涉农金融机构“使命漂移”与偿还率激励的局限:基于委托—代理框架
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摘要
关于小额信贷"使命漂移"的研究通常都几乎排他性地设定为借贷者之间的问题。基于此,大量实践试图利用团体贷款模式缓解借贷者之间的信息问题,破解穷人贷款难题。然而,团体贷款没有解决根据财富筛选借款人的问题。我们的调研发现,目前基于偿还率的信贷员激励措施是小额信贷客户选择偏离的重要原因。因此,本文将研究焦点转换为如何诱导信贷员选择贫困的客户,在委托—代理模型基础上,探讨如何设计涉农金融机构信贷员的工资结构实现信贷员激励机制与涉农金融机构社会目标相融。
引文
[1]Armendariz de Aghion,B.,and Gollier C.,Peer Group Formation in an Adverse Selection Model[J]. The Economic Journal,2000(465).
[2]Ghatak,M.,Group Lending,Local Information and Peer Seletion[J]. Journal of Development Economics,1999(1).
[3]Ghatak,M.,Screening by the Comply You Keep:Joint Liability,lending and the Peer Selection Effect[J]. The Economic Journal,2000(465).
[4]Laffont,J. J.,Collision and Group Lending with Adverse Selection[J]. Journal of Development Economics,2003(2).
[5]Wright,G.,and Dondo,A.,“Are you Poor Enough?”:Client Selection in Microfinance Institutions[R]. Microsave-Africa,Briefing Note 7,2001.
[6]Amin S,Rai A S,Topa G. Does Microcredit Reach the Poor and Vulnerable? Evidence from Northern Bangladesh[J]. Journal of Development Economics,2003(1).
[7]Matin I,Hulme D. Program for the Poorest:Learning from the IGVGD Program in Bangladesh[J]World Development,2003(3).
[8]Mosley P. Microfinance and Poverty in Bolivia[J],Journal of Development Studies,2001(4).
[9]Amendariz de Aghion,B.,and Morduch,J.,The Economics of Microfimance[M]. MIT Press,Cambridge,MA,2005.
[10]Mc Kim,A.,and Hugart,M.,Satff Incentive Schemes in Practice:Findings from a Global Survey of Microfinance Institutions[DB/OL]. Microfinance Network. http://www. mfnetwork. org/working-groups/staff-incentives. html,2005.
[11]Conning,J.,Outreach,Sustainability and Leverage in Monitored and Peer-Monitored Lending[J]. Jorunal of Development Economics,1999(1).
[12]Bond,P.,and Rai,A.,Collateral Substitutes in Microfinance. mimeo,CID[M]. Harvard University,2002.
[13]Jeon. D-S.,and Menicucci. D.,Hierarchy in Mcirofinance:Embezzlement and the Optimality of Girid Repayment Schedules and Joint Liability[C]. University Pompeu Fabra Working,2005.
[14]刘西川.黄祖辉.程恩江.小额信贷的目标上移:现象描述与理论解释——基于三省区农户调查[J].中国农村经济,2007(8).
[15]张世春.小额信贷目标偏离解构:粤赣两省证据[J].改革,2010(9).
[16]何剑伟.小额信贷商业化中的目标偏移:一个理论模型及西部小额贷款公司的经验研究[J].当代经济科学,2012(7).
[17]周天芸.农村小额信贷的“使命漂移”与中国验证[J].安徽师范大学学报(人文社会科学版),2012(7).
[18]张康松,王梦婷,米运生.金融公共服务与农村信贷市场“使命漂移”的政策纠偏——基于门槛效应的理论与证据[J].南方经济,2017(4).
[19]程恩江,刘西川.小额信贷缓解农户正规信贷配给了吗?——来自三个非政府小额信贷项目区的经验证据[J].金融研究,2010(12).
[20]张颖慧,聂强.小额信贷经理人愿意扶贫吗——基于西北地区贫困县152位信贷经理人的经验分析[J].西北农林科技大学学报(社会科学版),2016(11).
[21]Cecile Aubert,Alain be Janvry and Elisabeth Sadoulet,Designing Credit Agent Incentives to Prevent Mission Drift in Pro-poor Microfinance Institutions[J]. Journal of Development Economics,2008(5).
[22]Mckim A.,and Hugart,M.,Staff Incentives Schemes in Practice:Findings From a Global Survey of Microfinance Institution.Microfinance Network[DB/OL]. http://www. mfnetwork. org/working_groups/statt_incentives. html,2005.
(1)1-(1-α)y_p~s代表同时选择贫穷和富裕借款人的偿还变量,(1-y_s~p)代表只选择富裕借款人的偿还变量,?w/?ρ> 0,PC与IC条件不能同时成立。
[2]Ghatak,M.,Group Lending,Local Information and Peer Seletion[J]. Journal of Development Economics,1999(1).
[3]Ghatak,M.,Screening by the Comply You Keep:Joint Liability,lending and the Peer Selection Effect[J]. The Economic Journal,2000(465).
[4]Laffont,J. J.,Collision and Group Lending with Adverse Selection[J]. Journal of Development Economics,2003(2).
[5]Wright,G.,and Dondo,A.,“Are you Poor Enough?”:Client Selection in Microfinance Institutions[R]. Microsave-Africa,Briefing Note 7,2001.
[6]Amin S,Rai A S,Topa G. Does Microcredit Reach the Poor and Vulnerable? Evidence from Northern Bangladesh[J]. Journal of Development Economics,2003(1).
[7]Matin I,Hulme D. Program for the Poorest:Learning from the IGVGD Program in Bangladesh[J]World Development,2003(3).
[8]Mosley P. Microfinance and Poverty in Bolivia[J],Journal of Development Studies,2001(4).
[9]Amendariz de Aghion,B.,and Morduch,J.,The Economics of Microfimance[M]. MIT Press,Cambridge,MA,2005.
[10]Mc Kim,A.,and Hugart,M.,Satff Incentive Schemes in Practice:Findings from a Global Survey of Microfinance Institutions[DB/OL]. Microfinance Network. http://www. mfnetwork. org/working-groups/staff-incentives. html,2005.
[11]Conning,J.,Outreach,Sustainability and Leverage in Monitored and Peer-Monitored Lending[J]. Jorunal of Development Economics,1999(1).
[12]Bond,P.,and Rai,A.,Collateral Substitutes in Microfinance. mimeo,CID[M]. Harvard University,2002.
[13]Jeon. D-S.,and Menicucci. D.,Hierarchy in Mcirofinance:Embezzlement and the Optimality of Girid Repayment Schedules and Joint Liability[C]. University Pompeu Fabra Working,2005.
[14]刘西川.黄祖辉.程恩江.小额信贷的目标上移:现象描述与理论解释——基于三省区农户调查[J].中国农村经济,2007(8).
[15]张世春.小额信贷目标偏离解构:粤赣两省证据[J].改革,2010(9).
[16]何剑伟.小额信贷商业化中的目标偏移:一个理论模型及西部小额贷款公司的经验研究[J].当代经济科学,2012(7).
[17]周天芸.农村小额信贷的“使命漂移”与中国验证[J].安徽师范大学学报(人文社会科学版),2012(7).
[18]张康松,王梦婷,米运生.金融公共服务与农村信贷市场“使命漂移”的政策纠偏——基于门槛效应的理论与证据[J].南方经济,2017(4).
[19]程恩江,刘西川.小额信贷缓解农户正规信贷配给了吗?——来自三个非政府小额信贷项目区的经验证据[J].金融研究,2010(12).
[20]张颖慧,聂强.小额信贷经理人愿意扶贫吗——基于西北地区贫困县152位信贷经理人的经验分析[J].西北农林科技大学学报(社会科学版),2016(11).
[21]Cecile Aubert,Alain be Janvry and Elisabeth Sadoulet,Designing Credit Agent Incentives to Prevent Mission Drift in Pro-poor Microfinance Institutions[J]. Journal of Development Economics,2008(5).
[22]Mckim A.,and Hugart,M.,Staff Incentives Schemes in Practice:Findings From a Global Survey of Microfinance Institution.Microfinance Network[DB/OL]. http://www. mfnetwork. org/working_groups/statt_incentives. html,2005.
(1)1-(1-α)y_p~s代表同时选择贫穷和富裕借款人的偿还变量,(1-y_s~p)代表只选择富裕借款人的偿还变量,?w/?ρ> 0,PC与IC条件不能同时成立。