杜鲁门在朝鲜战争扩大化问题上的决策因素
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摘要
朝鲜战争之初,美国并非一定想将战火燃烧到三八线以北。国际国内形势的变化,以及杜鲁门的一系列错误决策,致使朝鲜战争扩大化。产生这些错误决策的一个重要根源是杜鲁门在1950年下半年一直无法在国内获得准确的朝鲜半岛局势分析,同时又过度相信前线总指挥麦克阿瑟对战局的误判,使其不能及时命令美国军队停止前进,导致战火直接燃烧到中国边境,使中国军队不得不出兵朝鲜,保家卫国,与以美国为首的"联合国军"展开了长达三年的战斗。
At the beginning of the Korean War, the United States was not absolutely determined that it would expand the war to the north of the military demarcation line. However, accompanying the development in domestic and international situations, Truman's successive wrong decisions led to the expansion of the Korean War. One of the most important reasons for Truman's wrong decisions is that Truman was prevented from getting accurate evaluation of the situations in Korean Peninsula and was overconfident in frontline commander Mac Arthur's evaluation of the war. Truman's failure to get an accurate access to the information of the war prevented him from stopping in time the advancing of US military forces. The result was the war expanded to the border of China, forcing China to dispatch its military forces into North Korea and engage in a 3-year war with the UN military forces led by the US.
At the beginning of the Korean War, the United States was not absolutely determined that it would expand the war to the north of the military demarcation line. However, accompanying the development in domestic and international situations, Truman's successive wrong decisions led to the expansion of the Korean War. One of the most important reasons for Truman's wrong decisions is that Truman was prevented from getting accurate evaluation of the situations in Korean Peninsula and was overconfident in frontline commander Mac Arthur's evaluation of the war. Truman's failure to get an accurate access to the information of the war prevented him from stopping in time the advancing of US military forces. The result was the war expanded to the border of China, forcing China to dispatch its military forces into North Korea and engage in a 3-year war with the UN military forces led by the US.
引文
(1)Roy Appleman,South to the Naktong,North to the Yalu:June to November 1950,Washington D.C.:Center of Military,United States Army,1992,p.674.
(2)Roy Appleman,South to the Naktong,North to the Yalu:June to November 1950,pp.701-708.美方资料显示当时有两个团的中国人民志愿军参加了战斗,但具体人数未知(笔者估计在三千余人左右),应远超过美国一个营的人数(一千余人)。
(3)有关中国方面的反应,见新华社1950年6月28日讯中的周恩来讲话。有关美国方面的命令,见“Statement Issued by the President,”Washington,Jun.27th,1950 extracted from United States Department of State,Foreign Relations of the United States(FRUS):Dplomatic Papers,1950,Vol.7(Korea),University of Wisconsin Digital Library,pp.202-203.
(1)“General Order No.1,military and naval”as Appendix A of“Memorandum by the Joint Chief of Staff”,Washington,August,15th,1945,approved by the president two days later,FRUS,1945,Vol.6,pp.657-659.
(2)Panikkar K.M.,In Two Chinas:Memoirs of a Diplomat,London:George Allen&Unwin,1955,p.108;另见周恩来:《为巩固和发展人民的胜利而奋斗》,1950年9月30日,《周恩来选集》下卷,北京:人民出版社1997年版。
(3)Steven Casey,Selling the Korean War:Propaganda,Politics,and Public Opinion in the United States,1950-1953,Oxford:University Press,2008,p.97.
(4)“Daily Opinion Summary”No.1418,Jul.24th,1950 by the Department of State.Retrieved from Truman Library(TL)website:http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/koreanwar/index.php
(5)“Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs(Allison)to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs,”Washington,July.13th,1950,FRUS,1950,Vol.7,p.373.
(6)Rosemary Foot,The Wrong War;American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict,1950-1953,Ithaca,Cornell University Press,1958,p.70.
(7)Steven Casey,Selling the Korean War:Propaganda,Politics,and Public Opinion in the United States,1950-1953,p.98.
(8)David Mc Cullough,Truman,New York:Simon and Schuster,1992,p.790,also see“Mr.and Mrs.Wylie Akenson to Harry S.Truman”on July 12th,1950;“Ann and George Ash to Harry S.Truman”on July 12th,1950.Both letters are retrieved from TL.
(9)David Mc Cullough,Truman,p.797.For the speech,see“Formosa is Vital to U.S.Security”in Douglas Mac Arthur,A Soldier Speaks:Public Papers and Speeches of General of the Army Douglas Mac Arthur,New York,Frederick A.Praeger Publishers,1965,pp.218-222.
(1)David Mc Cullough,Truman,p.792.
(2)James J.Lay Jr.,“Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council(Lay)to the National Security Council,”Washington,July.17th,1950,FRUS,1950,Vol.7,p.410.
(3)“Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council(Lay)”NSC81,Washington,Sept.1st,1950,FRUS,1950,Vol.7,pp.689-694.
(4)“Report by the National Security Council to the President”NSC 81/1,Washington,Sept.9th,1950,FRUS,1950,Vol.7,pp.712-721.All subsequent information about NSC81/1 is from the same source.
(5)Arnold A.Offner,Another Such Victory:President Truman and the Cold War:1945-1953,Stanford:Stanford University Press,2002,p.390.
(6)中国人民解放军第156、164、166师在朝鲜战争爆发以前已经移交给朝鲜民主主义人民共和国,成为其第5至第7步兵师。See Li Xiaobing,A History of the Modern Chinese Army,Lexington,KY:The University Press of Kentucky,2007,p.81.Also see telegraphs between Chou Enlai and Chinese officials in Northeastern China in Chou Enlai and China’s Response to the KoreanWar,North Korea International Documentation Project,E-Dossier#9.Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.
(7)William Whitney Steuk Jr.,The Road to Confrontation:American Policy toward China and Korea,1947-1950,Chapel Hill,The University of North Caroline Press,1981,p.228.
(8)毛泽东需要考虑多方面的原因,比如,获得苏联援助的武器、金日成的意见以及地缘政治的影响。考虑到所有的因素,在美军跨越三八线以后出兵有如下益处:1.金日成会主动邀请中国出兵;2.更容易说服其他中国领导人支持抗美援朝战争;3.为中国赢得更多战争准备时间;4.可以向世界说明,在朝鲜打击美军是保家卫国的正义行为。资料来源:李彦增:《兵发鸭绿江:抗美援朝决策的台前幕后》,http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/85037/8356890.html,2015年3月9日。
(1)在朝鲜战争前后,中国人民解放军达到创纪录的627万人,另外,四亿五千万人口提供了充足的兵员。数据来源《:中国人民解放军几次重大的精简整编(1949后)》,http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2004-07/20/content_1618369.htm,2015年3月10日。
(2)David Mc Cullough,Truman,p.797.按照前文引用关于麦克阿瑟的演讲,这位将军从军事角度出发认为必须将台湾从中华人民共和国分离出去并作为其反共的桥头堡。这种演讲自然会让中方认为美国一直在蓄意制造事端,不但阻止中国统一的进程,还意图颠覆新生的中华人民共和国政权。对于仍然想和中国保持一定关系的杜鲁门来说,这种演讲自然是不可接受的。但随着朝鲜局势的变化,杜鲁门的立场也有所变化。
(3)James D.Clayton and Anne S.Wells,Refighting the Last War:Command and Crisis in Korea 1950-1953,New York:The Free Press,1992,p.169.
(4)David Mc Cullough,Truman,p.799.
(5)Michael D.Pearlman,Truman&Mac Arthur:Policy,Politics,and the Hunger for Honor and Renown,Bloomington:Indiana University Press,2008,pp.135-136.
(6)Michael Schaller,Douglas Mac Arthur:the Far Eastern General,New York:Oxford University Press,1989,pp.200-202.
(1)David Mc Cullough,Truman,p.799.Rosemary Foot,The Wrong War;American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict,1950-1953,p.69.“Joint Chiefs of Staff to Douglas Mac Arthur”Sept.29th,1950,Retrieved from TL;also see Korea Institute of Military History(KIMH),The Korean War,Vol.1,Lincoln,NE:University of Nebraska Press,2000,p.742.
(2)“George C.Marshall to Harry S.Truman,with Attached Directive to Commander of United Nations Forces in Korea”Sept.27th,1950,Retrieved from TL.All subsequent information about this directive is from the same source.
(3)美国方面曾考虑过该问题,见“The Deputy Secretary of Defense(Lovett)to the President,”Oct.7th,1950,FRUS,1950,Vol.7,p.911.Lovett考虑了美国在中方在未经警告下出兵时应该采取的对策。.
(4)Fehrenbach T.R.,This Kind of War:A Study in Unpreparedness,New York:The Macmillan Company,1963,pp.287-289.
(5)David Mc Cullough,Truman,p.83,p.86,p.588.杜鲁门时常使用“chink”或者“chinaman”这类种族歧视性的词汇,McCullough认为杜鲁门早年即使用这些词,并把该习惯带到了其政治生涯中。
(6)“George C.Marshall to Douglas Mac Arthur”,Sept.29th,1950.Extracted from TL.
(1)KIMH,The Korean War,Vol.1,p.782.
(2)赵祎楠:《朝鲜战争中新中国的重大外交活动》,《党史博览》2010年第9期。根据美方资料,美国飞机越境扫射是因为导航失误,因为《NSC81/1》明确禁止任何在中国境内的军事行动。不过中方认为美方的行为是蓄意的挑衅。
(3)Panikkar K.M.,In Two Chinas:Memoirs of a Diplomat,p.108.印度在整个抗美援朝战争期间以一个中立国的身份出现。虽然其派出医疗队在朝鲜支援“联合国军”的行动,但印度在当时很多政治外交问题上一向支持中国。因此,印度可以在北京直接获得新中国的大量重要信息。该国也就成为美国有关中国方面信息的重要来源
(4)周恩来:《为巩固和发展人民的胜利而奋斗》,1950年9月30日,《周恩来选集》下卷,北京:人民出版社1997年版。
(5)Panikkar K.M.,in Two Chinas:Memoirs of a Diplomat,p.110,also see KIMH,The Korean War,Vol.1,p.760.
(6)Retrieved from“Editorial Note”,FRUS,1950,Vol.7,p.914.
(7)美国国务院收到了大量此类信息,例如“The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State,”New York,Oct.5th,1950,FRUS,1950,Vol.7,pp.883-884.
(8)“The Ambassador in India(Henderson)to the Secretary of State,”New Delhi,Oct.5th,1950,FRUS,1950,Vol.7,p.880.
(9)“The Consul General at Hong Kong(Wilkinson)to the Secretary of State,”Hong Kong,Oct.7th,1950,FRUS,1950,Vol.7,pp.912-913.Also see Rosemary Foot,The Wrong War;American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict,1950-1953,p.80.
(10)“Situation Summary”Sept.29th,Oct.6th,1950;“Daily Summary”on 3rd,4th,5th,and 9th,Oct.1950.Baptism by Fire:CIA Analysis of the Korean War Overview.(BF)Retrieved from http://www.foia.cia.gov/collection/baptism-fire-cia-analysis-korean-war-overview.
(11)“Daily Summary”,Oct.6th,1950,BF.“Memorandum by Mr.John C.Ross of the United States Mission at the United Nations to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs(Rusk)”New York,Oct.5th,1950,FRUS,1950,Vol.7,pp.879-880.
(1)“The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief,Far East(Mac Arthur)”Washington,Oct.9th,1950,FRUS,1950,Vol.7,p.915.即使中国已经表明了参战决心,参谋长联席会议仍然在分析中国没有发出警告(without prior announcement)的情况下美国应该采取的行动。很显然,前次中方警告并没有引起美方注意。
(2)毛泽东:《关于派志愿军入朝参战问题》,节选自一封在1950年10月2日给斯大林的电报(未发出),《毛泽东文集》第6卷,北京:人民出版社1999年版。另见毛泽东在1950年10月8日的《组成中国人民志愿军的命令》,来源同上。
(3)David Mc Cullough,Truman,p.800.麦克阿瑟最终选择了威克岛作为会见的地点。.
(4)Michael D.Pearlman,Truman&Mac Arthur:Policy,Politics,and the Hunger for Honor and Renown,p.111.
(5)James Chace,Acheson:The Secretary of State Who Created the American World,New York:Simon and Schuster,1998,p.299.
(6)“Memorandum by the Ambassador at Large(Jessup)to the Secretary of State,”Oct.9th,1950,FRUS,1950,Vol.7,pp.915-916.
(7)“Memorandum by the Central Intelligence Agency,”Washington,Oct.12th,1950,FRUS,1950,Vol.7,pp.933-938.All subsequent information about this memorandum is from the same source.
(8)尹家民:《抗美援朝的出兵与撤军》,《湘潮》2009年第1期。
(9)David Mc Cullough,Truman,pp.801-802.
(1)“Notes on the Wake Island Conference,”Oct.13th,1950,Retrieved from TL.All subsequent information about this meeting is from the same source.
(2)“Substance of Statements made at Wake Island Conference on 15thOctober 1950,Compiled from Notes Kept by the Conferees from Washington,”Oct.15th,1950,Retrieved from TL.All information about this conference is from the same source.
(3)Harry S.Truman,“Address in San Francisco at the War Memorial Opera House”Oct.17th,1950,Retrieved from the American Presidency Project,http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=13644
(4)“Memorandum for the President,World Reaction to the Wake Island Meeting,”Oct.17th,1950.Retrieved from TL.这个文件只显示社会主义国家(东欧)对威克岛会议的反应,并无美国方面对这些信息的分析。目前尚不知道杜鲁门总统是否了解中方对威克岛会议的反应。中方的意见是由美国驻荷兰大使馆转发给美国国务院。美方收到该信息的时间晚于上述备忘录数小时。来自荷兰大使馆的信息见“The Ambassador in the Netherlands(Chapin)to the Secretary of the State,”on Oct.17th,1950,FRUS,1950,Vol.7,p.974..
(5)KIMH,The Korean War,Vol.2,pp.101-103.
(6)“Daily Summary”on Oct.16th,22nd,28th,30th,31st,1950;“Situation Summary”on Oct.27th,1950.BF.
(1)“National Intelligence Estimate:Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea,”Released on Nov.8th,1950,The estimation was based on the CIA intelligence available on Nove.6th,CREST:25-Year Program Archive.Retrieved from http://www.foia.cia.gov/document/chinese-communist-intervention-korea.11月8日的文件注明其已经送达杜鲁门总统的办公室。
(2)Roy Appleman,South to the Naktong,North to the Yalu:June to November 1950,pp.701-708.美方资料显示当时有两个团的中国人民志愿军参加了战斗,但具体人数未知(笔者估计在三千余人左右),应远超过美国一个营的人数(一千余人)。
(3)有关中国方面的反应,见新华社1950年6月28日讯中的周恩来讲话。有关美国方面的命令,见“Statement Issued by the President,”Washington,Jun.27th,1950 extracted from United States Department of State,Foreign Relations of the United States(FRUS):Dplomatic Papers,1950,Vol.7(Korea),University of Wisconsin Digital Library,pp.202-203.
(1)“General Order No.1,military and naval”as Appendix A of“Memorandum by the Joint Chief of Staff”,Washington,August,15th,1945,approved by the president two days later,FRUS,1945,Vol.6,pp.657-659.
(2)Panikkar K.M.,In Two Chinas:Memoirs of a Diplomat,London:George Allen&Unwin,1955,p.108;另见周恩来:《为巩固和发展人民的胜利而奋斗》,1950年9月30日,《周恩来选集》下卷,北京:人民出版社1997年版。
(3)Steven Casey,Selling the Korean War:Propaganda,Politics,and Public Opinion in the United States,1950-1953,Oxford:University Press,2008,p.97.
(4)“Daily Opinion Summary”No.1418,Jul.24th,1950 by the Department of State.Retrieved from Truman Library(TL)website:http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/koreanwar/index.php
(5)“Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs(Allison)to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs,”Washington,July.13th,1950,FRUS,1950,Vol.7,p.373.
(6)Rosemary Foot,The Wrong War;American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict,1950-1953,Ithaca,Cornell University Press,1958,p.70.
(7)Steven Casey,Selling the Korean War:Propaganda,Politics,and Public Opinion in the United States,1950-1953,p.98.
(8)David Mc Cullough,Truman,New York:Simon and Schuster,1992,p.790,also see“Mr.and Mrs.Wylie Akenson to Harry S.Truman”on July 12th,1950;“Ann and George Ash to Harry S.Truman”on July 12th,1950.Both letters are retrieved from TL.
(9)David Mc Cullough,Truman,p.797.For the speech,see“Formosa is Vital to U.S.Security”in Douglas Mac Arthur,A Soldier Speaks:Public Papers and Speeches of General of the Army Douglas Mac Arthur,New York,Frederick A.Praeger Publishers,1965,pp.218-222.
(1)David Mc Cullough,Truman,p.792.
(2)James J.Lay Jr.,“Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council(Lay)to the National Security Council,”Washington,July.17th,1950,FRUS,1950,Vol.7,p.410.
(3)“Memorandum by the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council(Lay)”NSC81,Washington,Sept.1st,1950,FRUS,1950,Vol.7,pp.689-694.
(4)“Report by the National Security Council to the President”NSC 81/1,Washington,Sept.9th,1950,FRUS,1950,Vol.7,pp.712-721.All subsequent information about NSC81/1 is from the same source.
(5)Arnold A.Offner,Another Such Victory:President Truman and the Cold War:1945-1953,Stanford:Stanford University Press,2002,p.390.
(6)中国人民解放军第156、164、166师在朝鲜战争爆发以前已经移交给朝鲜民主主义人民共和国,成为其第5至第7步兵师。See Li Xiaobing,A History of the Modern Chinese Army,Lexington,KY:The University Press of Kentucky,2007,p.81.Also see telegraphs between Chou Enlai and Chinese officials in Northeastern China in Chou Enlai and China’s Response to the KoreanWar,North Korea International Documentation Project,E-Dossier#9.Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.
(7)William Whitney Steuk Jr.,The Road to Confrontation:American Policy toward China and Korea,1947-1950,Chapel Hill,The University of North Caroline Press,1981,p.228.
(8)毛泽东需要考虑多方面的原因,比如,获得苏联援助的武器、金日成的意见以及地缘政治的影响。考虑到所有的因素,在美军跨越三八线以后出兵有如下益处:1.金日成会主动邀请中国出兵;2.更容易说服其他中国领导人支持抗美援朝战争;3.为中国赢得更多战争准备时间;4.可以向世界说明,在朝鲜打击美军是保家卫国的正义行为。资料来源:李彦增:《兵发鸭绿江:抗美援朝决策的台前幕后》,http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/85037/8356890.html,2015年3月9日。
(1)在朝鲜战争前后,中国人民解放军达到创纪录的627万人,另外,四亿五千万人口提供了充足的兵员。数据来源《:中国人民解放军几次重大的精简整编(1949后)》,http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2004-07/20/content_1618369.htm,2015年3月10日。
(2)David Mc Cullough,Truman,p.797.按照前文引用关于麦克阿瑟的演讲,这位将军从军事角度出发认为必须将台湾从中华人民共和国分离出去并作为其反共的桥头堡。这种演讲自然会让中方认为美国一直在蓄意制造事端,不但阻止中国统一的进程,还意图颠覆新生的中华人民共和国政权。对于仍然想和中国保持一定关系的杜鲁门来说,这种演讲自然是不可接受的。但随着朝鲜局势的变化,杜鲁门的立场也有所变化。
(3)James D.Clayton and Anne S.Wells,Refighting the Last War:Command and Crisis in Korea 1950-1953,New York:The Free Press,1992,p.169.
(4)David Mc Cullough,Truman,p.799.
(5)Michael D.Pearlman,Truman&Mac Arthur:Policy,Politics,and the Hunger for Honor and Renown,Bloomington:Indiana University Press,2008,pp.135-136.
(6)Michael Schaller,Douglas Mac Arthur:the Far Eastern General,New York:Oxford University Press,1989,pp.200-202.
(1)David Mc Cullough,Truman,p.799.Rosemary Foot,The Wrong War;American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict,1950-1953,p.69.“Joint Chiefs of Staff to Douglas Mac Arthur”Sept.29th,1950,Retrieved from TL;also see Korea Institute of Military History(KIMH),The Korean War,Vol.1,Lincoln,NE:University of Nebraska Press,2000,p.742.
(2)“George C.Marshall to Harry S.Truman,with Attached Directive to Commander of United Nations Forces in Korea”Sept.27th,1950,Retrieved from TL.All subsequent information about this directive is from the same source.
(3)美国方面曾考虑过该问题,见“The Deputy Secretary of Defense(Lovett)to the President,”Oct.7th,1950,FRUS,1950,Vol.7,p.911.Lovett考虑了美国在中方在未经警告下出兵时应该采取的对策。.
(4)Fehrenbach T.R.,This Kind of War:A Study in Unpreparedness,New York:The Macmillan Company,1963,pp.287-289.
(5)David Mc Cullough,Truman,p.83,p.86,p.588.杜鲁门时常使用“chink”或者“chinaman”这类种族歧视性的词汇,McCullough认为杜鲁门早年即使用这些词,并把该习惯带到了其政治生涯中。
(6)“George C.Marshall to Douglas Mac Arthur”,Sept.29th,1950.Extracted from TL.
(1)KIMH,The Korean War,Vol.1,p.782.
(2)赵祎楠:《朝鲜战争中新中国的重大外交活动》,《党史博览》2010年第9期。根据美方资料,美国飞机越境扫射是因为导航失误,因为《NSC81/1》明确禁止任何在中国境内的军事行动。不过中方认为美方的行为是蓄意的挑衅。
(3)Panikkar K.M.,In Two Chinas:Memoirs of a Diplomat,p.108.印度在整个抗美援朝战争期间以一个中立国的身份出现。虽然其派出医疗队在朝鲜支援“联合国军”的行动,但印度在当时很多政治外交问题上一向支持中国。因此,印度可以在北京直接获得新中国的大量重要信息。该国也就成为美国有关中国方面信息的重要来源
(4)周恩来:《为巩固和发展人民的胜利而奋斗》,1950年9月30日,《周恩来选集》下卷,北京:人民出版社1997年版。
(5)Panikkar K.M.,in Two Chinas:Memoirs of a Diplomat,p.110,also see KIMH,The Korean War,Vol.1,p.760.
(6)Retrieved from“Editorial Note”,FRUS,1950,Vol.7,p.914.
(7)美国国务院收到了大量此类信息,例如“The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State,”New York,Oct.5th,1950,FRUS,1950,Vol.7,pp.883-884.
(8)“The Ambassador in India(Henderson)to the Secretary of State,”New Delhi,Oct.5th,1950,FRUS,1950,Vol.7,p.880.
(9)“The Consul General at Hong Kong(Wilkinson)to the Secretary of State,”Hong Kong,Oct.7th,1950,FRUS,1950,Vol.7,pp.912-913.Also see Rosemary Foot,The Wrong War;American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict,1950-1953,p.80.
(10)“Situation Summary”Sept.29th,Oct.6th,1950;“Daily Summary”on 3rd,4th,5th,and 9th,Oct.1950.Baptism by Fire:CIA Analysis of the Korean War Overview.(BF)Retrieved from http://www.foia.cia.gov/collection/baptism-fire-cia-analysis-korean-war-overview.
(11)“Daily Summary”,Oct.6th,1950,BF.“Memorandum by Mr.John C.Ross of the United States Mission at the United Nations to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs(Rusk)”New York,Oct.5th,1950,FRUS,1950,Vol.7,pp.879-880.
(1)“The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief,Far East(Mac Arthur)”Washington,Oct.9th,1950,FRUS,1950,Vol.7,p.915.即使中国已经表明了参战决心,参谋长联席会议仍然在分析中国没有发出警告(without prior announcement)的情况下美国应该采取的行动。很显然,前次中方警告并没有引起美方注意。
(2)毛泽东:《关于派志愿军入朝参战问题》,节选自一封在1950年10月2日给斯大林的电报(未发出),《毛泽东文集》第6卷,北京:人民出版社1999年版。另见毛泽东在1950年10月8日的《组成中国人民志愿军的命令》,来源同上。
(3)David Mc Cullough,Truman,p.800.麦克阿瑟最终选择了威克岛作为会见的地点。.
(4)Michael D.Pearlman,Truman&Mac Arthur:Policy,Politics,and the Hunger for Honor and Renown,p.111.
(5)James Chace,Acheson:The Secretary of State Who Created the American World,New York:Simon and Schuster,1998,p.299.
(6)“Memorandum by the Ambassador at Large(Jessup)to the Secretary of State,”Oct.9th,1950,FRUS,1950,Vol.7,pp.915-916.
(7)“Memorandum by the Central Intelligence Agency,”Washington,Oct.12th,1950,FRUS,1950,Vol.7,pp.933-938.All subsequent information about this memorandum is from the same source.
(8)尹家民:《抗美援朝的出兵与撤军》,《湘潮》2009年第1期。
(9)David Mc Cullough,Truman,pp.801-802.
(1)“Notes on the Wake Island Conference,”Oct.13th,1950,Retrieved from TL.All subsequent information about this meeting is from the same source.
(2)“Substance of Statements made at Wake Island Conference on 15thOctober 1950,Compiled from Notes Kept by the Conferees from Washington,”Oct.15th,1950,Retrieved from TL.All information about this conference is from the same source.
(3)Harry S.Truman,“Address in San Francisco at the War Memorial Opera House”Oct.17th,1950,Retrieved from the American Presidency Project,http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=13644
(4)“Memorandum for the President,World Reaction to the Wake Island Meeting,”Oct.17th,1950.Retrieved from TL.这个文件只显示社会主义国家(东欧)对威克岛会议的反应,并无美国方面对这些信息的分析。目前尚不知道杜鲁门总统是否了解中方对威克岛会议的反应。中方的意见是由美国驻荷兰大使馆转发给美国国务院。美方收到该信息的时间晚于上述备忘录数小时。来自荷兰大使馆的信息见“The Ambassador in the Netherlands(Chapin)to the Secretary of the State,”on Oct.17th,1950,FRUS,1950,Vol.7,p.974..
(5)KIMH,The Korean War,Vol.2,pp.101-103.
(6)“Daily Summary”on Oct.16th,22nd,28th,30th,31st,1950;“Situation Summary”on Oct.27th,1950.BF.
(1)“National Intelligence Estimate:Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea,”Released on Nov.8th,1950,The estimation was based on the CIA intelligence available on Nove.6th,CREST:25-Year Program Archive.Retrieved from http://www.foia.cia.gov/document/chinese-communist-intervention-korea.11月8日的文件注明其已经送达杜鲁门总统的办公室。