的前后变化上。此处我们能找到的临汾市级指标是2017/04/28颁布的《临汾市大气污染防治2017年行动计划》里规定的10万户,但该指标在省级指标出台前制定(2017/09/30颁布的《山西省2017-2018年秋冬季大气污染综合治理攻坚行动方案》中规定完成19.08万户),并不满足层层加码的时间顺序。如果抛去临汾这个城市,山西省其他市级指标合计仍然大于各市的省级指标合计。
(1)在2017年气荒爆发前,我国居民用气与非居民用气的售价不同,后者稍高。而受气荒事件影响,不少地区对居民气价与非居民气价做出临时调整,总体思路是对居民气价继续管控,非居民气价有条件放开。
(1)此处的需求指民用天然气的需求。
[2]张数球,李晓波.“气荒”成因与对策[J].天然气技术,2010(6).
[3]Paltsev,S.,Zhang,D..Natural Gas Pricing Reform in China:Getting Closer to a Market System?Energy Policy,2015(86).
[4]肖嵩.从气荒现象看天然气的市场发展与供气调峰[J].城市燃气,2010(10).
[5]郑丹.“气荒”之后看“气荒”[J].中国石油石化,2018(5-6).
[6]刘毅军.产业链视角下的“气荒”解读[J].天然气工业,2010(1).
[7]董秀成,李佳蔓.我国天然气“气荒”成因及对策研究[J].价格理论与实践,2018(2).
[8]刘满平.当前“气荒”产生的原因、影响及政策建议[J].城市燃气,2018(2).
[9]冯雁,沈晓悦,贾蕾,侯东林.从天然气供需关系看我国“气荒”原因[J].环境与可持续发展,2018(6).
[10]徐博,仝晓波.“气荒”的定义亟需科学准确界定[N].中国能源报,2018-10-22.
[11]刘满平.当前“气荒”产生的原因、影响及政策建议[J].城市燃气,2018(2).
[12]周淑慧.对当前我国天然气供应紧张问题的思考[J].国际石油经济,2018(2).
[13]谈飞.复杂网络上交通拥塞与级联失效的若干研究[D].浙江大学,2014.
[14]Buldyrev,S.V.,Parshani,R.,Paul,G.,Stanley,H.E.,Havlin,S.Catastrophic Cascade of Failures in Interdependent Networks.Nature,2010(7291).
[15]Li,D.,Jiang,Y.,Kang,R.,Havlin,S..Spatial Correlation Analysis of Cascading Failures:Congestions and Blackouts.Scientific Reports,2014(4).
[16]Pahwa,S.,Scoglio,C.,Scala,A..Abruptness of Cascade Failures in Power Grids.Scientific Reports,2014(1).
[17]Wang,A.,Luo,Y.,Tu,G.,Liu,P..Vulnerability Assessment Scheme for Power System Transmission Networks Based on the Fault Chain Theory.IEEETransactions on Power Systems,2011(1).
[18]孙可,韩祯祥,曹一家.复杂电网连锁故障模型评述[J].电网技术,2005(13).
[19]包铭磊,包铭磊,杨阳,丁一,邵常政,桑茂盛.考虑天然气系统影响的电力系统连锁故障评估[J].电网技术,2019(1).
[20]薛禹胜,谢云云,文福拴,董朝阳.关于电力系统相继故障研究的评述[J].电力系统自动化,2013(19).
[21]Light,P.C..A Cascade of Failures:Why Government Fails,and How to Stop it.Center for Effective Public Management at Brookings,2014.
[22]Weimer,D.L.,Vining,A.R..Policy analysis:Concepts and Practice.New York:Routledge,2017.
[23]McMillan,J..Reinventing the Bazaar:A Natural History of Markets.New York:WW Norton&Company,2003.
[24]Roth,A.E..What have We Learned from Market Design?Economic Journal,2008(527).
[25]Glaeser,E.L..A Review Essay on Alvin Roth’s Who Gets What-and Why.Journal of Economic Literature,2017(4).
[26]Gans,J.S.,Stern S..Is There A Market for Ideas?Social Science Electronic Publishing,2010(3).
[27]Xu,Y..China’s Functioning Market for Sulfur Dioxide Scrubbing Technologies.Environmental Science&Technology,2011(21).
[28]中华人民共和国建设部.城镇燃气设计规范(GB50028-2006)[S],2006.
[29]周慧之.抑制LNG疯涨,合同执行应优先于告诫[J].南方能源观察,2018(1).
[30][34]珀川.管道气竞价:需要冷静,谨防操纵[J].南方能源观察,2017(10).
[31]黄燕华.气荒到底有多荒?不能只相信耳朵[J].南方能源观察,2017(11).
[32]林伯强.加快天然气价格改革步伐[J].价格与市场,2010(1).
[33]王富平,冯琦,崔陈冬,胡奥林.中国天然气差别价格体系研究[J].天然气工业,2017(12).
[35]Roth,A.E..The Art of Designing Markets.Harvard Business Review,2007(10).
[36]周慧之.管道气竞价:改革方向比操作瑕疵更重要[J].南方能源观察,2017(10).
[37]张抗.“气荒”中的冷思考[J].国际石油经济,2010(1).
(1)“2+26”城市即《京津冀及周边地区2017年大气污染防治工作方案》中列出的我国北方地区冬季清洁取暖规划首批实施城市。
(2)实际完成的改造户数并不等同于最终的通气户数:报装数>安装数(改造数)>通气数>常用数。北京市、天津市和山西省的实际完成数目统计的是煤改清洁能源的完成数;山东省的数据是7个“2+26”城市的完成户数,不是全省的完成户数。
(3)山西省的市级指标合计略小于省级指标,主要源于临汾一市的数值的前后变化上。此处我们能找到的临汾市级指标是2017/04/28颁布的《临汾市大气污染防治2017年行动计划》里规定的10万户,但该指标在省级指标出台前制定(2017/09/30颁布的《山西省2017-2018年秋冬季大气污染综合治理攻坚行动方案》中规定完成19.08万户),并不满足层层加码的时间顺序。如果抛去临汾这个城市,山西省其他市级指标合计仍然大于各市的省级指标合计。
(1)在2017年气荒爆发前,我国居民用气与非居民用气的售价不同,后者稍高。而受气荒事件影响,不少地区对居民气价与非居民气价做出临时调整,总体思路是对居民气价继续管控,非居民气价有条件放开。
(1)此处的需求指民用天然气的需求。