基于动态博弈的航空公司延误处置策略研究
|
摘要
为优化航班延误情景中航空公司的价格策略,提高延误服务策略对旅客服务需求的响应水平,进而提高航空公司的竞争力,在考虑旅客社会属性和出行特征的基础上构建基于动态博弈的航空公司延误处置模型,应用劳斯-赫尔维茨(Routh-Hurwiz)定理分析博弈系统的稳定性,同时,运用Matlab仿真软件模拟不同参数组合条件下系统的动态演化过程和竞争态势,研究航空公司价格策略与延误服务策略对航空公司旅客流量变化和平均利润的影响.仿真结果表明,适当缩短博弈周期可规避竞争风险;考虑旅客属性特点及结构特征将促使航空公司制定更符合自身定位的价格策略及延误服务策略.
In order to optimize the price strategy of the airlines in the flight delay scenario,to improve the responselevel of the delayed service strategy to the passenger service demand,and to improve the competitiveness of theairlines,to build the dynamic game based on the passenger social attributes and travel characteristics the stability ofthe game system is analyzed by using the Routh-Hurwitz theorem. At the same time,the dynamic evolution processand competitive situation of the system under different parameter combination conditions are simulated by Matlabsimulation software. The impact of the airline price strategy and the delay service strategy on the passenger trafficflow and the average profit of the airline. The simulation results show that the shortening of the game cycle can avoidthe competition risk;considering the passenger attribute characteristic and the structural characteristic will makethe airline develop the price strategy which is more in line with its own position and delay service strategy.
In order to optimize the price strategy of the airlines in the flight delay scenario,to improve the responselevel of the delayed service strategy to the passenger service demand,and to improve the competitiveness of theairlines,to build the dynamic game based on the passenger social attributes and travel characteristics the stability ofthe game system is analyzed by using the Routh-Hurwitz theorem. At the same time,the dynamic evolution processand competitive situation of the system under different parameter combination conditions are simulated by Matlabsimulation software. The impact of the airline price strategy and the delay service strategy on the passenger trafficflow and the average profit of the airline. The simulation results show that the shortening of the game cycle can avoidthe competition risk;considering the passenger attribute characteristic and the structural characteristic will makethe airline develop the price strategy which is more in line with its own position and delay service strategy.
引文
[1]LUBBE B,VICTOR C.Flight delays:Towards measuring the cost to corporations[J].Journal of Air Transport Management,2012,19(1):9-12.
[2]顾欣.非正常航班的成本研究与分析[D].南京:南京航空航天大学,2013.
[3]张小莉.郑州机场大面积航班延误应急处置策略研究[D].南京:南京航空航天大学,2015.
[4]徐巧娜.从航班延误处置论如何提升机场服务质量[J].中南林业大学学报(社会科学版),2014,8(6):90-92.
[5]谢泗薪,李荣.航班延误后服务改进与理赔方案设计[J].中国民用航空学报,2007,25(4):52-55.
[6]顾绍康,张兆宁.大面积航班延误的实时航班延误程度评估研究[J].航空计算技术,2014,44(4):29-32.
[7]曾麒铭.民用机场大面积航班延误问题预防及处置研究[D].昆明:云南大学,2016.
[8]徐伟,马军海.保险市场中三寡头垄断的动态博弈模型研究[J].复杂系统与复杂性科学,2013,10(2):52-58.
[9]马军海,吴可菲.中国啤酒市场的四寡头价格博弈及其延迟决策[J].系统工程学报,2013,28(6):717-728.
[10]于羽.排污权交易机制下的有限理性动态寡头博弈研究[D].长春:吉林大学,2014.
[11]ZHU X,ZHU W,YU L.Analysis of a nonlinear mixed cournot game with boundedly rational players[J].Chaos Solitons&Fractals the Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science&Nonequilibrium&Complex Phenomena,2014,59(59):82-88.
[12]吴可菲.基于延迟决策的多寡头价格博弈模型复杂性分析及混沌控制研究[D].天津:天津大学,2012.
[13]ELSADANY A A,AGIZA H N,ELABBASY E M.Complex dynamics and chaos control of heterogeneous quadropoly game[J].Applied Mathematics&Computation,2013,219(24):11110-11118.
[14]郭战兵,马军海.双决策变量条件下动态博弈模型的复杂性研究[J].复杂系统与复杂性科学,2014,11(3):65-72.
[15]胡荣,张君.航空公司价格竞争复杂性与调控政策有效性[J].交通运输系统工程与信息,2014,14(3):22-27.
[16]ASKAR S.The rise of complex phenomena in cournot duopoly games due to demand functions without inflection points[J].Communications in Nonlinear Science&Numerical Simulation,2014,19(6):1918-1925.
[17]李天睿,胡荣,李东亚.基于多寡头的航空公司动态价格博弈模型研究[J].武汉理工大学学报,2016,38(1):551-555.
[18]李天睿.基于多寡头的航空公司动态价格博弈研究[D].南京:南京航空航天大学,2016.
[19]马国顺,蔡红.不完全信息下Cournot-Bertrand多维博弈模型及其均衡[J].管理评论,2014,26(4):31-39.
[20]ASKAR S S.Complex dynamic properties of cournot duopoly games with convex and log-concave demand function[J].Operations Research Letters,2014,42(1):85-90.
[2]顾欣.非正常航班的成本研究与分析[D].南京:南京航空航天大学,2013.
[3]张小莉.郑州机场大面积航班延误应急处置策略研究[D].南京:南京航空航天大学,2015.
[4]徐巧娜.从航班延误处置论如何提升机场服务质量[J].中南林业大学学报(社会科学版),2014,8(6):90-92.
[5]谢泗薪,李荣.航班延误后服务改进与理赔方案设计[J].中国民用航空学报,2007,25(4):52-55.
[6]顾绍康,张兆宁.大面积航班延误的实时航班延误程度评估研究[J].航空计算技术,2014,44(4):29-32.
[7]曾麒铭.民用机场大面积航班延误问题预防及处置研究[D].昆明:云南大学,2016.
[8]徐伟,马军海.保险市场中三寡头垄断的动态博弈模型研究[J].复杂系统与复杂性科学,2013,10(2):52-58.
[9]马军海,吴可菲.中国啤酒市场的四寡头价格博弈及其延迟决策[J].系统工程学报,2013,28(6):717-728.
[10]于羽.排污权交易机制下的有限理性动态寡头博弈研究[D].长春:吉林大学,2014.
[11]ZHU X,ZHU W,YU L.Analysis of a nonlinear mixed cournot game with boundedly rational players[J].Chaos Solitons&Fractals the Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science&Nonequilibrium&Complex Phenomena,2014,59(59):82-88.
[12]吴可菲.基于延迟决策的多寡头价格博弈模型复杂性分析及混沌控制研究[D].天津:天津大学,2012.
[13]ELSADANY A A,AGIZA H N,ELABBASY E M.Complex dynamics and chaos control of heterogeneous quadropoly game[J].Applied Mathematics&Computation,2013,219(24):11110-11118.
[14]郭战兵,马军海.双决策变量条件下动态博弈模型的复杂性研究[J].复杂系统与复杂性科学,2014,11(3):65-72.
[15]胡荣,张君.航空公司价格竞争复杂性与调控政策有效性[J].交通运输系统工程与信息,2014,14(3):22-27.
[16]ASKAR S.The rise of complex phenomena in cournot duopoly games due to demand functions without inflection points[J].Communications in Nonlinear Science&Numerical Simulation,2014,19(6):1918-1925.
[17]李天睿,胡荣,李东亚.基于多寡头的航空公司动态价格博弈模型研究[J].武汉理工大学学报,2016,38(1):551-555.
[18]李天睿.基于多寡头的航空公司动态价格博弈研究[D].南京:南京航空航天大学,2016.
[19]马国顺,蔡红.不完全信息下Cournot-Bertrand多维博弈模型及其均衡[J].管理评论,2014,26(4):31-39.
[20]ASKAR S S.Complex dynamic properties of cournot duopoly games with convex and log-concave demand function[J].Operations Research Letters,2014,42(1):85-90.