我国农业经营制度供求错位探析:基于乡村振兴视角
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摘要
乡村振兴需要解决农业经营制度供求错位问题,我国农业经营制度供求错位问题表现在小农经营困难、空壳合作社广泛存在、农业企业等新型农业经营主体和地方政府官员合谋套取财政补贴等。农业经营制度供求错位导致了大量资源浪费、农产品的低层次过剩、风险的错配和农业现代化受阻。农业经营制度供求错位主要是制度供给过程中农民需求受忽视、政府部门创租行为、决策模式不科学所致,解决制度供求错位问题,应满足农业经营主体合理诉求,理顺政府与市场关系,让市场机制更好发挥基础性作用,进一步改善公共决策。
Rural revitalization needs to solve the mismatch between supply and demand in China's agricultural operation system,which is manifested in the operation difficulties of small-scale farmers,extensive existence of shell cooperatives,collusion between new agricultural operation subjects,such as agricultural enterprises,and local government officials for financial subsidies.It leads to the waste of a large number of resources,low-level surplus of agricultural products,mismatch of risks and hindrance of agricultural modernization.The mismatch is mainly caused by the neglect of farmers' demand in the process of system supply,unreasonableness of government departments in creating rents and making decisions.To solve the problem,it is necessary to satisfy the reasonable demands of agricultural operation subjects,straighten out the relationship between government and market,let market mechanism better play a fundamental role,and further improve public decision-making.
Rural revitalization needs to solve the mismatch between supply and demand in China's agricultural operation system,which is manifested in the operation difficulties of small-scale farmers,extensive existence of shell cooperatives,collusion between new agricultural operation subjects,such as agricultural enterprises,and local government officials for financial subsidies.It leads to the waste of a large number of resources,low-level surplus of agricultural products,mismatch of risks and hindrance of agricultural modernization.The mismatch is mainly caused by the neglect of farmers' demand in the process of system supply,unreasonableness of government departments in creating rents and making decisions.To solve the problem,it is necessary to satisfy the reasonable demands of agricultural operation subjects,straighten out the relationship between government and market,let market mechanism better play a fundamental role,and further improve public decision-making.
引文
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[2]吕之望,李雄斌.关于制度供给过剩的一个框架[J].西北大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2004(2):128-131.
[3]鲍芳修,刘海燕.政府管制过程中的制度供给过剩[J].湖北社会科学,2010(9):25-26,130.
[4]中华人民共和国国家统计局.中华人民共和国2017年国民经济和社会发展统计公报[EB/OL].http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/zxfb/201802/t20180228_1585631.html.
[5]常伟.农产品价格异常波动的机理分析与对策探讨[J].价格理论与实践,2011(3):23-24.
[6]邵平,荣兆梓.家庭农场财政补贴政策的效用研究:以上海松江模式为例[J].上海经济研究,2015(9):112-119.
[7]张朝华,黄扬.家庭农场发展中若干关键问题的调查研究[J].经济纵横,2017(7):81-87.
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[9]常伟,李梦.农地大规模流转中的风险及其防范化解[J].湖南社会科学,2015(5):83-87.
[10]张晓山,刘长全.粮食收储制度改革与去库存[J].农村经济,2017(7):1-6.
[11]常伟.农业现代化中农地托管研究:以安徽省为例[J].经济纵横,2017(3):69-73.
[12]常伟,王丽霞.农业生产托管中的风险配置研究:基于反向租佃视角[J].农村经济,2018(9):87-92.