利益相关者视角下内江市农村土地承包经营权退出绩效评价
|
摘要
农村土地承包经营权退出涉及重大利益关系调整和农村土地制度的发展和完善,开展土地承包经营权退出绩效评估有利于反映退出政策的成效和不足,为退出模式的选择和优化提供理论借鉴。本文基于利益相关者视角,提出了农村土地承包经营权退出绩效概念,构建了农村土地承包经营权退出绩效三棱柱评价模型,并运用综合指数法科学评价了内江市市中区农村土地承包经营权退出换现金、换股份和换保障模式的单项绩效和综合绩效。结果表明:(1)基于利益相关者视角的绩效三棱柱评价模型适用于农村土地承包经营权退出绩效评价,其单项绩效和综合绩效能够反映土地承包经营权退出的成效及不足;(2)不同退出模式的单项绩效水平和综合绩效水平具有显著的差异性,退出换现金模式除了基于农村集体经济组织视角的绩效值高于退出换股份模式外,其他视角(农户和农业经营组织)及综合绩效值均低于退出换股份模式,退出换保障模式绩效最差;(3)依据不同退出模式的绩效水平差异,在相互借鉴的基础上取长补短、因地制宜地探寻理想的优化方案对于推进农村土地承包经营权有序退出具有重要意义。
The performance of rural land contractual management right exit is a comprehensive representation of the core stakeholders(farmers, rural collective economic organizations, and agricultural management organizations) in the decision-making. Before withdrawal, behavioral efficiency during exit and the effect after exit, it is to reflect the effectiveness of the implementation of the exit policy for rural land contractual management rights. Based on the perspective of stakeholders, this paper constructs a triangular prism evaluation model for the performance of rural land contractual management right exit and uses the comprehensive index method to scientifically evaluate single performance and overall performance of the rural land contractual management right of Neijiang City Central District to withdraw cash, exchange shares, and change the security model. The results show that:(1) The performance based triangular prism evaluation model and based on the stakeholder perspective is applicable to the performance evaluation of rural land contract management right exit. Its individual performance and comprehensive performance can reflect the effectiveness and deficiency of the land contractual management right exit.(2) The single performance level and the comprehensive performance level of the different exit mode exhibits significant differences. In addition to the performance value of the rural collective economic organization, the exit value is higher than the exit-for-share model. Other perspectives(farmers and agricultural management organizations) and overall performance values are lower than the exit-for-share model. The exit-for-guarantee model has the worst performance.(3)According to the differences of performance levels of different exit modes, it is of great significance to learn from the basis of mutual learning and to optimize the ideal optimization plan for the orderly exit of rural land contractual management rights.
The performance of rural land contractual management right exit is a comprehensive representation of the core stakeholders(farmers, rural collective economic organizations, and agricultural management organizations) in the decision-making. Before withdrawal, behavioral efficiency during exit and the effect after exit, it is to reflect the effectiveness of the implementation of the exit policy for rural land contractual management rights. Based on the perspective of stakeholders, this paper constructs a triangular prism evaluation model for the performance of rural land contractual management right exit and uses the comprehensive index method to scientifically evaluate single performance and overall performance of the rural land contractual management right of Neijiang City Central District to withdraw cash, exchange shares, and change the security model. The results show that:(1) The performance based triangular prism evaluation model and based on the stakeholder perspective is applicable to the performance evaluation of rural land contract management right exit. Its individual performance and comprehensive performance can reflect the effectiveness and deficiency of the land contractual management right exit.(2) The single performance level and the comprehensive performance level of the different exit mode exhibits significant differences. In addition to the performance value of the rural collective economic organization, the exit value is higher than the exit-for-share model. Other perspectives(farmers and agricultural management organizations) and overall performance values are lower than the exit-for-share model. The exit-for-guarantee model has the worst performance.(3)According to the differences of performance levels of different exit modes, it is of great significance to learn from the basis of mutual learning and to optimize the ideal optimization plan for the orderly exit of rural land contractual management rights.
引文
[1]文枫,鲁春阳,杨庆媛,等.农村集体建设用地流转研究进展[J].地理科学进展,2011,30(9):1193-1200.[Wen F,Lu C Y,Yang Q Y,et al.Progress in research on rural collective construction land transfer[J].Progress in Geography,2011,30(9):1193-1200.]
[2]四川省人民政府.我省四地纳入全国第二批农村改革试验[EB/OL].(2014-12-08)[2018-11].http://www.sc.gov.cn/10462/10464/10797/2014/12/8/10320397.shtml.[Sichuan Provincial People's Government.Four Provinces in Our Province Have Been Included in the Second Batch of Rural Reform Experiments in the Country[EB/OL].(2014-12-08)[2018-11].http://www.sc.gov.cn/10462/10464/10797/2014/12/8/10320397.shtml.]
[3]陈永昌.全面学习解读国务院《关于转变农业发展方式的意见》[J].农场经济管理,2015,(11):3-3.[Chen Y C.A comprehensive study of the state council's"opinions on transforming agricultural development modes"[J].Farm Economic Management,2015,(11):3-3.]
[4]王雯慧.国务院关于印发全国农业现代化规划(2016-2020年)的通知-为未来五年农业发展指路[J].中国农村科技,2016,(11):7-7.[Wang W H.Notice of the state council on printing and distributing the national agricultural modernization plan(2016-2020)-instructing the development of agriculture in the next five years[J].China Rural Science and Technology,2016,(11):7-7.]
[5]钟涨宝,聂建亮.建立健全农村土地承包经营权退出机制初探[J].理论与改革,2010,(5):78-80.[Zhong Z B,Nie J L.Study on establishing and perfecting the exit mechanism of rural land contract management right[J].Theory and Reform,2010,(5):78-80.]
[6]魏亚男,宋帅官.完善农村土地承包经营权退出机制[J].农业经济,2014,(5):16-18.[Wei Y N,Song S G.Improving the exit mechanism of rural land contractual management rights[J].Agricultural Economy,2014,(5):16-18.]
[7]王建友.完善农户农村土地承包经营权的退出机制[J].农业经济与管理,2011,(3):47-53.[Wang J Y.Improving the exit mechanism of farmers'rural land contract management right[J].Agricultural Economics and Management,2011,(3):47-53.]
[8]吴兴国.农村土地承包关系退出法律问题初探[J].求索,2012,(2):159-161.[Wu X G.A preliminary study on the legal issue of the withdrawal of rural land contract relationship[J].Seeking,2012,(2):159-161.]
[9]裴丽平.我国农村土地承包经营权退出机制的完善[J].淮海工学院学报(人文社会版),2017,15(6):26-29.[Pei L P.Improvement of the exit mechanism of rural land contract management right in China[J].Journal of Huaihai Institute of Technology(Humanities and Social Sciences),2017,15(6):26-29.]
[10]童彬.土地承包经营权退出机制的法律困境和制度建构[J].农村经济,2017,(2):38-45.[Tong B.Legal dilemma and system construction of the exit mechanism of land contract management right[J].Rural Economy,2017,(2):38-45.]
[11]钟涨宝,汪萍.农地流转过程中的农户行为分析-湖北、浙江等地的农户问卷调查[J].中国农村观察,2003,(6):55-64.[Zhong Z B,Wang P.Analysis of farmers'behavior in the process of farmland transfer-A survey of farmers in Hubei and Zhejiang[J].China Rural Survey,2003,(6):55-64.]
[12]高强,宋洪远.农村土地承包经营权退出机制研究[J].南京农业大学学报(社会科学版),2017,17(4):74-84.[Gao Q,Song H Y.Research on the exit mechanism of rural land contract management right[J].Journal of Nanjing Agricultural University,Social Science Edition,2017,17(4):74-84.]
[13]王丽双,王春平.实现农地承包经营权退出制度的路径选择[J].学术交流,2015,(11):155-159.[Wang L S,Wang C P.Path choice of realizing the exit system of agricultural land contract management right[J].Academic Exchange,2015,(11):155-159.]
[14]方志权.农村土地承包经营权退出意愿调查-基于上海四区1255份农村调查问卷的分析[J].科学发展,2017,(8):37-43.[Fang Z Q.Investigation on the exiting will of rural land contract management right-Based on the analysis of 1255 rural survey questionnaires in Shanghai four districts[J].Science Development,2017,(8):37-43.]
[15]张学敏.离农分化、效用差序与承包地退出-基于豫、湘、渝886户农户调查的实证分析[J].农业技术经济,2013,(5):44-52.[Zhang X M.Departure from agriculture,utility difference and contractual exit-An empirical analysis based on survey of 886 households in Henan,Hunan and Guizhou[J].Agricultural Technology&Economy,2013,(5):44-52.]
[16]王丽双,王春平,孙占祥.农户分化对农地承包经营权退出意愿的影响研究[J].中国土地科学,2015,29(9):27-33.[Wang L S,Wang C P,Sun Z X.Research on the influence of farmers'differentiation on the willingness to exit the farmland contract management right[J].China Land Science,2015,29(9):27-33.]
[17]刘同山.农业机械化、非农就业与农民的承包地退出意愿[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2016,26(6):62-68.[Liu T S.Agricultural mechanization,non-agricultural employment and farmers'willingness to exit from contracted areas[J].China Population,Resources and Environment,2016,26(6):62-68.]
[18]程飞.不同农村土地流转模式绩效评价研究[D].重庆:西南大学,2014.[Cheng F.Study on Performance Evaluation of Different Rural Land Transfer Models[D].Chongqing:Southwest University,2014.]
[19]周菁.成都市温江区农村集体土地流转绩效评价[D].雅安:四川农业大学,2015.[Zhou J.Evaluation of Rural Collective Land Transfer Performance in Wenjiang District of Chengdu City[D].Ya’an:Sichuan Agricultural University,2015.]
[20]王雅瑜.晋江市英林镇农村土地流转模式绩效评价[D].福州:福建农林大学,2016.[Wang Y Y.Performance Evaluation of Rural Land Transfer Model in Yinglin Town,Jinjiang City[D].Fuzhou:Fujian Agriculture and Forestry University,2016.]
[21]许亚敏.基于可持续发展的农村土地流转综合绩效评价模型[J].济宁学院学报,2014,35(1):102-106.[Xu Y M.Comprehensive performance evaluation model of rural land transfer based on sustainable development[J].Journal of Jining University,2014,35(1):102-106.]
[22]王立敏.潍坊市农地流转中介组织运行绩效研究[D].杨凌:西北农林科技大学,2016.[Wang L M.Research on the Performance of Agricultural Land Transfer Intermediary Organizations in Weifang City[D].Yangling:Northwest A&F University,2016.]
[23]李文彦.贵州省农村集体土地征收绩效评价研究[D].贵阳:贵州大学,2016.[Li W Y.Research on Performance Evaluation of Rural Collective Land Collection in Guizhou Province[D].Guiyang:Guizhou University,2016.]
[24]贾艳红,赵军,南忠仁,等.基于熵权法的草原生态安全评价-以甘肃牧区为例[J].生态学杂志,2006,25(8):1003-1008.[Jia Y H,Zhao J,Nan Z R,et al.Evaluation of grassland ecological security based on entropy weight method-A case study of Gansu Pastoral Area[J].Journal of Ecology,2006,25(8):1003-1008.]
[25]倪九派,李萍,魏朝富,等.基于AHP和熵权法赋权的区域土地开发整理潜力评价[J].农业工程学报,2009,25(5):202-209.[Ni J P,Li P,Wei C F,et al.Evaluation of regional land development and consolidation potential based on AHP and entropy weight method[J].Transactions of the Chinese Society of Agricultural Engineering,2009,25(5):202-209.]
[26]李萍,魏朝富,邱道持.基于熵权法赋权的区域耕地整理潜力评价[J].中国农学通报,2007,23(6):536-541.[Li P,Wei C F,Qiu D C.Evaluation of regional cultivated land consolidation potential based on entropy weight method[J].Chinese Agricultural Science Bulletin,2007,23(6):536-541.]
[27]於冉,黄贤金,钟太洋.省级政府土地管理绩效督察评价指标体系研究[J].中国土地科学,2014,28(9):17-24.[Yu R,Huang XJ,Zhong T Y.Study on the evaluation index system of provincial government land management performance supervision[J].China Land Science,2014,28(9):17-24.]
[2]四川省人民政府.我省四地纳入全国第二批农村改革试验[EB/OL].(2014-12-08)[2018-11].http://www.sc.gov.cn/10462/10464/10797/2014/12/8/10320397.shtml.[Sichuan Provincial People's Government.Four Provinces in Our Province Have Been Included in the Second Batch of Rural Reform Experiments in the Country[EB/OL].(2014-12-08)[2018-11].http://www.sc.gov.cn/10462/10464/10797/2014/12/8/10320397.shtml.]
[3]陈永昌.全面学习解读国务院《关于转变农业发展方式的意见》[J].农场经济管理,2015,(11):3-3.[Chen Y C.A comprehensive study of the state council's"opinions on transforming agricultural development modes"[J].Farm Economic Management,2015,(11):3-3.]
[4]王雯慧.国务院关于印发全国农业现代化规划(2016-2020年)的通知-为未来五年农业发展指路[J].中国农村科技,2016,(11):7-7.[Wang W H.Notice of the state council on printing and distributing the national agricultural modernization plan(2016-2020)-instructing the development of agriculture in the next five years[J].China Rural Science and Technology,2016,(11):7-7.]
[5]钟涨宝,聂建亮.建立健全农村土地承包经营权退出机制初探[J].理论与改革,2010,(5):78-80.[Zhong Z B,Nie J L.Study on establishing and perfecting the exit mechanism of rural land contract management right[J].Theory and Reform,2010,(5):78-80.]
[6]魏亚男,宋帅官.完善农村土地承包经营权退出机制[J].农业经济,2014,(5):16-18.[Wei Y N,Song S G.Improving the exit mechanism of rural land contractual management rights[J].Agricultural Economy,2014,(5):16-18.]
[7]王建友.完善农户农村土地承包经营权的退出机制[J].农业经济与管理,2011,(3):47-53.[Wang J Y.Improving the exit mechanism of farmers'rural land contract management right[J].Agricultural Economics and Management,2011,(3):47-53.]
[8]吴兴国.农村土地承包关系退出法律问题初探[J].求索,2012,(2):159-161.[Wu X G.A preliminary study on the legal issue of the withdrawal of rural land contract relationship[J].Seeking,2012,(2):159-161.]
[9]裴丽平.我国农村土地承包经营权退出机制的完善[J].淮海工学院学报(人文社会版),2017,15(6):26-29.[Pei L P.Improvement of the exit mechanism of rural land contract management right in China[J].Journal of Huaihai Institute of Technology(Humanities and Social Sciences),2017,15(6):26-29.]
[10]童彬.土地承包经营权退出机制的法律困境和制度建构[J].农村经济,2017,(2):38-45.[Tong B.Legal dilemma and system construction of the exit mechanism of land contract management right[J].Rural Economy,2017,(2):38-45.]
[11]钟涨宝,汪萍.农地流转过程中的农户行为分析-湖北、浙江等地的农户问卷调查[J].中国农村观察,2003,(6):55-64.[Zhong Z B,Wang P.Analysis of farmers'behavior in the process of farmland transfer-A survey of farmers in Hubei and Zhejiang[J].China Rural Survey,2003,(6):55-64.]
[12]高强,宋洪远.农村土地承包经营权退出机制研究[J].南京农业大学学报(社会科学版),2017,17(4):74-84.[Gao Q,Song H Y.Research on the exit mechanism of rural land contract management right[J].Journal of Nanjing Agricultural University,Social Science Edition,2017,17(4):74-84.]
[13]王丽双,王春平.实现农地承包经营权退出制度的路径选择[J].学术交流,2015,(11):155-159.[Wang L S,Wang C P.Path choice of realizing the exit system of agricultural land contract management right[J].Academic Exchange,2015,(11):155-159.]
[14]方志权.农村土地承包经营权退出意愿调查-基于上海四区1255份农村调查问卷的分析[J].科学发展,2017,(8):37-43.[Fang Z Q.Investigation on the exiting will of rural land contract management right-Based on the analysis of 1255 rural survey questionnaires in Shanghai four districts[J].Science Development,2017,(8):37-43.]
[15]张学敏.离农分化、效用差序与承包地退出-基于豫、湘、渝886户农户调查的实证分析[J].农业技术经济,2013,(5):44-52.[Zhang X M.Departure from agriculture,utility difference and contractual exit-An empirical analysis based on survey of 886 households in Henan,Hunan and Guizhou[J].Agricultural Technology&Economy,2013,(5):44-52.]
[16]王丽双,王春平,孙占祥.农户分化对农地承包经营权退出意愿的影响研究[J].中国土地科学,2015,29(9):27-33.[Wang L S,Wang C P,Sun Z X.Research on the influence of farmers'differentiation on the willingness to exit the farmland contract management right[J].China Land Science,2015,29(9):27-33.]
[17]刘同山.农业机械化、非农就业与农民的承包地退出意愿[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2016,26(6):62-68.[Liu T S.Agricultural mechanization,non-agricultural employment and farmers'willingness to exit from contracted areas[J].China Population,Resources and Environment,2016,26(6):62-68.]
[18]程飞.不同农村土地流转模式绩效评价研究[D].重庆:西南大学,2014.[Cheng F.Study on Performance Evaluation of Different Rural Land Transfer Models[D].Chongqing:Southwest University,2014.]
[19]周菁.成都市温江区农村集体土地流转绩效评价[D].雅安:四川农业大学,2015.[Zhou J.Evaluation of Rural Collective Land Transfer Performance in Wenjiang District of Chengdu City[D].Ya’an:Sichuan Agricultural University,2015.]
[20]王雅瑜.晋江市英林镇农村土地流转模式绩效评价[D].福州:福建农林大学,2016.[Wang Y Y.Performance Evaluation of Rural Land Transfer Model in Yinglin Town,Jinjiang City[D].Fuzhou:Fujian Agriculture and Forestry University,2016.]
[21]许亚敏.基于可持续发展的农村土地流转综合绩效评价模型[J].济宁学院学报,2014,35(1):102-106.[Xu Y M.Comprehensive performance evaluation model of rural land transfer based on sustainable development[J].Journal of Jining University,2014,35(1):102-106.]
[22]王立敏.潍坊市农地流转中介组织运行绩效研究[D].杨凌:西北农林科技大学,2016.[Wang L M.Research on the Performance of Agricultural Land Transfer Intermediary Organizations in Weifang City[D].Yangling:Northwest A&F University,2016.]
[23]李文彦.贵州省农村集体土地征收绩效评价研究[D].贵阳:贵州大学,2016.[Li W Y.Research on Performance Evaluation of Rural Collective Land Collection in Guizhou Province[D].Guiyang:Guizhou University,2016.]
[24]贾艳红,赵军,南忠仁,等.基于熵权法的草原生态安全评价-以甘肃牧区为例[J].生态学杂志,2006,25(8):1003-1008.[Jia Y H,Zhao J,Nan Z R,et al.Evaluation of grassland ecological security based on entropy weight method-A case study of Gansu Pastoral Area[J].Journal of Ecology,2006,25(8):1003-1008.]
[25]倪九派,李萍,魏朝富,等.基于AHP和熵权法赋权的区域土地开发整理潜力评价[J].农业工程学报,2009,25(5):202-209.[Ni J P,Li P,Wei C F,et al.Evaluation of regional land development and consolidation potential based on AHP and entropy weight method[J].Transactions of the Chinese Society of Agricultural Engineering,2009,25(5):202-209.]
[26]李萍,魏朝富,邱道持.基于熵权法赋权的区域耕地整理潜力评价[J].中国农学通报,2007,23(6):536-541.[Li P,Wei C F,Qiu D C.Evaluation of regional cultivated land consolidation potential based on entropy weight method[J].Chinese Agricultural Science Bulletin,2007,23(6):536-541.]
[27]於冉,黄贤金,钟太洋.省级政府土地管理绩效督察评价指标体系研究[J].中国土地科学,2014,28(9):17-24.[Yu R,Huang XJ,Zhong T Y.Study on the evaluation index system of provincial government land management performance supervision[J].China Land Science,2014,28(9):17-24.]