美国军舰擅闯我国南海岛礁邻近海域的国际法实证分析
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摘要
自2015年10月的"拉森"号事件以来,美国频繁派遣军舰擅闯我国南海岛礁邻近海域,开展其所谓的"航行自由行动",挑战我国南海的海洋权利和主张,严重侵犯我国在南海的领土主权。本文运用实证分析法,通过对近年来美舰擅闯行动进行数据统计、分类,归纳出美舰擅闯行动主要挑战的三类事项,即"军用船舶在领海的无害通过须获事先批准"、"西沙群岛的直线基线"、"南沙群岛部分岛礁的领海主张"。通过分析美舰挑战这三类事项的原因及意义,可得出这三类事项在短期内仍然是美舰擅闯行动挑战的重点,且该行动的挑战重心正转变为西沙群岛与南沙群岛并重。经过分析可以预判在未来可预见的一段时间内,美舰针对我国南海岛礁邻近海域的擅闯行动不会停止。据此,我国有必要尽快制定有效的对策应对美舰的擅闯行动。
Since the USS Lassen Incident in October 2015,the US Navy has been dispatching warships to"intrude"into the adjacent waters of Chinese maritime features in the South China Sea on a regular basis.In the name of so-called "Freedom of Navigation Operations"of the US Navy,such "unauthorized intrusions"actually challenged various maritime claims of China in the South China Sea,and seriously violated China's territorial sovereignty in the region. With an empirical approach,the paper analyses the statistics of the US warships' "unauthorized intrusions"in recent years and generalizes features of these operations. The paper finds that these "unauthorized intrusions"mainly target at three categories of maritime claims: the prior authorization of warships into the Chinese territorial sea,the straight baselines of the Xisha Islands,and the legal status of some islands and reefs of the Nansha Islands. An analysis of the cause and significance of these operations concludes that in the foreseeable future,the aforementioned maritime claims of China remain main targets of "unauthorized intrusions". In addition,it is predicted that the focus of the US operations will be switched to the Xisha Islands as well as the Nansha Islands. Accordingly,the Chinese government must act promptly and effectively so as to forestall further intrusions of US warships.
Since the USS Lassen Incident in October 2015,the US Navy has been dispatching warships to"intrude"into the adjacent waters of Chinese maritime features in the South China Sea on a regular basis.In the name of so-called "Freedom of Navigation Operations"of the US Navy,such "unauthorized intrusions"actually challenged various maritime claims of China in the South China Sea,and seriously violated China's territorial sovereignty in the region. With an empirical approach,the paper analyses the statistics of the US warships' "unauthorized intrusions"in recent years and generalizes features of these operations. The paper finds that these "unauthorized intrusions"mainly target at three categories of maritime claims: the prior authorization of warships into the Chinese territorial sea,the straight baselines of the Xisha Islands,and the legal status of some islands and reefs of the Nansha Islands. An analysis of the cause and significance of these operations concludes that in the foreseeable future,the aforementioned maritime claims of China remain main targets of "unauthorized intrusions". In addition,it is predicted that the focus of the US operations will be switched to the Xisha Islands as well as the Nansha Islands. Accordingly,the Chinese government must act promptly and effectively so as to forestall further intrusions of US warships.
引文
(1)“中方坚决反对美军舰擅自进入中国黄岩岛邻近海域”,中国新闻网,2019年5月20日,http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2019/05-20/8842307.shtm;l“U.S.Warship Sails in Disputed South China Sea Amid Trade Tensions”,Reuters,May 20,2019,https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-military-idUSKCN1SQ067。
(1)“2019年5月20日外交部发言人陆慷主持例行记者会”,中华人民共和国外交部,2019年5月20日,http://www3.fmprc.gov.cn/web/fyrbt_673021/t1664956.shtml。
(2)2015年10月27日,美国海军“拉森”号导弹驱逐舰擅自进入我国南沙群岛渚碧礁12海里之内。See“U.S.Destroyer Comes within 12 Nautical Miles of Chinese South China Sea Artificial Island,Beijing Threatens Response”,USNI News,October 27,2015,https://news.usni.org/2015/10/27/u-s-destroyer-comes-within-12-nautical-miles-of-chinese-south-china-sea-artificial-islandbeijing-threatens-response.
(3)关于这17次事件的具体统计,见本文第二部分的表2。本文提到的“擅闯”,主要指的是外国军舰未遵守我国1992年《领海与毗连区法》第六条的规定、未获得我国政府事先许可的通行。该条规定:“外国军用船舶进入中华人民共和国领海,须经中华人民共和国政府批准”。
(4)具体情况见第二部分的表2。
(5)近两年我国学者针对航行自由问题发表的研究成果有:江河、洪宽:“专属经济区安全与航行自由的衡平---以美国‘航行自由行动’为例”,《太平洋学报》,2018年第2期,第46-58页;贾宇:“南海航行自由:问题、规则与秩序”,《亚太安全与海洋研究》,2019年第3期,第50-66页;马得懿:“美国‘航行自由行动’的逻辑实质与应对策略”,《学术前沿》,2019年第1期,第60-69页;邢瑞利:“美国对南海‘航行自由’问题的安全化建构及中国应对”,《太平洋学报》,2019年第4期,第25-39页。
(6)迄今为止,美国国防部网站公布了1991至2018财政年度的《航行自由行动报告》,共26期。See US Department of Defense,“DoD Annual Freedom of Navigation(FON)Reports”,https://policy.defense.gov/OUSDP-Offices/FON/。
(7)美国提出的所谓“过度海洋主张”指的是“某些沿海国提出的与国际海洋法(的规则)不符的海洋区域或管辖权的主张”。See US Department of Defense,“Freedom of Navigation(FON)Program Fact Sheet”,February 28,2017,http://policy.defense.gov/Portals/11/DoD%20FON%20Program%20Summary%2016.pdf?ver=2017-03-03-141350-380.
(8)Ronald Reagan,“President’s Ocean Policy Statement,March 10,1983”,reprinted in J.Ashley Roach and Robert W.Smith,Excessive Maritime Claims,3rd edn,Leiden:Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,2012,p.648.
(9)美国《航行自由行动报告》中所指的“财政年度”(财年,英文首字母缩写为FY),通常是指上一年的10月1日至该年的9月30日这一整年的时间。
(1)1992年制定、2002年和2017年两次修订的《中华人民共和国测绘法》第五十一条明确规定了外国的组织或个人未经批准,擅自在我国管辖的海域从事测绘活动的,可负刑事责任。此外,1996年通过的《中华人民共和国涉外海洋科学研究管理规定》第十三条的措辞表明:未经许可进行涉外海洋科学研究活动的外国组织和个人也有可能负刑事责任。
(2)2009年3月8日,美国海军海洋监测船“无瑕”号在海南岛南部75英里处进行军事活动时为我国五艘船舶拦截、驱逐。See Raul Pedrozo,“Close Encounters at Sea:The USNS Impeccable Incident”,Naval War College Review,Vol.62,No.3,2009,pp.101-102;Jonathan G.Odom,“The True‘Lies’of the Impeccable Incident:What Really Happened,Who Disregarded International Law,and Why Every Nation(Outside of China)Should Be Concerned”,Michigan State Journal of International Law,Vol.18,No.3,2010,pp.414-415.
(1)“Annual Freedom of Navigation Report,Fiscal Year 2018”,US Department of Defense,March 19,2019,https://policy.defense.gov/Portals/11/Documents/FY18%20DoD%20Annual%20FON%20Report%20(final).pdf?ver=2019-03-19-103517-010.
(1)见金永明:“论领海无害通过制度”,《国际法研究》,2016年第2期,第67页。See Kim Hyun-Soo,“The 1992 Chinese Territorial Sea Law in the Light of the UN Convention”,International and Comparative Law Quarterly,Vol.43,No.4,1994,p.902;Zou Keyuan,“Innocent Passage for Warships:The Chinese Doctrine and Practice”,Ocean Development&International Law,Vol.29,No.3,1998,p.203;Thomas Windsor,“Innocent Passage of Warships in East Asian Territorial Seas”,Australian Journal of Maritime and Ocean Affairs,Vol.3,No.3,2011,pp.76,78.
(2)甚至于,对于我国并未公布领海基线的中沙群岛黄岩岛海域以及南沙群岛南薰礁、赤瓜礁、永暑礁海域,美国也以存在“潜在的领海”看待,进行挑战。
(3)See J.Ashley Roach and Robert W.Smith,Excessive Maritime Claims,3rd edn,Leiden:Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,2012,p.247,footnote 81.
(1)James Kraska and Raul Pedrozo,The Free Sea:The American Fight for Freedom of Navigation,Annapolis:Naval Institute Press,2018,pp.274-275.
(2)See“USS McC ampbell FONOP Past Paracel Islands Irks China”,USNI News,January 7,2019,https://news.usni.org/2019/01/07/40202.
(3)See US Department of State Office of the Legal Adviser,“Freedom of Navigation,”in Marian Lloyd Nash,ed.,Digest of USPractice in International Law1979,Washington:Government Printing Office,1979,pp.1066,1067-1068.
(4)See United States Department of State,Office of Ocean Affairs,Limits in the Seas No.117:Straight Baseline Claims:China,Washington:United States Department of State,1996,p.8.
(5)See“Freedom of Navigation:FY 2011 Operational Assertions”,US Department of Defense,https://policy.defense.gov/Portals/11/Documents/gsa/cwmd/FY2011%20DOD%20Annual%20FON%20Report.pdf.
(1)有关大陆国家远海群岛划设直线基线的实践梳理,见中国国际法学会:《南海仲裁案裁决之批判》,外文出版社2018年版,第241-251页。See also,J.Ashley Roach,“Offshore Archipelagos Enclosed by Straight Baselines An Excessive Claim?”Ocean Development&International Law,Vol.49,No.2,2018,pp.5-6.
(2)See J.Ashley Roach and Robert W.Smith,Excessive Maritime Claims,3rd edn,Leiden:Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,2012,pp.108-115.
(3)同(2),pp.63-64。
(4)同(2),p.67。See also,International Law Association,Sydney Conference 2018,“Baselines under the International Law of the Sea”,Final Report 2018,paras.19-21.
(5)我国于2012年9月10日公布了钓鱼岛及其附属岛屿的领海基线。美国于2013年3月7日通过外交照会向我国表达抗议。See CarrieLyn D.Guymon,ed.,Digest of US Practice in International Law 2013,Office of the Legal Advisor,United States Department of State,pp.369-370,https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/226409.pdf.
(6)See Republic of the Philippines v.People’s Republic of China,“Award”,July 12,2016,p.237,paras.575-576.
(7)See“Remarks by President Obama at U.S.-ASEAN Press Conference”,February 16,2016,https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/16/remarks-president-obama-usasean-press-conference.See also,US Department of State,“Decision in the Philippines-China Arbitration”,July 12,2016,https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/07/259587.htm.
(1)用美国当局的官方说法,就是“行动或声明表明在无法产生领海的地物周围宣告拥有领海”。See“Annual Freedom of Navigation Report,Fiscal Year 2017”.
(2)See Republic of the Philippines v.People’s Republic of China,“Award”,July 12,2016,p.173,paras.377-378.
(3)“U.S.Destroyer Made an‘Innocent Passage’Near Chinese South China Sea Artificial Island in Recent Mission”,USNI News,November 2,2015,https://news.usni.org/2015/11/02/u-sdestroyer-made-an-innocent-passage-near-chinese-south-chia-sea-artificial-island-in-recent-mission.
(4)“U.S.Warship Came Within 6 Miles of Chinese Artificial Island in Toughest Challenge Yet to Beijing South China Sea Claims”,USNI News,May 25,2017,https://news.usni.org/2017/05/25/u-s-warship-came-beijing-south-china-sea-claims.
(5)同(2),para.383.
(6)“US Sails Warship Past Contested Islands in South China Sea,Ahead of G20 Summit”,CNN News,November 30,2018,https://edition.cnn.com/2018/11/29/politics/us-warship-south-china-sea/index.html.
(1)See Eleanor Freund,“Freedom of Navigation in the South China Sea:A Practical Guide”,Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs Special Report,June2017,p,38.http://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/SCS%20Report%20-%20web.pdf.
(2)见《公约》第十八条第2款。
(3)金永明:“论领海无害通过制度”,《国际法研究》,2016年第2期,第68页。
(4)见《公约》第三百条。
(5)见《公约》第三百零一条。
(6)See Malcolm N.Shaw,International Law,8th edn,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2017,p.77.See also,Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria(Cameroon v.Nigeria),Preliminary Objections,Judgement of 11 June 1998,1998 ICJReports 275,p.296,para.38.
(7)See Killian O’Breien,“Article 300”in Alexander Proelss,ed.,United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea:A Commentary,Oxford:Hart Publishing,2017,p.1940.
(8)例如见2019年5月的两次外交部新闻发言人的回应:“2019年5月6日外交部发言人耿爽主持例行记者会”,中华人民共和国外交部,2019年5月6日,http://www3.fmprc.gov.cn/web/fyrbt_673021/t1661103.shtml;“2019年5月20日外交部发言人陆慷主持例行记者会”,中华人民共和国外交部,2019年5月20日,http://www3.fmprc.gov.cn/web/fyrbt_673021/t1664956.shtml。
(9)[英]詹宁斯、瓦茨修订,王铁崖等译:《奥本海国际法》(第一卷第二分册),中国大百科全书出版社,1998年版,第7页。
(10)“2017年10月11日外交部发言人华春莹主持例行记者会”,中华人民共和国外交部,2017年10月11日,https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/fyrbt_673021/t1500839.shtml。
(11)根据越南海军军官、越南海军学院讲师Anh Duc Ton的梳理,在东南亚沿海国中,包括中国(含中国台湾地区)、朝鲜、韩国、越南、菲律宾一直坚持对外国军舰进入本国领海设置限制,或坚持事先通知制、或坚持事先批准制。See Anh Duc Ton,“Innocent Passage of Warships:International Law and the Practice of East Asian Littoral States”,Asia-Pacific Journal of Ocean Law and Policy,Vol.1,No.2,2016,pp.216-236.
(1)“李克强:让南海成为和平之海、友谊之海、合作之海”,中国政府网,2014年11月13日,http://www.gov.cn/guowuyuan/2014-11/13/content_2778119.htm。
(2)“2018年9月6日外交部发言人华春莹主持例行记者会”,中华人民共和国外交部,2018年9月6日,https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/fyrbt_673021/t1592689.shtml。
(3)See“Future South China Sea FONOPS Will Include Allies,Partners”,USNI News,February 12,2019,https://news.usni.org/2019/02/12/41070.
(4)James Kraska and Raul Pedrozo,The Free Sea:The American Fight for Freedom of Navigation,Annapolis:Naval Institute Press,2018,pp.1,269.
(5)See“Pentagon Pledges More Freedom of Navigation Operations in South China Sea”,USNI News,May 31,2018,https://news.usni.org/2018/05/31/34016.
(1)见马新民、刘洋:“《南海仲裁案裁决之批判》评述”,《亚太安全与海洋研究》,2019年第1期,第25-50页。
(1)“2019年5月20日外交部发言人陆慷主持例行记者会”,中华人民共和国外交部,2019年5月20日,http://www3.fmprc.gov.cn/web/fyrbt_673021/t1664956.shtml。
(2)2015年10月27日,美国海军“拉森”号导弹驱逐舰擅自进入我国南沙群岛渚碧礁12海里之内。See“U.S.Destroyer Comes within 12 Nautical Miles of Chinese South China Sea Artificial Island,Beijing Threatens Response”,USNI News,October 27,2015,https://news.usni.org/2015/10/27/u-s-destroyer-comes-within-12-nautical-miles-of-chinese-south-china-sea-artificial-islandbeijing-threatens-response.
(3)关于这17次事件的具体统计,见本文第二部分的表2。本文提到的“擅闯”,主要指的是外国军舰未遵守我国1992年《领海与毗连区法》第六条的规定、未获得我国政府事先许可的通行。该条规定:“外国军用船舶进入中华人民共和国领海,须经中华人民共和国政府批准”。
(4)具体情况见第二部分的表2。
(5)近两年我国学者针对航行自由问题发表的研究成果有:江河、洪宽:“专属经济区安全与航行自由的衡平---以美国‘航行自由行动’为例”,《太平洋学报》,2018年第2期,第46-58页;贾宇:“南海航行自由:问题、规则与秩序”,《亚太安全与海洋研究》,2019年第3期,第50-66页;马得懿:“美国‘航行自由行动’的逻辑实质与应对策略”,《学术前沿》,2019年第1期,第60-69页;邢瑞利:“美国对南海‘航行自由’问题的安全化建构及中国应对”,《太平洋学报》,2019年第4期,第25-39页。
(6)迄今为止,美国国防部网站公布了1991至2018财政年度的《航行自由行动报告》,共26期。See US Department of Defense,“DoD Annual Freedom of Navigation(FON)Reports”,https://policy.defense.gov/OUSDP-Offices/FON/。
(7)美国提出的所谓“过度海洋主张”指的是“某些沿海国提出的与国际海洋法(的规则)不符的海洋区域或管辖权的主张”。See US Department of Defense,“Freedom of Navigation(FON)Program Fact Sheet”,February 28,2017,http://policy.defense.gov/Portals/11/DoD%20FON%20Program%20Summary%2016.pdf?ver=2017-03-03-141350-380.
(8)Ronald Reagan,“President’s Ocean Policy Statement,March 10,1983”,reprinted in J.Ashley Roach and Robert W.Smith,Excessive Maritime Claims,3rd edn,Leiden:Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,2012,p.648.
(9)美国《航行自由行动报告》中所指的“财政年度”(财年,英文首字母缩写为FY),通常是指上一年的10月1日至该年的9月30日这一整年的时间。
(1)1992年制定、2002年和2017年两次修订的《中华人民共和国测绘法》第五十一条明确规定了外国的组织或个人未经批准,擅自在我国管辖的海域从事测绘活动的,可负刑事责任。此外,1996年通过的《中华人民共和国涉外海洋科学研究管理规定》第十三条的措辞表明:未经许可进行涉外海洋科学研究活动的外国组织和个人也有可能负刑事责任。
(2)2009年3月8日,美国海军海洋监测船“无瑕”号在海南岛南部75英里处进行军事活动时为我国五艘船舶拦截、驱逐。See Raul Pedrozo,“Close Encounters at Sea:The USNS Impeccable Incident”,Naval War College Review,Vol.62,No.3,2009,pp.101-102;Jonathan G.Odom,“The True‘Lies’of the Impeccable Incident:What Really Happened,Who Disregarded International Law,and Why Every Nation(Outside of China)Should Be Concerned”,Michigan State Journal of International Law,Vol.18,No.3,2010,pp.414-415.
(1)“Annual Freedom of Navigation Report,Fiscal Year 2018”,US Department of Defense,March 19,2019,https://policy.defense.gov/Portals/11/Documents/FY18%20DoD%20Annual%20FON%20Report%20(final).pdf?ver=2019-03-19-103517-010.
(1)见金永明:“论领海无害通过制度”,《国际法研究》,2016年第2期,第67页。See Kim Hyun-Soo,“The 1992 Chinese Territorial Sea Law in the Light of the UN Convention”,International and Comparative Law Quarterly,Vol.43,No.4,1994,p.902;Zou Keyuan,“Innocent Passage for Warships:The Chinese Doctrine and Practice”,Ocean Development&International Law,Vol.29,No.3,1998,p.203;Thomas Windsor,“Innocent Passage of Warships in East Asian Territorial Seas”,Australian Journal of Maritime and Ocean Affairs,Vol.3,No.3,2011,pp.76,78.
(2)甚至于,对于我国并未公布领海基线的中沙群岛黄岩岛海域以及南沙群岛南薰礁、赤瓜礁、永暑礁海域,美国也以存在“潜在的领海”看待,进行挑战。
(3)See J.Ashley Roach and Robert W.Smith,Excessive Maritime Claims,3rd edn,Leiden:Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,2012,p.247,footnote 81.
(1)James Kraska and Raul Pedrozo,The Free Sea:The American Fight for Freedom of Navigation,Annapolis:Naval Institute Press,2018,pp.274-275.
(2)See“USS McC ampbell FONOP Past Paracel Islands Irks China”,USNI News,January 7,2019,https://news.usni.org/2019/01/07/40202.
(3)See US Department of State Office of the Legal Adviser,“Freedom of Navigation,”in Marian Lloyd Nash,ed.,Digest of USPractice in International Law1979,Washington:Government Printing Office,1979,pp.1066,1067-1068.
(4)See United States Department of State,Office of Ocean Affairs,Limits in the Seas No.117:Straight Baseline Claims:China,Washington:United States Department of State,1996,p.8.
(5)See“Freedom of Navigation:FY 2011 Operational Assertions”,US Department of Defense,https://policy.defense.gov/Portals/11/Documents/gsa/cwmd/FY2011%20DOD%20Annual%20FON%20Report.pdf.
(1)有关大陆国家远海群岛划设直线基线的实践梳理,见中国国际法学会:《南海仲裁案裁决之批判》,外文出版社2018年版,第241-251页。See also,J.Ashley Roach,“Offshore Archipelagos Enclosed by Straight Baselines An Excessive Claim?”Ocean Development&International Law,Vol.49,No.2,2018,pp.5-6.
(2)See J.Ashley Roach and Robert W.Smith,Excessive Maritime Claims,3rd edn,Leiden:Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,2012,pp.108-115.
(3)同(2),pp.63-64。
(4)同(2),p.67。See also,International Law Association,Sydney Conference 2018,“Baselines under the International Law of the Sea”,Final Report 2018,paras.19-21.
(5)我国于2012年9月10日公布了钓鱼岛及其附属岛屿的领海基线。美国于2013年3月7日通过外交照会向我国表达抗议。See CarrieLyn D.Guymon,ed.,Digest of US Practice in International Law 2013,Office of the Legal Advisor,United States Department of State,pp.369-370,https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/226409.pdf.
(6)See Republic of the Philippines v.People’s Republic of China,“Award”,July 12,2016,p.237,paras.575-576.
(7)See“Remarks by President Obama at U.S.-ASEAN Press Conference”,February 16,2016,https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/16/remarks-president-obama-usasean-press-conference.See also,US Department of State,“Decision in the Philippines-China Arbitration”,July 12,2016,https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/07/259587.htm.
(1)用美国当局的官方说法,就是“行动或声明表明在无法产生领海的地物周围宣告拥有领海”。See“Annual Freedom of Navigation Report,Fiscal Year 2017”.
(2)See Republic of the Philippines v.People’s Republic of China,“Award”,July 12,2016,p.173,paras.377-378.
(3)“U.S.Destroyer Made an‘Innocent Passage’Near Chinese South China Sea Artificial Island in Recent Mission”,USNI News,November 2,2015,https://news.usni.org/2015/11/02/u-sdestroyer-made-an-innocent-passage-near-chinese-south-chia-sea-artificial-island-in-recent-mission.
(4)“U.S.Warship Came Within 6 Miles of Chinese Artificial Island in Toughest Challenge Yet to Beijing South China Sea Claims”,USNI News,May 25,2017,https://news.usni.org/2017/05/25/u-s-warship-came-beijing-south-china-sea-claims.
(5)同(2),para.383.
(6)“US Sails Warship Past Contested Islands in South China Sea,Ahead of G20 Summit”,CNN News,November 30,2018,https://edition.cnn.com/2018/11/29/politics/us-warship-south-china-sea/index.html.
(1)See Eleanor Freund,“Freedom of Navigation in the South China Sea:A Practical Guide”,Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs Special Report,June2017,p,38.http://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/SCS%20Report%20-%20web.pdf.
(2)见《公约》第十八条第2款。
(3)金永明:“论领海无害通过制度”,《国际法研究》,2016年第2期,第68页。
(4)见《公约》第三百条。
(5)见《公约》第三百零一条。
(6)See Malcolm N.Shaw,International Law,8th edn,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2017,p.77.See also,Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria(Cameroon v.Nigeria),Preliminary Objections,Judgement of 11 June 1998,1998 ICJReports 275,p.296,para.38.
(7)See Killian O’Breien,“Article 300”in Alexander Proelss,ed.,United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea:A Commentary,Oxford:Hart Publishing,2017,p.1940.
(8)例如见2019年5月的两次外交部新闻发言人的回应:“2019年5月6日外交部发言人耿爽主持例行记者会”,中华人民共和国外交部,2019年5月6日,http://www3.fmprc.gov.cn/web/fyrbt_673021/t1661103.shtml;“2019年5月20日外交部发言人陆慷主持例行记者会”,中华人民共和国外交部,2019年5月20日,http://www3.fmprc.gov.cn/web/fyrbt_673021/t1664956.shtml。
(9)[英]詹宁斯、瓦茨修订,王铁崖等译:《奥本海国际法》(第一卷第二分册),中国大百科全书出版社,1998年版,第7页。
(10)“2017年10月11日外交部发言人华春莹主持例行记者会”,中华人民共和国外交部,2017年10月11日,https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/fyrbt_673021/t1500839.shtml。
(11)根据越南海军军官、越南海军学院讲师Anh Duc Ton的梳理,在东南亚沿海国中,包括中国(含中国台湾地区)、朝鲜、韩国、越南、菲律宾一直坚持对外国军舰进入本国领海设置限制,或坚持事先通知制、或坚持事先批准制。See Anh Duc Ton,“Innocent Passage of Warships:International Law and the Practice of East Asian Littoral States”,Asia-Pacific Journal of Ocean Law and Policy,Vol.1,No.2,2016,pp.216-236.
(1)“李克强:让南海成为和平之海、友谊之海、合作之海”,中国政府网,2014年11月13日,http://www.gov.cn/guowuyuan/2014-11/13/content_2778119.htm。
(2)“2018年9月6日外交部发言人华春莹主持例行记者会”,中华人民共和国外交部,2018年9月6日,https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/fyrbt_673021/t1592689.shtml。
(3)See“Future South China Sea FONOPS Will Include Allies,Partners”,USNI News,February 12,2019,https://news.usni.org/2019/02/12/41070.
(4)James Kraska and Raul Pedrozo,The Free Sea:The American Fight for Freedom of Navigation,Annapolis:Naval Institute Press,2018,pp.1,269.
(5)See“Pentagon Pledges More Freedom of Navigation Operations in South China Sea”,USNI News,May 31,2018,https://news.usni.org/2018/05/31/34016.
(1)见马新民、刘洋:“《南海仲裁案裁决之批判》评述”,《亚太安全与海洋研究》,2019年第1期,第25-50页。