不同权力结构下供应链企业社会责任激励
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摘要
本文以单个供应商和单个零售商组成的两级供应链为对象,假设仅考虑供应商对产品安全方面的社会责任,研究了在供应商主导和零售商主导两种权力配置模式下,供应商履行社会责任程度的差异,以及如何在供应商和零售商间建立合理的契约以激励供应商社会责任的履行。研究发现,相对供应商主导,在零售商主导下供应商会更多地履行社会责任。引入收入共享的事后契约和成本共担的事前契约后,在供应商主导下,两种契约在一定条件下均能有效地激励供应商更好地履行社会责任,但在留存比例与分担比例相等的条件下,成本共担契约的激励效应更强。在零售商主导下,收入共享契约虽能激励供应商的社会责任履行,但因导致零售商的利润下降,故无法达成,而成本共担契约只有在分担足够大时才有激励效应。
Most studies addressing the problem of corporate social responsibility(CSR)stimulation of a supply chain assume that supplier dominates the supply chain.However,the tendency appears that the retailing market is becoming more and more concentrated so that the dominance of retailers on the supply chain gets more and more prominent for some industries.Furthermore,suppliers in the supply chains dominated by different parties may have different motivation to engage CSR and prefer different contracts.Therefore,how to motivate supplier to engage inmore social responsibilities under different power structure of supply chain is studied in this paper.A supply chain consisting of a supplier and a retailer is constructed.Assuming that only the supplier fulfills CSR,the market power structure(retailer-led and supplier-led)is integrated with the supply chain social responsibility incentive contract(revenue-sharing incentive and cost-sharing incentive)choice decision,aiming to maximize the social responsibility under the premise that profits increased for both parties of the supply chain after the contract is introduced.The following findings are contributed.Relative to the supplier-dominated mode,the supplier would undertake more social responsibility in the retailer-dominatedmode.With the introduction of revenue-sharing and cost-sharing contract,it is found that the cost-sharing contract is more effective even though both contracts are feasible to stimulate suppers' social responsibilities in the supplier-led model.However,in the retailer-dominated mode,the revenue-sharing contract can motivate the suppliers to undertake more corporate social responsibility,but a fails to increase the profit of retailer.The contract can't thereby be reached.The cost-sharing contract only has a stimulating effect when the sharing rate is big enough,which is inconsistent with the intuition.All the findings are demonstrated by the simulation results.It is revealed,on the one hand,sharing contract can motivate suppliers to fulfill CSR,and on the other hand,it provides implications to motivate suppliers' CSR initiatives for the retailer-led supply chain.
Most studies addressing the problem of corporate social responsibility(CSR)stimulation of a supply chain assume that supplier dominates the supply chain.However,the tendency appears that the retailing market is becoming more and more concentrated so that the dominance of retailers on the supply chain gets more and more prominent for some industries.Furthermore,suppliers in the supply chains dominated by different parties may have different motivation to engage CSR and prefer different contracts.Therefore,how to motivate supplier to engage inmore social responsibilities under different power structure of supply chain is studied in this paper.A supply chain consisting of a supplier and a retailer is constructed.Assuming that only the supplier fulfills CSR,the market power structure(retailer-led and supplier-led)is integrated with the supply chain social responsibility incentive contract(revenue-sharing incentive and cost-sharing incentive)choice decision,aiming to maximize the social responsibility under the premise that profits increased for both parties of the supply chain after the contract is introduced.The following findings are contributed.Relative to the supplier-dominated mode,the supplier would undertake more social responsibility in the retailer-dominatedmode.With the introduction of revenue-sharing and cost-sharing contract,it is found that the cost-sharing contract is more effective even though both contracts are feasible to stimulate suppers' social responsibilities in the supplier-led model.However,in the retailer-dominated mode,the revenue-sharing contract can motivate the suppliers to undertake more corporate social responsibility,but a fails to increase the profit of retailer.The contract can't thereby be reached.The cost-sharing contract only has a stimulating effect when the sharing rate is big enough,which is inconsistent with the intuition.All the findings are demonstrated by the simulation results.It is revealed,on the one hand,sharing contract can motivate suppliers to fulfill CSR,and on the other hand,it provides implications to motivate suppliers' CSR initiatives for the retailer-led supply chain.
引文
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[14]肖迪,郝云宏.基于关系契约的供应链企业社会责任协调及成本分担策略[J].中国流通经济,2017,31(06):53-60.
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[16]Wu Chenghan.Collaboration and sharing mechanisms in improving corporate social responsibility[J].Central European Journal of Operations Research,2016,(3):1-27.
[17]Ma Peng,Shang J,Wang Haiyan.Enhancing corporate social responsibility:Contract design under information asymmetry[J].Omega,2017,67:19-30.
[18]李明芳,薛景梅.不同渠道权力结构下制造商回收闭环供应链绩效分析[J].控制与决策,2016,31(11):2095-2100.
[19]Ma Peng,Wang Haiyan,Shang J.Supply chain channel strategies with quality and marketing effort-dependent demand[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2013,144(2):572-581.
[20]易余胤.具竞争零售商的再制造闭环供应链模型研究[J].管理科学学报,2009,12(6):45-54.
[21]Ghosh D,Shah J.A comparative analysis of greening policies across supply chain structures[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2012,135(2):568-583.
[22]Liu Zugang,Anderson T D,Cruz J M.Consumer environmental awareness and competition in two-stage supply chains[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2012,218(3):602-613.
[23]Savaskan R C,Bhattacharya S,Wassenhove L N V.Closed-loop supply chain models with product remanufacturing[J].Management Science,2004,50(2):239-252.
[24]Sen S,Bhattacharya C B.Does doing good always lead to doing better?Consumer reactions to corporate social responsibility[J].Journal of Marketing Research,2001,38(2):225-243.
[25]Gao Juhong,Han Hongshuai,Hou Liting,et al.Pricing and effort decisions in a closed-loop supply chain under different channel power structures[J].Journal of Cleaner Production,2016,112:2043-2057.
[26]Ma Peng,Wang Haiyan,Shang J.Contract design for two-stage supply chain coordination:Integrating manufacturer-quality and retailer-marketing efforts[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2013,146(2):745-755.
[27]Wu Chenghan.Price and service competition between new and remanufactured productsin a two-echelon supply chain[J].International Journal of Production E-conomics,2012,140(1):496-507.
[28]江世英,李随成.考虑产品绿色度的绿色供应链博弈模型及收入共享契约[J].中国管理科学,2015,23(6):169-176.
[29]宋杰珍,黄有方,谷金蔚.具有社会责任意识的单生产商-两零售商供应链均衡决策研究[J].管理学报,2016,13(10):1571-1578.
[30]颜波,刘巳.基于连续时间动态博弈的供应链企业社会责任研究[J].管理学报,2016,13(6):913-921.
[31]肖迪,潘可文.基于收入共享契约的供应链质量控制与协调机制[J].中国管理科学,2012,20(4):67-73.
[32]叶晓文.基于企业社会责任的供应链协调研究[D].暨南大学,2015.
[2]AmaeshiK M,Nnodim P.Corporate social responsibility in supply chains of global brands:A boundaryless responsibility?clarifications,exceptions and implications[J].Journal of Business Ethics,2008,81(1):223-234.
[3]Boyd D E,Spekman R E,Kamauff J W,et al.Corporate social responsibility in global supply chains:A procedural justice perspective[J].Long Range Planning,2007,40(3):341-356.
[4]Du Shuili,Bhattacharya C B,Sen S.Corporate social responsibility and competitive advantage:Overcoming the trust barrier[J].Management Science,2010,57(9):1528-1545.
[5]李金华.企业社会责任差异化对供应链竞争影响的博弈分析[J].系统科学学报,2017,25(02):62-66.
[6]郭毅,苏欣.供应链社会责任管理与零售业的可持续发展[J].北京工商大学学报(社会科学版),2012,27(4):12-16.
[7]Rammohan S.Business benefits to Hewlett-Packard suppliers from socially and environmentally responsible(SER)practices in China:A case study[C]//Socially and environmentally responsible supply chains program global supply chainmanagement forum,Stanford Graduate School of Business.2008.
[8]Panda S.Coordination of a socially responsible supply chain using revenue sharing contract[J].Transportation Research Part E:Logistics&Transportation Review,2014,67:92-104.
[9]Panda S,Modak N M,Basu M,et al.Channel coordination and profit distribution in a social responsible three layer supply chain[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2015,168:224-233.
[10]Panda S,Modak N M,Pradhan D.Corporate social responsibility,channel coordination and profit division in a two echelon supply chain[J].International Journal of Management Science&Engineering Management,2016a,11(1):22-33.
[11]段华薇,严余松,张亚东.考虑企业社会责任的物流服务供应链定价与协调[J].控制与决策,2016,31(12):2287-2292.
[12]范建昌,倪得兵,唐小我.企业社会责任与供应链产品质量选择及协调契约研究[J].管理学报,2017,14(09):1374-1383.
[13]Ni Debing,Li K W,Tang Xiaowo.Social responsibility allocation in two-echelon supply chains:Insights from wholesale price contracts[J].European Journal of Opera-tional Research,2010,207(3):1269-1279.
[14]肖迪,郝云宏.基于关系契约的供应链企业社会责任协调及成本分担策略[J].中国流通经济,2017,31(06):53-60.
[15]Hsueh C F.Improving corporate social responsibility in a supply chain through a new revenue sharing contract[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2014,151(3):214-222.
[16]Wu Chenghan.Collaboration and sharing mechanisms in improving corporate social responsibility[J].Central European Journal of Operations Research,2016,(3):1-27.
[17]Ma Peng,Shang J,Wang Haiyan.Enhancing corporate social responsibility:Contract design under information asymmetry[J].Omega,2017,67:19-30.
[18]李明芳,薛景梅.不同渠道权力结构下制造商回收闭环供应链绩效分析[J].控制与决策,2016,31(11):2095-2100.
[19]Ma Peng,Wang Haiyan,Shang J.Supply chain channel strategies with quality and marketing effort-dependent demand[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2013,144(2):572-581.
[20]易余胤.具竞争零售商的再制造闭环供应链模型研究[J].管理科学学报,2009,12(6):45-54.
[21]Ghosh D,Shah J.A comparative analysis of greening policies across supply chain structures[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2012,135(2):568-583.
[22]Liu Zugang,Anderson T D,Cruz J M.Consumer environmental awareness and competition in two-stage supply chains[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2012,218(3):602-613.
[23]Savaskan R C,Bhattacharya S,Wassenhove L N V.Closed-loop supply chain models with product remanufacturing[J].Management Science,2004,50(2):239-252.
[24]Sen S,Bhattacharya C B.Does doing good always lead to doing better?Consumer reactions to corporate social responsibility[J].Journal of Marketing Research,2001,38(2):225-243.
[25]Gao Juhong,Han Hongshuai,Hou Liting,et al.Pricing and effort decisions in a closed-loop supply chain under different channel power structures[J].Journal of Cleaner Production,2016,112:2043-2057.
[26]Ma Peng,Wang Haiyan,Shang J.Contract design for two-stage supply chain coordination:Integrating manufacturer-quality and retailer-marketing efforts[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2013,146(2):745-755.
[27]Wu Chenghan.Price and service competition between new and remanufactured productsin a two-echelon supply chain[J].International Journal of Production E-conomics,2012,140(1):496-507.
[28]江世英,李随成.考虑产品绿色度的绿色供应链博弈模型及收入共享契约[J].中国管理科学,2015,23(6):169-176.
[29]宋杰珍,黄有方,谷金蔚.具有社会责任意识的单生产商-两零售商供应链均衡决策研究[J].管理学报,2016,13(10):1571-1578.
[30]颜波,刘巳.基于连续时间动态博弈的供应链企业社会责任研究[J].管理学报,2016,13(6):913-921.
[31]肖迪,潘可文.基于收入共享契约的供应链质量控制与协调机制[J].中国管理科学,2012,20(4):67-73.
[32]叶晓文.基于企业社会责任的供应链协调研究[D].暨南大学,2015.