页岩革命与美国的能源新权力
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摘要
页岩革命后,美国在能源市场上角色的转变将引发世界能源市场与地缘政治的"系统效应"。美国不仅借页岩革命成为全球最大油气生产国,而且正在利用能源新权力改变油气市场博弈规则,进而重塑全球能源地缘政治格局。特朗普政府的能源外交越来越具有浓厚的新现实主义色彩。能源被当作加强美国全球领导力的重要工具。页岩革命既为中美在能源领域开展合作提供了机遇,也使美国拥有在能源领域对中国施压的可能。如何构建与包括美国在内的全球主要油气行为体的新型合作关系,应成为中国能源安全战略的重要内容。
The transformation of the US energy role after the shale revolution will trigger a "systemic effect" of the world's energy market and geopolitics. The shale revolution not only pushes the US to the top of the world's largest energy producer,but is also shaking the rules of the traditional oil and gas market,which in turn changes the global landscape of energy geopolitics. The Trump Administration's energy diplomacy is increasingly tinged with new realism. Energy is seen as an important geopolitical tool for strengthening the US global leadership and international influence. The shale revolution not only provides an opportunity for China and the US to cooperate in energy sector,but also gives the US new possibilities to put pressure on China in energy sector. How to construct a new type of cooperative relationship with the world's major energy players,including the US,should be an important part of China's energy security strategy.
The transformation of the US energy role after the shale revolution will trigger a "systemic effect" of the world's energy market and geopolitics. The shale revolution not only pushes the US to the top of the world's largest energy producer,but is also shaking the rules of the traditional oil and gas market,which in turn changes the global landscape of energy geopolitics. The Trump Administration's energy diplomacy is increasingly tinged with new realism. Energy is seen as an important geopolitical tool for strengthening the US global leadership and international influence. The shale revolution not only provides an opportunity for China and the US to cooperate in energy sector,but also gives the US new possibilities to put pressure on China in energy sector. How to construct a new type of cooperative relationship with the world's major energy players,including the US,should be an important part of China's energy security strategy.
引文
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(1)2018年3月,美国能源部长里克·佩里在“剑桥能源周”发表主题演讲,首次旗帜鲜明地提出“能源新现实主义”,即美国在“能源独立”的基础上向全世界出口更多的石油和天然气,其实质是进一步追求“能源统治”这一新的战略目标。
(1)作为非传统现实主义者的苏珊·斯特兰奇认为在经济事务中发挥关键性作用的不是物质上的资源禀赋,而是结构与联系,并由此提出基于生产、安全、金融和知识四种权力来源的“结构性权力”概念。([英]苏珊·斯特兰奇.国家与市场[M].杨宇光等译.上海:上海世纪出版集团,2006:21,211-217.)
(1)当作为卡特尔组织的欧佩克协商减产并促使全球油价升高时,页岩油生产商能迅速提升生产能力,这将缩短传统产油国“减产保价”模式的受益时间。而当油价低迷时,页岩油生产商又将迅速削减投资实现减产、规避损失。
(2)美国液化气价格采用美洲管道气长期合同价与路易斯安那州亨利中心价格挂钩的定价方式。亨利中心价格绑定了纽约商品交易所实物交割的天然气期货合约价。
(1)天然气出口国家论坛于2001年成立,由世界12个主要天然气生产国和5个观察国组成。该论坛控制全球天然气储备的57%,全球天然气贸易的40%和液化气贸易的60%。(Eldar O. Kassayev.The Myth of a Natural Gas OPEC[EB/OL].https://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-myth-natural-gas-opec-8082,2013-02-11.)天然气出口国家论坛是一个代表天然气生产国利益的国际机构。有关该论坛是否会变成天然气卡塔尔引发了很多争论。(S. A. Gabriel,K.E. Rosendahl,Ruud Egging,H.G. Avetisyan,and S. Siddiqui. Cartelization in Gas Market:Studying the Potential for a"Gas OPEC"[J].Energy Economics,2012,Vol. 34:137.)
(1)1980年1月23日,美国总统卡特在国情咨文中提出一项对海湾地区的政策声明,称“外部势力攫取控制波斯湾地区的任何企图,都将被看作是对美国根本利益的进攻。对于这种进攻,美国将使用包括军事力量在内的任何必要手段,予以击退。”这一声明被称作“卡特主义”。关于美国是否应重新考虑其在海湾石油出口中的军事担保国角色,目前引起较大争论。(Glaser L. Glaser and Rosemary A. Kelanic eds.. Crude Strategy:Rethinking the US Military Commitment to Defend Persian Gulf Oil[M]. Georgetown University Press,2016. 141-165;Glaser L. Glaser and Rosemary A. Kelanic. Getting Out of the Gulf:Oil and US Military Strategy[J]. Foreign Affairs,2017,Vol. 96,No. 1:122-131.)
(1)2017年6月,第一批美国液化气抵达波兰,波兰总理称这是“一个历史性的时刻”。2018年3月,美国实现向波罗的海三国出口液化气。
(2)北溪-2天然气管道项目总造价95亿欧元,由俄气出资50%,其余一半融资由法国ENGIE集团、奥地利石油天然气集团(OMV Group)、荷兰皇家壳牌、德国Uniper公司和德国温特沙尔公司(Wintershall)提供。俄气是该项目运营商北溪-2公司的唯一股东。
(3)捷克、匈牙利、波兰、斯洛伐克、拉脱维亚、立陶宛、爱沙尼亚、罗马尼亚和克罗地亚等欧盟9个成员国联名致函欧洲委员会,认为北溪-2使俄天然气直接输送至德国,强化了欧盟对俄天然气依赖,损害了欧盟整体利益。波兰称北溪-2是俄罗斯取得对欧输气控制权的政治性项目,并敦促欧盟委员会明确立场、按照欧盟法律审核该项目。乌克兰和波罗的海国家认为,作为直通管道,北溪-2的建成运营将使俄罗斯不再顾及过境国利益,随心所欲地“讹诈”乌克兰等欧洲国家。(Jean Arnold Vinois and Thomas Pellerin-Carlin. Nord Stream-2:A Decisive Test for EU Energy Diplomacy[EB/OL].http://www. naturalgaseurope.com/nordstream-2-eu-energy-diplomacy-expert-27171,2015-12-16.)
(4)2015年,中国取代美国首次成为世界最大石油进口国。根据国际能源署《天然气市场报告2018》,2017年至2023年间,中国将贡献全球天然气消费增长的37%,2019年成为世界最大的天然气进口国。
(5)2017年,中国石油进口依存度升至72.3%,天然气进口依存度为39%。
(1)具体而言,国家能源投资集团与美国西弗吉尼亚州签署框架协议,对后者页岩气、电力和化工生产项目投资837亿美元。阿拉斯加州政府、阿拉斯加州天然气开发公司(AGDC)、中国石化、中投公司与中国银行签署协议,以促进阿拉斯加州的液化气开发,该协议将涉及最多430亿美元的投资。(中美签订2535亿美元创纪录大单、能源项目超千亿美元[EB/OL].新浪网,https://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/2017-11-10/doc-ifynsait6850227.shtml,2017-11-10.)
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[3] EIA. United States Expected to Become a Net Export of Natural Gas This Year[EB/OL].https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=32412#,2017-08-09.
[4] World Energy Outlook 2018[M].IEA,2018. 24.
[5] Kenneth B. Medlock,Amy Myers Jaffe and Meghan O’Sullivan. The Global Gas Market,LNG Exports and TheShifting US Geopolitical Presence[J].Energy Strategy Reviews,2014,Vol. 5:15.
[6] Jim Krane and Kenneth B.Medlock III. Geopolitical Dimensions of US Oil Security[J].Energy Policy,2018,Vol. 114:561.
[7] Agnia Grigas. The New Geopolitics of Natural Gas[M].Harvard University Press,2017.9,94.
[8] Jason Bordoff and Akos Losz. The United States Turns on the Gas[EB/OL].https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ar?ticles/2016-03-04/united-states-turns-gas,2016-03-04;Bruce D. Jones and David Steven. The Risk Pivot:Great Powers,International Security,and the Energy Revolution[M].Brookings,2014.
[9] Brittney Lenard and Yevgen Sautin. Time for Natural Gas Diplomacy[EB/OL].https://nationalinterest.org/com?mentary/time-natural-gas-diplomacy-9825,2014-02-05;Empowering America:How Energy Abundance CanStrengthen US Global Leadership[M].Atlantic Council Global Energy Center,2015. 2;Tim Boersma,CharlesK. Ebinger and Heather L. Greenley. An Assessment of U.S. Natural Gas Exports[J].Natural Gas Issue Brief,2015,Vol. 4:16.
[10] National Security Strategy of the United States of America[EB/OL].https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905-2.pdf,2017-12-18.
[11] William Wilkes. U.S. Threatens Sanctions if Nord Stream 2 Project Proceeds[EB/OL].https://www.worldoil.com/news/2018/5/17/us-threatens-sanctions-if-nord-stream-2-project-proceeds,2018-05-17.
[12]富景筠.“页岩革命”与俄罗斯在世界能源体系中的地位[J].欧亚经济,2018(3):51.
[13] Meghan L. O'Sullivan. Windfall:How the New Energy Abundance Upends Global Politics and StrengthensAmerica's Power[M].Simon&Schuster,2017.80.
[14]徐建山.论油权——初探石油地缘政治的核心问题[J].世界经济与政治,2012(12):126-129.
[15] Nalin Kumar Mohapatra. Energy Security Paradigm,Structure of Geopolitics and International Relations Theory:From Global South Perspectives[J].GeoJournal,2017,Vol.82:683-700.
[16]刘叶.现行国际原油定价机制下中东利益保障机制及其启示[J].世界经济与政治论坛,2013(1):83.
[17] Meghan L. O'Sullivan. Windfall:How the New Energy Abundance Upends Global Politics and StrengthensAmerica's Power[M].Simon&Schuster,2017. 43.
[18] Tight Oil Expected to Make Up Most of U.S. Oil Production Increase through 2040[EB/OL].https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=29932,2017-02-13.
[19] A.M. Jaffe and E. Morse. The End of OPEC[EB/OL].https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/10/16/the-end-of-opec/#,2013-10-16.
[20] J.D. Colgan. The Emperor Has no Clothes:The Limits of OPEC in the Global Oil Market[J].International Or?ganization,2014,Vol. 68:599-632;Khalid M. Kisswani. Does OPEC Act as a Cartel? Empirical Investigation ofCoordination Behavior[J].Energy Policy,2016,Vol. 97:178.
[21] Jeff D. Colgan and Thijs Van de Graaf. A Crude Reversal:The Political Economy of the United States CrudeOil Export Policy[J].Energy Research&Social Science,2017,Vol. 24:34.
[22] Robert L. Kleinberg,Sergey Paltsev,Charle K. Ebinger,David Hobbs,and Tim Boersma. Tight Oil Develop?ment Economics:Benchmarks,Breakeven Points,and Inelasticities[M].MIT CEEPR Working Paper,2016. 2.
[23] Dawud Ansari. OPEC,Saudi Arabia,and Shale Revolution:Insights from Equilibrium Modeling and Oil Politics[J].Energy Policy,2017,Vol. 111:174.
[24] Spencer Dale. New Economics of Oil[M].Society of Business Economists Annual Conference,2015. 8-10.
[25] Dawud Ansari. OPEC,Saudi Arabia,and Shale Revolution:Insights from Equilibrium Modeling and Oil Politics[J].Energy Policy,2017,Vol. 111:168;John Baffes,M. Ayhan Kose,Franziska Ohnsorge,and Marc Stocker.The Great Plunge in Oil Prices:Causes,Consequences,and Policy Responses[M].Development Economics,World Bank Group,2015. 14.
[26] Spencer Dale. New Economics of Oil[M].Society of Business Economists Annual Conference,2015. 17.
[27] Meghan L. O’Sullivan. Windfall:How the New Energy Abundance Upends Global Politics and StrengthensAmerica's Power[M].Simon&Schuster,2017. 34.
[28]李扬,徐洪峰.特朗普政府“美国第一能源计划”及其影响[J].东北亚论坛,2017(5):106.
[29] Andreas Goldthau.Rhetoric versus Reality:Russian Threats to European Energy Supply[J].Energy Policy,2008,Vol. 36:686.
[30] Anthony J. Melling. Natural Gas Pricing and Its Future—Europe as the Battleground[M].Carnegie Endowmentfor International Peace,2010. 10.
[31] Massimiliano Caporin and Fulvio Fontini. The Long-run Oil-Natural Gas Price Relationship and the Shale GasRevolution[J].Energy Economics,2017,Vol. 64:512.
[32] Willem L. Auping et al.. The Geopolitical Impact of the Shale Revolution:Exploring Consequences on EnergyPrices and Rentier States[J].Energy Policy,2016,Vol. 98:390.
[33] Paul Stevens. The"Shale Gas Revolution":Developments and Changes[M].Chatham House Briefing Paper,2012. 1;Empowering America:How Energy Abundance Can Strengthen US Global Leadership[M].AtlanticCouncil Global Energy Center,2015. 20.
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(1)2018年3月,美国能源部长里克·佩里在“剑桥能源周”发表主题演讲,首次旗帜鲜明地提出“能源新现实主义”,即美国在“能源独立”的基础上向全世界出口更多的石油和天然气,其实质是进一步追求“能源统治”这一新的战略目标。
(1)作为非传统现实主义者的苏珊·斯特兰奇认为在经济事务中发挥关键性作用的不是物质上的资源禀赋,而是结构与联系,并由此提出基于生产、安全、金融和知识四种权力来源的“结构性权力”概念。([英]苏珊·斯特兰奇.国家与市场[M].杨宇光等译.上海:上海世纪出版集团,2006:21,211-217.)
(1)当作为卡特尔组织的欧佩克协商减产并促使全球油价升高时,页岩油生产商能迅速提升生产能力,这将缩短传统产油国“减产保价”模式的受益时间。而当油价低迷时,页岩油生产商又将迅速削减投资实现减产、规避损失。
(2)美国液化气价格采用美洲管道气长期合同价与路易斯安那州亨利中心价格挂钩的定价方式。亨利中心价格绑定了纽约商品交易所实物交割的天然气期货合约价。
(1)天然气出口国家论坛于2001年成立,由世界12个主要天然气生产国和5个观察国组成。该论坛控制全球天然气储备的57%,全球天然气贸易的40%和液化气贸易的60%。(Eldar O. Kassayev.The Myth of a Natural Gas OPEC[EB/OL].https://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-myth-natural-gas-opec-8082,2013-02-11.)天然气出口国家论坛是一个代表天然气生产国利益的国际机构。有关该论坛是否会变成天然气卡塔尔引发了很多争论。(S. A. Gabriel,K.E. Rosendahl,Ruud Egging,H.G. Avetisyan,and S. Siddiqui. Cartelization in Gas Market:Studying the Potential for a"Gas OPEC"[J].Energy Economics,2012,Vol. 34:137.)
(1)1980年1月23日,美国总统卡特在国情咨文中提出一项对海湾地区的政策声明,称“外部势力攫取控制波斯湾地区的任何企图,都将被看作是对美国根本利益的进攻。对于这种进攻,美国将使用包括军事力量在内的任何必要手段,予以击退。”这一声明被称作“卡特主义”。关于美国是否应重新考虑其在海湾石油出口中的军事担保国角色,目前引起较大争论。(Glaser L. Glaser and Rosemary A. Kelanic eds.. Crude Strategy:Rethinking the US Military Commitment to Defend Persian Gulf Oil[M]. Georgetown University Press,2016. 141-165;Glaser L. Glaser and Rosemary A. Kelanic. Getting Out of the Gulf:Oil and US Military Strategy[J]. Foreign Affairs,2017,Vol. 96,No. 1:122-131.)
(1)2017年6月,第一批美国液化气抵达波兰,波兰总理称这是“一个历史性的时刻”。2018年3月,美国实现向波罗的海三国出口液化气。
(2)北溪-2天然气管道项目总造价95亿欧元,由俄气出资50%,其余一半融资由法国ENGIE集团、奥地利石油天然气集团(OMV Group)、荷兰皇家壳牌、德国Uniper公司和德国温特沙尔公司(Wintershall)提供。俄气是该项目运营商北溪-2公司的唯一股东。
(3)捷克、匈牙利、波兰、斯洛伐克、拉脱维亚、立陶宛、爱沙尼亚、罗马尼亚和克罗地亚等欧盟9个成员国联名致函欧洲委员会,认为北溪-2使俄天然气直接输送至德国,强化了欧盟对俄天然气依赖,损害了欧盟整体利益。波兰称北溪-2是俄罗斯取得对欧输气控制权的政治性项目,并敦促欧盟委员会明确立场、按照欧盟法律审核该项目。乌克兰和波罗的海国家认为,作为直通管道,北溪-2的建成运营将使俄罗斯不再顾及过境国利益,随心所欲地“讹诈”乌克兰等欧洲国家。(Jean Arnold Vinois and Thomas Pellerin-Carlin. Nord Stream-2:A Decisive Test for EU Energy Diplomacy[EB/OL].http://www. naturalgaseurope.com/nordstream-2-eu-energy-diplomacy-expert-27171,2015-12-16.)
(4)2015年,中国取代美国首次成为世界最大石油进口国。根据国际能源署《天然气市场报告2018》,2017年至2023年间,中国将贡献全球天然气消费增长的37%,2019年成为世界最大的天然气进口国。
(5)2017年,中国石油进口依存度升至72.3%,天然气进口依存度为39%。
(1)具体而言,国家能源投资集团与美国西弗吉尼亚州签署框架协议,对后者页岩气、电力和化工生产项目投资837亿美元。阿拉斯加州政府、阿拉斯加州天然气开发公司(AGDC)、中国石化、中投公司与中国银行签署协议,以促进阿拉斯加州的液化气开发,该协议将涉及最多430亿美元的投资。(中美签订2535亿美元创纪录大单、能源项目超千亿美元[EB/OL].新浪网,https://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/2017-11-10/doc-ifynsait6850227.shtml,2017-11-10.)