中国式政府监管:特征、困局与走向
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摘要
在市场经济体制中,政府监管是政府职能的核心。审批和执法是中国式监管的主要手段。本文从一种宏观的视角归结中国式监管的特点,剖析其内在的失效原因,指出重审批轻监管是中国式监管的弊病,并由此引发诸多流弊。因此,应重塑政府监管的中国模式,将风险监管运用于日常监管机制中。从运动式监管走向风险监管、建设风险监管型政府是推进国家治理体系和治理能力现代化的现实需求。
In market economy system, government supervision is the core of government functions. Approval and enforcement are the main means of Chinese-style supervision. This paper summarizes the characteristics of Chinese-style supervision from a macro perspective, analyzes its internal failure reasons, and points out that emphasizing approval but neglecting supervision is a drawback of Chinese-style supervision, and it has caused many abuses. Therefore, the Chinese model of government supervision should be reshaped,and risk supervision should be applied to the daily regulatory mechanism. Moving from ‘campaign-style' supervision to risk supervision and building a risk-regulated government is a realistic need to promote the modernization of the national governance system and governance capacity.
In market economy system, government supervision is the core of government functions. Approval and enforcement are the main means of Chinese-style supervision. This paper summarizes the characteristics of Chinese-style supervision from a macro perspective, analyzes its internal failure reasons, and points out that emphasizing approval but neglecting supervision is a drawback of Chinese-style supervision, and it has caused many abuses. Therefore, the Chinese model of government supervision should be reshaped,and risk supervision should be applied to the daily regulatory mechanism. Moving from ‘campaign-style' supervision to risk supervision and building a risk-regulated government is a realistic need to promote the modernization of the national governance system and governance capacity.
引文
[1]Margaret M.Pearson.The Business of Governing Business in China:Institutions and Norms of the Emerging Regulatory State.World Politics,Vol.57,No.2(Jan.,2005),pp.296-322.
[2]吴鹏,范学臣.“联合执法”的问题及完善路径[J].中国行政管理,2006(5).
[3]罗许生.从运动式执法到制度性执法[J].重庆社会科学,2005(7).
[4][美]西蒙·库兹涅茨.现代经济增长[M].戴睿,易诚(译).北京:北京经济学院出版社,1989:289.
[5]王波.执法过程的性质:法律在一个城市工商所的现实运作[M].北京:法律出版社,2011:57.
[6]姜明安.行政执法研究[M].北京:北京大学出版社,2004:152.
[7]崔卓兰,卢护锋.试论我国行政监管制度的重构[J].学术研究,2009(6).
[8]肖兴志,宋晶.政府监管理论与政策[M].大连:东北财经大学出版社,2006:15-16.
[9]刘亚平.走向监管国家:以食品安全为例[M].北京:中央编译出版社,2011:118-119.
[10]周玲等.风险监管:提升我国产品质量安全管理的有效路径[J].北京师范大学学报(社会科学版),2011(6).
[11][美]史蒂芬·布雷耶.打破恶性循环:政府如何有效规制风险[M].宋华琳(译).北京:法律出版社,2009:3.
[2]吴鹏,范学臣.“联合执法”的问题及完善路径[J].中国行政管理,2006(5).
[3]罗许生.从运动式执法到制度性执法[J].重庆社会科学,2005(7).
[4][美]西蒙·库兹涅茨.现代经济增长[M].戴睿,易诚(译).北京:北京经济学院出版社,1989:289.
[5]王波.执法过程的性质:法律在一个城市工商所的现实运作[M].北京:法律出版社,2011:57.
[6]姜明安.行政执法研究[M].北京:北京大学出版社,2004:152.
[7]崔卓兰,卢护锋.试论我国行政监管制度的重构[J].学术研究,2009(6).
[8]肖兴志,宋晶.政府监管理论与政策[M].大连:东北财经大学出版社,2006:15-16.
[9]刘亚平.走向监管国家:以食品安全为例[M].北京:中央编译出版社,2011:118-119.
[10]周玲等.风险监管:提升我国产品质量安全管理的有效路径[J].北京师范大学学报(社会科学版),2011(6).
[11][美]史蒂芬·布雷耶.打破恶性循环:政府如何有效规制风险[M].宋华琳(译).北京:法律出版社,2009:3.