风险投资、IPO超募与企业价值
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摘要
本文以2014年底前在我国创业板上市的419家公司为研究对象,探究了风险投资对企业IPO超募融资及超募资金使用效率的影响。研究发现:(1)风险投资介入能够降低企业的超募融资率,且风险投资持股比例越大,其对企业超募融资率的抑制作用越强;(2)风险投资支持提高了企业超募资金的使用效率,具体表现为企业超募资金投资概率的增大和投资效率的提高,使企业超募资金投资能够对企业未来经营业绩和市场回报产生较大的提升效应;(3)进一步对风险投资影响超募资金投资效率的机理进行分析后发现,风险投资机构可以通过提高超募资金的资本投资率和发挥其监督职能两条途径实现对企业超募资金投资效率的积极影响。
Using the 419 companies listed on China's GEM and IPO over-financing before the end of 2014 as the research sample,this paper explores the impact of venture capital on corporate IPO over-financing and the use efficiency of over-financing funds. The study finds that:( 1) The venture capital can effectively reduce the over-financing rate of the enterprise,and the more in the proportion of venture capital holdings,the stronger its inhibition on the over-financing rate of the enterprise;( 2) Venture capital improves the over-financing funds use efficiency by increasing its investment probability and its investment efficiency,so that corporate over-financing investment can have a greater positive effect on business performance and market returns;( 3) Further analysis of the mechanism of venture capital affecting the efficiency of over-financing funds investment finds that venture capital institutions have achieved positive effects on the efficiency of corporate over-financing funds investment by increasing the capital investment rate of over-financing funds and exerting their supervisory functions.
Using the 419 companies listed on China's GEM and IPO over-financing before the end of 2014 as the research sample,this paper explores the impact of venture capital on corporate IPO over-financing and the use efficiency of over-financing funds. The study finds that:( 1) The venture capital can effectively reduce the over-financing rate of the enterprise,and the more in the proportion of venture capital holdings,the stronger its inhibition on the over-financing rate of the enterprise;( 2) Venture capital improves the over-financing funds use efficiency by increasing its investment probability and its investment efficiency,so that corporate over-financing investment can have a greater positive effect on business performance and market returns;( 3) Further analysis of the mechanism of venture capital affecting the efficiency of over-financing funds investment finds that venture capital institutions have achieved positive effects on the efficiency of corporate over-financing funds investment by increasing the capital investment rate of over-financing funds and exerting their supervisory functions.
引文
[1]方军雄,方芳.新股发行制度市场化改革与融资超募现象[J].证券市场导报,2010,(12):39-45.
[2] Smith D A,Lohrke F T. Entrepreneurial network devel-opment:trusting in the process[J]. Journal of BusinessResearch,2008,61(4):315-322.
[3]许昊,万迪昉,徐晋.风险投资改善了新创企业IPO绩效吗[J].科研管理,2016,37(1):101-109.
[4]曾庆生,陈信元,洪亮.风险投资入股、首次过会概率与IPO耗时———来自我国中小板和创业板的经验证据[J].管理科学学报,2016,19(9):18-33.
[5]吴超鹏,吴世农,程静雅,等.风险投资对上市公司投融资行为影响的实证研究[J].经济研究,2012,(1):105-119.
[6] Guo D,Jiang K. Venture capital investment and theperformance of entrepreneurial firms:evidence fromChina[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,2013,22(3):375-395.
[7] Kortum S,Lerner J. Assessing the contribution of venturecapital to innovation[J]. Rand Journal of Economics,2000,31(4):674-692.
[8]付雷鸣,万迪昉,张雅慧. VC是更积极的投资者吗?———来自创业板上市公司创新投入的证据[J].金融研究,2012,(10):125-138.
[9]蔡地,陈振龙,刘雪萍.风险投资对创业企业研发活动的影响研究[J].研究与发展管理,2015,27(5):1-11.
[10]李曜,宋贺.风险投资支持的上市公司并购绩效及其影响机制研究[J].会计研究,2017,(6):60-66.
[11]董静,汪立,吴友.风险投资介入与创业企业国际化———基于我国高科技上市公司的实证研究[J].财经研究,2017,(4):120-132.
[12] Megginson W L,Weiss K A. Venture capitalist certifi-cation in initial public offerings[J]. Journal of Finance,1991,46(3):879-903.
[13] Gompers P A. Grandstanding in the venture capitalindustry[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1996,42(1):133-156.
[14] Kaplan S N,Stromberg P. Financial contracting theorymeets the real world:an empirical analysis of venturecapital contracts[J]. Social Science ElectronicPublishing,2003,70(2):281-315.
[15] Ball R,Shivakumar L. Earnings quality at initial publicofferings[J]. Journal of Accounting&Economics,2008,45(2-3):324-349.
[16] Nahata R. Venture capital conflicts of interest:evidencefrom acquisitions of venture-backed firms[J]. Journal ofFinancial&Quantitative Analysis, 2011, 46(2):395-430.
[17]王欣荣.金融中介机构声誉对IPO融资超募有抑制作用吗[J].经济问题,2014,(3):54-60.
[18]夏芸,徐欣.公司内部治理与IPO超募资金的使用———来自中国证券市场的研究[J].证券市场导报,2012,(10):28-34.
[19]黄志忠,张程睿. IPO超募、过度投资与公司价值[J].证券市场导报,2013,(8):18-22.
[20]邢斌,徐龙炳.超募、投资机会与公司价值[J].财经研究,2015,41(9):65-78.
[21] Jensen M C. Agency costs of free cash flow,corporatefinance,and takeovers[J]. American Economic Review,1986,76(2):323-329.
[22] Richardson S. Over-investment of free cash flow[J].Review of Accounting Studies,2006,11(2-3):159-189.
[23]陈见丽.承销商声誉、融资超募与超募资金使用效率———基于我国创业板上市公司的经验证据[J].经济社会体制比较,2012,(3):47-57.
[24]蔡宁.风险投资“逐名”动机与上市公司盈余管理[J].会计研究,2015,(5):20-27.
[25]黄福广,彭涛,田利辉.风险资本对创业企业投资行为的影响[J].金融研究,2013,(8):180-192.
[26] Heckman J J. Sample selection bias as a specificationerror[J]. Applied Econometrics,1979,47(1):153-161.
[2] Smith D A,Lohrke F T. Entrepreneurial network devel-opment:trusting in the process[J]. Journal of BusinessResearch,2008,61(4):315-322.
[3]许昊,万迪昉,徐晋.风险投资改善了新创企业IPO绩效吗[J].科研管理,2016,37(1):101-109.
[4]曾庆生,陈信元,洪亮.风险投资入股、首次过会概率与IPO耗时———来自我国中小板和创业板的经验证据[J].管理科学学报,2016,19(9):18-33.
[5]吴超鹏,吴世农,程静雅,等.风险投资对上市公司投融资行为影响的实证研究[J].经济研究,2012,(1):105-119.
[6] Guo D,Jiang K. Venture capital investment and theperformance of entrepreneurial firms:evidence fromChina[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,2013,22(3):375-395.
[7] Kortum S,Lerner J. Assessing the contribution of venturecapital to innovation[J]. Rand Journal of Economics,2000,31(4):674-692.
[8]付雷鸣,万迪昉,张雅慧. VC是更积极的投资者吗?———来自创业板上市公司创新投入的证据[J].金融研究,2012,(10):125-138.
[9]蔡地,陈振龙,刘雪萍.风险投资对创业企业研发活动的影响研究[J].研究与发展管理,2015,27(5):1-11.
[10]李曜,宋贺.风险投资支持的上市公司并购绩效及其影响机制研究[J].会计研究,2017,(6):60-66.
[11]董静,汪立,吴友.风险投资介入与创业企业国际化———基于我国高科技上市公司的实证研究[J].财经研究,2017,(4):120-132.
[12] Megginson W L,Weiss K A. Venture capitalist certifi-cation in initial public offerings[J]. Journal of Finance,1991,46(3):879-903.
[13] Gompers P A. Grandstanding in the venture capitalindustry[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1996,42(1):133-156.
[14] Kaplan S N,Stromberg P. Financial contracting theorymeets the real world:an empirical analysis of venturecapital contracts[J]. Social Science ElectronicPublishing,2003,70(2):281-315.
[15] Ball R,Shivakumar L. Earnings quality at initial publicofferings[J]. Journal of Accounting&Economics,2008,45(2-3):324-349.
[16] Nahata R. Venture capital conflicts of interest:evidencefrom acquisitions of venture-backed firms[J]. Journal ofFinancial&Quantitative Analysis, 2011, 46(2):395-430.
[17]王欣荣.金融中介机构声誉对IPO融资超募有抑制作用吗[J].经济问题,2014,(3):54-60.
[18]夏芸,徐欣.公司内部治理与IPO超募资金的使用———来自中国证券市场的研究[J].证券市场导报,2012,(10):28-34.
[19]黄志忠,张程睿. IPO超募、过度投资与公司价值[J].证券市场导报,2013,(8):18-22.
[20]邢斌,徐龙炳.超募、投资机会与公司价值[J].财经研究,2015,41(9):65-78.
[21] Jensen M C. Agency costs of free cash flow,corporatefinance,and takeovers[J]. American Economic Review,1986,76(2):323-329.
[22] Richardson S. Over-investment of free cash flow[J].Review of Accounting Studies,2006,11(2-3):159-189.
[23]陈见丽.承销商声誉、融资超募与超募资金使用效率———基于我国创业板上市公司的经验证据[J].经济社会体制比较,2012,(3):47-57.
[24]蔡宁.风险投资“逐名”动机与上市公司盈余管理[J].会计研究,2015,(5):20-27.
[25]黄福广,彭涛,田利辉.风险资本对创业企业投资行为的影响[J].金融研究,2013,(8):180-192.
[26] Heckman J J. Sample selection bias as a specificationerror[J]. Applied Econometrics,1979,47(1):153-161.