大股东股权质押对企业创新投资的影响分析——基于创业板上市公司的经验证据
|
摘要
依据代理理论和资源基础理论,本文选取2011～2016年创业板上市公司作为样本,实证分析大股东股权质押行为对企业创新投资的影响机制。结果表明,大股东进行股权质押融资不利于企业创新投资,并且企业创新投资会随质押比例的提高而降低,在尽可能控制内生性问题后结论依然成立。进一步区分股东异质性后发现,大股东股权质押对企业创新投资的负向影响,存在于非国有控股企业组以及高持股比例组。研究表明,大股东股权质押后出于维护控制权地位的考虑,会产生风险规避倾向和掏空动机,从而影响企业的创新投资水平。
According to the agency theory and the resource-based theory, this paper selects the GEM listed companies from 2011 to 2016 as a sample to empirically analyze the impact mechanism of the shareholder pledge behavior of large shareholders on the innovation investment of enterprises. The results show that the equity pledge financing of large shareholders is not conducive to enterprise innovation investment, and the enterprise innovation investment will decrease with the increase of pledge ratio. The conclusion is still established after controlling endogenous problems as much as possible. After further distinguishing the heterogeneity of shareholders, it is found that the negative impact of the shareholder pledge of large shareholders on the innovation investment of enterprises exists in the non-state-owned holding enterprise group and the highshareholding ratio group. Research conclusions show that, considering the maintenance of the status of control right after the shareholder's equity pledge, the risk aversion tendency and the short-term motivation will be generated, which will affect the level of innovation investment of the company.
According to the agency theory and the resource-based theory, this paper selects the GEM listed companies from 2011 to 2016 as a sample to empirically analyze the impact mechanism of the shareholder pledge behavior of large shareholders on the innovation investment of enterprises. The results show that the equity pledge financing of large shareholders is not conducive to enterprise innovation investment, and the enterprise innovation investment will decrease with the increase of pledge ratio. The conclusion is still established after controlling endogenous problems as much as possible. After further distinguishing the heterogeneity of shareholders, it is found that the negative impact of the shareholder pledge of large shareholders on the innovation investment of enterprises exists in the non-state-owned holding enterprise group and the highshareholding ratio group. Research conclusions show that, considering the maintenance of the status of control right after the shareholder's equity pledge, the risk aversion tendency and the short-term motivation will be generated, which will affect the level of innovation investment of the company.
引文
[1]Brown J R,Petersen B C.Cash Holdings and R&DSmoothing[J].Journal of Corporate Finance[J],2011,17(3):694-709.
[2]Claessens S,Yurtoglu B B.Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets:A Survey[J].Social Science Electronic Publishing,2013,15(8):1-33.
[3]Huang,Z.and Q.Xue,Re-examination of the Effect of Ownership Structure on Financial Reporting:Evidence from Share Pledges in China[J].China Journal of Accounting Research,2016,9(2):137-152.
[4]Johnson S,Porta R L,Shleifer A.Tunneling[J].American Economic Review,2000,90(2):22-27.
[5]Peng W Q,Wei K C J,Yang Z.Tunneling or Propping:Evidence form Connected Transactions in China[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2011,17(2):306-325.
[6]Porta,Rafael La,F.Lopez-De-Silanes,and A.Shleifer.Corporate Ownership Around the World[J].Journal of Finance,1999,54(2):471-517.
[7]Shleifer A,R.W.Vishny.Large Shareholders and Corporate Control[J].The Journal of Political Economy.1986,94(3):461-488.
[8]Yafeh Y,Yosha O.Large Shareholders and Banks:Who Monitors and How?[J].The Economic Journal,2003,113(484):128-146.
[9]Yeh Y H,Ko C E,Su Y H.Ultimate Control and Expropriation of Minority Shareholders:New Evidence from Taiwan[J].Academia Economic Papers,2003,31(3):263-299.
[10]Yehning Chen,ShingYang Hu.The Controlling Shareholder's Personal Leverage and Firm Performance[J].Social Science Electronic Publishing,2007,39(8):1059-1075.
[11]李旎,郑国坚.市值管理动机下的控股股东股权质押融资与利益侵占[J].会计研究,2015,(05):42-49.
[12]李政,陆寅宏.国有企业真的缺乏创新能力吗?——基于上市公司所有权性质与创新绩效的实证分析与比较[J].经济理论与经济管理,2014,34(2):27-38.
[13]吕晓亮.控股股东股权质押与公司违规[J].山西财经大学学报,2017,39(11):84-96.
[14]欧阳才越,谢妍,熊家财.控股股东股权质押与新发行公司债券定价[J].山西财经大学学报,2018,40(1):26-38.
[15]任海云.股权结构与企业R&D投入关系的实证研究——基于A股制造业上市公司的数据分析[J].中国软科学,2010,(05):126-135.
[16]王春燕,张玉明,朱磊.卖空真的会促进企业的创新投资吗?——基于双重差分模型的检验[J].证券市场导报,2018,(5):52-61.
[17]王雄元,欧阳才越,史震阳.股权质押、控制权转移风险与税收规避[J].经济研究,2018,(01):138-152.
[18]王彦超.融资约束、现金持有与过度投资[J].金融研究,2009,(07):122-133.
[19]谢德仁,廖珂,郑登津.控股股东股权质押与开发支出会计政策隐性选择[J].会计研究,2017,(03):30-38.
[20]谢德仁,郑登津,崔宸瑜.控股股东股权质押是潜在的“地雷”吗?——基于股价崩盘风险视角的研究[J].管理世界,2016,(05):128-140.
[21]徐进,吴雪芬.企业现金持有改善了研发投入平稳性吗?[J].证券市场导报,2017,(06):36-42.
[22]杨风,李卿云.股权结构与研发投资——基于创业板上市公司的经验证据[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2016,37(2):123-135.
[23]杨勇,达庆利,周勤.公司治理对企业技术创新投资影响的实证研究[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2007,28(11):61-65.
[24]郑国坚,林东杰,林斌.大股东股权质押、占款与企业价值[J].管理科学学报,2014,17(9):72-87.
[25]张瑞君,徐鑫,王超恩.大股东股权质押与企业创新[J].审计与经济研究,2017,32(4):63-73.
[26]郑国坚,林东杰,张飞达.大股东财务困境、掏空与公司治理的有效性——来自大股东财务数据的证据[J].管理世界,2013,(05):157-168.
[2]Claessens S,Yurtoglu B B.Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets:A Survey[J].Social Science Electronic Publishing,2013,15(8):1-33.
[3]Huang,Z.and Q.Xue,Re-examination of the Effect of Ownership Structure on Financial Reporting:Evidence from Share Pledges in China[J].China Journal of Accounting Research,2016,9(2):137-152.
[4]Johnson S,Porta R L,Shleifer A.Tunneling[J].American Economic Review,2000,90(2):22-27.
[5]Peng W Q,Wei K C J,Yang Z.Tunneling or Propping:Evidence form Connected Transactions in China[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2011,17(2):306-325.
[6]Porta,Rafael La,F.Lopez-De-Silanes,and A.Shleifer.Corporate Ownership Around the World[J].Journal of Finance,1999,54(2):471-517.
[7]Shleifer A,R.W.Vishny.Large Shareholders and Corporate Control[J].The Journal of Political Economy.1986,94(3):461-488.
[8]Yafeh Y,Yosha O.Large Shareholders and Banks:Who Monitors and How?[J].The Economic Journal,2003,113(484):128-146.
[9]Yeh Y H,Ko C E,Su Y H.Ultimate Control and Expropriation of Minority Shareholders:New Evidence from Taiwan[J].Academia Economic Papers,2003,31(3):263-299.
[10]Yehning Chen,ShingYang Hu.The Controlling Shareholder's Personal Leverage and Firm Performance[J].Social Science Electronic Publishing,2007,39(8):1059-1075.
[11]李旎,郑国坚.市值管理动机下的控股股东股权质押融资与利益侵占[J].会计研究,2015,(05):42-49.
[12]李政,陆寅宏.国有企业真的缺乏创新能力吗?——基于上市公司所有权性质与创新绩效的实证分析与比较[J].经济理论与经济管理,2014,34(2):27-38.
[13]吕晓亮.控股股东股权质押与公司违规[J].山西财经大学学报,2017,39(11):84-96.
[14]欧阳才越,谢妍,熊家财.控股股东股权质押与新发行公司债券定价[J].山西财经大学学报,2018,40(1):26-38.
[15]任海云.股权结构与企业R&D投入关系的实证研究——基于A股制造业上市公司的数据分析[J].中国软科学,2010,(05):126-135.
[16]王春燕,张玉明,朱磊.卖空真的会促进企业的创新投资吗?——基于双重差分模型的检验[J].证券市场导报,2018,(5):52-61.
[17]王雄元,欧阳才越,史震阳.股权质押、控制权转移风险与税收规避[J].经济研究,2018,(01):138-152.
[18]王彦超.融资约束、现金持有与过度投资[J].金融研究,2009,(07):122-133.
[19]谢德仁,廖珂,郑登津.控股股东股权质押与开发支出会计政策隐性选择[J].会计研究,2017,(03):30-38.
[20]谢德仁,郑登津,崔宸瑜.控股股东股权质押是潜在的“地雷”吗?——基于股价崩盘风险视角的研究[J].管理世界,2016,(05):128-140.
[21]徐进,吴雪芬.企业现金持有改善了研发投入平稳性吗?[J].证券市场导报,2017,(06):36-42.
[22]杨风,李卿云.股权结构与研发投资——基于创业板上市公司的经验证据[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2016,37(2):123-135.
[23]杨勇,达庆利,周勤.公司治理对企业技术创新投资影响的实证研究[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2007,28(11):61-65.
[24]郑国坚,林东杰,林斌.大股东股权质押、占款与企业价值[J].管理科学学报,2014,17(9):72-87.
[25]张瑞君,徐鑫,王超恩.大股东股权质押与企业创新[J].审计与经济研究,2017,32(4):63-73.
[26]郑国坚,林东杰,张飞达.大股东财务困境、掏空与公司治理的有效性——来自大股东财务数据的证据[J].管理世界,2013,(05):157-168.