董秘财务经历对分析师跟踪的影响研究
|
摘要
本文以2008～2015年沪深两市A股上市公司为研究样本,实证检验了董秘财务经历对分析师跟踪的影响。研究表明,董秘财务经历能吸引更多的分析师跟踪,而且,董秘财务经历能削弱股权集中度对分析师跟踪的负面影响。进一步研究发现,相对于非国有企业,国有企业中董秘财务经历对分析师跟踪的影响更显著。本文拓宽了分析师跟踪影响因素的研究领域,为上市公司甄选董秘提供了经验证据。
Based on the empirical data of listed companies in China, this paper investigates the association between the secretary's financial experience and analyst following. The results show that the financial experience of secretaries can attract more following, and the secretary's financial experience will weaken the negative correlation between the ownership concentration and analyst following. In addition, compared with non-state-owned enterprises, the influence of secretary's financial experience on the analyst following is more significant in state-owned enterprises. This paper broadens the field of analyst following, and provides empirical evidence for listed companies to select secretary.
Based on the empirical data of listed companies in China, this paper investigates the association between the secretary's financial experience and analyst following. The results show that the financial experience of secretaries can attract more following, and the secretary's financial experience will weaken the negative correlation between the ownership concentration and analyst following. In addition, compared with non-state-owned enterprises, the influence of secretary's financial experience on the analyst following is more significant in state-owned enterprises. This paper broadens the field of analyst following, and provides empirical evidence for listed companies to select secretary.
引文
[1]蔡卫星,曾诚.公司多元化对证券分析师关注度的影响--基于证券分析师决策行为视角的经验分析[J].南开管理评论,2010,13(4):125-133.
[2]高凤莲,王志强.“董秘”社会资本对信息披露质量的影响研究[J].南开管理评论,2015,18(4):60-71.
[3]高强,伍丽娜.兼任董秘能提高信息披露质量吗?--对拟修订《上市规则》关于董秘任职资格新要求的实证检验[J].会计研究,2008,(1):47-54.
[4]姜付秀,石贝贝,马云飙.信息发布者的财务经历与企业融资约束[J].经济研究,2016a,(6):83-97.
[5]姜付秀,石贝贝,马云飙.董秘财务经历与盈余信息含量[J].管理世界,2016b,(9):161-173.
[6]姜国华,岳衡.大股东占用上市公司资金与上市公司股票回报率关系的研究[J].管理世界,2005,(9):119-157.
[7]毛新述,王斌,林长泉,王楠.信息发布者与资本市场效率[J].经济研究,2013,(10):69-81.
[8]李春涛,宋敏,张璇.分析师跟踪与企业盈余管理--来自中国上市公司的证据[J].金融研究,2014,(7):124-139.
[9]李培功,沈艺峰.媒体的公司治理作用:中国的经验证据[J].经济研究,2010,(4):14-27.
[10]罗进辉,向元高,金思静.董事会秘书能够提高资本市场效率吗--基于股价同步性的经验证据[J].山西财经大学学报,2015,37(12):80-90.
[11]孙光国,赵健宇.产权性质差异、管理层过度自信与会计稳健性[J].会计研究,2014,(5):52-58.
[12]杨志强,王华.公司内部薪酬差距、股权集中度与盈余管理行为--基于高管团队内和高管与员工之间薪酬的比较分析[J].会计研究,2014,(6):57-65.
[13]余明桂,夏新平,潘红波.控股股东与小股东之间的代理问题:来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].管理评论,2007,(4):3-11.
[14]张宏亮,翟学刚.投资者关系、公司价值与投资者保护--基于金牌董秘评比结果的实证研究[J].财贸研究,2009,(4):138-144.
[15]周冬华.证券分析师关心公司治理吗[J].山西财经大学学报,2013,35(2):23-34.
[16]朱茶芬,李志文.国家控股对会计稳健性的影响研究[J].会计研究,2008,(5):38-45.
[17]朱红军,何贤杰,陶林.中国的证券分析师能够提高资本市场的效率吗--基于股价同步性和股价信息含量的经验证据[J].金融研究,2007,(2):110-121.
[18]Arya,A.,Mittendorf,B.e interaction among disclosure,competition between rms,and analyst following[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2007,43(2-3):321-339.
[19]Ball,R.,Kothari,S.P.,Robin,A.e e ects of international institutional factors on properties of accounting earnings[R].Working Paper,University of Rochester,1998.
[20]Bhushan,R.Firm characteristics and analyst following[J].Journal of Accounting&Economics,1989,11(2):255-274.
[21]Boubaker,S.,Labegorre,F.Ownership structure,corporate governance and analyst following:A study of French listed firms[J].Journal of Banking and Finance,2008,32(6):961-976.
[22]Boyd,J.H.,Smith,B.D.The co-evolution of the real and nancial sectors in the growth process[J].World Bank Economic Review,1996,10(2):371-396.
[23]Brennan,M.J.,Hughes,P.J.Stock prices and the supply of information[J].Journal of Finance,1991,46:1665-1691.
[24]Chang,J.J.,Khanna,T.,Palepu,K.Analyst activity around the world[R].Working Paper,Harvard University,2000.
[25]Cheung,Y.L.,Rau,P.R.,Stouraitis,A.Tunneling,propping,and expropriation:Evidence from connected party transactions in Hong Kong[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2006,82(2):343-386.
[26]Degeorge,F.,Yuan,D.,Jeanjean,T.,Stolowy,H.Analyst coverage,earnings management and nancial development:An international study[J].Journal of Accounting&Public Policy,2013,32(1):1-25.
[27]Guercio,D.D.,Seery,L.,Woidtke,T.Do boards pay attention when institutional investors activists“just vote no”?[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2008,90(1):84-103.
[28]Healy,P.M.,Palepu,K.G.Information asymmetry,corporate disclosure,and the capital markets:A review of the empirical disclosure literature[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2001,31(1-3):405-440.
[29]Hope,O.K.Analyst following and the influence of disclosure components,IPOs,and ownership concentration[J].AsiaPacific Journal of Accounting and Economics,2003,10:117-141.
[30]How,J.,Verhoeven,P.,Wahab,E.A.A.Institutional investors,political connections and analyst following in Malaysia[J].Economic Modelling,2014,43:159-167.
[31]Jian,M.,Wong,T.J.Propping through related party transactions[J].Review of Accounting Studies,2010,15(1):70-105.
[32]Jiang,G.,Lee,C.M.C.,Yue,H.Tunneling through intercorporate loans:The China experience[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2010,98(1):1-20.
[33]Jiraporn,P.,Chintrakarn,P.,Kim,Y.S.Analyst following,staggered boards,and managerial entrenchment[J].Journal of Banking&Finance,2012,36(11):3091-3100.
[34]Korczak,P.,Tavakkol,A.Institutional investors and the information content of earnings announcements:The case of Poland[J].Economic Systems,2004,28(2):193-208.
[35]Lang,M.H.,Lins,K.V.,Miller,D.P.Concentrated control,analyst following and valuation:Do analysts matter when investors are protected least?[J].Journal of Accounting Research,2004,42:589-623.
[36]Liu,Q.,Lu,Z.Corporate governance and earnings management in the Chinese listed companies:A tunneling perspective[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2007,13(5):881-906.
[37]Marston,C.Firm characteristics and analyst following in the UK[J].British Accounting Review,1997,29:35-347.
[38]Moreton,Z.,Zenger,T.Information intermediaries’incentives and corporate strategy choices in the US[M].Corporate Governance and Firm Organization,Oxford University Press,2004:113-140.
[39]Moyer,R.C.,Chatfield,R.E.,Sisneros,P.M.Security analyst monitoring activity:Agency costs and information demand[J].Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,1989,24:503-512.
[40]O’Brien,P.C.,Bhushan,R.Analyst following and institutional ownership[J].Journal of Accounting Research.1990,28:55-76.
[41]Parrino,R.,Sias,R.W.,Starks,L.T.Voting with their feet:Institutional ownership changes around forced CEOturnover[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2003,68(1):3-46.
[42]Peng,W.Q.,Wei,K.C.J.,Yang,Z.Tunneling or propping:Evidence from connected transactions in China[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2011,17(2):306-325.
[43]Piotroski,J.D.,Roulstone,D.T.e in uence of analysts,institutional investors,and insiders on the incorporation of market,industry,and firm-specific information into stock prices[J].e Accounting Review,2004,(9):1119-1151.
[44]Pound,J.Raiders,targets and politics:The history and future of American corporate control[J].Journal of Applied Corporate Finance,1992,5(3):6-18.
[45]Rock,W.Analyst following and count-data econometrics[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2001,30:351-373.
[46]Yu,F.Analyst coverage and earnings management[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2008:245-271.
[2]高凤莲,王志强.“董秘”社会资本对信息披露质量的影响研究[J].南开管理评论,2015,18(4):60-71.
[3]高强,伍丽娜.兼任董秘能提高信息披露质量吗?--对拟修订《上市规则》关于董秘任职资格新要求的实证检验[J].会计研究,2008,(1):47-54.
[4]姜付秀,石贝贝,马云飙.信息发布者的财务经历与企业融资约束[J].经济研究,2016a,(6):83-97.
[5]姜付秀,石贝贝,马云飙.董秘财务经历与盈余信息含量[J].管理世界,2016b,(9):161-173.
[6]姜国华,岳衡.大股东占用上市公司资金与上市公司股票回报率关系的研究[J].管理世界,2005,(9):119-157.
[7]毛新述,王斌,林长泉,王楠.信息发布者与资本市场效率[J].经济研究,2013,(10):69-81.
[8]李春涛,宋敏,张璇.分析师跟踪与企业盈余管理--来自中国上市公司的证据[J].金融研究,2014,(7):124-139.
[9]李培功,沈艺峰.媒体的公司治理作用:中国的经验证据[J].经济研究,2010,(4):14-27.
[10]罗进辉,向元高,金思静.董事会秘书能够提高资本市场效率吗--基于股价同步性的经验证据[J].山西财经大学学报,2015,37(12):80-90.
[11]孙光国,赵健宇.产权性质差异、管理层过度自信与会计稳健性[J].会计研究,2014,(5):52-58.
[12]杨志强,王华.公司内部薪酬差距、股权集中度与盈余管理行为--基于高管团队内和高管与员工之间薪酬的比较分析[J].会计研究,2014,(6):57-65.
[13]余明桂,夏新平,潘红波.控股股东与小股东之间的代理问题:来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].管理评论,2007,(4):3-11.
[14]张宏亮,翟学刚.投资者关系、公司价值与投资者保护--基于金牌董秘评比结果的实证研究[J].财贸研究,2009,(4):138-144.
[15]周冬华.证券分析师关心公司治理吗[J].山西财经大学学报,2013,35(2):23-34.
[16]朱茶芬,李志文.国家控股对会计稳健性的影响研究[J].会计研究,2008,(5):38-45.
[17]朱红军,何贤杰,陶林.中国的证券分析师能够提高资本市场的效率吗--基于股价同步性和股价信息含量的经验证据[J].金融研究,2007,(2):110-121.
[18]Arya,A.,Mittendorf,B.e interaction among disclosure,competition between rms,and analyst following[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2007,43(2-3):321-339.
[19]Ball,R.,Kothari,S.P.,Robin,A.e e ects of international institutional factors on properties of accounting earnings[R].Working Paper,University of Rochester,1998.
[20]Bhushan,R.Firm characteristics and analyst following[J].Journal of Accounting&Economics,1989,11(2):255-274.
[21]Boubaker,S.,Labegorre,F.Ownership structure,corporate governance and analyst following:A study of French listed firms[J].Journal of Banking and Finance,2008,32(6):961-976.
[22]Boyd,J.H.,Smith,B.D.The co-evolution of the real and nancial sectors in the growth process[J].World Bank Economic Review,1996,10(2):371-396.
[23]Brennan,M.J.,Hughes,P.J.Stock prices and the supply of information[J].Journal of Finance,1991,46:1665-1691.
[24]Chang,J.J.,Khanna,T.,Palepu,K.Analyst activity around the world[R].Working Paper,Harvard University,2000.
[25]Cheung,Y.L.,Rau,P.R.,Stouraitis,A.Tunneling,propping,and expropriation:Evidence from connected party transactions in Hong Kong[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2006,82(2):343-386.
[26]Degeorge,F.,Yuan,D.,Jeanjean,T.,Stolowy,H.Analyst coverage,earnings management and nancial development:An international study[J].Journal of Accounting&Public Policy,2013,32(1):1-25.
[27]Guercio,D.D.,Seery,L.,Woidtke,T.Do boards pay attention when institutional investors activists“just vote no”?[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2008,90(1):84-103.
[28]Healy,P.M.,Palepu,K.G.Information asymmetry,corporate disclosure,and the capital markets:A review of the empirical disclosure literature[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2001,31(1-3):405-440.
[29]Hope,O.K.Analyst following and the influence of disclosure components,IPOs,and ownership concentration[J].AsiaPacific Journal of Accounting and Economics,2003,10:117-141.
[30]How,J.,Verhoeven,P.,Wahab,E.A.A.Institutional investors,political connections and analyst following in Malaysia[J].Economic Modelling,2014,43:159-167.
[31]Jian,M.,Wong,T.J.Propping through related party transactions[J].Review of Accounting Studies,2010,15(1):70-105.
[32]Jiang,G.,Lee,C.M.C.,Yue,H.Tunneling through intercorporate loans:The China experience[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2010,98(1):1-20.
[33]Jiraporn,P.,Chintrakarn,P.,Kim,Y.S.Analyst following,staggered boards,and managerial entrenchment[J].Journal of Banking&Finance,2012,36(11):3091-3100.
[34]Korczak,P.,Tavakkol,A.Institutional investors and the information content of earnings announcements:The case of Poland[J].Economic Systems,2004,28(2):193-208.
[35]Lang,M.H.,Lins,K.V.,Miller,D.P.Concentrated control,analyst following and valuation:Do analysts matter when investors are protected least?[J].Journal of Accounting Research,2004,42:589-623.
[36]Liu,Q.,Lu,Z.Corporate governance and earnings management in the Chinese listed companies:A tunneling perspective[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2007,13(5):881-906.
[37]Marston,C.Firm characteristics and analyst following in the UK[J].British Accounting Review,1997,29:35-347.
[38]Moreton,Z.,Zenger,T.Information intermediaries’incentives and corporate strategy choices in the US[M].Corporate Governance and Firm Organization,Oxford University Press,2004:113-140.
[39]Moyer,R.C.,Chatfield,R.E.,Sisneros,P.M.Security analyst monitoring activity:Agency costs and information demand[J].Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,1989,24:503-512.
[40]O’Brien,P.C.,Bhushan,R.Analyst following and institutional ownership[J].Journal of Accounting Research.1990,28:55-76.
[41]Parrino,R.,Sias,R.W.,Starks,L.T.Voting with their feet:Institutional ownership changes around forced CEOturnover[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2003,68(1):3-46.
[42]Peng,W.Q.,Wei,K.C.J.,Yang,Z.Tunneling or propping:Evidence from connected transactions in China[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2011,17(2):306-325.
[43]Piotroski,J.D.,Roulstone,D.T.e in uence of analysts,institutional investors,and insiders on the incorporation of market,industry,and firm-specific information into stock prices[J].e Accounting Review,2004,(9):1119-1151.
[44]Pound,J.Raiders,targets and politics:The history and future of American corporate control[J].Journal of Applied Corporate Finance,1992,5(3):6-18.
[45]Rock,W.Analyst following and count-data econometrics[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2001,30:351-373.
[46]Yu,F.Analyst coverage and earnings management[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2008:245-271.