内时间意识结构分析
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摘要
时间意识分析是认识论中一个古老而存在巨大困难的课题,现象学通过对客观时间、内在时间和内时间意识的区分,认为只有彻底搞清楚内时间意识,才能使内在时间和日常生活中的客观时间得到真正的说明,并最终揭示"认识何以可能"的形式条件。通过对内时间意识的原印象-滞留-前摄三个构成环节的分析,可以初步回答我们究竟是通过"想象"还是"直观"把过去、现在和将来联系起来构成意识的连续统一体这个内时间意识的根本问题。
An analysis of time-consciousness is an ancient subject with the enormous difficulties in epistemology.Phenomenology believes that only by thoroughly making a distinction among the objective time,immanent time,and consciousness of internal time,and radically getting to the bottom consciousness of internal time,can we really make out the immanent time of the flow of consciousness and the time of the experienced world,eventually bring light to the formal conditions of "How cognition is possible".This paper,through an analysis of a triad dependent moments of consciousness of internal time which include primal impression-retention-protention,has given a preliminary answer whether we connect the past,the present and the future by "imagination"or "intuition"to constitute a continua of consciousness to the underlying problems in consciousness of internal time.
An analysis of time-consciousness is an ancient subject with the enormous difficulties in epistemology.Phenomenology believes that only by thoroughly making a distinction among the objective time,immanent time,and consciousness of internal time,and radically getting to the bottom consciousness of internal time,can we really make out the immanent time of the flow of consciousness and the time of the experienced world,eventually bring light to the formal conditions of "How cognition is possible".This paper,through an analysis of a triad dependent moments of consciousness of internal time which include primal impression-retention-protention,has given a preliminary answer whether we connect the past,the present and the future by "imagination"or "intuition"to constitute a continua of consciousness to the underlying problems in consciousness of internal time.
引文
[1]HusserlianaII.Analysen zur passive Synthesis.AusVorlesungs-und Forschungsmanuskripten 1918-1926.Ed.Margor Fleischer.The Hague:Maitinus Nijhoff,1966,s125.
[2][德]埃德蒙德·胡塞尔.内时间意识现象学[M].倪梁康译.北京:商务印书馆,2009.
[3][德]胡塞尔.纯粹现象学通论[M].李幼蒸译.北京:中国人民大学出版社,2014.
[4][丹]丹·扎哈维.胡塞尔现象学[M].李忠伟译.上海:上海译文出版社,2007.
(1)“原初印象(也被认为是原初表象)是胡塞尔表述我们对对象的现在—阶段的意识的术语,而不是表述现在—阶段本身的术语。”参见[丹]丹·扎哈维著,李忠伟译:《胡塞尔现象学》,上海译文出版社2007年版,第86页。原印象是时间意识的最原初样式,也是意识与被意识之物的原交遇期,因此也被标识为“原感情”或“原感觉”。参见倪梁康:《胡塞尔现象学概念通释》,三联书店1999年版,第469-470页。
[2][德]埃德蒙德·胡塞尔.内时间意识现象学[M].倪梁康译.北京:商务印书馆,2009.
[3][德]胡塞尔.纯粹现象学通论[M].李幼蒸译.北京:中国人民大学出版社,2014.
[4][丹]丹·扎哈维.胡塞尔现象学[M].李忠伟译.上海:上海译文出版社,2007.
(1)“原初印象(也被认为是原初表象)是胡塞尔表述我们对对象的现在—阶段的意识的术语,而不是表述现在—阶段本身的术语。”参见[丹]丹·扎哈维著,李忠伟译:《胡塞尔现象学》,上海译文出版社2007年版,第86页。原印象是时间意识的最原初样式,也是意识与被意识之物的原交遇期,因此也被标识为“原感情”或“原感觉”。参见倪梁康:《胡塞尔现象学概念通释》,三联书店1999年版,第469-470页。