基于多寡头的航空公司动态价格博弈模型研究
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摘要
我国民用航空运输市场具有较典型的多寡头垄断竞争型市场特征,根据各航空公司旅客运输量的数据,建立了非线性的多寡头航空公司动态博弈价格竞争模型。使用Matlab软件对该模型构成的博弈系统进行复杂性分析、数值计算和仿真模拟。通过改变各航空公司价格调整速度,分析博弈系统在到达均衡状态前的情况。仿真结果表明,在各项参数确定的情况下,初始值的大小仅影响到达均衡状态的时间;博弈周期的增加可能会导致竞争进入无序状态。在其他竞争条件不利的情况下,若保证价格调整速度在稳定域内,各航空公司适时逐步改变定价策略可使得平均利润超过其他竞争对手。
According to the data of civil air transport market of each airlines' passenger transport volume in China,it's decided that the market is a more typical multi- oligopoly market at the present. And in accordance with the analysis,a nonlinear multi- oligopoly airlines' dynamic game price competition models is established. Meanwhile,it's used Matlab software to analyze the complexity of the system which is consisted of the model,numerical computation and simulation of the models. By the variation of each airline' price adjusting speed,the conditions of the game system before the equilibrium state is analyzed. It's clear that the results of simulation shows that whatever the initial values is,it can only affect the time to the equilibrium state with every parameters decided. With the increasing game cycle,the competition can get into disordered state. In disadvantage competitive conditions,if keeping the price adjusting speed in the stability region,airlines may gradually change the pricing strategies in time to make the average profits over the other competitors.
According to the data of civil air transport market of each airlines' passenger transport volume in China,it's decided that the market is a more typical multi- oligopoly market at the present. And in accordance with the analysis,a nonlinear multi- oligopoly airlines' dynamic game price competition models is established. Meanwhile,it's used Matlab software to analyze the complexity of the system which is consisted of the model,numerical computation and simulation of the models. By the variation of each airline' price adjusting speed,the conditions of the game system before the equilibrium state is analyzed. It's clear that the results of simulation shows that whatever the initial values is,it can only affect the time to the equilibrium state with every parameters decided. With the increasing game cycle,the competition can get into disordered state. In disadvantage competitive conditions,if keeping the price adjusting speed in the stability region,airlines may gradually change the pricing strategies in time to make the average profits over the other competitors.
引文
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[2]牟德一,李琴.单航线双寡头下的航空公司定价决策[J].管理科学文摘,2008,10(4):155-156.
[3]肖艳颖.航空公司市场竞争定价博弈模型[J].中国民航大学学报,2008,26(6):52-55.
[4]AGUIRREGABIRIA V,HO C Y.A dynamic game of airline network competition:hub-and-spoke networks and entry deterrence[J].International Journal of Industrial Organization,2010,28(4):377-382.
[5]王锐兰.航空公司价格竞争的博弈解释[J].技术经济与管理研究,2004,5(3):81-82.
[6]胡荣,张君.航空公司价格竞争复杂性与调控政策有效性[J].交通运输系统工程与信息,2014,14(3):22-27.
[7]江华.基于系统动力学的航空公司经营预测研究[D].赣州:江西理工大学,2008.
[8]中国民用航空总局规划科技司.从统计看民航[M].北京:中国民航出版社,2013:23-112.
[9]中国民用航空局发展计划司.2013年民航行业发展统计公报[EB/OL].[2014-06-30].http://www.caac.gov.cn/I1/K3/201406/P020140623612275082363.pdf.
[10]马军海,吴可菲.中国啤酒市场的四寡头价格博弈及其延迟决策[J].系统工程学报,2013,28(6):717-728.
[11]ELSADANY A A,AGIZA H N,ELABBASY E M.Complex dynamics and chaos control of heterogeneous quadropoly game[J].Applied Mathematics and Computation,2013,219(24):11110-11118.
[12]ASKAR S.The rise of complex phenomena in Cournot duopoly games due to demand functions without inflection points[J].Commun Nonlinear Sci Numer Simulat,2014,19(6):1918-1925.
[13]ASKAR S S.On complex dynamics of monopoly market[J].Economic Modelling,2013,31(1):586–589.
[14]NAIMZADA A K,SBRAGIA L.Oligopoly games with nonlinear demand and cost functions:two boundedly rational adjustment processes[J].Chaos Solitons and Fractals,2006,29(3):707-722.
[15]徐伟,马军海.保险市场中三寡头垄断的动态博弈模型研究[J].复杂系统与复杂性科学,2013,10(2):52-58.