论作为创新信息系统的专利制度
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摘要
专利制度发挥着一种受信赖的信息系统之作用,它被视为信息可靠性的保障,降低了发明信息的传递成本和交易成本。它所意欲促进扩散的创新信息不仅指技术信息,还包括与技术相关的非技术信息。非技术信息对于技术扩散也具有重要的意义,但其价值常常被人们漠视,其原因在于人们对专利制度如何促进技术信息扩散的作用机理产生了错误的认识。专利制度不仅应该通过公开充分性制度来实现技术信息的扩散,它还需要通过权利要求解释、侵权救济与权利例外等制度的完善来实现非技术信息的扩散。因此,传统上的"专利公开"概念应该予以拓宽。
Patent system plays a role as a trusted information system,which is regarded as the guarantee of information reliability and reduces the transmission and transaction cost of inventive information.The innovative information whichthe pattern system intends to diffuse not only includes the technical information,but also the non-technical information related to technology.The non-technical information is also of great significance to the diffusion of technology,but its value is often neglected because people have a wrong understanding of the mechanism of how the patent system promotes the diffusion of technological information.The realization of diffusion of technical information of patent system should not only depends on the open and sufficient system,but also on the perfection of the system of right claim interpretation,tort relief,and right exception,etc.Therefore,the traditional concept of "patent disclosure" should be broadened.
Patent system plays a role as a trusted information system,which is regarded as the guarantee of information reliability and reduces the transmission and transaction cost of inventive information.The innovative information whichthe pattern system intends to diffuse not only includes the technical information,but also the non-technical information related to technology.The non-technical information is also of great significance to the diffusion of technology,but its value is often neglected because people have a wrong understanding of the mechanism of how the patent system promotes the diffusion of technological information.The realization of diffusion of technical information of patent system should not only depends on the open and sufficient system,but also on the perfection of the system of right claim interpretation,tort relief,and right exception,etc.Therefore,the traditional concept of "patent disclosure" should be broadened.
引文
[1]Gaia Bernstein.In the Shadow of Innovation[J].Cardozo Law Review,2010,31:2260.
[2]W·R·Cornish.Intellectual Property:Patent,Copyright,Trademarks and Allied Rights[M].7rd,London:Sweet&Maxwell,2010:144.
[3]Spencer Weber Waller,Matthew Sag.Promoting Innovation[J].Iowa Law Review,2015,100:2223-2224.
[4]中共中央文献研究室.习近平关于科技创新论述摘编[M].北京:中央文献出版社,2016.
[5]Arnold Heertje,Jan Middendorp.Schumpeter on the Economics of Innovation and the Development of Capitalism[M].Edward Elgar Publishing,2006:79.
[6]董景荣.技术创新扩散的理论、方法与实践[M].北京:科学出版社,2009:25-26.
[7]Kenneth J.Arrow.Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention[M]∥The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity:Economic and Social Factors.New Jersey:Princeton University Press,1962:609.
[8]梁志文.美国专利法上的“不公平行为原则”[J].法令月刊,2011(9):126-143.
[9]赵勇.专利正当性:阿罗悖论的困境及其重释[J].吉首大学学报(社会科学版),2016(1):70-81.
[10]钱弘道.经济分析法学[M].北京:法律出版社,2003:345.
[11]John R.Allison,Lisa Larrimore Ouellette.How Courts Adjudicate Patent Definiteness and Disclosure[J].Duke Law Journal,2016,65:609.
[12]梁志文.论专利公开[M].北京:知识产权出版社,2012:161.
[13]徐瑄.专利权垄断性的法哲学分析[J].中国法学,2002(4):95-101.
[14]J.Jonas Anderson.Nontechnical Disclosure[J].Vanderbilt Law Review,2016,69:1573-1602.
[15]Colleen V.Chien.Contextualizing Patent Disclosure[J].Vanderbilt Law Review,2016,69:1849-1890.
[16]Jeanne C.Fromer.Dynamic Patent Disclosure[J].Vanderbilt Law Review,2016,69:1715-1738.
[17]Jason Rantanen.Peripheral Disclosure[J].Pitt.L.Rev.,2012,74:1-45.
[18]梁志文.论专利制度的基本功能[J].吉首大学学报(社会科学版),2012(3):94-103.
[19]依法加大惩治力度,让侵权者付出代价[EB/OL].[2018-05-16].http:∥www.sipo.gov.cn/mtsd/1120607.htm.
[20]John R.Allison,et al.Valuable Patents[J].GEO.L.J.,2004,92:435-494
[21]Jacob Schmookler.Economic Sources of Inventive Activity[J].J.ECON.HIST.,1962,22:1-20.
[22]Mark A.Lemley.Ignoring Patents[J].MICH.ST.L.REV.,2008:19-24.
[23]FED.TRADE COMM'N.THE EVOLVING IPMARKETPLACE:ALIGNING PATENT NOTICEAND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION[M/OL].[2018-05-18].https:∥max.book118.com/html/2018/0309/156575307.shtm,2011:91-92.
[24]Andrew S.Baluch.Relating the Two Experimental Use in Patent Law:I nventor's Negation and I nfringer's Defense[J].B.U.L.REV.,2007,87:214.
[25]鲁德夫·克拉瑟.专利法[M].单晓光,等译.北京:知识产权出版社,2016:971.
[26]苏珊娜·斯科奇姆.创新与激励[M].刘勇,译.上海:格致出版社,上海人民出版社,2010:124-125.
[27]Ted Hagelin.The Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement:Information on Ice,Competition on Hold[J].FLA.L.REV.,2006,58:483-560.
[28]梁志文.论专利授权行为的法律效力[J].法律科学,2009(5):157-164.
[29]仁达建材厂诉新益公司专利侵权纠纷案[J].最高人民法院公报,2005(10):21.
[30]Peter Lee.Patent Law and the Two Cultures[J].YALE.L.J.,2010,121:2-82.
[31]梁志文.专利权的界定:沟通权利要求的解释与公开充分性[J].清华知识产权评论,2015(1):50-61.
[32]Craig Allen Nard.Legal Fictions and the Role of Information in Patent Law[J].Vanderbilt Law Review,2016,69:1517-1542.
[33]梁志文.专利制度的“阿喀琉斯之踵”及其克服[J].吉首大学学报(社会科学版),2016(1):58-69.
(1)阿罗认识到专利制度将可能导致对发明(信息)利用不足的问题,因而他认为,最理想的情况应该是由政府来对发明予以奖励,社会公众可以免费使用。参见Kenneth J.Arrow,Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention,in The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity:Economic and Social Factors,New Jersey:Princeton University Press,1962,at 623。但是,哈罗德·德姆塞斯认为,与奖励制度的弊端相比,专利制度是较优的选择。参见Harold Demsetz,Information and Efficiency:Another Viewpoint,12J.L.&ECON.1(1969)。德姆塞斯的观点成为现代专利经济学的基础,但阿罗指出的信息公开悖论成为了专利经济学分析的前提。
(1)更详细的论述,参见Enhanced Patent Quality Initiative:Moving Forward,U.S.PAT.&TRADEMARK OFF.:DIRECTOR'S F.:A BLOG FROM USPTO'S LEADERSHIP(Nov.6,2015),http:∥www.uspto.gov/blog/director/entry/enhanced_patent_quality_initiative_moving[https:∥perma.cc/C344-U2X8]。
(1)参见Halo Elecs.,Inc.v.Pulse Elecs.,Inc.,136S.Ct.1923,1928(2016)。该案讨论了美国专利法上惩罚性赔偿的发展与具体适用条件。
[2]W·R·Cornish.Intellectual Property:Patent,Copyright,Trademarks and Allied Rights[M].7rd,London:Sweet&Maxwell,2010:144.
[3]Spencer Weber Waller,Matthew Sag.Promoting Innovation[J].Iowa Law Review,2015,100:2223-2224.
[4]中共中央文献研究室.习近平关于科技创新论述摘编[M].北京:中央文献出版社,2016.
[5]Arnold Heertje,Jan Middendorp.Schumpeter on the Economics of Innovation and the Development of Capitalism[M].Edward Elgar Publishing,2006:79.
[6]董景荣.技术创新扩散的理论、方法与实践[M].北京:科学出版社,2009:25-26.
[7]Kenneth J.Arrow.Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention[M]∥The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity:Economic and Social Factors.New Jersey:Princeton University Press,1962:609.
[8]梁志文.美国专利法上的“不公平行为原则”[J].法令月刊,2011(9):126-143.
[9]赵勇.专利正当性:阿罗悖论的困境及其重释[J].吉首大学学报(社会科学版),2016(1):70-81.
[10]钱弘道.经济分析法学[M].北京:法律出版社,2003:345.
[11]John R.Allison,Lisa Larrimore Ouellette.How Courts Adjudicate Patent Definiteness and Disclosure[J].Duke Law Journal,2016,65:609.
[12]梁志文.论专利公开[M].北京:知识产权出版社,2012:161.
[13]徐瑄.专利权垄断性的法哲学分析[J].中国法学,2002(4):95-101.
[14]J.Jonas Anderson.Nontechnical Disclosure[J].Vanderbilt Law Review,2016,69:1573-1602.
[15]Colleen V.Chien.Contextualizing Patent Disclosure[J].Vanderbilt Law Review,2016,69:1849-1890.
[16]Jeanne C.Fromer.Dynamic Patent Disclosure[J].Vanderbilt Law Review,2016,69:1715-1738.
[17]Jason Rantanen.Peripheral Disclosure[J].Pitt.L.Rev.,2012,74:1-45.
[18]梁志文.论专利制度的基本功能[J].吉首大学学报(社会科学版),2012(3):94-103.
[19]依法加大惩治力度,让侵权者付出代价[EB/OL].[2018-05-16].http:∥www.sipo.gov.cn/mtsd/1120607.htm.
[20]John R.Allison,et al.Valuable Patents[J].GEO.L.J.,2004,92:435-494
[21]Jacob Schmookler.Economic Sources of Inventive Activity[J].J.ECON.HIST.,1962,22:1-20.
[22]Mark A.Lemley.Ignoring Patents[J].MICH.ST.L.REV.,2008:19-24.
[23]FED.TRADE COMM'N.THE EVOLVING IPMARKETPLACE:ALIGNING PATENT NOTICEAND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION[M/OL].[2018-05-18].https:∥max.book118.com/html/2018/0309/156575307.shtm,2011:91-92.
[24]Andrew S.Baluch.Relating the Two Experimental Use in Patent Law:I nventor's Negation and I nfringer's Defense[J].B.U.L.REV.,2007,87:214.
[25]鲁德夫·克拉瑟.专利法[M].单晓光,等译.北京:知识产权出版社,2016:971.
[26]苏珊娜·斯科奇姆.创新与激励[M].刘勇,译.上海:格致出版社,上海人民出版社,2010:124-125.
[27]Ted Hagelin.The Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement:Information on Ice,Competition on Hold[J].FLA.L.REV.,2006,58:483-560.
[28]梁志文.论专利授权行为的法律效力[J].法律科学,2009(5):157-164.
[29]仁达建材厂诉新益公司专利侵权纠纷案[J].最高人民法院公报,2005(10):21.
[30]Peter Lee.Patent Law and the Two Cultures[J].YALE.L.J.,2010,121:2-82.
[31]梁志文.专利权的界定:沟通权利要求的解释与公开充分性[J].清华知识产权评论,2015(1):50-61.
[32]Craig Allen Nard.Legal Fictions and the Role of Information in Patent Law[J].Vanderbilt Law Review,2016,69:1517-1542.
[33]梁志文.专利制度的“阿喀琉斯之踵”及其克服[J].吉首大学学报(社会科学版),2016(1):58-69.
(1)阿罗认识到专利制度将可能导致对发明(信息)利用不足的问题,因而他认为,最理想的情况应该是由政府来对发明予以奖励,社会公众可以免费使用。参见Kenneth J.Arrow,Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention,in The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity:Economic and Social Factors,New Jersey:Princeton University Press,1962,at 623。但是,哈罗德·德姆塞斯认为,与奖励制度的弊端相比,专利制度是较优的选择。参见Harold Demsetz,Information and Efficiency:Another Viewpoint,12J.L.&ECON.1(1969)。德姆塞斯的观点成为现代专利经济学的基础,但阿罗指出的信息公开悖论成为了专利经济学分析的前提。
(1)更详细的论述,参见Enhanced Patent Quality Initiative:Moving Forward,U.S.PAT.&TRADEMARK OFF.:DIRECTOR'S F.:A BLOG FROM USPTO'S LEADERSHIP(Nov.6,2015),http:∥www.uspto.gov/blog/director/entry/enhanced_patent_quality_initiative_moving[https:∥perma.cc/C344-U2X8]。
(1)参见Halo Elecs.,Inc.v.Pulse Elecs.,Inc.,136S.Ct.1923,1928(2016)。该案讨论了美国专利法上惩罚性赔偿的发展与具体适用条件。